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Trump-Xi summit to weigh US energy sales amid Hormuz crisis

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Trump-Xi summit to weigh US energy sales amid Hormuz crisis

Energy partnership will be one of the key items on the agenda when United States President Donald Trump meets Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing from Wednesday to Friday, with Washington seeking Beijing’s commitment to resume regular purchases of American oil and gas.

US officials have recently said a deal for Beijing to buy more American energy is under consideration, as the war in Iran and the blockade around the Strait of Hormuz have raised fresh questions about China’s exposure to Middle Eastern supply routes.

Chinese imports of US oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) amounted to US$8.4 billion in 2024, but were largely halted after the tariff war initiated by Trump in April 2025.

In 2024, China imported 193,000 barrels per day of US crude oil, worth about US$6 billion in total. But it has not imported any US oil since May 2025 due to a 20% import tariff imposed during the trade war, offsetting the shortfall with higher shipments from countries such as Canada and Brazil.

For US LNG, China’s imports have fluctuated sharply in recent years. In 2021, China imported about 7.04 million tons of US LNG, but the figure declined to 4.15 million tons in 2024 as Chinese buyers turned to suppliers such as Russia and Qatar, which offered more cost-effective cargoes than US spot shipments.

The figure fell further to 26,000 tons in 2025 after China imposed a 25% tariff on US LNG as part of the tit-for-tat trade war.

China’s imports of US ethane and propane, by contrast, have been less affected by rising political tensions between the two countries. It is because the US was China’s sole supplier of ethane and remained China’s largest propane supplier in 2025. Both materials are for making plastics.

The US has been pushing China to buy its energy through a carrot-and-stick strategy. On the one hand, the US Treasury Department in April sanctioned Chinese “teapot” oil refiners and dozens of ships and vessels linked to Iran’s shadow fleet, while also threatening secondary sanctions on Chinese banks that help settle transactions related to Iranian oil.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said on May 6 that buyers of Iranian oil were contributing to Tehran’s terrorism activities and that China’s refusal to comply with US sanctions would have to become a key discussion item in the coming Trump-Xi meeting. 

On the other hand, Trump said China is welcome to buy energy from the US. In a media briefing at the White House on May 5, he described Xi as a “tremendous guy” and said he got along well with Xi. 

“We’ve offered that if he wants to send the ships to the US,” Trump said. “I made a statement: send your ships to Texas. It’s not that much further. Send your ships to Louisiana. Send your ships to Alaska. Alaska is actually very close to a lot of the Asian countries; people don’t realize it.”

Trump added that the US was making “tremendous” deals with South Korea and Japan, which lost their main source of oil supply due to transportation disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. He also said that although China had 60% of its imported oil from the Strait of Hormuz, Xi has been “very respectful” as the strait’s logistics have affected by the war in Iran. 

Beijing’s responses

During a regular briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was asked about Trump’s suggestion that Beijing should buy American oil rather than Iranian oil. Lin declined to give a direct answer and referred the media to the competent authorities.

Chinese commentators have mixed views on the matter. Some say the disruption in the Middle East has strengthened the case for China to diversify oil and gas supplies, including from the US.

A Hunan-based columnist using the pen name Xu Sanlang says China suspended most US energy imports as a countermeasure after Trump returned to the White House in early 2025. He says China’s last crude oil purchase from the US was in February 2025, while LNG imports stopped after December 2024.

Citing Chinese customs data, Xu says China imported about US$325 billion worth of crude oil in 2024, of which US crude accounted for only 1.8%, or about US$6 billion. The figure basically dropped to zero in 2025.

However, citing Kpler data, he says that nearly 600,000 barrels per day of US crude oil were loaded onto tankers bound for China in April 2026. He says the main reason was Iran’s move to close the Strait of Hormuz and its strikes on energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.

“Faced with this situation, the most rational response is to diversify procurement sources,” Xu writes. “Although the US is China’s trade rival, it does have sufficient energy supplies. China’s purchases of US energy were previously interrupted by a tariff war in 2025, but the situation has since changed. Supply security is more important than anything else.”

“Trump has long asked China to buy more American agricultural products, aircraft and energy products but when the trade war was intense China could ignore those demands,” he adds. “Now the Middle East conflicts and global supply-chain tensions have made Trump’s energy-purchase request easier for Beijing to accept.”

He stresses that resuming US energy purchases would meet China’s own supply security needs while giving Trump some “face” during his visit to Beijing. “It kills two birds with one stone,” he said. “It protects energy security while creating favorable conditions for China-US negotiations.”

Other commentators argue that Beijing should not deepen its reliance on US energy, as Washington has illegitimately used force to control oil exports from Chinese allies, including Venezuela and Iran.

A Henan-based writer says Trump claimed earlier this month that the US was receiving “hundreds of millions of barrels of oil” from Venezuela and sending the crude to Houston for refining.

“Four months ago, US forces raided Caracas and took away Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife,” he writes. “How can Trump now say that the US and Venezuela are partners?”

The writer says the US Treasury Department revoked Chevron’s license to operate in Venezuela on March 1 and issued a new general license that broadly authorizes US companies to do business with state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela.

“This is not normal international trade. This is naked plunder,” he says.

He says the US was tightening pressure on Iran and obstructing oil routes through Hormuz while asking other countries to buy the Venezuelan oil refined in Texas. As oil prices rise, he says, the Venezuelan crude controlled by the US becomes more valuable, making the arrangement look more like coercion than cooperation.

A Hebei-based writer says China did not necessarily have to buy US-refined Venezuelan crude because it had spent two decades building pipelines to import oil and gas from Central Asia. He says the Central Asia-China gas pipeline delivered 4.67 million tons of natural gas to China in January and February this year, or about 79,200 tons per day, and has operated steadily.

He says the pipeline starts in Turkmenistan and enters China through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Horgos in Xinjiang, running entirely over land. In 2025, China imported US$8.41 billion worth of natural gas from Turkmenistan, making it China’s second-largest gas supplier after Russia, which supplied US$9.41 billion. He says the route does not pass through disputed waters and is not subject to shipping delays or higher insurance costs due to rising oil prices.

“Together with LNG imports from Australia, Qatar, Russia and other suppliers, China has effectively built a diversified energy network,” he says. “No matter how strong a maritime power is, it cannot cut off the steel pipelines running through the heart of Central Asia.”

Some commentators also say China can choose to increase its imports of heavy crude from Canada, although it is about US$10 per barrel more expensive than Venezuelan oil. 

Read: New Trump sanctions on Chinese firms: leverage on Xi or overkill?

Follow Jeff Pao on X at @jeffpao3

London: A Playground for the Islamic Republic’s Networks Abroad

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London: A Playground for the Islamic Republic’s Networks Abroad


The IRGC is believed to be increasingly using criminal gangs in London, drawing on methods similar to those used by organized crime networks worldwide

In recent months, the Islamic Republic appears to have shifted its methods for deploying proxy actors to carry out intimidation, espionage, sabotage, violent attacks, and, in some cases, alleged terrorist activities against its opponents as well as Jewish targets in Britain.  

According to information reviewed and verified by The Media Line, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is making greater use of criminal gangs, including networks that recruit teenagers, drawing on methods resembling those seen in Scandinavian organized crime cases and on operational patterns often associated with Russian intelligence services.   

2 injured during stabbing in Golders Green, April 29, 2026. Following a series of terrorist attacks targeting Jewish communities, London’s Metropolitan Police raised the national terrorism threat level to Level 4. (Screenshot: YouTube)

Following a series of attacks targeting Jewish communities, the UK national terrorism threat level was raised to “severe,” meaning an attack is considered highly likely in the next six months. British authorities said the upgrade followed the Golders Green attack and a broader rise in concern over terrorism threats.  

At the same time, new groups have emerged to recruit and manage such criminal gangs. One such organization is Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI), whose name surfaced after an attack on the Persian-language broadcaster Iran International in northwest London, where Molotov cocktails were allegedly thrown into the outlet’s parking area. The group later circulated a video on Telegram purporting to show the attack.  

The incident caused no major damage, but it highlighted the vulnerability of a broadcaster that has long faced threats and intimidation linked to the Iranian regime. Police said three suspects were arrested after a vehicle pursuit ended in a crash; those charged included two British men, aged 21 and 19, and a 16-year-old boy.  

Iran International has repeatedly faced security threats. In 2024, one of its journalists was stabbed outside his home in London, an attack that renewed scrutiny of the safety of Persian-language journalists living in exile. In many other cases, both current and former staff members of the broadcaster have reported serious threats and intimidation.  

HAYI also claimed responsibility for attacks against ambulances belonging to a Jewish organization in north London, where Jewish and Iranian communities have lived side by side for years and have often supported one another. The group also claimed responsibility for the attack carried out by Essa Suleiman against two Jewish men in Golders Green. During that incident, a bystander intervened, helping prevent more serious harm and stopping the attacker from escaping.  

The IRGC, and especially its external operations apparatus, often referred to as Unit 840, is widely believed to play a central role in the Islamic Republic’s overseas operations. In recent years, and particularly after the recent war with Israel, these networks appear to have expanded their activities through a combination of Iranian and non-Iranian regime supporters in London and across Britain, alongside financial channels operating through exchange houses and other financial institutions allegedly involved in financial transfers and money laundering.  

With the assistance of criminal organizations such as the Zindashti Network, these structures have reportedly been able to establish links with organized crime groups.   

A security analyst in Tehran told The Media Line that in many European cities, the Islamic Republic’s covert networks are engaged not only in surveillance and intelligence gathering, but also in building proxy groups to threaten dissidents, target selected individuals, and demonstrate capability to European security authorities. That assessment reflects mounting concern among British officials, journalists, and rights groups over Iran-linked threats in the UK.  

Several Iranian journalists in London, including this writer, say they have repeatedly been followed by individuals believed to be linked to the IRGC, some of whom have presented themselves as diplomatic staff attached to the Iranian embassy. The Islamic Republic has also long been accused by dissidents and analysts of using Iraqi and Afghan Shiite networks to help identify or recruit operational assets abroad.  

A person raises a fist next to a sign reading No To Execution during a demonstration organized by members of the Iranian opposition to demand justice, human rights, and freedom for the Iranian people, in Paris, France, February 8, 2025. It is believed that the Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have been used as hubs for espionage and for planning attacks against dissidents. Diplomats affiliated with the regime have repeatedly been expelled from European countries or faced legal proceedings over such activities. For this reason, many Iranians have called for the closure of the Islamic Republic’s embassies and diplomatic missions. (BASTIEN OHIER/Hans Lucas/AFP via Getty Images)

The human rights organization Hana says the Islamic Republic uses its diplomatic missions for espionage and hostile activity against opposition journalists and dissident groups.  

Shilan Vakili, the organization’s spokesperson, told The Media Line: “There are reports that some individuals who were forced to visit Iranian consulates were questioned about their political activities, their relationships with various people, and even aspects of their personal lives.” 

Vakili said such encounters amounted to intelligence extraction. She added that the Islamic Republic uses its embassies and consulates, under diplomatic cover, to conduct espionage, build cases against opponents, and infiltrate Iranian communities through people posing as refugees, journalists, or researchers.   

British security services have in recent months arrested several Iranian nationals and other suspects—some of whom allegedly entered the country illegally, claiming to be asylum seekers—in operations linked to national security concerns. Officials have said some of those detained were involved in surveillance on Iranian dissidents and Jewish centers in London.  

Until only a few weeks ago, virtually nothing was known publicly about HAYI. Some analysts, therefore, believe the group may be an artificial construct composed of gang members and hired teenagers used for specific operations, echoing methods previously attributed to Iranian-linked activity in Sweden and Denmark involving criminal gangs targeting Israeli or Jewish interests.   

Investigative journalist Jane Prinsley of the Jewish Chronicle told The Media Line that “the name of this group has only emerged in recent weeks, after the recent war with Iran, and that is very frightening because these attacks are unpredictable.” She added that more evidence and intelligence would be needed before concluding that the group receives direct orders from the IRGC.   

Prime Minister Keir Starmer warned after the Golders Green attack that Iranian attempts to stir up violence in Britain would not be tolerated, accusing Tehran of spreading hatred and violence and attempting to destabilize the country.   

 

Part of the Islamic regime’s terrorist operations abroad is allegedly carried out through the Zindashti criminal network, whose leader has been described by some media outlets as “Iran’s El Chapo.” (Social media)

At the center of many of these allegations stands the Zindashti Network.   

The network has previously been accused of threatening journalists and dissidents investigating its activities. It is associated with Naji Sharifi Zindashti, a figure who has long been described in media and sanctions reporting as a major international organized crime boss with links to Iranian intelligence.  

In May 2026, Britain sanctioned members of the network’s broader financial architecture operating in London and abroad. According to the UK government, the sanctions targeted the Zindashti Network as well as exchange houses and individuals accused of providing financial and operational support for hostile Iranian activity. Some of those sanctioned were British citizens or residents, while others reportedly held St. Kitts and Nevis passports and were active in the exchange-house business.  

In recent years, alongside cooperation with European criminal organizations involved in human trafficking and drug smuggling, the network has also been linked to the kidnapping and assassination of Iranian dissidents in Turkey and Europe, as well as assassination plots against two individuals in the United States.   

According to multiple reports, the network operates not only in London but across Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Azerbaijan through extensive smuggling routes. It has allegedly played a role in recruiting hitmen and operatives tasked with surveillance or assassination missions against Iranian dissidents.   

Some of those hired to monitor Persian-language journalists and television stations in London, or to threaten them, may also have been recruited through this kind of criminal infrastructure. That possible overlap between organized crime and state-backed coercion is one of the most disturbing features of the Islamic Republic’s alleged overseas playbook.    

Zindashti himself was once known as a drug trafficker in Iran before fleeing to Turkey, where he became associated with IRGC intelligence units. He was later arrested in Turkey on drug-trafficking charges, released under controversial circumstances, and fled back to Iran. Today, he appears publicly alongside senior regime officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, portraying himself as a philanthropist.   

Alongside these criminal organizations, the Islamic Republic has also developed a network in London of Shiite activists from various countries through public institutions such as the Islamic Centre of England, as well as through private gatherings coordinated by the Iranian embassy, mosques, and affiliated Islamic centers.     

Pro-Iranian government supporters hold the images of Mojtaba Khamenei (left) and his late father, Ali Khamenei, on Al-Quds Day, on 15th March, in London, England, 2026. Many Iranians in London believe the city has become a safe haven and operational backyard for the Islamic Republic, where the regime has accumulated significant financial, logistical, and human resources.(Richard Baker /In Pictures via Getty Images)

In times of crisis, these networks could potentially function as a “fifth column.”   

Together with Kurdish, Turkish, Albanian, Romanian, and low-level criminal gangs, these networks are believed to receive instructions directly from IRGC operational officers operating in London under diplomatic cover.  

MI5 has officially identified the Islamic Republic, alongside Russia, as one of the most serious threats to Britain’s domestic security. But it is possible the Islamic Republic’s network of operatives in Britain is far broader and more layered than what has publicly emerged so far. 

For decades, London has been both a base for the regime’s operatives and privileged elites, as well as a major financial hub for supporters of the Islamic Republic. A regime that has assassinated thousands of opponents over the years now appears increasingly willing, particularly after the January uprising and the heavy blows it suffered during the recent war, to openly threaten dissidents abroad and extend its climate of fear and intimidation beyond Iran’s borders.    

FDA chief resigns after Trump admin forced approval of fruity e-cigs

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FDA chief resigns after Trump admin forced approval of fruity e-cigs

Marty Makary on Tuesday resigned from his role as Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, days after news broke on Friday that the White House had signed off on plans to fire him.

Trump confirmed Makary’s resignation on social media, posting an image that appears to show that Makary resigned from his role over a text message. The text message begins “Dr. President Trump[sic], Please accept my resignation, effective today.”

Trump wrote in the social media post that Makary had “done a great job at the FDA,” and that he was “a hard worker, who was respected by all, and will go on to have an outstanding career in Medicine.”

Trump ended by announcing that Kyle Diamantas, the top food regulator at the FDA, will serve as acting commissioner for now.

Trump’s positive review of Makary stands in contrast to the news last week. As administration insiders were widely broadcasting plans for Makary’s ouster on Friday, they offered a long list of issues and instances in which Makary was at odds with the White House. And, according to those close to Makary who spoke with The New York Times today, the now-former commissioner had his own reasons for departing.

Complaints

Makary’s insiders said the former Johns Hopkins University cancer surgeon resigned after Trump forced his hand on authorizing fruit-flavored e-cigarettes. Makary had reportedly been resisting the sign-offs out of concern that the kid-friendly flavors could again entice youth use and addiction—something public health officials and experts have for years worked to combat. But Makary’s stance was in conflict with Trump’s “save vaping” campaign promise—and with the tobacco industry’s interests.

Earlier this month, The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump had called Makary over a weekend to scold him for not moving fast enough to authorize flavored vapes, particularly menthol, mango, and blueberry flavors from the Los Angeles manufacturer Glas. The FDA authorized those flavored products days later and issued a new policy that would make it easier to market flavored vapes.

Officials in the Trump administration also noted that Makary had angered anti-abortion activists, who accused him of slow-walking a safety review of mifepristone, a pill used for abortion and miscarriage treatment.

Officials also said Makary butted heads with other health officials and was seen as struggling to manage his agency. He reportedly made enemies among lobbyists for the biotech, tobacco, and pharmaceutical industries. Public health experts, meanwhile, criticized Makary for changes to the FDA’s vaccine reviews under his watch, which aligned with Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy’s anti-vaccine agenda.

“He has offended almost everyone involved in FDA issues, which is not easy to do,” Diana Zuckerman, the president of the National Center for Health Research, told the Times.

According to Politico, which was the first to report Makary’s resignation, it was Kennedy—not Trump—who made the call on planning to fire Makary, though Trump had to agree.

US visas shouldn’t turn migrants into pawns against China

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US visas shouldn’t turn migrants into pawns against China

The latest warning from Washington that China could face visa restrictions over deportation cooperation points to a broader pattern: migration policy is increasingly being pulled into the orbit of geopolitical rivalry.

While US officials frame the issue as a matter of compliance — urging Beijing to accept nationals ordered removed — the use of visa pressure signals something more strategic.

Once migration becomes leverage between major powers, it rarely produces better coordination. Such approaches can introduce additional friction, making cooperation more difficult at a time when bilateral trust is already under strain.

Visas as leverage

The latest US warning over deportation cooperation shows how quickly migration can become a diplomatic pressure point.

Under Section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Washington has the option of tightening visas against countries it considers unwilling to take back their nationals.

But the existence of a legal tool does not answer the deeper question: does using migration enforcement as geopolitical pressure make the system safer, or does it deepen the logic of confrontation?

The danger is that a human issue is being securitized. International migration institutions and human rights bodies have long argued that migrants’ rights should be protected by law, not used as instruments of state pressure.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stressed that migrants’ rights are protected under existing legal frameworks and that rights are not opposed to security; rather, they reinforce the rule of law when properly applied.

That principle matters here because visa threats and sanctions blur the line between lawful immigration management and political punishment.

Migration inside rivalry

It is more than a technical immigration dispute. The issue falls within a broader US-China relationship shaped by mistrust, tariffs, export controls and a growing strategic split.

In that climate, even ordinary consular or deportation questions can be recast as tests of national resolve. Once that happens, migration stops being a policy area and becomes another theater of pressure, where each side signals toughness instead of solving practical problems.

The antiwar argument is straightforward: security language often expands the space for confrontation while shrinking the space for compromise. Scholars of migration securitization have shown that when states frame mobility mainly as a security threat, the result can be militarized borders, reduced rights protection, and policy spillover far beyond the original issue.

In this case, visa sanctions may satisfy a domestic political audience, but they risk turning consular coordination into a proxy battlefield in a great-power dispute.

There is a cost to this approach. If Washington wants Beijing’s cooperation on repatriations, it needs predictable consular channels and clear documentation procedures — not public ultimatums.

When Washington turns to public pressure, it risks closing off those pathways. Beijing, like most governments, tends to push back when cooperation is sought through public pressure.

That dynamic can slow down repatriation efforts and complicate identity verification. Over time, this approach risks feeding a cycle in which using migration as leverage only makes resolution harder to achieve.

A better approach

A more practical course would separate migration management from strategic rivalry. The US and China can compete on trade and security while still cooperating on deportations, identity checks and travel documents.

That is not a concession but a matter of keeping routine functions insulated from politics. A rights-based approach does not dilute enforcement; it helps sustain it without escalating tensions.

US credibility on migration depends on consistent enforcement, not measures that draw foreign nationals into a broader dispute. China, for its part, has room to ease tensions by approaching repatriations more consistently and without knock-on effects for ordinary travelers. Otherwise, a technical problem risks turning into yet another arena for rivalry.

If Washington wants credibility on migration, it needs to enforce immigration rules without turning foreign nationals into bargaining chips. Visa restrictions should be used sparingly, and only where they are clearly tied to law and to a proportionate policy goal.

Beijing has its own reason to avoid escalation. If it does not cooperate on lawful repatriation procedures, the fallout could widen beyond deportations and affect ordinary travelers, students and businesspeople.

That is not an abstract risk: Reuters reported this week that the Trump administration is prepared to consider visa sanctions on China if repatriation cooperation does not improve.

There is also a practical lesson here. Immigration enforcement depends on documentation, identity verification and regular consular contact, not just pressure from Washington.

When those channels weaken, removals become slower and more politicized, and the issue stops looking technical altogether.

Good migration governance

In practical terms, people in Asia are likely to feel this in their day‑to‑day plans. A visa dispute between Washington and Beijing can throw off study plans, holiday trips or business schedules that depend on smooth cross‑border travel.

Once migration is cast as a measure of political strength, it becomes easier for other states in the region to treat it as a security issue too, and harder to keep space for cooperation that puts people’s rights at the center.

A more sustainable course would ring‑fence migration from strategic rivalry. Washington should reserve visa restrictions for clearly defined legal violations and avoid using foreign nationals as bargaining chips.

Beijing should engage more consistently on repatriations and documentation, not to concede to US pressure, but to keep migration governance out of the line of fire.

If both sides can insulate this area from zero‑sum politics, they will not only protect migrants’ rights but also strengthen the stability that students, workers and firms across Asia now depend on.

Noah Lamington is a New Zealand-based journalist

NBA Star Dies at 29

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NBA Star Dies at 29


The sports world is in shock after former Memphis Grizzlies forward Brandon Clarke died suddenly on Monday at just 29 years old.

Clarke’s death was confirmed by the Grizzlies, though the exact cause has not been revealed.

“We are heartbroken by the tragic loss of Brandon Clarke,” the team wrote in a statement posted to X. “Brandon was an outstanding teammate and an even better person whose impact on the organization and the greater Memphis community will not be forgotten.”

The team also shared condolences with Clarke’s family and loved ones as fans flooded social media with messages of grief and disbelief over the young athlete’s sudden death.

Clarke’s agency, Priority Sports, released a separate statement asking for privacy as his family mourns and begins making funeral arrangements.

The tragic news comes just weeks after Clarke found himself making headlines for a very different reason.

Back in April, the 6-foot-8 NBA forward was reportedly involved in a high-speed chase with law enforcement that ended with multiple charges. Authorities accused Clarke of trafficking Kratom, a controversial substance that has sparked heated debate across the country. He was also charged with possession of a controlled substance, fleeing police at excessive speeds, and improper passing.

The incident stunned many fans, especially given Clarke’s reputation as one of the league’s quieter and more respected players.

Clarke first entered the NBA in 2019 after being selected 21st overall in the draft by the Oklahoma City Thunder. But before he could even suit up, he was traded to Memphis, where he quickly became a fan favorite thanks to his hustle, athleticism, and high-energy play.

Over seven seasons with the Grizzlies, Clarke carved out a reputation as a reliable role player and explosive presence off the bench.

But injuries derailed the later part of his career. Clarke appeared in only two games this past season after battling serious knee and calf injuries that kept him sidelined for most of the year.

Now, fans are left mourning a player many believed still had years ahead of him both on and off the court.

Social media quickly filled with tributes Monday night, with devastated fans remembering Clarke not just for his basketball talent, but for his personality and presence in the Memphis community.

Twin brothers wipe 96 gov’t databases minutes after being fired

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Twin brothers wipe 96 gov’t databases minutes after being fired

In the US, fired and laid-off workers often have their digital credentials deactivated before they learn about the loss of their jobs; indeed, the inability to log in to a corporate system may be the first an employee knows of the situation.

Though not a generous or humane approach to staff reduction, it does follow from the simple fact that a fired employee with access to company systems is a security risk.

Just ask the Akhter twin brothers, accused of wiping out 96 databases hosting US government information in the minutes after both were fired last year from their shared employer.

DROP DATABASE

Muneeb and Sohaib Akhter, now both 34, had been in trouble before. Back in 2015, the brothers pled guilty in Virginia to a scheme involving wire fraud and computers. Muneeb was sentenced to three years in prison, while Sohaib got two.

After their stints in jail, the brothers worked their way back into the tech world. In 2023, Muneeb got a job with a Washington, DC, firm that sold software and services to 45 federal clients; Sohaib got a job at the same company a year later.

According to the government, however, the two couldn’t stay out of trouble. For instance:

On Feb. 1, 2025, Muneeb Akhter asked Sohaib Akhter for the plaintext password of an individual who submitted a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Public Portal, which was maintained by the Akhters’ employer. Sohaib Akhter conducted a database query on the EEOC database and then provided the password to Muneeb Akhter. That password was subsequently used to access that individual’s email account without authorization.

This was not a one-off. Muneeb had been assembling usernames and passwords—5,400 of them taken from his own company’s network data. He then built custom Python scripts to try these logins against common websites; for instance, his “marriott_checker.py” application tested the logins against Marriott’s hotel chains. Muneeb managed to log in successfully hundreds of times, including to DocuSign and airline accounts. Sometimes, if victims had airline miles stored, Muneeb would book travel for himself.

The brothers’ employer appears to have learned about their criminal past at some point in February. On February 18, 2025, the brothers—who lived together in Virginia—were both called into a Microsoft Teams meeting and summarily fired.

The call took place at the end of the day, wrapping up at 4:50 pm. Five minutes later, Sohaib was already trying to access his (now former) employer’s network—but found that his VPN access and Windows account were terminated.

Muneeb’s account had been overlooked, however, and he immediately embarked on a campaign of destruction.

At 4:56 pm, Muneeb accessed a US government database that his company maintained. He “issued commands to prevent other users from connecting or making changes to the database, and then issued a command to delete the database,” the government said.

At 4:58 pm, he wiped out a DHS database using the command “DROP DATABASE dhsproddb.”

At 4:59 pm, he asked an AI tool, “How do i clear system logs from SQL servers after deleting databases?” He later asked, “How do you clear all event and application logs from Microsoft windows server 2012?”

In the space of a single hour, Muneeb deleted around 96 databases with US government information. He downloaded 1,805 files belonging to the EEOC and stashed them on a USB drive, then grabbed federal tax information for at least 450 people.

Smart ideas

While this was going on, the brothers held a running conversation. (The government is not clear about whether this took place over text, instant message, or in person.)

“I see you cleaning out their database backups,” Sohaib said as he watched Muneeb’s work. As the database casualty list grew, Sohaib said, “Alright—if you have good plausible deniability.”

Muneeb didn’t appear to consider his actions a big deal. “Eh, they can recover from yesterday,” he said, referring to daily database backups.

“Yeah, they could,” Sohaib agreed.

Muneeb noted that an employee they knew would “have some work to do” when the destruction was revealed.

Sohaib fed Muneeb more suggestions.

“Delete their filesystem as well?” he said.

“Smart idea,” said Muneeb.

Sohaib then wondered if they had been too hasty. Perhaps, he said, “You shoulda had a kill script. Like, blackmailing them for some money would have been—”

“No, you do not do that, that’s proof of guilt, man,” Muneeb said.

“No, but the thing was, you always have your opinion,” Sohaib complained, and the two then bickered about whether they might try to blackmail their company’s customers instead.

As the data destruction went on, Sohaib said, “They’re gonna probably raid this place.”

“I’ll clean this shit up,” Muneeb said.

After wiping out the databases and event logs, the brothers reinstalled the operating systems on their corporate laptops with the help of an unnamed co-conspirator.

God guide my words

Sohaib was right; the feds did raid them. It just took three weeks.

On March 12, 2025, a search warrant was executed at Sohaib’s home in Alexandria. Agents grabbed plenty of tech gear but also turned up seven firearms and 370 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. Given his former crimes, Sohaib should have had none of this.

The brothers remained free for another nine months as the investigation proceeded, but both were eventually arrested on December 3 and indicted for a host of crimes (you can read the indictment here).

Muneeb signed a plea deal on April 15, 2026, admitting to the major allegations in the indictment.

Sohaib took his case to trial. He lost. On May 7, 2026, a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit computer fraud, password trafficking, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. He will be sentenced in September.

The cases would seem to be basically over, except that Muneeb has begun filing handwritten petitions from jail, arguing that his lawyer has been ineffective. More recently, the filings have taken aim at his signed guilty plea.

Photo of one of Muneeb's letters from prison.

One of Muneeb’s letters from prison.

One of Muneeb’s letters from prison.

“God guide my words,” he wrote in a one-paragraph letter to the judge on April 27. “I am uncomfortable with my plea and the pace with which the government expected it signed during pretrial motion deadlines limiting my ability to challenge the evidence against me… I stand with my brother in his innocence.” (As mentioned above, Sohaib was found guilty several days later.)

Another brief handwritten letter, filed on May 5, claims that Muneeb is innocent of count 10, “since accessing DocuSign account does not grant anything of value nor did he obtain or intend to obtain anything of value from it.” It says nothing about deleting the 96 databases.

A third letter, also filed on May 5, asks for permission to proceed pro se—that is, with Muneeb functioning as his own lawyer. This is generally the “kiss of death” for federal cases. Still, like many intelligent-but-overconfident defendants with plenty of time on their hands, Muneeb wants to give it a shot. It may well turn out to be one more of his “smart ideas.”

How Keir Starmer could be replaced as UK prime minister

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How Keir Starmer could be replaced as UK prime minister


U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer is facing a battle for his job after his Labour Party suffered a calamitous set of results in local elections last week that if repeated at a general election would see it comprehensively ejected from power.

Despite winning a landslide election victory in July 2024, Labour’s popularity has sunk and Starmer is getting much of the blame.

The reasons why are varied, including a series of policy missteps, a perceived lack of vision, a struggling British economy and questions over his judgment — especially his appointment of Peter Mandelson as U.K. ambassador to Washington despite the envoy’s ties to the convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.

How to get on track

The next U.K. national election doesn’t have to be held until 2029, but British politics allows parties to change leader midterm without the need for a general election.

Many within Labour think the only way to get the government back on track and to see off the threats from the right and the left is for Starmer to go — and as soon as possible.

“We have to change and we have to do it quickly,” Labour lawmaker Catherine West said. “We have to lay out a timetable and we have to turn this ship around.”

Changing leaders is easier said than done. Labour, unlike the main opposition Conservative Party, doesn’t have a history of ousting its leaders. There are a number of ways in which Starmer could go, with some more straightforward than others.

The easiest way

The simplest option is that Starmer announces his intention to resign, triggering an election for the Labour leadership. A resignation could possibly come if a Cabinet delegation tells Starmer that he has lost too much support within the party, or if members of his government quit in protest.

If Starmer decides to resign, the Cabinet and Labour’s governing body would likely pick an interim leader to be prime minister, probably someone not running to be Labour leader. Deputy Prime Minister David Lammy could fit the bill.

Under Labour’s rules, candidates must have the support of a fifth of the party’s House of Commons lawmakers — a number that currently stands at 81.

Those meeting that threshold would then have to receive the support of 5% of local constituency parties, or at least three party affiliates — groups such as trade unions and cooperative societies.

Eligible members of the party and affiliates would then vote for the leader using an electoral system that ranks the candidates. The winner is the first candidate to secure more than 50% of the vote.

King Charles III would then invite the winner to become prime minister and form a government.

The not so easy way

Starmer insisted that he won’t quit, saying that would “plunge the country into chaos.”

If Starmer doesn’t resign, he could face a challenge from one or more Labour lawmakers.

The first to move was West, who said Saturday that she would try to run for party leader, if the Cabinet didn’t remove Starmer by Monday. West acknowledged that she had nowhere near the support of 81 colleagues needed to force a contest, and her move appeared to be an attempt to force more high-profile contenders to make a move.

Unlike the Conservative Party, which has a history of getting rid of leaders such as Margaret Thatcher in 1990 and Boris Johnson in 2022, Labour doesn’t have that muscle memory. No Labour prime minister has ever been dislodged, though Tony Blair announced his plan to resign in 2007 after a series of low-level resignations.

Challengers would have to meet the eligibility thresholds above, but Starmer would automatically be on the ballot.

The potential candidates

Those considered to harbor leadership ambitions include Health Secretary Wes Streeting, former deputy prime minister Angela Rayner, who had to resign last year after acknowledging that she didn’t pay enough tax on a house purchase. An investigation into that is ongoing.

Andy Burnham, the popular mayor of Greater Manchester, is widely perceived as one of the strongest candidates. But he’s not eligible to stand at present, because he’s not in Parliament. Earlier this year, Labour officials blocked him from running in a special parliamentary election.

However, if Starmer indicates that he’s intending to stand down — for example, at Labour’s annual conference in September — a way could be found for Burnham to return to the House of Commons. A Labour lawmaker in a relatively safe seat could quit, opening up another chance for Burnham. Winning that special election is another matter, if the latest local election results are any guide.

Source: AP

How climate change could help hantavirus find more hosts

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How climate change could help hantavirus find more hosts

The cruise ship departed Ushuaia, Argentina, in April with plans to ferry 147 passengers and crew members to some of the most remote places on earth, including Antarctica. But the ship, named the MV Hondius, had its voyage cut short by a rare virus that has killed three and infected several others. 

Hantaviruses are an ancient family of rodent-borne pathogens that likely caused disease in humans long before they first appeared in medical records in the 1950s. The viruses infect people via rodent waste — often through the inhalation of dust containing trace amounts of the excreta. Andes hantavirus, the strain that gripped the MV Hondius on its polar cruise, is one of a few hantaviruses known to cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, a rare but often deadly illness.

The Andes strain is also the only known hantavirus that can be transmitted human-to-human — a characteristic turning a rare rodent-borne infection into a multinational emergency, just a few years after the world was caught flat-footed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The good news is that the Andes hantavirus, while uniquely deadly, is likely nowhere nearly as transmissible as COVID-19. Nevertheless, the outbreak is illuminating the complexity of responding to infectious disease outbreaks as international cooperation on public health issues has become fractured and contentious — all while global pandemics are only becoming more likely overall. A month before the first patients onboard the MV Hondius became symptomatic, Argentina officially completed the process of withdrawing from the World Health Organization, joining the U.S. in leaving a global health alliance that exists in large part to coordinate responses to these very kinds of cross-border disease outbreaks. 

The emergency also points to another growing challenge for global public health: Climate change is altering the rainfall, vegetation, and habitat conditions that influence rodent populations — changes that experts say boost the odds that the pathogens these animals carry will spill over into human populations.

While the hantavirus’s one-to-six-week incubation period means the outbreak could have originated in any of the passengers’ home countries, a possible culprit is the ship’s stop for a birding expedition near Ushuaia, which is home to a landfill that attracts rodents looking for food. Argentina’s health authorities have already documented a sharp rise in hantavirus this season: 101 infections have been recorded since June 2025, about twice as many as there were in the same period a year earlier.

The country’s health ministry hasn’t yet determined what’s behind the surge, but research suggests that climate change may play a role. Argentina and neighboring countries in South America endured years of severe drought between 2021 and 2024, including Argentina’s worst dry spell in more than 60 years in 2023, followed by extreme rainfall last year. Weather extremes exacerbated by global warming change how rodents behave, according to Kirk Douglas, a senior scientist who studies hantaviruses and climate change at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, in Barbados.

Prolonged drought sends rats and mice into populated areas in search of food, which can put people at higher risk of contracting the virus. Sudden rainfall following drought causes trees and shrubs to produce a windfall of nuts and seeds, which tend to benefit rodents and boost their numbers — all the while increasing the risk of transmission from animal to human.

That doesn’t mean there’s a one-to-one relationship between global temperature rise and rodent-driven risk, however, and climate change is hardly the only force at play. A complex web of natural and human-made landscape changes can increase or decrease contact between humans and rodents. Increased temperatures and humidity, for example, don’t seem to influence the disease ecology of hantavirus in the same way that drought and precipitation do.

“Hantavirus is sensitive to the changes climate change will bring,” Douglas emphasized. “It’s all dependent on what the prevailing climate impact is.”

That complexity makes hantavirus risk difficult to predict — and easy to overlook. In the United States, hantavirus has been rare since federal surveillance began in 1993. There were fewer than 1,000 total confirmed cases up to 2023, the latest year that data is available. About 35 percent of those cases, almost all of which occurred west of the Mississippi River, resulted in death. 

As in South America, the dynamics of hantavirus in the U.S. may be shifting. The places most at risk, federal scientists reported in a study published last year, are dry landscapes where homes are spread out, many kinds of rodents live nearby, and communities may have fewer resources to prevent or respond to disease — conditions that describe broad swaths of the American West.


Fearful, diminished and isolated: what this year’s Victory Day parade in Moscow tells us about Russia’s war against Ukraine

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Fearful, diminished and isolated: what this year’s Victory Day parade in Moscow tells us about Russia’s war against Ukraine

The military parade through Moscow’s Red Square on May 9, “Victory Day”, is the pinnacle of Russia’s annual celebrations marking the end of the second world war. Televised live and watched by millions, including invited foreign dignitaries, the Victory Day parade is all about showcasing Russia’s status and pride.

The first Victory Day parade was held in 1945 amid the triumph and relief at the defeat of Nazi Germany. A second was held in 1965 – but only two more were staged by the Soviet Union, in 1985 and 1990.

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, however, the parade has become a huge demonstration of Russia’s military prowess and might. And, since the start of Russia’s mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the parade has also provided a snapshot of the progress of the conflict, including the country’s wartime mood and the extent of its international support.

But this year’s Victory Day parade showed the world a Russia that is fearful, diminished and isolated. There were no military vehicles or equipment on display. Instead, the products of Russia’s military industry were only visible to the crowds in video images displayed on big screens. Concerned that Ukraine might attack Moscow during the parade, Russian officials made the decision to protect valuable weapons needed for the war by withdrawing them from the event entirely.

The Russians had good reasons for their anxieties. Ukraine has developed the capability to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. Just a few days before the parade, two of Moscow’s airports were temporarily closed in response to hundreds of drones reportedly attacking in multiple regions of Russia, including near the capital.

This is not the first time that Russian officials have scaled down a Victory Day parade out of concern about Ukrainian attacks. In 2023 the situation was similar, with drone strikes in Russia leading up to the holiday amid widespread expectation of an imminent major Ukrainian counteroffensive. But even then, the number of military vehicles in Red Square not eliminated entirely. And the following year the parade featured launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles to emphasise that Russia was willing and able to use any means necessary – including nuclear weapons – to impose its will on Ukraine. In 2025 the parade featured nearly 200 military vehicles.

Now, in the fifth year of the war, the Russian leadership is clearly concerned about their ability to protect their capital city from the Ukrainians, despite surrounding Moscow with elaborate air defences – including some equipment hastily relocated from combat zones.

It was not only the absence of military equipment that made this Victory Day parade underwhelming. One of the features of the event that helps to elevate it beyond a national holiday is the presence of international distinguished guests in the audience. This year, only a handful of national leaders were in attendance, three of whom represent former Soviet states and close allies of Russia: Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The contrast with last year’s parade was stark. In 2025 – to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war – Putin hosted leaders from nearly 30 countries, most notably China’s president Xi Jinping, who was given the place of honour next to Putin. Chinese soldiers marched in the parade, providing a further symbol of the cooperation between the two countries and the support that Moscow could rely on from Beijing.

This year Russia’s president was surrounded not by powerful world leaders but by elderly war veterans placed around him in the viewing stand. In this company, Putin looked like just another old man, dreaming of glory days long behind him.

Vladimir Putin speaks with an elderly man in military uniform.

Ageing comrades: Vladimir Putin speaks with second world war veteran Svet Turunov. EPA/Pavel Bednyakov/pool

The sharp reduction in the number – and status – of foreign leaders that the Russians were able to attract to Moscow this year reflects changes in the international political climate that are not in Russia’s favour. In 2025, the Slovakian prime minister, Robert Fico, attended the parade – an indication of rifts within the European Union over the war and support for Ukraine.

In 2026 Fico was again in Moscow – but didn’t attend the parade. Last year Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro sat in the viewing stands – this year he sits in a US jail having been removed from power in an American raid.

War-weariness in Russia

Putin’s Victory Day speech this year was another indication of a change in Russia’s fortunes, striking a far less confident tone than in previous years. In 2023, the Russian president compensated for that year’s scaled-back parade with defiant rhetoric, claiming Russia was under threat of attack from the west and styling the conflict as “the people’s war”. In 2024, Putin responded to a suggestion from French president, Emmanuel Macron, that western troops might be deployed to Ukraine with thinly veiled threats that Russia might use nuclear weapons to reassert its dominance.

This year Putin was far more subdued. Although he denounced the west and claimed that victory would belong to Russia, these statements had a tired, ritualistic feel. His emphasis on Russia’s ability to endure anything and respond to any challenge hinted at the current state of the war.

Russia is losing territory on the battlefield to the Ukrainian forces for the first time since 2024 and is reported to be losing troops faster than it can replace them. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drones regularly attack Russian oil refineries, threatening Moscow’s ability to sell its most profitable export.

But this war is far from over. Russia still has a large military, a well-resourced defence industry and is increasingly drawing in foreign soldiers to fight on its side – North Koreans marched alongside Russian troops in the parade.

But while Russia may not be on the verge of defeat, the way that it celebrated its most important holiday of the year suggests a new war-weariness. It’s a big contrast with the confidence exuded by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. His tongue-in-cheek decree giving Putin permission to hold the parade suggests a turning point in the two countries’ morale – at the very least.

Hegseth Asks for More Money as Iran War Costs Skyrocket

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Hegseth Asks for More Money as Iran War Costs Skyrocket


Despite a ceasefire that has been in effect for more than a month, the cost of the U.S. war with Iran keeps spiking higher, a senior Pentagon official said on Tuesday.

Two weeks ago, the Pentagon claimed the war had cost $25 billion, a figure that analysts said was likely a gross undercount. In testimony before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, the Department of War’s comptroller, Jay Hurst, said the cost of the war has risen “closer” to $29 billion because of the “repair and replacement of equipment” and “general operational costs” of keeping troops in the Middle East.

Experts also expressed skepticism at this revised count.

“The costs of this war are still growing, and the Pentagon is still not being straight with taxpayers or lawmakers about the numbers. If the numbers being thrown around in committee hearings were complete, why would the Pentagon continue withholding a comprehensive, itemized cost assessment from Congress?” said Gabe Murphy, a policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a nonpartisan budget watchdog advocating for an end to wasteful spending. “Taxpayers deserve answers, and lawmakers need them in order to craft a responsible budget.”

“If they can’t defend the nation with a trillion dollars, they’re doing it wrong.”

Hurst, War Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Gen. Dan Caine, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are on Capitol Hill to discuss the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion budget request for 2027 before House and Senate appropriations subcommittees on Tuesday. Hegseth said the massive sum — the largest request in history — “reflects the urgency of the moment” and would address both the “deferment of long-standing problems as well as position our forces for the current and future fight.”

Murphy called the dramatic 45 percent increase a negotiating tactic. “They’re seeking $350 billion through reconciliation and $1.15 trillion in the base budget, but they know reconciliation is a long shot. It’s all about trying to make a $1.15 trillion Pentagon budget seem reasonable in comparison,” said Murphy. “But there’s nothing reasonable about it. It’s a roughly $150 billion increase over last year.”

Americans, Murphy said, deserve an explanation for the runaway military budget. “If they can’t defend the nation with a trillion dollars, they’re doing it wrong.”

President Donald Trump said Monday that the ceasefire with Iran — which went into effect on April 8 — is “on life support” after Iran’s response to the latest U.S. peace proposal. Reuters, citing Iranian state media, reported that Iran’s proposal included war reparations from the United States, lifting sanctions on Tehran, and recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Trump rejected Iran’s reply as “totally unacceptable” and called it a “piece of garbage.”

Hegseth said the Pentagon was prepared to reignite hostilities with Iran. “We have a plan to escalate, if necessary; we have a plan to retrograde if necessary. We have a plan to shift assets,” the secretary testified, declining to say more in the public hearing.

An analysis by The Intercept found that Trump has embroiled the U.S. in more than 20 military interventions, armed conflicts, and wars during his five-plus years in the White House. The expenses of this wide-ranging war on the world are rising across the globe.

The Intercept was, for example, the first outlet to reveal that the U.S. military’s intervention in Venezuela and attacks on boats in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific — Operations Absolute Resolve and Operation Southern Spear, respectively — have already cost taxpayers at least $4.7 billion, according to an exceptionally cautious estimate from Brown University’s Costs of War Project.

The ultimate price tag of Americas wars in Latin America will further balloon in the decades ahead, saddling future Americans with soaring costs, according to the report. “War is financed by debt, adding interest costs to the public budget,” wrote authors Hanna Homestead, a research analyst with the National Priorities Project, and Jennifer Kavanagh, the director of military analysis at Defense Priorities, a nonpartisan research group. “Furthermore, the federal government undertakes an obligation to pay veterans benefits for decades into the future.”

Recently, Linda Bilmes, a former assistant secretary and chief financial officer of the U.S. Department of Commerce and currently a public policy professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, told The Intercept that the already-excessive expense of the Iran war would likely be pushed into the trillions of dollars by such long-term costs like veterans benefits and interest on the debt to pay for the war.

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