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Amnesty Indonesia is right, the Foreign Ministry is wrong: Quit Trump’s Board of Peace

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Amnesty Indonesia is right, the Foreign Ministry is wrong: Quit Trump’s Board of Peace

On Thursday, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry defended the country’s seat on the Board of Peace. Ministry spokesperson Vahd Nabyl Mulachela said joining the Board is part of Indonesia’s effort to support Palestine and help rebuild Gaza. He hoped the Board could lead to an independent Palestine living next to Israel.

He was answering Amnesty International Indonesia. A day earlier, its director, Usman Hamid, said the Board was a mistake from the very beginning and that Indonesia still has time to leave. He spoke in Jakarta after an event with Francesca Albanese, the United Nations expert on the occupied Palestinian territories. Usman said the Board is controlled by the United States, a country that fully supports Israel and its military campaign that has killed so many Palestinian civilians.

The real question is whether the Board of Peace is the right tool. Amnesty says it is not, and Amnesty is right.

The ministry’s hope is understandable. But hope is not a plan. The way the Board actually works tells a different story.

Neil Quilliam, a researcher at Chatham House, a respected think tank in London, studied the Board’s design in February. He explained that real power sits with the Board and its chairman, Trump. Daily decisions go to a Gaza Executive Board, which has no Palestinian members. A foreign military force keeps security.

There is a Palestinian committee of 15 people, but Israel checked and approved its members under American supervision. In simple words, outsiders choose who speaks for Palestinians, and those Palestinians get very little power.

Quilliam also pointed out that the UN Security Council decision backing the plan does not promise a Palestinian state. It only says statehood might become possible after many conditions are met, such as Gaza giving up all its weapons and the Palestinian Authority carrying out reforms. Until then, Gaza and the West Bank stay separated, at least until the end of 2027, when the Board’s mandate ends. By that time, he warns, it may be too late.

The rebuilding plan is no better. Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, has presented a New Gaza with new districts designed to look like Dubai. Quilliam argues the plan treats Gaza like empty beach property, not as part of a Palestinian homeland, and that Palestinians were barely consulted. Building will start in New Rafah, an area under Israeli army control, and Israel and its partners may decide which Palestinians can live there. The likely result, in his view, is two Gazas: one clean, disarmed and closely watched, and another left in ruins, where most Palestinians live.

READ: Why Indonesia joined the Badr pact, and what it must do next

Then there is the West Bank. In February, Israel’s security cabinet approved new rules that widen Israeli control there and make it easier to take Palestinian land. As Quilliam notes, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said Israel would “continue to bury the idea of a Palestinian state.” The Board of Peace has no power over any of this. It only looks at Gaza.

Most painful of all, the killing has not stopped. In September, Hamas urged the Board to stop Israeli attacks on Gaza. This week, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that attacks by Israeli settlers are meant to push Palestinians off their land.

A body that cannot stop bombs in Gaza or land grabs in the West Bank is not bringing peace. It is only managing the damage on terms that suit Israel.

The ministry says Indonesia can steer the Board from the inside. Yet the same spokesperson admitted that Indonesia has put all its discussions in the Board on hold while it watches events in the Middle East. If Indonesia has already stepped back, what influence is it really using?

Staying also has a price. Indonesia has a proud history of standing with Palestine at the United Nations. Indonesia’s name on the Board makes a process built without Palestinians look more acceptable to the world. That works against the very cause Indonesia says it defends.

There is a better road. Amnesty has called on Indonesia to make full use of its place at the UN. Indonesia can work with Arab, Asian and European countries to protect the goal of a Palestinian state, push for sanctions when international law is broken, and help Palestinian groups unite. Even Quilliam says governments must move beyond statements and apply real pressure, or the chance of a Palestinian state will disappear.

Indonesia says it wants to help Palestine. Leaving the Board of Peace would show the world that it means it.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Israel Needs a New Generation of Leaders, Not Just Another Election

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Israel Needs a New Generation of Leaders, Not Just Another Election


The first election since October 7 may change Israel’s government, but the country’s deeper divisions will remain. Real political renewal requires fresh leadership beyond the familiar parties and personalities.

It has become almost passé for pundits to warn that the coming election will be the most crucial in shaping Israel’s future. Pardon my cynicism, but I have heard it all before.

That warning is a mantra repeated at election time, often accompanied by fearmongering. Yet the 2026 election will be the first opportunity for the public to have its say since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023.

Much has changed since October 7. The political landscape, though, remains largely static. The divisions that existed on October 6, 2023, have not disappeared. If anything, they have deepened.

Whether the pro-Netanyahu camp wins, the anti-Netanyahu camp prevails, or the result is a stalemate, I struggle to see a fundamental difference between the two blocs in how they would end the current conflict or approach Palestinian statehood. There are important differences, of course—not least over ultra-Orthodox military enlistment, judicial reform, and the form an inquiry into the failures preceding October 7 should take. But it is difficult to believe that the election alone will resolve the deeper questions facing the country.

Removing Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir from the government might improve Israel’s image abroad. So might the departure of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But it would be folly to assume that a change of faces would, by itself, end Israel’s isolation or alter the way its enemies portray the country. They would have little difficulty casting Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, or Avigdor Liberman as the next villains.

That brings me back to a conversation I had with a 28-year-old student who was called up for reserve duty for the second time in 2024. He believed that the entire leadership of the major parties—the leaders who had embraced the security assumptions that prevailed before October 7—should go. Many Israelis share that sentiment.

Accountability is one of the core principles of public life. Those responsible for the failures that allowed the October 7 attacks to happen cannot simply expect to carry on as before. They must answer for what happened, and some will have to leave public life. An election is one means of accountability; a serious inquiry is another.

But accountability alone will not bring renewal. Nor will a new coalition assembled from the same political cast necessarily heal the divisions that have taken hold. What Israel needs is a new generation of leaders who can build on the strengths the country has shown since October 7 without inheriting the habits and divisions of the old political establishment.

Israel has produced outstanding people in almost every field, including technology, education, business, medicine, law, and the military. Yet too few people with talent and experience in these fields have entered politics. The question is not whether such people exist, but how they can be identified, encouraged, and given the chance to learn how to govern.

October 7 exposed the nation’s failures. Its aftermath also revealed its strengths: Israelis rallied to support one another, often in spite of their leaders. The hope is that a new generation shaped by the events since October 7 can carry that spirit into public life without being trapped by the divisions that preceded them.

No leader is irreplaceable. The political clock will eventually run out for the current generation, including Netanyahu. But renewal will not happen automatically. It may take another election cycle or two. What matters is beginning now: identifying people with integrity and ability and bringing them into public service.

I do not expect the current election to bring the major changes Israel needs. Nor am I persuaded that any of the current candidates can form a unity government capable of healing the country’s divisions.

So I will cast my vote symbolically for The Reservists, which is running on a joint electoral list with the New Economic Party. I do not expect one vote—or one party—to transform Israeli politics overnight. I hope, rather, that the movement can establish a foothold, recruit the heroes of a new generation, and help prepare a new cadre of leaders to take the reins of power over the coming decade.

A 1,000-mile cloud on Mars may reveal physics never seen in nature

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A 1,000-mile cloud on Mars may reveal physics never seen in nature

Every morning during the Martian spring and summer, a thin and extremely long cloud emerges, only to disappear again. The wispy formation appears near the volcano Arsia Mons and gradually elongates until it reaches over 1,000 miles—about the distance from New York to Kansas City as the crow flies—before dissipating. This cycle then repeats for several months.

Since it was first recorded by a probe in 2018, scientists have been unable to find a plausible explanation for the existence of this cloud, often referred to as the Arsia Mons Elongated Cloud (AMEC). Until now. Recently, researchers successfully modeled the cloud’s formation for the first time, their results suggesting that it may be driven by a physical process that has never been directly observed in any planet’s atmosphere.

“We found that we needed to include some exotic physics… physics that, while included in textbooks, is treated as theoretical and usually thought not to happen in nature. It certainly hasn’t been seen in action before,” Jorge Hernández-Bernal, a planetary scientist at Paris’ Sorbonne Université and lead author of the study, said in a press release. “Once we included this physics in our simulations, the AMEC emerged just as we hoped.”

On Earth, clouds usually form when water vapor creates droplets or ice crystals in the presence of tiny particles, such as dust or salt. The new study, published in Nature Geoscience, instead suggests AMEC could be forming through so-called homogeneous nucleation, where vapor changes directly into ice crystals on its own without any help from debris.

“It’s akin to droplets of condensation appearing in the middle of a room, rather than on a window,” Hernández-Bernal explained. “It’s wholly unexpected.”

This phenomenon requires extreme conditions—a sharp temperature drop of 30° Celsius within 10 minutes and high relative humidity. The Arsia Mons volcano also plays a key role. When wind current hits the 65,000-foot-tall volcano, it creates a powerful wave that launches moist air high in the atmosphere in a matter of minutes.

Scientists have assumed a similar phenomenon could occur in the upper atmospheres of other planets, including Venus and even Earth, but it has never been observed. That’s not too surprising given the extreme air humidity required for this phenomenon, which is more than 100,000 times greater than any value measured on Earth.

Before this modeling, it was not known that these humidity levels existed on Mars either. “We don’t have nearly as much information about Mars’ atmosphere as we do about Earth’s, so reproducing the AMEC to this degree is a big success,” said Hernández-Bernal, adding, “the result is remarkable.”

This story originally appeared on WIRED Czech Republic and Slovakia and has been translated from Czech.

Why ultra‑Orthodox parties will decide Netanyahu’s electoral fate

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Why ultra‑Orthodox parties will decide Netanyahu’s electoral fate

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On October 20, 2026, a week before Israel’s elections, dozens of men were detained on suspicion of evading the draft – arrests that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called “unacceptable.”

The young men attend ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, religious schools, whose students were long exempt from the military service mandatory for most Israelis.

A 2024 court ruling that Haredi men must be drafted alongside other Jewish youth intensified the conscription debate. Netanyahu’s government has failed to either legalize the draft exemption or enforce the court’s ruling, though he has said Haredim who are not studying should enlist.

With Israel’s military fighting in several conflicts, those exemptions have become increasingly unpopular: The vast majority of Jewish voters want Haredi communities to share the burden.

Haredi political parties, however, are key potential coalition members as Netanyahu attempts to secure his political future. Although a relatively small percentage of the population, the Haredim hold disproportionate sway in Israel’s parliamentary system.

Growing population

Haredi Jews strictly observe Jewish religious law and often disapprove of liberal interpretations.

They typically live in Haredi-majority neighborhoods where large families are the norm – six children, on average – and about half of the men devote themselves to full-time religious study. The poverty rate is 33%, more than double the percentage for non-Haredi Jews.

The Israeli public is about 14% Haredi, but the community is growing quickly because of its high birth rate. Projections by the Central Bureau of Statistics estimate that almost a quarter of Israelis will be Haredi by 2050.

A busy shopping street with men and women in modest clothing.
People walk the streets of the ultra-Orthodox neighborhood Mea Shearim in Jerusalem, Israel, on April 18, 2024. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Leo Correa

Haredi communities are diverse and represented by two main political parties. Haredim who are Ashkenazi – Jews whose ancestors came from northern and eastern Europe – are linked to United Torah Judaism, or UTJ. Those who are Sephardi or Mizrachi, meaning their ancestors came from the Iberian Peninsula and the Middle East, are linked to Shas.

A third Haredi party, Haredi Public, was formed in July 2026. The party says it will represent Haredim who feel underserved by Shas and UTJ, emphasizing employment and poverty, housing development and the education system. Unlike the other two Haredi parties, it has included women on its candidate list.

Conservative allies

Elections for the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, use a proportional representation system. Any party that receives more than 3.25% of votes receives seats based on the fraction of votes it received. Each party allocates its seats to members based on a list of candidates published before elections.

Having multiple parties with similar target demographics risks dividing the vote, leaving that group with fewer representatives in the Knesset. Shas and UTJ have agreed to share their surplus votes in the 2026 election to maximize their overall seat share.

A few men walk through a plaza in front of a building with a large poster of a man with a white beard and dark glasses.
Orthodox Jews walk past an election campaign banner for the Haredi religious political party Shas, bearing a portrait of former Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, in Jerusalem on Oct. 15, 2026. Photo: John Wessels/ AFP via Getty Images via The Conversation

Because of the low electoral threshold, many parties are able to win seats. No Israeli party has ever attained the 50% share needed to control parliament by itself. As in other countries with similar systems, it is very common for parties to form coalitions and govern as a team.

Likud, one of the major conservative parties, has led most governing coalitions for the past two decades, with party leader Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. Haredi parties are seen as strong conservative allies, and they have been key coalition members for Likud administrations.

Today, as Netanyahu faces challenges from other right-wing parties over his handling of October 7, 2023, and several wars, Likud may need them even more.

Landmark ruling

The fact that Likud has needed Haredi parties to form coalitions has given them negotiating power. For many years, one of their priorities has been draft exemptions for religious education.

Military service is mandatory for most groups in Israel, although Muslim and Christian Arab citizens are generally exempted. Jewish Israelis see conscription as a unifying experience and a costly demonstration of commitment to the state.

Starting at age 18, most women serve two years and most men serve almost three years. Former soldiers can be called up as reservists into their 40s, depending on their training.

For decades, Haredi men received de facto exemptions. It was, effectively, one of several government arrangements that subsidize Haredi communities. Religious schools for teen boys and married men receive government payments for each student.

Given the communities’ low employment rates, large families and high poverty rates, many families rely on public support.

In 2024, Israel’s Supreme Court ruled that a blanket exemption from military service for Haredim was not legal. Netanyahu’s government struggled to enact a compromise between those who favored drafting Haredim and the Haredi parties; the failure to find a lasting legal way to exempt Haredi men led Shas and UTJ to leave the Likud-led coalition in 2025.

Men in black suits and white shirts hold signs that say, 'We will go to jail, but not to the army.'
Ultra-Orthodox Jewish men protest military recruitment by blocking a road in Bnei Brak, near Tel Aviv, Israel, on July 16, 2024. Photo: AP via The Conversation / Ohad Zwigenberg

Growing tensions

Nonetheless, this ruling has not led to mass conscription.

Haredi groups have held public protests, and many have ignored draft notices. While tens of thousands of men are draft eligible but not serving, and most of them are Haredi, fewer than 500 evaders have been arrested in 2026. Netanyahu argues against arrests, saying they discourage men from enlisting without coercion.

In July 2026, at the urging of Haredi parties, the government passed a law to temporarily prevent arresting draft evaders. Some members of Netanyahu’s governing coalition opposed the law, however, and right-wing opposition parties filed petitions to challenge it in court.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett – leader of the Together alliance, and seen as a key contender to oust Netanyahu – has threatened to cut subsidies to the Haredi community if they continue to defy the draft.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the centrist Yashar party, is another top contender to replace Netanyahu. He has proposed allowing 3% of Haredi men exemptions to study, while drafting the majority.

As the number of conflict zones increases – Gaza, southern Lebanon and Iran, as well as deployments in the West Bank – the unequal burden of military participation is a growing source of resentment among many conscripted Israelis and their families. Seven in 10 Jewish Israelis favor drafting the Haredim.

Shas and UTJ, however, have declared they will not join a coalition unless it promises to codify the draft exemption into law.

Shifting coalitions

When the Haredi parties exited Netanyahu’s coalition, Likud replaced them with nationalist parties that emphasize the state and Jewish supremacy.

Particularly notable was the decision to include the Jewish Power party, an offshoot of an earlier group banned for racism; including Kahanist groups was long seen as a red line.

Two men in suits and ties grin and shake hands as several other people watch on.
National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, seen here with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2023, is also head of the Jewish Power party. Photo AP iva The Conversation / Ohad Zwigenberg

Haredi communities, on the other hand, tend to prioritize religious Jewishness over the state. Most Haredim do not consider themselves Zionist, and a small percentage are anti-Zionist.

They argue that it was sacrilegious for people to create a state of Israel rather than waiting for God to return Jews to the land of Israel. Where nationalist politicians emphasize the secular state and military service, Haredim see their religious study as service to the Jewish community.

As Likud’s changing coalition shows, Netanyahu’s alliances are strategic rather than ideological. His decision to side with the Haredim on the recent draft legislation suggests his coalition is open to revision after the October 2026 election.

As the Haredi community grows, its power in the electoral system will become less disproportionate. In a democratic framework, a large social group would deserve proportional representation and influence.

As such, the tension between their electoral power, their demands for exemptions and subsidies, and the tolerance of non-Haredi Jews will persist as a political challenge.

Hannah Ridge is assistant professor of political science, Chapman University; Institute for Humane Studies

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Germany’s military warns of ‘significant’ Russian sabotage threat

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Germany’s military warns of ‘significant’ Russian sabotage threat


Germany’s armed forces classified the threat of ​Russian sabotage against their own troops and facilities as “significant” for the first time, the ‌second-highest level on their internal threat scale, according to a Bundeswehr assessment reported by German broadcasters WDR and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

A defence ministry spokesperson confirmed the assessment, telling reporters: “We are noting that we face a ​significant sabotage threat overall for the Bundeswehr.”

The reassessment was triggered by the discovery in mid-September ​of a crashed drone carrying a tin of high explosives near the Wunstorf ⁠air base in Lower Saxony, WDR and Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported.

CROSSED ‘RED LINE’

The internal document, seen by WDR ​and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, said Russia had crossed “a previously anticipated red line of harmful intent involving kinetic ​and/or lethal effects” against Germany and the Bundeswehr through the use of weaponised drones.

The Wunstorf drone resembles one laden with explosives that was used in a failed attack at Leipzig/Halle airport in August. But unlike the Leipzig incident, which ​authorities said targeted civilian cargo aircraft, investigators believe the Wunstorf drone was aimed at Bundeswehr aircraft, ​the document is cited as saying.

Germany has blamed Russia for the Leipzig attack.

Moscow denied involvement and has consistently rejected accusations ‌of ⁠carrying out sabotage or hybrid attacks in Europe.

The report also cited a pattern of suspected Russian reconnaissance across Germany, including drone overflights of the Arrow 3 missile defence site in Saxony-Anhalt, and a camouflaged camera found filming a strategically important railway station in Minden, Westphalia.

Intelligence services expect the situation to ​worsen in the short term, ​with further actions likely ⁠in the near future, the document says, according to WDR and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

The defence ministry spokesperson said preventive measures were being tailored to individual ​sites and could range from increased guard patrols to additional technical security such ​as infrared ⁠cameras and fence surveillance systems.

The assessment comes just over a week after German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said Germany faced a “shadow war” and called for expanded intelligence powers.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Wednesday that Russian disinformation ⁠and ​hybrid attacks posed the biggest threat to Germany. “My view is ​that our people are still underestimating this big threat to our society… This is a fundamental attack against the entire political ​order we achieved after 1990.”

Ice sheet expansion may have started 2,000 years ago, but we canceled that

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Ice sheet expansion may have started 2,000 years ago, but we canceled that

The tiny remains of the Laurentide Ice Sheet began getting somewhat less tiny.

Baffin Island is a good location for ice sheets to spend their retirement. Credit: Posnov

Barnes Ice Cap sits on the central plateau of Baffin Island, in the Canadian Arctic. It is the last surviving fragment of the Laurentide Ice Sheet, the largest of the Pleistocene ice sheets, which at its peak buried most of Canada under two miles of ice and locked away around 80 meters of sea level. That remnant has now yielded direct physical evidence that ice sheets might have reversed their retreat and started to grow again thousands of years ago.

In a recent Science study, researchers show that the Laurentide reached its smallest size about 3,600 years ago, then started re-expanding roughly 2,000 years ago, which the team interprets as the opening move of the next glaciation. Apparently, this brand-new ice age was on its way until about 1960, when human-caused climate warming reversed it.

Frozen to the bed

“Barnes is the last remaining piece of one of the domes of the Laurentide Ice Sheet,” says Nicolás Young, a geologist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory and lead author of the study. As that enormous dome thinned through the Holocene, its margin withdrew up onto Baffin Island, and what’s left today is the deflated core of something that was once two miles thick. The reason Barnes can testify about its own history, Young explains, comes down to the temperature at its base.

Most glaciers are warm-based, meaning meltwater at the bed lets them slide, and sliding ice grinds up everything beneath it, erasing the record. Barnes is cold-based, and thus frozen directly onto the bedrock beneath it, which prevents it from sliding.

“If there is an ice event where you live and you have to go and scrape off your windshield, that ice that’s plastered to the windshield of your car, that’s a good example of how cold-based ice operates. It’s sort of just stuck to what it’s on,” Young says.

This stuck ice preserves what’s beneath instead of eroding it. As the Laurentide retreated across the plateau, tundra plants colonized the newly bare ground. When the ice came back later, it simply smothered them in place and held them there, intact, for two millennia. To pinpoint the exact moment of this turnaround, Young’s team used two independent dating methods.

Rocks and plants

The first method measures beryllium-10, an isotope that accumulates in the top few centimeters of rock that is exposed to the sky. By sampling a boulder’s upper surface and counting the beryllium, researchers could learn how long it has been uncovered. That technique put a date on the ice sheet’s retreat. It turned out the Laurentide had withdrawn to within today’s ice margin by 3,600 years ago, probably shrinking further by around 3,000.

The second dating method looked at the dead plants. “There were all these plants growing, just like today. And included in that are mosses, these little mosses that are rooted in the ground,” Young says. “So they’re there, they’re living their life, and eventually the Laurentide Ice Sheet starts to re-expand. And when that ice margin covers the moss, it literally kills it.”

By radiocarbon dating the remnants of the moss, the team could pinpoint the moment it died, yielding what glaciologists call a kill date—the moment the ice arrived at that spot. By stringing multiple kill dates of moss samples taken from different spots, scientists reconstructed a map of an advancing ice margin.

About 70 percent of the team’s radiocarbon dates cluster around 1800 CE, at the culmination of the Little Ice Age. “It’s all sort of the same thing,” he says. The Little Ice Age marks the point where Northern Hemisphere glaciers were at their most extensive in recent millennia. At Barnes, Young argues, it was just one late pulse within an advance that had been running for two thousand years.

The most important plants for Young’s team, however, are still hidden under ice. Barnes’ margin has retreated 200 to 800 meters since 1960, exposing mosses killed from about 1000 CE onward. Anything older remains buried. To pinpoint the exact moment the ice started advancing, the team had to look at Barnes’ neighbors.

Pinning down the turn

Scattered across the same plateau are other small ice caps, close enough to share the same climate. Earlier studies collected nearly 200 kill dates from beneath them—not one is older than 2,000 years. “What that means is that all of those ice caps up there didn’t start advancing or re-expanding until about 2,000 years ago,” Young says. “Since the Barnes Ice Cap is right next door, it’s probably a good bet that it also started expanding 2,000 years ago.”

Young argues that continued retreat of the Barnes Ice Cap should eventually reveal the decisive samples. “If we went back there in 20 years or something, as the ice margin has retreated a little more, we actually might be able to sample those 2,000-year-old plants,” he says.

According to the study, the ice started re-expanding at this precise moment because two global forces were pulling it in opposite directions, and one of them eventually won.

A tug of war

Solar energy reaching high northern latitudes peaked about 10,000 to 11,000 years ago and has declined ever since, pushing the planet toward the next ice age. Meanwhile, atmospheric carbon dioxide crept up by roughly 20 parts per million between 8,000 and 2,000 years ago, increasing the greenhouse effect that was heating the atmosphere up. “That drop in insolation and temperatures actually overwhelmed the small temperature forcing the little bit of carbon dioxide rise over the same time span,” Young explains.

Eventually, 2,000 years ago, temperatures dropped far enough due to lower sunlight in the high latitudes, and the effects of carbon dioxide weren’t high enough, so ice sheets started to re-expand. This happened despite the fact that calculations of orbital forcings, together with modeling of how carbon dioxide interferes with glacial inception, have suggested the next ice age was postponed by tens of thousands of years. Young argues there’s really no contradiction between these models and the evidence his team collected in the field.

“A lot of people have defined glacial inception as glaciers and ice sheets needing to be of a certain size—big enough that we’ll say, ah, yes, we are into the next ice age,” Young says. “And that’s perfectly reasonable, because until now there’s been no way to actually pinpoint when an ice sheet first turns around and starts to expand.” But a few geological moments after the Laurentide sheet started re-expanding, humanity entered the chat.

Greenhouse gases had risen by about 12 ppm between 1750 and 1850, another 50 ppm by 1960, and a further 138 ppm by 2024. “Once we hit the Industrial Revolution, we’re now pumping way more carbon dioxide at a magnitude that has never occurred in the geologic record,” Young says. By 1960, Barnes’ mass balance went negative and its advance ended.

Today, Barnes Ice Cap is dying. In the 1960s and ’70s, roughly 35 percent of its surface sat above the area’s snow line. By the early 2000s, about 3 percent did. Today, none of it does. “This means in the summer, it’s all melting. There’s no more accumulation zone. There’s no more new ice forming,” Young says. “An ice cap or glacier cannot survive if it does not have an accumulation zone.” According to his models, under any plausible emissions scenario, Barnes will disappear within a few centuries.

So did we actually dodge the bullet by warming the climate so quickly?

Canceled ice age

“Frankly, in modern times, no one wants to live in an ice age climate. Things would be quite hard and quite different,” Young says. He argues, though, that we did not exactly do ourselves a favor here. To get to a true, full ice age climate with big ice sheets, it would have taken several tens of thousands of years. “I would argue that the pumping of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere hasn’t really saved us from anything,” Young claims. What we have done instead is interrupt a cycle that was very old and very regular.

“The pacing of ice ages over the last 2.5 million years has been one of the most consistent cycles in the Earth system that we have,” Young says. “We have evidence now that humans, and specifically greenhouse gases, have actually terminated one of the most consistent cycles on Earth.”

The study is published in Science: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aed3379

Photo of Jacek Krywko

Jacek Krywko is a freelance science and technology writer who covers space exploration, artificial intelligence research, computer science, and all sorts of engineering wizardry.

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China bets refitted destroyers can hold line in US numbers race

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China bets refitted destroyers can hold line in US numbers race

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Recent midlife upgrades to China’s older surface combatants highlight an ongoing debate over whether preserving naval fleet mass provides an operational edge over purely qualitative technological modernization in naval warfare.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has carried out an extensive midlife refit of its legacy Type 051C guided-missile destroyer, replacing aging Russian-built combat systems with modern domestic air defense systems, based on recent sea trial imagery.

Commissioned in the mid-2000s as a stopgap fleet-air-defense platform, the Luzhou-class warship originally relied on imported Russian S-300FM Rif-M vertical launch missile systems and heavy rotating tracking radars to shield coastal approaches.

The overhaul, conducted at northern naval shipyards as the vessel nears the final phase of its operational service life, stripped out the dated Russian components and replaced them with indigenous universal vertical launch cells and advanced Chinese phased-array radars.

The upgrade is designed to streamline maintenance logistics, eliminate reliance on foreign parts, and enhance the warship’s tactical interoperability within modern, digitally integrated battle groups operating alongside newer Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers.

By fielding domestic surface-to-air missiles and updated electronic warfare suites, the PLAN extends the combat relevance and coastal air-defense utility of its veteran surface combatants before their eventual planned retirement.

While a February 2026 Newsweek article notes that China initially built the modern PLAN using Soviet technology in the 2000s, Alex Luck adds that legacy Russian-built systems in PLAN service may disappear within the next decade or two.

Luck notes that China has now overtaken Russia in some areas, especially sensors and electronics, thanks to its much larger domestic electronics and semiconductor industries.

He adds that comprehensive modernization of aging destroyers such as the Type 051C reflects the PLAN’s desire not to compromise on the number of its large surface combatants, allowing China to maintain front-line combat mass without sacrificing ship numbers as it transitions entirely to advanced domestic designs.

The PLAN’s decision to modernize legacy surface combatants rather than decommission them raises the question of whether the strategic utility of fleet mass outweighs the compounding operational liabilities of sustaining older hulls in peer naval competition.

Keeping older warships in service creates multiple challenges for navies. In a March 2026 Heritage Foundation report, Brent Sadler says warships more than 20 years old pose severe operational, structural, and budgetary challenges for navies trying to sustain frontline combat readiness against modern adversaries.

Sadler notes that decades of deferred maintenance on aging hulls trigger compounding structural degradation, rendering life extensions costly and difficult while draining limited shipyard capacity from new construction.

He adds that legacy platforms increasingly suffer obsolescence, requiring extensive retrofits to accommodate modern radar, electronic warfare suites, and missile cells.

According to Sadler, keeping these older vessels also risks fleet-wide firepower losses upon retirement and strains overburdened maintenance crews already contending with persistent spare-part shortages.

But the warship-age problem might be less of a challenge for the PLAN than for the US Navy. In a June 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Alexander Palmer and other authors note that about 70% of active Chinese warships were launched after 2010, compared with just 25% of the US Navy.

Palmer and others point out that the disparity is particularly pronounced among surface combatants: the PLAN deployed 23 destroyers launched in the past decade versus just 11 operational US equivalents and has launched eight cruisers since 2017 compared to none for the US, which has not launched a similarly large type (the Zumwalt-class destroyer) since 2016.

Furthermore, US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) estimates suggest Chinese shipbuilders have roughly 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the US, raising the question of why the PLAN bothers preserving older hulls at all.

Because Chinese state-backed yards leverage an enormous commercial shipbuilding base to absorb naval construction, this dual-use industrial capacity lets shipbuilders rapidly accelerate combat vessel output, absorb attrition and conduct high-volume battle-damage repairs during a protracted war, echoing Allied manufacturing advantages in World War II.

Yet keeping older warships in service could confer decisive quantitative advantages. In a January 2023 Proceedings article, Sam Tangredi points out that numerical superiority routinely overcomes technological advantages in peer naval conflicts because volume lets forces absorb damage, exhaust adversary munitions, and mass decisive firepower.

Tangredi says that while initial technological leads rapidly erode over time, larger fleets retain combat striking power after absorbing first salvos and can overwhelm defensive systems through multi-axis saturation attacks.

He adds that greater platform mass also enhances broad-area scouting, rapidly depletes an opponent’s finite stockpiles of expensive precision munitions, creates complex targeting dilemmas, and provides the operational resilience needed to replace catastrophic wartime losses.

Fleet numbers illustrate this dynamic. the US Department of Defense’s 2020 China Military Power Report (CMPR) formally recognized that the PLAN had become the world’s largest maritime force by hull count, deploying about 350 ships and submarines, including more than 130 major surface combatants.

In contrast, an October 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report recorded an active US Navy inventory of 301 battle force ships that year, including 94 large surface combatants.

That discrepancy may widen, with an April 2025 US CRS report noting that the PLAN’s fleet of over 370 vessels is projected to grow to 395 by 2025 and 435 by 2030, led by major surface combatants.

In contrast, a January 2026 US CRS report shows that US Navy battle force inventory fell from 296 hulls in late 2024 to 293 by late 2025, with projections anticipating 294 ships by 2030 amidst acute shipyard capacity constraints and procurement delays.

However, the April 2025 CRS report cautions that comparing US and Chinese naval capabilities solely through ship counts or aggregate fleet tonnage is fundamentally misleading and analytically flawed.

The report says hull numbers are a one-dimensional metric that overlooks critical combat determiners, including weapon payloads, sensor sophistication, networking, logistics, personnel proficiency, and doctrine.

It also adds that modern naval warfighting increasingly hinges on internal electronics and software that external observation cannot judge. It cautions that crude quantitative tallies obscure wide fleet asymmetries and fail to measure how each force aligns with its respective strategic missions.

Ultimately, the PLAN’s fleet-mass doctrine will succeed only if integrated digital systems and tactical networking keep legacy hulls combat-effective, or if rising lifecycle maintenance costs eventually favor qualitative modernization.

Intel gets waiver after worries fuzzy US ban on foreign-made robots may hit fabs

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Intel gets waiver after worries fuzzy US ban on foreign-made robots may hit fabs

US chip champion Intel was so confused by the US government ban on foreign-made robots that it requested and received a waiver “out of an abundance of caution.” The tech company wanted to make sure that it could continue using certain robotic vehicles in its US chip fabs.

The uncertainty surrounding the Federal Communications Commission ban on certain foreign-made robots was revealed in the agency’s decision to grant Intel’s waiver request. On October 22, the FCC published its order allowing Intel to continue using the foreign-made robots in US semiconductor manufacturing facilities for a period of one year.

The robots in question are automated guided vehicles operating on “tracks or predefined paths” while often requiring operator oversight, according to Intel’s website. They help to move materials and items around within warehouses and factory floors.

Such robotic vehicles are typically manufactured by Japanese companies like Murata Machinery and Daifuku Co., according to Bloomberg News. But the exact types of robotic vehicles used by Intel were only identified in a “confidential appendix” that accompanied its request.

The FCC’s ban mainly covers new models of mobile robots, like humanoid robots and robot vacuums, and still allows for the import of robots previously approved for sale in the United States. But the agency rules seem to restrict major modifications to “previously authorized devices.”

Intel’s waiver request stated that it was “unclear” whether its robotic vehicles even qualify as robots covered by the FCC ban but said it sought relief just in case. The tech company also received approval to “make certain hardware, software, and firmware changes” that would help ensure the continued operation and maintenance of the robotic vehicles.

The tech company described the robotic vehicles as being “critical to its domestic semiconductor manufacturing operations” and argued that the ability to maintain the robots was crucial to avoiding any disruptions to chip production. It also said there are no US-made alternatives that meet the company’s requirements.

The FCC approval came within a week of when Intel filed its waiver request on October 16. That is not too surprising given the importance of Intel to the Trump administration’s plans for reshoring chip manufacturing—not to mention that the US government took an $8.9 billion equity stake in the chip company.

Meanwhile, the US robotics industry at large is still grappling with the consequences of the FCC ban on foreign-made robots, given that China is the world’s leading supplier of robots and robotic components. Ars previously talked with one US robotics distributor that has pivoted from importing China’s humanoid robots to opening a US manufacturing facility for robots.

Some analysts have warned that the US government’s attempt to boost domestic production of robots via the restrictions on foreign-made robots could backfire for US industry. A report by the market intelligence firm International Data Corporation looks forward to 2030 and estimates that the FCC rule could reduce US revenue from deploying humanoid robots by 58 percent compared to pre-restriction expectations.

Hollywood Icon Forced to ‘Retire’ Due to Blindness

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Hollywood Icon Forced to ‘Retire’ Due to Blindness


Hollywood legend Judi Dench has made a heartbreaking admission about her future, revealing that her deteriorating eyesight has left her unable to act, read or even recognize the faces of people standing directly in front of her.

The 91-year-old Oscar winner, whose extraordinary career has spanned more than seven decades, says her worsening vision has made it impossible to continue the work that defined much of her life.

Speaking during an emotional interview on BBC Radio 4’s Today program on October 22, Dench revealed just how dramatically her life has changed since being diagnosed with age-related macular degeneration in 2012.

“I can’t be on stage. I can’t do a play any more. I can’t do a film any more. I can’t read any more,” she admitted.

For an actress celebrated for her remarkable memory, commanding stage presence and unforgettable performances, the admission marks a devastating turning point.

But the difficulties extend far beyond Hollywood. Dench revealed that she can no longer clearly recognize familiar faces, sometimes approaching complete strangers because she mistakenly believes she knows them.

During the interview, she told BBC presenter Emma Barnett that she could not see her face, despite sitting directly across from her.

The beloved actress also shared a particularly touching example of how much her world has changed. Although she has always appreciated the beauty of nature, she can no longer enjoy certain sights that once brought her happiness.

Recalling reports of a spectacular display of bluebells, Dench explained that she had been unable to see a single flower. Instead, she now relies partly on her memories of familiar surroundings to picture what her eyes can no longer make out.

Dench’s condition, known as age-related macular degeneration, damages the central portion of the retina responsible for sharp, detailed vision. It is a leading cause of serious vision loss among older adults and can make everyday activities such as reading, driving and recognizing faces extremely difficult.

Although the condition does not typically cause complete blindness, its effects can become severely limiting.

For Dench, the decline has been gradual but relentless. She previously revealed that her once-reliable photographic memory was no longer enough to help her learn scripts because she could not see the words on the page. By 2023, she was relying on friends to read lines aloud so she could memorize them through repetition.

Her latest comments suggest that even those adjustments are no longer enough to make traditional stage and film performances possible.

The news is especially poignant considering Dench’s remarkable place in entertainment history.

After establishing herself as one of Britain’s finest Shakespearean performers, she achieved international fame as M, the formidable intelligence chief in the James Bond franchise. She appeared in eight Bond films, becoming a favorite among audiences during the Pierce Brosnan and Daniel Craig eras.

Her unforgettable performance as Queen Elizabeth I in the 1998 film Shakespeare in Love earned her an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actress, despite her limited screen time.

She also delivered acclaimed performances in Mrs Brown, Iris, Notes on a Scandal and Philomena, earning a reputation as one of the most versatile and respected actresses of her generation.

While Dench has not issued a formal retirement announcement, her latest admission makes clear that returning to the type of acting work that made her famous is no longer realistic.

Still, she has not completely disappeared from entertainment. Earlier in 2026, she contributed a voice performance to the fantasy film The Magic Faraway Tree, demonstrating that her distinctive voice remains a powerful part of her artistic legacy.

She is also preparing for the November 3 release of her memoir, Is It Too Late to Make a Run for It?, written with longtime friend and theater director Brendan O’Hea.

Despite her physical limitations, Dench has maintained her famously sharp humor and her deep affection for Shakespeare, particularly his sonnets, which she continues to admire for their extraordinary ability to capture human emotions.

Asked how she feels about growing older, the actress dismissed the subject with characteristic bluntness, describing aging as “rubbish” and explaining that she tries not to dwell on circumstances she cannot change.

For generations of moviegoers and theater audiences, Dench’s performances have been unforgettable. And although her failing eyesight may have brought an extraordinary chapter of her life to a close, the legacy she leaves behind remains firmly intact.

Israel’s Election: The Polls Are Split, and So Is the Press

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Israel’s Election: The Polls Are Split, and So Is the Press


From pro-Netanyahu broadcasters to liberal newspapers and the religious press, competing forecasts range from a renewed right-wing government to another parliamentary stalemate

Five days before Israelis vote for their next Knesset, the country’s news media are presenting remarkably different pictures of the election. In much of the mainstream press, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot is heading for a first-place finish, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is struggling to retain power, and another political deadlock is a serious possibility. In the pro-Netanyahu media, the prime minister is substantially ahead, and his right-wing and religious allies may already have enough support to form another government.

Yet beneath those conflicting headlines lies one important point of agreement: The election is exceptionally difficult to predict, and winning the largest number of seats does not necessarily mean winning the premiership.

A survey of polling and political reporting in Channel 12, Channel 13, Kan, i24NEWS, Israel Hayom, Ynet, Walla, The Times of Israel, Zman Yisrael, and the pro-Netanyahu Channel 14 reveals a striking divide. Channel 14’s latest survey gives Netanyahu’s bloc 62 seats, enough for a narrow parliamentary majority. Most other major surveys place his bloc well below the 61 seats needed to govern, but do not give his opponents a clear majority either.

There is also an important timing qualification. The final pre-election weekend is October 23–24, and the last Friday newspaper editions and television broadcasts have not yet appeared. This survey therefore examines the reporting, polls, and editorial positions available through Thursday evening, rather than treating forthcoming weekend commentary as already published.

What the Latest Polls Actually Say

SELECTED POLLS AVAILABLE OCTOBER 22

News outlet Leading party Netanyahu bloc Non-Netanyahu Zionist parties
Channel 12, Oct. 21 Eisenkot, 23 51 55
Channel 13, Oct. 21 Eisenkot, 20 49 52
Israel Hayom, Oct. 22 Eisenkot, 23 50 56
Walla, Oct. 20 Eisenkot, 23 48 54
Kan 11, Oct. 18 Eisenkot, 23 51 52
i24NEWS, Oct. 20 Netanyahu, 26 58 48
Channel 14, Oct. 21 Netanyahu, 30 62 44
Zman Yisrael/Times of Israel, Oct. 22 Eisenkot, 23 51 51
Seats out of 120. The 61-seat line is the majority threshold. Figures use each outlet’s own bloc classification where available; the Arab parties and, in several surveys, the Hendel–Zelicha list are counted separately. The Zman Yisrael survey was released October 22 but its fieldwork was conducted October 14–15.

Netanyahu bloc: published seat projections

The October 21 Channel 14 survey is the only one in this selection giving Netanyahu a majority.

These are not minor disagreements over one or two seats. Channel 14 gives Likud 30 seats and its allies a parliamentary majority. Channel 13 gives Likud just 19 seats and Netanyahu’s bloc only 49. Both cannot be accurate descriptions of the electorate.

Some caution is necessary when interpreting polling averages. Different polling organizations use different methodologies, and the ideological composition of their samples may differ. Independent aggregators also produce divergent averages depending on which polling organizations they include and how they weight them. For that reason, comparing the actual published polls is more illuminating than choosing a single poll-of-polls figure and presenting it as a definitive forecast.

There are, however, three broad patterns. Most polling organizations place Eisenkot’s Yashar first, typically with 20–24 seats. Netanyahu’s Likud leads in the consistently more favorable polls published by Channel 14 and i24NEWS. And even where anti-Netanyahu Zionist parties collectively outnumber Netanyahu’s bloc, they generally fall short of forming a government without additional partners.

How the Different Media Camps Are Covering the Race

The mainstream and center: Eisenkot leads, but a victory may not produce a government

The strongest common theme in Channel 12, Channel 13, Kan, Ynet, Walla, and much of the reporting carried by Maariv is the growing distinction between an electoral victory and the ability to govern.

An October 21 polling comparison published by Maariv and carried by The Jerusalem Post averaged the Channel 12, Channel 13, Kan, and Walla surveys. It found Eisenkot’s Yashar averaging 22.5 seats, compared with 19.75 for Likud. But the larger blocs remained close: approximately 50 seats for Netanyahu’s allies and 53 for the Zionist opposition. Neither was close to a majority.

Ynet goes further than merely reporting those figures. In an October 21 analysis updated ahead of Thursday, political reporters Moran Azulay and Saar Hess assessed several possible governing arrangements and assigned them probabilities. They rated a Netanyahu-led right-wing government as unlikely, an Eisenkot-led change government as unlikely, and various unity and minority-government arrangements as very unlikely.

Their highest-probability scenario was another election, potentially in 2027.

Israel Hayom provides a particularly interesting counterpoint. Despite its longstanding reputation as a newspaper sympathetic to Netanyahu, its October 22 poll, conducted by Kantar, places Eisenkot first with 23 seats, Likud second with 21, and Netanyahu’s bloc at only 50. Bennett’s Beyachad alliance rises to 14 seats. The paper’s reporting therefore does not fit the assumption that every right-leaning outlet is predicting a Netanyahu victory.

The Jerusalem Post, which generally approaches Israeli politics from a center-right perspective, has emphasized both the polling disagreement and the difficulties facing either potential prime minister. Its October 21 coverage described a near-tie between the blocs in the mainstream polling average, while a separate report examined how Netanyahu might retain power even without winning 61 seats.

The pro-Netanyahu right: A majority may be within reach

Channel 14 is the clearest exception to the prevailing polling picture.

Its October 21 survey, conducted by Shlomo Filber’s NEXT DATA, puts Likud on 30 seats, Eisenkot’s Yashar on 20, and Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc on 62.

That result would allow Netanyahu, in principle, to form another government with parties already aligned with him, without recruiting an opposition faction. Channel 14’s broader election coverage is also strongly favorable to Netanyahu.

The difference goes beyond numerical forecasts. The independent media watchdog The Seventh Eye reported on October 16 that Channel 14 had continued excluding opposition politicians from its interviews in September. Across the five major television news channels, the watchdog found that 52% of political interviews featured representatives of Netanyahu’s camp, compared with 42% for his opponents. The figures measure airtime, not formal endorsements, and include coverage of sitting government figures.

i24NEWS provides a less decisive but still relatively Netanyahu-friendly polling picture. Its October 20 Direct Polls survey puts Likud first on 26 seats and the Netanyahu bloc on 58. That makes Netanyahu significantly stronger than in Channel 12 or Channel 13’s surveys, but it still leaves him three seats short of a majority.

The left: Opposition to Netanyahu does not resolve the coalition problem

Haaretz’s editorial position is unmistakably critical of Netanyahu and his government, particularly concerning democratic institutions, the judiciary, the conduct of the war, and the country’s future direction.

That position should not, however, be confused with a formal endorsement of Eisenkot, Bennett, or Yair Golan’s Democrats. I could not verify an unequivocal institutional endorsement of one of those parties in the material published through October 22.

The distinction is particularly relevant because the anti-Netanyahu electorate is divided among parties with different ideological commitments. A preference for replacing Netanyahu does not establish agreement over who should lead the replacement government, whether Arab parties should participate, or whether any compromise with Likud would be acceptable.

What the Religious and Haredi Press Is Saying

Some of the most revealing reporting comes from the religious press, where the principal question is not simply whether Netanyahu has enough votes, but whether the parties traditionally counted in his camp will remain united.

The national-religious weekly Besheva published an unusually explicit forecast on October 22. Political correspondent Amiel Yarchi argued that, absent a last-minute surprise, neither bloc would be able to assemble a government. He suggested that politicians were already positioning themselves for the election that might follow this one.

Yarchi identified Avigdor Liberman and Yitshak Goldknop, a senior United Torah Judaism figure, as potential decision-makers. Liberman’s refusal to support a government dependent on Arab-party votes could prevent Eisenkot from governing. Meanwhile, tensions between Netanyahu and Goldknop could complicate even a narrow right-wing majority.

This is a significant finding: A commentator writing in a national-religious, right-leaning publication is openly anticipating another round of elections.

Arutz Sheva, another national-religious outlet, has published competing polls and explored a different escape route from deadlock. Political scientist Prof. Avi Diskin told the outlet that greater turnout among Arab voters could change the election’s arithmetic, but that a Netanyahu–Eisenkot partnership might eventually become possible. He presented it as a plausible scenario, not a confirmed agreement or a prediction of an immediate coalition.

Makor Rishon, the conservative national-religious newspaper, has also examined the possibility of alternative coalition arrangements, including involving Bennett, as politicians confront the possibility of another election. These remain speculative arrangements dependent on leaders reversing their commitments.

In the Haredi media, one of the most consequential developments concerns the traditional party newspapers.

Political commentator Avi Ravina told Haredi radio station Kol Chai on October 12 that Yated Neeman and HaMevaser were giving substantial election coverage to United Torah Judaism, while HaModia, associated with the Ger Hasidic movement, had conspicuously failed to mobilize readers in the customary fashion.

Ravina connected the difference to internal Hasidic tensions and reported concerns that some disillusioned Haredi voters might stay home. He cited figures suggesting that as many as 10% of Haredi voters could abstain, although that figure should be treated as a reported political assessment rather than a verified turnout forecast.

Even JDN, a Haredi news outlet, is not uniformly optimistic about Netanyahu’s prospects. Its October 19 election model, drawing on 13 polls from eight polling organizations, projected 58 seats for the existing coalition parties, 47 for the Zionist opposition, and 15 for the Arab parties.

The analysis focused heavily on votes potentially lost to parties below the electoral threshold, especially smaller right-wing lists.

For Shas, the affiliated newspaper HaDerech belongs to a different category from an independent newspaper offering an editorial endorsement: Its institutional political identification is with the party itself. Similarly, Yated Neeman and HaMevaser have longstanding factional loyalties. Such ties are more useful for understanding their electoral messages than treating each publication as an independent forecaster.

Which Outlets Are Actually Endorsing Candidates?

The distinction between institutional endorsement, political sympathy, and ordinary election coverage is important.

Outlet or media group Editorial orientation or relationship Verified position through Oct. 22
Channel 14 Strongly pro-Netanyahu Consistently favorable coverage and polling; no separate formal endorsement verified
i24NEWS Generally more favorable Netanyahu polling Likud leads its survey; no formal endorsement verified
Israel Hayom / HaYom Historically Netanyahu-friendly Reports Eisenkot ahead; no formal endorsement verified
Haaretz Liberal-left, strongly critical of Netanyahu Clearly favors political change; no specific party endorsement verified
Yedioth Ahronoth / Ynet, Maariv, Walla Mainstream commercial outlets with varied commentary Report competing party claims and polls; no institutional endorsements verified
Kan, Channel 12, Channel 13 Public-service or commercial broadcasters Election coverage and opinion from commentators; no verified institutional candidate endorsements
Yated Neeman, HaMevaser Haredi factional publications Promoting United Torah Judaism’s electoral interests
HaModia Associated with Ger Hasidism Reportedly withholding its customary active campaign mobilization
HaDerech Shas-affiliated newspaper Institutionally identified with Shas
Besheva, Makor Rishon, Arutz Sheva National-religious and generally right-leaning Varied commentary; no specific blanket party endorsement verified

 

The most defensible answer is therefore that formal endorsements are much less prominent in the mainstream Israeli news media than ideological sympathies and commentary. The clearest institutional party allegiances are found in the factional Haredi press.

This table does not purport to cover every individual columnist. A Channel 12 commentator, a Haaretz opinion writer, or a Jerusalem Post columnist may publicly advocate for a candidate without that position representing the organization as a whole.

Who Thinks a Government Will Be Formed Quickly—and Who Expects Another Election?

Three identifiable strands of prediction emerge from the reporting.

The Netanyahu-majority scenario: Channel 14’s 62-seat projection is the clearest numerical basis for a relatively straightforward Netanyahu-led coalition. The parties in that bloc have established political relationships, making it a simpler governing formula than any currently apparent Eisenkot coalition.

But it would be an overstatement to say that Channel 14 has established that Netanyahu will quickly form a government. A single survey is not an election result, 62 is a slender majority, and internal negotiations over portfolios, military conscription, and coalition policy could still be difficult.

The Netanyahu-survives-without-a-majority scenario: In an October 12 Jerusalem Post analysis, Anna Barsky reported that some Likud officials privately considered 55 or 56 seats an important target, even if Netanyahu failed to reach 61. Their calculation was that such a bloc could prevent his rivals from governing, leaving him in office as caretaker prime minister while they sought either a coalition partner or another election.

The same report identified Bennett as a potential recruit, but said no negotiations with him had taken place. It is a description of a Likud strategy, not evidence that Bennett intends to join Netanyahu.

The renewed-deadlock scenario: Ynet’s October 21–22 assessment is the clearest published forecast that another election is more probable than any of the plausible coalition alternatives. Besheva’s October 22 commentary reaches a similar conclusion from a national-religious perspective. The Jerusalem Post’s polling comparisons, JDN’s election model, and the surveys from Kan, Walla, and the major commercial broadcasters also provide numerical reasons to take deadlock seriously, even where the outlets do not explicitly forecast a new election.

As of Thursday evening, I did not find a comparably well-substantiated, explicit forecast from a major outlet that an Eisenkot-led government will be formed quickly. Polls giving Eisenkot first place do not demonstrate that the necessary coalition exists.

Why Forming an Eisenkot Government Would Be So Difficult

The essential obstacle is the arithmetic of the Arab parties.

The Joint List and Ra’am together are projected to win approximately 13–15 seats in many recent surveys. That means there may be enough legislators opposed to Netanyahu to deny him a majority while still lacking a viable alternative governing coalition.

Eisenkot’s bloc could theoretically secure the votes needed to form a government through cooperation with some Arab-party legislators, either inside a coalition or through outside support.

But Liberman has rejected a minority government reliant on Arab-party votes. Bennett has also rejected relying on Ra’am. Eisenkot himself has ruled out joining a Netanyahu-led government, including under a rotation arrangement.

Ynet’s analysis judged these commitments sufficiently restrictive that every coalition alternative was unlikely or very unlikely.

The Arabic-language press, including Arab48 and Panet/Hala TV, has followed the same polling and paid particular attention to the Arab parties’ expected representation and the possible consequences of higher Arab turnout. Arab48 also reported a Maariv survey showing that Israelis preferred a unity government to another election if neither side achieved a majority.

That public preference is important, but it is not a forecast that unity will happen. The October 16 Maariv survey found that approximately 55% preferred unity, compared with 27% favoring another election. Political leaders, however, have to reach agreements that voters do not.

A second uncertainty is the 3.25% electoral threshold. Parties such as Ofer Winter’s Amcha Yisrael and the Reservists-Economic alliance led by Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha are close enough to the threshold in some polls to change the distribution of seats materially.

If one list enters the Knesset while another falls short, the difference may be four or more seats, enough to change the coalition calculations. The latest Israel Hayom, Channel 12, Channel 13, Walla, and Channel 14 polls disagree substantially about which of these smaller parties will win representation.

Finally, even if the electorate gives one leader a clear relative advantage, the process of forming a government is not immediate. The president must consult party representatives and select a Knesset member to attempt to form a coalition. The initial period is generally 28 days, potentially extendable by 14 days, with further constitutional procedures if that attempt fails.

Netanyahu would remain caretaker prime minister until a new government is sworn in, even if Likud finishes second.

The Big-Picture Consensus

The Israeli press has no genuine consensus about whether Eisenkot or Netanyahu will win the largest number of seats. Channel 14 and i24NEWS substantially favor Likud, while most of the other recent published polls favor Eisenkot.

There is, however, a stronger consensus concerning the difficulty of assembling a majority.

Across much of the mainstream press, in the national-religious Besheva, and in Haredi polling analysis, the central concern is that the election may replace one parliamentary impasse with another. Netanyahu has a cohesive set of potential coalition partners but, in most surveys, too few seats. Eisenkot may command the largest individual party and a larger anti-Netanyahu parliamentary camp, but his possible partners do not agree on the terms of governing.

Channel 14’s polling provides the principal counterargument: Netanyahu may already have the 61 seats required and could simply renew his right-wing coalition.

The outcome may therefore hinge on a relatively small number of votes, the electoral survival of minor parties, turnout in Arab and Haredi communities, and whether politicians honor the coalition red lines they have drawn during the campaign.

The most revealing possibility is that both leading camps could claim an election victory on October 27, while neither is able to govern. In that event, the political contest will not have ended when the polls close. It will merely have moved from the ballot box to the negotiations over the next government.

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