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Arctic a missile defense corridor, emerging national security node

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Arctic a missile defense corridor, emerging national security node

Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article, the first of two in a series, is republished with permission.

Beyond the Arctic’s increasing relevance as a commercial corridor, the region is emerging as a strategic missile-warning and deterrence theater linked to Indo-Pacific security writ large. As Russia, China, and the United States jockey for military power and influence in the Arctic, Washington must consider the threats and opportunities of the present security environment and accordingly design its High North policy to protect American national security and extended deterrence networks.

The unique geolocation, climate, and terrain north of the Arctic Circle (66°33′ N) make the Arctic region an ideal node for missile defense, especially for early warning (EW) and interception.

The Earth’s geodesic structure makes air passage over the Arctic the shortest route between many a pair of locations in the Northern Hemisphere, enabling ballistic missiles to travel the minimum time and distance between launching point and destination. These geostrategic characteristics make the region the frontline for nuclear deterrence and early warning assets during a potential first-strike scenario.

The US-Soviet nuclear arms race of the Cold War extended into the Arctic, where both powers developed infrastructure for missile testing and early warning (EW in military jargon), as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The Soviet Union established a dense network of military facilities across the region, including the Northern Fleet base at Zapadnaya Litsa and nuclear testing sites in Novaya Zemlya.

The United States, for its part, built a layered early warning and defense architecture across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. This system included the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a chain of radar stations stretching from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic to Greenland, providing a warning window of approximately three to six hours against incoming Soviet air-borne threats. Complementing this systerm were Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile installations, including Nike Site Summit 0verlooking Anchorage, as well as forward operating bases that supported Arctic surveillance and response missions.

These investments reinforced Alaska’s role as a forward defense hub and “guardian of the North.” DEW has since been incorporated into the North Warning System (NWS), the US and Canada’s joint 5,000-km radar network consisting of 13 long-range and 36 short-range radar sites. The NWS provides coverage across the Arctic from Alaska through northern Canada to Labrador.

Today, the United States maintains key early warning and missile defense facilities in the Arctic region, including Pituffik Space Base in Greenland, equipped with Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), and Clear Space Force Station in Alaska. Fort Greely hosts Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors, a vital component of the US homeland missile defense system.

Meanwhile, Russia has revitalized its Arctic military posture, reactivating dozens of Soviet-era bases and concentrating strategic assets in the Kola Peninsula. The evolution of Russia’s presence in the Arctic demonstrates a renewed emphasis on EW, deterrence, and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the High North.

Russia is also pursuing asymmetric advantages in the Arctic through the integration of critical defense assets, including the Northern Fleet and the Nudol anti-satellite system, and by using asymmetric capabilities to weaken key elements of US deterrence infrastructure. These efforts include preparations for the deployment of advanced nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missiles and Poseidon underwater drones, both of which have the capacity to complicate or overwhelm existing US missile defense systems.

In addition to investing in missile defenses, both Russia and the United States have invested heavily in ISR and conventional deterrence capacity in the region. In particular, the United States hosts critical service branches in Anchorage and Fairbanks including Elmendorf-Richardson), Eielson Air Force Base, and Space Force and Coast Guard bases.

Emerging strategic pressures

In recent years, China and Russia have expanded cooperation through a series of joint activities, including strategic bomber patrols near the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone, joint coast guard operations and naval patrols in the North Pacific near Alaska. The two countries have also engaged in dual-use seabed mapping and maritime research, which support both scientific objectives and undersea military operations, including submarine navigation and ISR capabilities.

Such activities reinforce Russia’s existing military advantages in the Arctic while enabling new forms of asymmetric capability development. Russian cooperation with China in underwater and uncrewed domains complements Russia’s unilateral investments in advanced underwater systems, including nuclear-capable unmanned underwater vehicles designed to operate in Arctic conditions. These developments undermine US detection and response capabilities – particularly in the Arctic region whose environmental conditions already degrade sensor performance, thereby increasing uncertainty in early warning and crisis response.

Russia’s growing missile activities are destabilizing the regional security environment of the Arctic. Following the outbreak of the full-scale Russian invasion against Ukraine, Russia has conducted increasingly frequent missile tests across the region. These included major, publicized nuclear-delivery tests across air, land, and maritime domains.

Overall, Russia’s development of hypersonic, highly maneuverable delivery systems is challenging traditional radar-based tracking. Those systems operate at high speed between Mach 10 and Mach 20 and can be launched from an unpredictable initial launch point (e.g., an aircraft or a rocket vehicle) to defeat sectored, non-360-degree radar coverage.

The Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile are examples of such initiatives. Avangard entered combat duty in December 2019, and Kinzhal has been in service since 2017. Avangard reportedly features onboard countermeasures and is nuclear-capable.

Due to the unpredictability of their flight paths and speeds, these systems further constrain pattern-recognition-based targeting and compress the conventional detection window. They degrade pattern-recognition targeting by avoiding predictable parabolic paths, varying atmospheric flight paths, creating plasma sheaths that confuse radar, and exploiting the persistent low-altitude sensor gap. Avangard can travel at Mach 20 (24,700 km/h), and Kinzhal has potential to reach speeds of up to Mach 10 (12,350 km/h).

Second, Russia’s nuclear modernization and investment in uncrewed systems are increasing and diversifying its second-strike capabilities. By adding more survivable delivery platforms, these systems increase the resilience of the Russian nuclear deterrent against a first strike, thereby strengthening its assured retaliation.

For example, the nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable Poseidon uncrewed underwater vehicle is designed for long-endurance, stealthy operations in the Arctic Ocean. Its ability to evade traditional anti-submarine warfare and survive a first strike enhances Russia’s second-strike credibility while complicating the United States’ ability to detect, track and intercept.

Beyond the air and underwater arenas, Russia’s counterspace capabilities present an additional security challenge for the United States. The Kremlin’s investment in space-based anti-satellite capabilities now threatens the satellite infrastructure on which United States’ missile warning systems and C5ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) rely.

Additionally, the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026 introduces added uncertainty to the arms control architecture. In the absence of consent on the limits of delivery systems, along with mutually agreed mechanisms for investigation and management, increasing uncertainty is faced by each side regarding the other’s force posture and modernization trajectory.

Consequently, transparency has declined, while opportunities for confidence-building have become more limited. This further complicates potential collaboration on strategic stability assessment and increases the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation during a crisis.

Finally, the proliferation of dual-capable delivery systems could increase the risks of inadvertent escalation. These platforms can carry conventional or nuclear payloads, which could compromise the detector’s real-time warhead-type identification capability for incoming missiles. As a result, the prolonged identification time further compresses the decision window available to the military and political leadership. This situation, therefore, increases decision costs and the probability of miscalculation.

The ambiguity also introduces the possibility of a more effective first strike. Without fully reliable and verifiable intelligence to determine the incoming strike’s nature – particularly, whether it is conventional or nuclear – US and allied commanders may thus be confronted with a binary dilemma: Either select an option within a limited credibility and decision timeline or risk the survivability of their own nuclear arsenal and homeland security.

Together, the limit to situational awareness and the compressed decision timeline increase the likelihood of a delayed or compromised response, thereby further enhancing the operational effectiveness of Russia’s first-strike options.

Arctic environmental conditions also limit the effectiveness of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) platforms. Such factors include extreme cold, reduced visibility, electromagnetic interference and severe weather. These operational constraints narrow the available interception window for US and allied missile defense forces by reducing sensor performance and complicating target identification.

New delivery platforms, especially maneuverable hypersonic systems, can evade traditional interception through variable trajectories and reduce predictability, thus increasing the survivability of the missiles. Such developments could reduce the efficacy of established missile defense systems, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot.

The integration of such systems into multi-domain operations that involve Northern Fleet assets, counterspace systems (e.g., Nudol), and next-generation strike platforms may further increase credible threats against US legacy systems.

As the Arctic becomes a more contested and strategically integrated domain, it is essential to examine the growing connection between developments in the High North and wider deterrence dynamics. In part two of this series, we will examine the Arctic’s impact on Indo-Pacific security and offer recommendations on how the US and its allies should respond.

Emerson Tsui (Emersonatsui@outlook.com) is a Washington, D.C.–based China and Indo-Pacific security analyst whose research focuses on Taiwan security, cross-Strait deterrence, and PRC strategic affairs. He has contributed to multiple policy publications on Indo-Pacific and Taiwan security issues and joined the Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program in 2023.

Google revamps image search for its 25th anniversary with more images and more AI

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Google revamps image search for its 25th anniversary with more images and more AI

Believe it or not, there was a time when searching the web for images was not possible. Twenty-five years ago, Google launched image search, and it’s celebrating by looking back at its biggest visual milestones and refreshing the experience for today’s searchers. The celebration also includes expanded AI because that’s just how Google rolls in 2026.

Google claims the impetus for image search a quarter-century ago was the green Versace dress Jennifer Lopez wore to the 2000 Grammy Awards. If you were alive at the time, you probably remember the one. Google engineers understood that people searching for the dress didn’t want to read about it—they just wanted to see it. The company got to work building image search, launching the first version in July 2001. Twenty-five years later, it’s easy to take for granted that you can search for Lopez’s green dress or whatever else strikes your fancy.

Currently, going to the Google image search site shows a plain search bar for finding images. It’s a refreshingly minimalist interface for the modern web. Even Google’s search homepage has a smattering of AI buttons and drop-down menus. That will change when the new Google Images rolls out.

Soon, Google Image search will feature a gallery of images from across the web before you’ve even searched for anything. Google says this gallery will be updated continuously based on your interests. Your “interests” in this context means your web and search history on Google. So the things you look up and interact with online will inform what content Google suggests in this new interface.

Google images interface

The new Google image search page.

The new Google image search page. Credit: Google

Google is also using this update as an opportunity to resurface Collections, a feature of image search you probably don’t use. As you browse Google’s suggested images and search for more, you can add items to your Collections. These will appear in a menu at the top of the main gallery for easy access.

The last change is not so much image search—it’s kind of the opposite. If the sheer volume of existing images on the Internet isn’t doing it for you, Google is making it easier to generate new images with AI. Google’s impressive Nano Banana image model has long been available in Gemini, and it expanded to AI Mode a few months back. Now, it’s coming to AI Overviews.

AI Overview Image Generation

If you want more AI images in your search results, just ask for one in your query. Google’s AI will generate and place it in the AI Overview that occupies an increasingly expansive portion of the results page. The image will naturally push the organic search results even farther down the page.

Both the refreshed Google Images page and image generation in AI Overviews will roll out over the coming weeks. They will both be limited to accounts set to English at first.

Trump Drops 20% Hormuz Fee Plan, Favors Gulf Investment in US 

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Trump Drops 20% Hormuz Fee Plan, Favors Gulf Investment in US 


US President Donald Trump backed away Tuesday from his proposal to charge a 20% fee on cargo passing through the Strait of Hormuz, saying he instead favored Gulf leaders investing in the United States and arguing that no country should collect fees for passage through the waterway. 

President Trump said he reconsidered the proposal after receiving calls from “kings and emirs” and other leaders who offered an alternative to the transit charge. 

“They said we’d love to do it a different way. We’d love to invest in the United States with billions and billions of dollars,” PresidentTrump told reporters in the Oval Office on Tuesday. 

The investment proposal was preferable to collecting tolls “because I don’t think anybody should be able to charge a fee for the Strait,” President President Trump added. 

US officials have said throughout the conflict that ships should be able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz without paying transit charges. That stance contrasts with Iran’s proposal to collect fees from vessels using the strategic waterway. 

Tehran has described its proposed charges as “service fees” rather than official “tolls.” Iran says the payments would cover maritime security, environmental protection and vessel management. 

It remains unclear whether the investments discussed by the leaders who contacted President Trump would represent new financial commitments or agreements already announced following the president’s visit to the Middle East last year. 

President Trump’s remarks came as the United States and Iran exchanged fire for a third night. 

The renewed fighting followed an impasse in discussions over a memorandum of understanding intended to end the conflict that began in late February. 

 

 

 

US military sent explosive drone boats into combat for the first time

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US military sent explosive drone boats into combat for the first time

For the first time in its history, the US military sent explosive-laden drone boats into combat by attacking an Iranian midget submarine and naval port. The unprecedented use of such kamikaze sea drones by the United States comes nearly a decade after Iranian and Houthi forces first demonstrated such weapons.

The US military shared a video showing three “one-way attack surface drones” exploding after approaching an Iranian midget submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on the night of July 12. US Central Command, the US military combat command responsible for Middle East operations, described the strikes in a social media post as the “first time American forces have employed sea drones in combat operations.”

The US drone boats were able to “make a low-speed, uncontested approach” to their targets before exploding, according to USNI News, a news service from the nonprofit US Naval Institute. USNI News also identified one of the targets as an Iranian Ghadir-class midget submarine that was out of the water while being suspended from a gantry.

Kamikaze drone boat attack.

The technology behind the strikes involved Saronic Corsair autonomous surface vessels developed by Saronic Technologies, a defense company based in Austin, Texas. The company’s website describes the drone boat as being 24 feet in length and capable of carrying up to 1,000 pounds over 1,000 nautical miles at a top speed surpassing 34 knots.

Such Corsair drone boats supposedly have the capability to operate autonomously without direct human control, including long-range navigation and patrol missions along with regulating power consumption and engine use to loiter at a specific position, according to a Saronic blog post. They are designed to perform a wide variety of missions and were likely equipped with explosives for this specific strike.

This marks the second notable US military use of drone boats during the war, which began with the United States and Israel attacking Iran on February 28, 2026. The US military already used a Corsair sea drone to rescue two US Army helicopter pilots in the waters off the coast of Oman on June 8, after their US Army AH-64 Apache helicopter was taken down by a cheap Iranian Shahed drone.

An image of the Corsair autonomous surface vessel developed by Saronic Technologies racing across the surface of a blue-gray ocean with white water foam in its wake.

The Corsair autonomous surface vessel developed by Saronic Technologies is one of the drone boats in the US Navy’s service.

The Corsair autonomous surface vessel developed by Saronic Technologies is one of the drone boats in the US Navy’s service. Credit: Saronic Technologies

A history of drone boat violence

The United States is far from the first country to have used exploding drone boats, also colloquially described as kamikaze or suicide drone boats. The first confirmed use of such weapons occurred on January 30, 2017, when the Houthi faction based in Yemen struck the Royal Saudi Naval frigate Al Madinah using an uncrewed remote-controlled boat. A US Navy commander told Defense News that the Houthi weapon was likely developed with the technical assistance of Iran, which has long supported the Houthis.

In more recent years, the Ukrainian military has also developed and deployed drone boats for asymmetric warfare at sea since Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite lacking a traditional navy, Ukraine has used a combination of flying drones and explosive drone boats to strike Russian warships and tankers, forcing Russia to withdraw its Black Sea Fleet to bases farther from Ukraine and cutting off vital Russian shipping routes.

Ukrainian drone boats have also achieved several milestones in military history by using missiles to shoot down Russian helicopters and acting as surface platforms to deploy small flying drones to strike Russian air defenses. Most recently, a Ukrainian drone boat even deployed an armed ground robot onto contested coastal territory in an unprecedented amphibious operation.

It’s unclear how the US military may continue deploying drone boats as President Donald Trump once again ramps up the war with Iran following the collapse of a supposed ceasefire. The US drone boat strikes came as part of a broader attack by conventional US military forces on Iranian targets in recent days, including strikes by US fighter aircraft and warships.

The US military has also been using one-way aerial attack drones for the first time during its war with Iran—LUCAS drones based in large part on Iranian-developed Shahed drones. Along with the drone boats, the United States is following the example of less powerful countries or factions that have used inexpensive drone weapons to pursue asymmetric warfare. The US military is currently trying to procure a new generation of cheaper surveillance and strike drones, especially after losing dozens of costly hunter-killer Reaper drones collectively worth more than $1 billion in the war against Iran.

Prepare for wild and dangerous scenarios on the Korean Peninsula

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Prepare for wild and dangerous scenarios on the Korean Peninsula

Kim Jong Un inspects Hwasong missiles in storage this month. Photo: KCNA

North Korea and Russia have approaches to the value of human life and risk that are radically different from those of the West – a reality that US and South Korean defense planners must prepare for.

State-sanctioned violence and militarism form the foundation of the rejuvenated North Korea-Russia partnership, and that should shape how US and South Korean alliance planners read the North’s tolerance for risk. 

But the relationship lacks the dynamics of 21st-century alliances. North Korea and Russia share no ethnic or religious linkage, no common political system and no joint economic vision. They do not trade goods and services to improve domestic living conditions. They trade weapons, ammunition, and soldiers to destabilize regions.

Both regimes accept far higher human costs than democratic governments do, and that is the assumption that the United States and South Korea should carry into any contingency planning.

In a 2003 essay, political theorist Achille Mbembe explained the concept of necropolitics and said that “the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die.”

Using necropolitics as a conceptual framework to explain the North Korea-Russia relationship allows us to see this partnership in a different light. Unlike the collective West, which traditionally upholds universal human rights and the rule of law, the North Korean and Russian regimes view these liberal values and principles as inherent weaknesses.

The inability of Western publics to stomach high body counts in war and sacrifice economic stability for military needs is seen as a strategic opportunity for the dictatorships in Pyongyang and Moscow.  

While Mbembe mainly uses necropolitics to explain the Israel-Palestine situation, extending this idea to diplomacy is a useful tool for explaining international partnerships such as the North Korea-Russia relationship that fall outside traditional definitions of alliance structures.

The North Korea-Russia partnership is centered around facilitating the means and ends of warfare. With both nations on a permanent wartime footing, Kim Jong Un offers artillery shellssoldiers, and landmine sweepers to Vladimir Putin in exchange for military technology. The two nations send each other the tools and instruments of death.

What makes this different from arms sales between democracies is the fact that this military-centered trade between Pyongyang and Moscow forms the core of this diplomatic partnership. While the United States may sell weapons systems to South Korea and vice versa, the two governments do not see those arms sales as the primary driver of the alliance. 

Beyond the diplomatic realm, necropolitics defines North Korean and Russian domestic politics. Russian dissidents “accidentally” fall out of apartment windows or end up in Siberian gulags. Kim enlarges an already expansive political prison system and ruthlessly kills potential political rivals, including his half brother.

Most of the people living in both North Korea and Russia would qualify under Mbembe’s category of the “living dead.” Malnourishment and the inability to escape precarious socioeconomic conditions characterize much of life in the rural regions of both countries.

Moreover, the mandatory military conscription of North Korean and Russian men renders them as living in a “death world” where personal agency is taken away and their lives are at the whims of their commanders. 

More than 350,000 Russian soldiers have died in Putin’s war against Ukraine. This gruesome statistic parallels Stalin’s disregard for human life during World War II. While many in Washington and Seoul see these body counts as a sign of Russian weakness in the war, it is useful to remember that dictators do not view humanity similarly.

These illiberal necropolitical values, embraced by Pyongyang and Moscow, change the risk calculus on the Korean Peninsula. While most pundits do not believe Kim would be foolish enough to launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea, it is still worthwhile to understand that the North approaches risk and the value of human life from an entirely different perspective.

While South Korea has matured into a robust liberal democracy with strong institutions and rule of law, North Korea has descended into Kim’s personal fiefdom. With absolute control of party-state affairs, he willingly sacrificed thousands of his own soldiers for a conflict in a faraway European theater. It is therefore useful to consider that Kim might be willing to do something equally reckless on the Korean Peninsula to pursue his own goals. 

The inability to understand the nature of the North Korean regime has long clouded analyses and assessments of the Kim family regime. But despite the opacity of North Korea’s inner workings, it is clear from defector testimony and human rights organization reports that Pyongyang has a radically different conception of the value of individual human life.

Given this fact and Pyongyang’s history of reckless behavior, it is imperative that both Washington and Seoul prepare for wild and dangerous scenarios on the peninsula. While Kim is not an irrational figure, he operates from an entirely different vantage point that only a handful of other dictators in the world understand. 

Benjamin R. Young is an assistant professor of intelligence studies at Fayetteville State University and a non-resident fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America. KEI originally published this article, which is republished with permission. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

Wife Grabs onto Husband’s Legs After He was Sucked Out of Plane

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Wife Grabs onto Husband’s Legs After He was Sucked Out of Plane


A wife has described the terrifying moment she grabbed onto her husband’s legs after he was pulled toward a shattered window on a Ryanair flight at 20,000 feet.

Svetlana Grković said she reacted on instinct when her husband, Ljubiša Karović, was suddenly thrown into a nightmare scenario during a Friday flight from Thessaloniki, Greece, to Memmingen, Germany.

The couple, who are from Serbia, had been returning from a summer holiday in Greece when chaos erupted on board Ryanair flight FR1879.

According to passengers, there was a deafening bang shortly after takeoff. Moments later, a window beside Karović shattered after what Grković described as part of the engine breaking away and striking the aircraft.

The Boeing 737-800 was forced to turn back and make an emergency landing in Thessaloniki.

“It was as if a part of the engine broke off and hit the window next to which my husband Ljubiša was sitting,” Grković told Nova.

What happened next left passengers fearing they might not survive.

Karović, who had been sitting next to the window, was pulled toward the opening. His wife said she immediately grabbed his legs and refused to let go.

“I reacted immediately and grabbed his legs,” she said. “I thought: ‘If we die, we die together.’ It was horrible.”

Grković reportedly held onto her husband for about five minutes before other passengers were able to help pull him back inside the cabin. Oxygen masks dropped as panic spread through the plane.

“Some people came to my aid,” she said. “I remember one man and one woman. That man helped me a lot, Ljubiša and I.”

Grković said she wants to find and personally thank the passenger who helped save her husband’s life.

Karović remains in the hospital and is believed to be unable to speak because of his injuries. His wife said his hand is badly injured and that he suffered a series of burns, including friction burns. He is also reportedly in severe shock.

She said her husband lost consciousness several times during the ordeal and has little memory of what happened.

One passenger told Informer that Karović was lucky he had not unbuckled his seat belt.

“His wife Svetlana Grković held his legs for five full minutes, until the other passengers ran to help and managed to pull him back into the cabin,” the passenger said.

Another witness told Greek broadcaster ERT that the man’s “head and shoulders were sticking out of the broken window.”

Passengers said they feared the plane “wouldn’t make it” as it flew for around 30 minutes with the damaged window.

One traveler who had been sitting toward the back of the plane said they initially had no idea what had happened.

“We thought we were falling,” the passenger said. “We were wearing oxygen masks, we didn’t know if we would make it.”

The same witness said Karović “had blood on his head” and “fainted several times.”

Footage reportedly shared by a Ryanair flight attendant appeared to show damage to the aircraft after the incident, including a missing engine blade, a smashed window, and a large hole in the side of the engine casing.

A Ryanair spokesman told the Daily Mail that the flight returned to Thessaloniki shortly after takeoff after “a passenger window dislodged inflight.”

“The aircraft landed normally and passengers returned to the terminal,” the spokesman said.

The airline said one passenger requested and received medical assistance on the ground in Thessaloniki.

“To minimise any delay, a replacement aircraft was arranged to bring passengers to Memmingen which departed Thessaloniki at 9.53am local this morning,” the spokesman added.

According to publicly available flight data, the plane landed back in Thessaloniki after one hour and 14 minutes.

A pregnant woman who was also on board was taken to the hospital, according to local media. She is reportedly in good health and has since been released.

The president of the Panhellenic Federation of Public Hospital Employees, known as POEDIN, said the incident came dangerously close to disaster.

He claimed there was “almost a tragedy” and said the damaged window gave way before part of the passenger’s body was pulled outside the aircraft.

Karović is from Vrnjačka Banja in central Serbia, but has spent much of his time in Greece, where he sells and rents apartments in the resorts of Paralija and Olympic Beach.

For Grković, the horror of the flight came down to one instinctive choice: hold on, no matter what.

Trump’s Intel Pick Played Key Role in NYT Subpoenas — But Some Democrats Still On the Fence

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Trump’s Intel Pick Played Key Role in NYT Subpoenas — But Some Democrats Still On the Fence


Progressive groups are demanding that Democrats on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence oppose Jay Clayton’s nomination as director of national intelligence, pointing to his role in an attempt to intimidate the New York Times over critical reporting on the Trump administration.

Some key Democrats, however, have so far not committed to opposing President Donald Trump’s nominee for the nation’s top intelligence job.

Clayton, who serves as the top federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York, signed the subpoenas sent Friday that targeted New York Times journalists for their reporting on serious security flaws in the Qatari-donated Air Force One jet.

“It seems Jay Clayton is up to his eyeballs in sending intimidation subpoenas to reporters.”

Two Democrats on the intelligence committee did not indicate whether the subpoenas were a dealbreaker for Clayton’s nomination, which is set to be the subject of a Wednesday hearing.

Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., the vice chair of the committee, has not said whether he intends to vote in favor of Clayton’s nomination. He previously praised Clayton for having the “right temperament” when Trump tapped him, but has said he still wants to press the prosecutor about whether he will use the DNI post to pursue Trump’s 2020 election obsession.

Asked for comment about the subpoenas Tuesday, Warner said he anticipated that Clayton would be quizzed about the matter during his hearing.

“I think it’s important that we stand up for the independence of the press,” he said.

When asked by The Intercept whether the subpoenas were disqualifying for Clayton’s nomination, fellow intelligence committee member Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., said, “I’ve got questions about it.”

The cautious position staked out by the Democrats stood in sharp contrast to that of Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., the committee’s longest serving member and a frequent skeptic of the intelligence agencies when it comes to civil liberties. In a social media post Sunday, Wyden noted that federal agents hand-delivered some of the subpoenas to the reporters who co-authored the article.

“It seems Jay Clayton is up to his eyeballs in sending intimidation subpoenas to reporters and armed thugs to their homes,” Wyden said. “This is not acceptable in a DNI.”

Dems Pushing for Clayton

The subpoenas came at an awkward moment for some Democrats in Congress aligned with the intelligence community. Those Democrats, including Connecticut Rep. Jim Himes, the ranking member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, had hoped to swiftly confirm Clayton in order to cut short the temporary appointment of housing czar Bill Pulte as director of national intelligence.

Clayton was seen by Democrats such as Himes as an acceptable alternative to Pulte, who was handed the reins of the country’s intelligence apparatuses with a mandate from Trump to stoke baseless conspiracy theories about the 2020 election.

Some Democrats like Wyden, however, have noted that Clayton himself has also publicly indulged in election fraud conspiracy theories.

His role in the subpoenas should make him a non-starter for intelligence chief, a coalition of progressive groups including Indivisible and Reporters Without Borders said in a letter Monday.

“Members of Congress across the aisle have embraced Clayton as a more respectable option than Pulte and hope to see the nomination process quickly,” the groups said. “Measuring Clayton’s qualifications against Pulte’s rather than the demands of the office would be a detriment to national security.”

Caitlin Vogus, a senior adviser with Freedom of the Press Foundation, said intelligence committee members should grill Clayton over the subpoenas.

“Anyone who hides behind fabricated ‘national security’ claims to demand journalists expose confidential sources can’t be trusted to lead America’s intelligence agencies,” Vogus said in a statement to The Intercept. “Senators should demand to know whether Clayton issued these outrageous subpoenas at the explicit behest of the White House, and whether he’d use similar tactics as DNI against journalists and whistleblowers who expose intelligence failures or abuses.”

Trump admin puts Americans in Congo on “do-not-board” list, barring return

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Trump admin puts Americans in Congo on “do-not-board” list, barring return

The Trump administration on Monday barred US citizens in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from returning home amid an Ebola outbreak that continues to outpace response efforts.

Reuters first reported late Monday that Americans currently in the DRC or those who have recently traveled to the Ebola-stricken country have been put on a “do-not-board” list. They cannot travel back to the US until they have spent 21 days in a third country. The order, taken under a transportation authority known as Title 49, was independently confirmed by Politico on Tuesday.

Both outlets noted that roughly two dozen Americans who had been set to board flights home on Tuesday have already been blocked by the new rule. It remains unclear if the bar also applies to government workers. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has at least two dozen employees working in the DRC.

The move adds to the already extremely stringent and controversial travel restrictions imposed by the Trump administration in an effort to wall itself off from the outbreak. Health experts continue to be critical of such restrictions, as they have historically been unsuccessful and harmful. Specifically, they discourage countries and people from being transparent about outbreaks and disease risks, hurt economies, and create stigma. There is also concern that such restrictions will limit humanitarian aid workers.

Ebola threat

Ebola is not a disease that readily spreads like respiratory viruses. It transmits via contact with bodily fluids while people are actively sick or recently deceased. It has been described as a disease of compassion because it primarily spreads to family, loved ones, caregivers, and medical personnel who have extensive contact with cases when they are most ill and infectious. In other words, it’s not a disease one would pick up by sitting next to someone who is merely coughing on an airplane.

According to the CDC, “do-not-board” lists are intended to bar travelers who are “known or suspected to have a contagious disease,” not simply anyone who has been in a country with an outbreak.

Still, if people unknowingly carried Ebola into the US, the country is well-equipped to handle the situation. The US has built an elite network of medical facilities that can safely isolate Ebola patients while offering high-quality care.

In past Ebola outbreaks, no such stringent travel restrictions were implemented, and the US repatriated eight cases for high-level care. None of the repatriated patients transmitted the virus.

Amid the Trump administration’s isolationist strategy, the World Health Organization is warning that the outbreak continues to spread out of control. On Tuesday, the United Nations health agency said it has less than half the funding it needs to properly respond to the outbreak. WHO has struggled with funding after the US withdrew its membership, removing a significant funding source.

WHO said last week that four out of every five new Ebola cases have no link to known cases, indicating undetected spread. Officials warned that the true scale of the outbreak could be two- to four-times larger than current case counts. As of July 14, the DRC is reporting 1,963 cases and 719 deaths.

South Korean strategy responds deftly to Trump’s unpredictability

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south-korean-strategy-responds-deftly-to-trump’s-unpredictability
South Korean strategy responds deftly to Trump’s unpredictability

US President Donald Trump’s whimsical and profoundly ill-advised war against Iran has shredded the US reputation for probity. Trump committed a huge strategic blunder. The global consensus views the current crisis as an artificial emergency, and US allies are now suffering for Trump’s mistakes, both economically and potentially militarily, for example by the unilateral redeployment of PAC-3 and THAAD missile defense systems from East Asian allies to the Middle Eastern theater.

So what is the impact of the US-Iran War, specifically on the South Korea-US Alliance? Amid the international disorder generated over the past nine months by Trump’s military interventions in Venezuela and Iran, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pursued a strategy of “Pragmatic Diplomacy Centered on National Interest.”

Prioritizing national interest is a universal goal for any sovereign state, but this author initially doubted whether such a pragmatic approach could effectively counter the current US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy – which are distinctively unilateral and coercive, aggressively demanding increased burden-sharing from allies.

Upon deeper analysis, however, the pragmatic diplomacy of the Lee Jae Myung administration has proven to be a highly substantive, practical, and effective national security strategy for protecting South Korea’s interests against President Trump’s erratic behavior, for several reasons:

First, with a US administration that unilaterally takes unpredictable military actions, driven by the principles of America First and “Make America Great Again,” President Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy offers helpful flexibility. In contrast, a rigidly principled, conventional response would be of little use when the US routinely ignores its own strategic doctrines and international law in favor of President Trump’s personal whims.

Second, historically, whenever the US released a new National Security or National Defense Strategy, its allies would rush to publish their own corresponding security and defense blueprints, to align their roles with the US During the current Trump administration, however, very few allies have issued formal written responses, having concluded that proactively committing to specific principles and roles offers no strategic advantage.

Third, under previous US administrations, international law served as the ultimate shield for smaller nations resisting superpower coercion, but President Trump has repeatedly disregarded such niceties. US allies are therefore shifting toward flexible, case-by-case strategies tailored to make the best of Trump’s erratic behavior, rather than naively relying on international law as a fixed rule.

Accordingly, South Korea and other nations are focusing less on formal US strategic documents and more on monitoring where Trump’s personal attention is moving, adopting a “situation-to-situation response” framework.

This dynamic explains why President Trump’s call for allies to join a coalition against Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was met with a lukewarm response, since US allies felt that Trump had manufactured the crisis himself. Encountering difficulties, Trump began aggressively bullying allies, including South Korea – one of the primary users of the strait – to deploy forces to help him out.

This coercive approach, was more appropriate for a primary school child than for an American president. Trump complained, for example, that the UK was not helping, then said that he did not need British help – and, anyway, UK forces were useless. Public opinion about Trump, as well as the US, has turned sharply negative in Trump’s second turn, this reversal being particularly strong in South Korea.

In fact, President Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy has secured a number of substantial concrete achievements, as detailed in this table:

Key Achievement Area Specific Outcome & Strategic Leverage
ROK–US Summits Minimized the fallout of Trump’s tariff wars, leveraging commitments for large-scale South Korean investment in the US and its domestic shipbuilding base.
Nuclear Technology Support Alleviated doubts regarding the US extended deterrence commitment by securing US support for South Korea’s civilian and naval nuclear technology, formalized in a Joint Fact Sheet released by the White House on November 13 last year.
Indigenous SSN Project President Lee personally took charge of the ROK Navy’s independent nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) program. On May 26, he chaired the historic 1st Future Defense Development Committee at the Submarine Command in Jinhae. A US working-level inter-agency delegation visited Seoul on June 12 for a two-day kick-off meeting, agreeing to hammer out technical specifics in upcoming expert panels.
OPCON Transition Roadmap Announced a concrete roadmap for the transition/recovery of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK Armed Forces. Operating under the reality that the terms of both administrations conclude in 2028, Seoul is actively pushing the Trump administration to establish the end of 2028 as “X-Year” for the final OPCON handover.

We are now entering a transitional phase which requires a fundamental reinterpretation of the South Korea-US alliance. The role of United States Forces Korea (USFK) is changing, and a new division of labor between USFK and the Republic of Korea military is required. Trump has asserted that while the US will handle global confrontations with China and Russia, allies must increase their defense spending to counter regional military threats within their respective theaters, a concept he describes as a “decent peace.”

In support of a stronger role for its military, South Korea has emerged as the world’s fourth-largest defense exporter, very capable of mass-producing the heavy weaponry and hardware vital for modern and future warfare. Indeed, at the recent G7 meeting, President Trump explicitly asked President Lee, Can South Korea urgently build 10 naval warships for the United States?” and President Lee responded, “In the spirit of our 70-year alliance, and with South Korea’s world-class defense industrial capacity, we are fully capable.”

On June 23, the New York Times published an op-ed arguing that even a global superpower like the United States cannot maintain its status without allies, and must therefore delegate roles and missions to them. This logic aligns nicely with President Lee’s policy of building a self-reliant defense and a strong military, which does not imply isolating the ROK military, it means evolving into a highly complementary military alliance with USFK.

The OPCON transition will boost the ROK military’s expertise in combined operations and significantly strengthen the mission capability of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. While some critics point out that only a small minority of ROK generals have fully digested the combined operational plan, OPLAN 5015, this transitional window is precisely the time to pivot toward a South Korean-led combined operations framework.

Trump’s America First policy threatens to alter the traditional contours of the combined defense posture, as seen for example by the recent provocative comments of USFK Commander General Xavier Brunson about the Korean Peninsula being a “dagger” aimed at China. We must seize this opportunity: it is time for the ROK military to take the steering wheel and guide USFK forward.

Domestic security and military analysts have had a tendency to treat the ROK–US alliance as eternal and unshakeable. This needs to change. In the past, assignments to the ROK–US Combined Forces Command were often seen as marginal, and were sometimes filled by officers waiting out the time until retirement. The OPCON transition will require a drastic change in this mindset: only the best of the best will do for the core of our combined defense commands.

This will enable the ROK military to take the lead in upgrading our defensive posture against North Korea, moving from a legacy-based, conventional framework to build an advanced, future-warfare-ready capability. Our next generation of military leaders will guide USFK and design future operational doctrines, using OPCON recovery as a springboard to a genuinely strong military.

OPCON transfer has been discussed since 2007, but its execution has long suffered from political timidity. At the working level, staff worried more about their English language proficiency than about strategic command. Today, the English language capability of ROK service members ranks among the highest in the world.

What does the Trump administration, or any subsequent administration, really want from South Korea? Surely, they need a strong, self-reliant, and capable ally. It is time to trust the institutional capacity of the ROK military to back our pragmatic diplomacy with hard power, and time to get on and complete the OPCON transition.

Captain Sukjoon Yoon (ROK Navy, Ret.) is a Policy Advisory Committee Member, Ministry of National Defense, since last December and a visiting research fellow, Korea Institute for Military Affairs (KIMA).

Israel kills 11 Palestinians, including police chief, in Gaza

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Israel kills 11 Palestinians, including police chief, in Gaza

At least 11 Palestinians, including the director of the police station in Jabalia refugee camp, and several police officers, were killed Tuesday in a series of Israeli attacks across the Gaza Strip, according to Palestinian officials.

The strikes came amid continued Israeli violations of the ceasefire that took effect on Oct. 10, 2025.

The bodies of seven Palestinians, including a woman, were taken to Al-Shifa Medical Complex and the American field hospital after an Israeli strike near Shadia School in the Al-Falouja area west of Jabalia refugee camp, a medical source told Anadolu.

In a statement, the Gaza Interior Ministry said those killed included Col. Mohammed Marwan Salem, director of the Jabalia refugee camp police station, along with several police officers and personnel, after an Israeli strike targeted a police post in the area.

An Israeli drone struck the police post in an area crowded with tents sheltering displaced Palestinians and temporary evacuation centers, witnesses told Anadolu.

READ: Katz boasts of Gaza’s destruction, says it is the result of a ‘well-thought-out policy’ and announces plan for three military outposts

Two Palestinians were also killed in Israeli shelling of a tent southwest of Gaza City, a medical source said.

In a separate incident earlier Tuesday, one Palestinian was killed and three others were wounded when an Israeli drone struck a tent housing displaced people near the Tayba Towers area west of Khan Younis in southern Gaza, the source added.

The identity of the person killed in that strike was not immediately available, and the conditions of the wounded were unknown.

In another incident, the same source said child Moataz Abu Shaar was killed by Israeli army gunfire in the Al-Mawasi area of Rafah in southern Gaza.

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, Israeli attacks since the ceasefire began have killed 1,108 Palestinians and injured 3,578 others as of Monday.

Since Israel’s genocide began on Oct. 8, 2023, more than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed and more than 173,000 injured, according to the ministry. Palestinian authorities say about 90% of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

READ: Pro-Palestinian activist Mahmoud Khalil sues Heritage Foundation, Stephen Miller, others

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