As families continue searching for missing loved ones, the reemergence of figures associated with Bashar Assad’s former government raises questions about accountability, economic settlements, and the future of Syria’s political transition 

For nearly 15 years, Hussein al-Tawil and his family have waited to learn what happened to Ali Ahmad al-Tawil, a 29-year-old civilian from Jabal al-Zawiya in the Idlib countryside who disappeared in Damascus in late 2011.  

Year after year, the family received no answers. They did not know whether Ali was alive or dead. According to his brother Hussein, Ali disappeared at the hands of militias loyal to former Syrian President Bashar Assad.  

When Assad’s government collapsed, the family hoped Ali might be among the detainees released from prisons or that newly accessible detention facilities and records might finally reveal his fate. But they found no trace of him. They received neither a death certificate nor any official document explaining what had happened.  

Now, as Hussein continues waiting for news of his brother, he watches figures who once supported Assad reappear in public life, with some seeking proximity to Syria’s new authorities.  

For Hussein, Assad’s fall did not end his family’s ordeal. Instead, it raised another question: How can Syria pursue national reconciliation while so many families still do not know what happened to their loved ones?  

We had hoped for transitional justice that would hold criminals accountable

“We had hoped for transitional justice that would hold criminals accountable, and for moral justice that would remove from public life those who supported Assad through the media, arts, politics, and sports,” al-Tawil told The Media Line.  

He said the renewed public prominence of former government supporters has deepened the anguish of victims’ families, particularly those still waiting for information about missing relatives.  

His concerns extend beyond the absence of accountability. He fears that networks of influence established under Assad could survive by shifting their allegiance to the new leadership.  

In his view, some figures who supported the former government may now be prepared to offer their loyalty to the new authorities in exchange for preserving their economic interests and influence. Without meaningful institutional change, he warned, the same practices that enabled authoritarian rule could reemerge under different leadership.  

Al-Tawil’s experience reflects a broader debate in Syria over the return of individuals associated with Assad’s government to economic, political, and public life, even as victims’ families continue demanding information about the disappeared and accountability for past abuses.  

Syrian political activist and former opposition figure Jubair al-Sukkari believes Assad’s removal has not yet produced the deeper changes many Syrians expected.  

Speaking to The Media Line, al-Sukkari criticized the appearance of figures associated with the former government in institutions established during Syria’s transition, particularly those involved in transitional justice and preserving the memory of victims.  

He cited what he described as the appointment of Futah Saqr, whom he characterized as having a Baathist background and family connections to figures associated with the former government, to a role involving the preservation of historical memory and archives at the National Commission for Transitional Justice.  

Al-Sukkari questioned the criteria used to select individuals entrusted with documenting the Syrian uprising and preserving the experiences of its victims, arguing that such responsibilities require the confidence of survivors and their families.  

The Media Line has not independently verified Saqr’s alleged position, the nature of her responsibilities, or the background described by al-Sukkari. His statements are presented as allegations rather than established findings.  

Al-Sukkari also raised concerns about Fadi Saqr, a figure formerly associated with the pro-Assad National Defense Forces, questioning the public reemergence of individuals linked to armed formations from the previous era without adequate scrutiny of their past roles.  

He referred to allegations of abuses involving pro-government armed groups in Damascus and other parts of Syria and called for investigations into those suspected of participating in violations.  

Such allegations do not, by themselves, establish individual criminal responsibility, which must be determined through evidence and appropriate legal proceedings.  

For al-Sukkari, the renewed visibility of former Assad supporters sends a painful message to those who opposed the previous government and lost relatives during the conflict.  

As families of victims and relatives of martyrs, we have so far achieved only the first objective of our revolution, which was the fall of the regime

“As families of victims and relatives of martyrs, we have so far achieved only the first objective of our revolution, which was the fall of the regime,” he said.  

He also criticized what he described as the marginalization of some military officers who defected from Assad’s forces, arguing that individuals who opposed the former government have not always been given the roles they expected in the new state.  

Nevertheless, al-Sukkari emphasized that backing Assad did not necessarily mean someone had committed crimes. 

“There is a difference between a supporter and a criminal,” he said. 

He argued that Syrians who supported Assad politically or worked in civilian state institutions should not automatically be treated in the same way as individuals found responsible for abuses against civilians.  

Financial settlements involving businessmen associated with Assad’s government have become another major source of controversy.  

One prominent example is the settlement involving businessman Mohammed Hamsho, who was closely tied to the economic circles around the former president.  

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa defended such settlements during a meeting with members of the Syrian diaspora in New York in September.  

Al-Sharaa said authorities had confiscated approximately 80% of Hamsho’s assets while allowing him to retain the portion they determined had not been acquired unlawfully.  

He argued that companies associated with Hamsho provided employment for approximately 40,000 people and that confiscating all their assets could jeopardize those jobs and harm Syria’s economy.  

The president also stressed that a financial settlement would not protect Hamsho from criminal prosecution if he were found responsible for other offenses.  

His remarks outlined the government’s argument for separating asset recovery and economic continuity from criminal accountability.  

Critics, however, question whether such a distinction can be maintained in practice, particularly when individuals with substantial financial resources and established networks may retain influence over public institutions or investigations.  

Bishr al-Hawi, a member of Syria’s People’s Assembly, told The Media Line that it is important to distinguish between the political return of former government figures and the continued economic activity of businessmen previously associated with Assad.  

According to al-Hawi, former political figures have not returned to their previous positions of influence, while some businessmen have negotiated financial settlements with the new authorities and retained portions of their wealth.  

He acknowledged that traders and business figures associated with the former government have resumed economic activities but said they are less prominent than under Assad.  

Al-Hawi argued that these individuals have not necessarily regained their former economic standing or political influence, adding that Syria needs the resources some of them possess.  

At the same time, he acknowledged delays in implementing transitional justice.  

The transitional justice file has not received the momentum we had hoped for

“The transitional justice file has not received the momentum we had hoped for,” al-Hawi said.  

He said the People’s Assembly seeks to accelerate the process in cooperation with the relevant executive institutions.  

In a significant acknowledgment, al-Hawi said the assembly had not yet received a draft transitional justice law from the National Commission for Transitional Justice.  

He explained that the commission was expected to submit a legislative proposal for parliamentary consideration and eventual approval, but that this had not yet happened.  

The People’s Assembly is awaiting the proposal before beginning its legislative review, he said.  

His comments highlight a central tension in Syria’s transition: Economic settlements involving figures associated with the former government are moving forward while, according to a member of the legislature, the proposed legal framework for transitional justice has yet to reach parliament.  

Al-Moutassim al-Kilani, a researcher specializing in international criminal law, said the reintegration of individuals associated with the former government must be governed by clear legal standards that protect victims’ rights and prevent financial or political influence from replacing accountability.  

Speaking to The Media Line, al-Kilani stressed that support for Assad, by itself, does not establish criminal responsibility.  

Criminal accountability, he explained, must be based on specific conduct and evidence rather than former political affiliations.  

He warned, however, that financial settlements could produce impunity in practice if money, personal connections, or political influence obstruct investigations or shield individuals from prosecution, even without any formal grant of immunity.  

Recovering public assets, he argued, does not extinguish criminal liability or eliminate victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparations.  

“Recovering the money is a duty, but it does not pay the price of torture, killing, or enforced disappearance,” al-Kilani said.  

Recovering the money is a duty, but it does not pay the price of torture, killing, or enforced disappearance

He maintained that genuine national reconciliation requires establishing the truth, acknowledging abuses, compensating victims, and reforming the institutions that allowed violations to occur.  

He also rejected collective punishment, emphasizing that former political affiliation or employment in state institutions should not be treated as proof of criminal wrongdoing.  

For al-Kilani, one of the greatest risks is that old networks of influence could preserve their ability to shape political decisions, security institutions, the judiciary, and the economy simply by transferring their loyalty to the new leadership.  

“Changing loyalties does not dismantle a corruption network, and changing faces is not enough if the same mechanisms of control remain in place,” he said.  

He argued that preventing a recurrence of past abuses requires an independent judiciary, accountable security institutions, transparent economic agreements, and effective protections for victims seeking justice.  

The National Commission for Transitional Justice has previously stated that economic settlements do not constitute pardons for serious violations and do not grant immunity from criminal prosecution.  

Questions remain, however, about how that principle will be enforced, whether independent mechanisms exist to examine the records of individuals entering settlements, and what safeguards will protect victims’ claims from political or economic interference.  

The Media Line contacted the head of the National Commission for Transitional Justice for comment on criticism of the transitional justice process and settlements involving figures associated with Assad’s government.  

The commission’s chairman referred the request to its media office.  

After several hours of follow-up, the media office said it would provide answers at a later time but did not specify when. The Media Line had not received responses to its questions by the time this report was prepared.  

The debate reaches beyond whether former Assad supporters should be allowed to participate in Syria’s public life.  

While the authorities defend certain settlements as a means of recovering assets, preserving jobs, and supporting a fragile economy, some former opposition activists and victims’ families fear that reintegrating influential figures without sufficient scrutiny could undermine confidence in the country’s new institutions.  

Legal experts emphasize that transitional justice should neither criminalize everyone who supported the former government nor let economic arrangements replace investigations and accountability.  

With a member of the People’s Assembly acknowledging delays in the legislative process, the question of how Syria will balance economic stability, reconciliation, and victims’ rights remains unresolved.  

For Hussein al-Tawil, however, the debate is not primarily about financial settlements or political appointments.  

It is about one missing person.  

Nearly 15 years after his brother Ali Ahmad al-Tawil disappeared in Damascus, Hussein and his family still do not know what happened to him.  

The government Hussein holds responsible for his brother’s disappearance has fallen, but its collapse has not brought the family the answer it has awaited for so long.  

And as figures from Syria’s past return to public life, Ali remains missing, leaving his family to ask what political change can mean for those who are still waiting for the truth.