The US move to allow Syrian arms sales could shift Damascus away from Russian dependence while complicating Turkey’s growing role and Israel’s security calculations
[DAMASCUS] The United States has ended its blanket policy of denying licenses for military exports and services to Syria, marking another shift in relations between Washington and Damascus.
The State Department amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) took effect on October 1. Under a new policy approved by the secretary of state on August 19, applications involving transfers of defense articles and services to Syria may now be reviewed on a case-by-case basis rather than denied as a matter of policy.
However, the decision does not mean Syria can now purchase any American weapon it wants, nor does it constitute approval of any specific arms deal. Rather, Washington has removed the presumption of denial and can now determine which Syrian requests, if any, it is prepared to approve.
The move is part of a broader series of changes that have dismantled restrictions surrounding Syria. In August, Washington waived separate sanctions that had barred arms sales and export licenses for items on the US Munitions List, and foreign military financing under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. Four days later, the State Department rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
But the question facing Damascus now is not simply whether American weapons have become legally accessible. It is what kind of military Syria is trying to build—and what it actually needs from the United States.
Brig. Gen. Mustafa Ahmad al-Sheikh, former head of the Free Syrian Army’s Military Council and one of the highest-ranking Syrian officers to defect from Bashar Assad’s military during the early years of the war, told The Media Line that rebuilding the armed forces should begin with defining missions and military doctrine, not with shopping lists. Al-Sheikh previously served as head of the Syrian military’s Chemical Branch and as a security officer for the northern region.
I would not begin by asking what weapons we can buy from America. I would ask what mission the Syrian army will be required to perform over the next five or 10 years.
“If we want to think with a military mindset, I would not begin by asking what weapons we can buy from America,” al-Sheikh said. “I would ask what mission the Syrian army will be required to perform over the next five or 10 years.”
Syria, he said, faces long borders, terrorist threats, arms and narcotics smuggling, and areas where state authority still needs to be consolidated, while the military suffers from major weaknesses in command and control, intelligence and surveillance, communications, and air defense.
For that reason, al-Sheikh said the priority should not be the purchase of modern fighter jets or billion-dollar tank fleets.
“The first priority must be rebuilding the military command, control, and communications system,” he said. “You can own a thousand tanks, but if you do not have secure communications between the command, division, brigade, and battalion, and if you do not have a unified picture of the battlefield, you do not have a modern army. You have armed units operating separately.”
The first priority must be rebuilding the military command, control, and communications system
Al-Sheikh placed surveillance, reconnaissance, border security, and counterterrorism immediately behind command and control.
Those needs, he said, include surveillance radars, reconnaissance aircraft and drones, encrypted communications, suitable vehicles for border forces, and intelligence and technical capabilities that allow relatively small numbers of troops to monitor large areas.
Those categories may be among the most realistic areas for initial US-Syria defense cooperation.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) says it continues to engage pragmatically with the Syrian government, is expanding counterterrorism cooperation, and, together with interagency and regional partners, is supporting efforts to responsibly build Syrian security capacity. CENTCOM’s 2026 posture statement describes Syria as the “center of gravity” for the enduring defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) and says limited external assistance remains critical to preventing the group from reconstituting.
Al-Sheikh said the October 1 decision is significant because it opens access to technologies and services that had effectively been closed to Syria. But one Syrian requirement is far more sensitive than encrypted communications or border surveillance: air defense.
“Air defense, in my view, is the most serious strategic requirement,” al-Sheikh said. “Syria needs to restore its ability to monitor its airspace and protect military and vital installations.”
He does not, however, expect the United States to become the fastest or most likely source of advanced air defense systems for Syria.
Such weapons, he said, are directly tied to regional military calculations, particularly Israel, and therefore, would be treated very differently from communications equipment, vehicles, surveillance systems, or counterterrorism assistance.
The United States would also not be the only country positioned to play a role in rebuilding and rearming the Syrian military.
Turkey currently has the clearest formal framework for contributing to the training and equipping of Syrian forces. Damascus and Ankara signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2025 covering training and consultancy as well as the provision of weapons systems, logistical materials, and equipment.
Russia, meanwhile, has not disappeared from Syria’s military landscape. Under a new agreement reached this year, Russian military facilities at Tartus and Khmeimim are being converted into joint training centers while some Russian forces remain in the country.
Other countries are also exploring defense cooperation with Damascus. In January, Syrian defense officials met a delegation from Qatar’s Barzan Holdings to discuss defense industries, military capacity, and modern technology. Syria and Pakistan have also held talks on expanding bilateral military cooperation, although neither track has yet produced a publicly announced Syrian arms purchase.
Al-Sheikh said it would be neither practical nor necessary for Syria simply to move from a Russian-equipped military to an American-equipped one.
“The realistic model, in my opinion, is a military with multiple sources—but not a military with random sources of weapons,” he said.
The realistic model, in my opinion, is a military with multiple sources—but not a military with random sources of weapons
There is, he said, a major difference between diversifying suppliers and building a force whose systems cannot communicate with one another, share ammunition, or operate within the same maintenance and logistical structure.
“The problem in war is not only getting the weapon,” al-Sheikh said. “The more important question is whether you can keep it working after one year or five years. Where does the spare part come from? Who trains the technician? Who repairs the radar? Can a Turkish communications system exchange information with a Russian radar and an American system?”
He sees Turkey as likely to play a major role in training, restructuring, and developing a new military doctrine because of geography and the existing defense relationship. Russia could retain a role in systems and expertise already familiar to Syrian personnel, while the United States could emerge as an important supplier of advanced technology, particularly in communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and border protection.
“The most dangerous thing that could happen to the new Syrian army is for it to become an exhibition of Russian, Turkish, and American weapons that cannot work together,” al-Sheikh said.
That potential competition among suppliers also helps explain the political significance of the US decision beyond the financial value of any eventual arms contracts.
Syrian political researcher and analyst Mustafa al-Naimi told The Media Line that the decision falls somewhere between two interpretations: It is more significant than a technical regulatory adjustment, but it is too early to describe it as an American decision to arm Syria.
“The automatic ban has ended, but automatic approval has not begun,” al-Naimi said.
He views the timing as part of a broader restructuring of the relationship between Washington and Damascus, including sanctions relief, Syria’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, and expanded security engagement.
Al-Naimi argues that American military equipment could create a relationship that extends far beyond the initial delivery.
When the Americans sell you a military system, the relationship does not end when the weapon is delivered
“When the Americans sell you a military system, the relationship does not end when the weapon is delivered,” he said. “There is training, maintenance, spare parts, upgrades, software, and end-use monitoring. That creates a long-term relationship between the Syrian military institution and the American military and security system.”
Such a relationship could also give Washington a degree of influence at a time when Turkey is expanding its defense role in Syria and Russia is trying to preserve elements of its longstanding military presence.
Al-Naimi said that if a US-Syria defense relationship begins to develop, he would expect it initially to focus on capabilities that deepen security cooperation without dramatically altering the regional balance of power—counterterrorism, border security, communications, reconnaissance, training, and selected defensive equipment.
“Weapons, from the perspective of American policy, are not simply a commodity,” he said. “They can become a tool for managing the relationship with Syria.”
Israel remains the most sensitive factor in that equation.
US law requires the administration, when considering proposed arms sales to Middle Eastern countries other than Israel, to determine that such sales would not adversely affect Israel’s “qualitative military edge” (QME). That legal framework is intended to preserve Israel’s ability to counter credible military threats from neighboring states through superior capabilities and training.
That makes it unlikely that all potential Syrian requests would be treated equally.
Border-surveillance equipment or communications systems used in counter-ISIS operations would raise a very different set of considerations from advanced combat aircraft, long-range missiles, or strategic air defense systems.
Al-Naimi said Israel is likely to view any large-scale rebuilding of Syrian military power cautiously, regardless of the source of the weapons. But he argued that American-origin equipment could, in some circumstances, be more controllable from an Israeli security perspective than systems supplied by countries over which Washington has less leverage.
US arms transfers generally come with end-use restrictions, retransfer conditions, and monitoring requirements, giving Washington continuing oversight after delivery.
“There is a difference between Syria obtaining a military system from a country whose political decision Israel can influence and with which it has deep security coordination, and obtaining systems from an outside supplier whose conditions of use Washington and Israel cannot influence in the same way,” al-Naimi said.
He stressed, however, that this does not mean Israel would support broad American rearmament of Syria.
“The type of weapon is decisive,” he said. “Communications equipment, border-monitoring systems, or capabilities used against ISIS can be treated very differently from advanced fighters, long-range missiles, or strategic air defense.”
Turkey adds another layer to the equation. Ankara is already building an institutional relationship with Syria’s defense establishment, while Israeli concerns over an expanding Turkish military role in Syria have become part of the wider regional security debate.
Al-Naimi said Washington could increasingly find itself acting as a balancing force among Damascus, Ankara, and Israel: Syria wants to rebuild its military, Turkey wants a major role in that process, and Israel wants to prevent the emergence of capabilities it considers threatening.
“The more accurate question is not whether Israel will allow Syria to rearm or not,” al-Naimi said. “The question is what kind of Syrian army will be rebuilt, what capabilities it will possess, and who will be able to influence the decisions of that army.”
So far, there is no announced US arms package for Damascus and no public Syrian list of American systems it intends to request.
What changed on October 1 is narrower than that—but still significant.
For years, the US regulatory answer to defense trade with Syria was effectively predetermined. Washington can now say “yes” selectively and conditionally.
As al-Sheikh put it, the success of Syria’s new military will ultimately not be measured by the number of tanks or aircraft it acquires.
It will be measured by whether those weapons operate within a unified military under a single command, doctrine, and integrated logistical system—or whether Syria ends up with a collection of incompatible arsenals supplied by competing international powers.
