Following the attempted hijacking of a Flydubai flight, an Israeli aviation security expert proposes remotely activated cockpit cameras, while others call for tighter crew screening and better intelligence sharing

A bomb scare aboard a Delta Air Lines flight at Ben Gurion Airport on Tuesday morning prompted a security search that found no explosives, less than two weeks after an attempted hijacking of a Flydubai flight bound for Tel Aviv exposed serious questions about Israel’s aviation security arrangements.

Passengers were evacuated after the Delta flight arrived from New York, and the aircraft was moved to an isolated area for inspection. Authorities found no explosives, and preliminary assessments suggested the anonymous threat might have been a hoax.

The September 30 Flydubai incident presented a different and potentially more dangerous threat: An airline employee allegedly attempted to turn the aircraft into a weapon.

According to prosecutors in the United Arab Emirates, a co-pilot aboard Flydubai flight FZ1073 attacked the captain with an emergency ax and attempted to seize control of the aircraft. Investigators said he intended to crash the plane into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion Airport, causing mass casualties.

The aircraft plunged thousands of feet before the wounded captain, passengers, and other crew members managed to subdue the attacker. Two additional pilots aboard the flight helped bring the aircraft safely to an emergency landing in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Mena Bacharach, an international aviation security expert and former senior aviation security official with Israel’s Shin Bet, said the attack demonstrated the need for additional technological safeguards inside aircraft cockpits.

Bacharach proposed installing remotely activated, Wi-Fi-based cockpit cameras that would allow authorized personnel on the ground to observe what was happening during an emergency. The cameras would remain off during normal operations and activate only after a distress signal had been triggered, potentially allowing ground personnel to assess a crisis and coordinate a response.

Such a system would require careful consideration of operational reliability, secure communications, privacy, and protection against unauthorized access.

A serious problem needs creative solutions, and there is need for a whole range of them

“A serious problem needs creative solutions, and there is need for a whole range of them,” aviation commentator Aharon Lapidot told The Media Line. “Any solution, especially the technological ones, brings with it a host of new challenges, such as privacy issues and vulnerability to cyberattacks.”

The suspect, identified as 29-year-old Omani national Hamam al-Hammami, had passed professional and security checks before joining Flydubai in January. UAE investigators said he had developed extremist views years earlier and had deliberately pursued a career in aviation to carry out an attack inspired by the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.

The disclosures have intensified scrutiny of how airlines assess their employees and whether existing safeguards adequately address threats originating inside the cockpit.

“In professional terms, this is an ‘insider threat,’ and it forces us to re-examine the fundamental beliefs that aviation security is built on,” Yossi Amrusi, a former senior officer in the Shin Bet security agency and a researcher at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy, told The Media Line. “It highlights the importance of having additional protection mechanisms in case one of the crew members, not necessarily the pilot, turns out to be a threat.”

Security screening, he said, must extend beyond pilots to include other flight personnel and ground crews responsible for maintaining and servicing aircraft.

“This is a major earthquake,” Lapidot told The Media Line. “It opens a whole new perspective and a wide range of possibilities for terrorists to carry out attacks.”

UAE Attorney General Hamad Saif al-Shamsi said on October 9 that the co-pilot’s radicalization began in 2017 while he was studying in Australia. Investigators said he had consumed extremist material, adopted beliefs advocating violence, and made preparations for an attack.

The suspect had previously worked for Oman Air and Royal Air Maroc before joining Flydubai. According to reporting by The Wall Street Journal, his employment history included concerns about extremist interests that had affected his prospects at those airlines. Flydubai reportedly did not consult his former employers about those concerns before hiring him.

The revelations have raised questions about whether airlines should be required to share more information about employees whose conduct or expressed beliefs have prompted security concerns.

You can check a person’s history, his training and his professional abilities, but it is much harder to predict his future intentions

“You can check a person’s history, his training and his professional abilities, but it is much harder to predict his future intentions,” Amrusi told The Media Line.

The incident recalls the March 2015 Germanwings disaster, when co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately flew a passenger aircraft into the French Alps, killing all 150 people aboard.

French investigators subsequently found that Lubitz had experienced serious mental health problems and had concealed information about his condition from his employer.

Although the Germanwings crash was not a terrorist attack, both incidents demonstrate how dangerous it can be when a person entrusted with operating an aircraft deliberately endangers those aboard.

“There are far more terrorists than people with suicidal tendencies who wish to commit suicide while killing other people,” said Lapidot, explaining why the Flydubai incident is being viewed as a turning point in the aviation industry.

Bacharach said the Flydubai incident exposed weaknesses in Israel’s aviation security arrangements that had already been highlighted in a 2024 State Comptroller’s report.

The report called for a comprehensive examination of civil aviation security, including flights departing Israel, Israeli aviation operations abroad, and foreign aircraft entering Israeli airspace. It recommended that the National Security Council work with relevant government and security agencies to reassess responsibilities, oversight, and the allocation of resources.

Following the report, the security cabinet ordered an interagency review of security arrangements for international commercial flights to Israel. The National Security Council was tasked with coordinating the work of the Transportation Ministry, Civil Aviation Authority, Shin Bet, Mossad, and Finance Ministry.

According to subsequent Israeli media reporting, disagreements emerged over which agency should bear responsibility for security checks on foreign airlines and whether the Transportation Ministry had the personnel and resources to carry out the task.

The ministry ultimately retained responsibility, but reporting following the Flydubai attack indicated that important screening requirements had not been consistently enforced.

Bacharach said the attempted attack illustrated the need to translate security recommendations into practical safeguards.

Someone didn’t do their job and fell asleep while on guard

“Israel spends billions of dollars on security; it shouldn’t be left to the hands of a brave pilot, courageous civilians and a miracle to thwart attacks,” said Bacharach. “Someone didn’t do their job and fell asleep while on guard.”

One of the most immediate questions concerned how the Omani co-pilot had been permitted to operate a flight to Israel.

Oman does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Israel. Israeli security regulations restrict the participation of crew members holding citizenship in certain countries on flights to Israel, including countries without diplomatic relations.

According to an internal security directive reported by Israeli media, foreign airlines were responsible for checking crew members against a list of restricted nationalities. However, the Transportation Ministry had not consistently enforced those requirements or verified crew lists.

Following the attempted hijacking, the ministry tightened restrictions on foreign airline crews, barring people holding citizenship in countries without formal diplomatic relations with Israel from operating or traveling aboard Israel-bound flights, according to Channel 12.

The change has already affected airline operations.

Israeli media reported that an Ethiopian Airlines cargo flight traveling from Addis Ababa to Tel Aviv was forced to turn back overnight Sunday after Israeli authorities discovered an Indonesian national among the crew.

Indonesia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel. According to reports by Channel 12 and The Jerusalem Post, the crew member was a pilot.

Channel 13 reported that the crew list had been transmitted to Israeli authorities only after the aircraft had departed Ethiopia. The plane subsequently resumed its journey after the crew member was replaced.

The incident illustrated the operational difficulties involved in enforcing restrictions when information about flight crews is not received and checked before departure.

But Bacharach warned against treating nationality as a sufficient measure of risk.

“The problem is not only pilots from hostile countries,” Bacharach told The Media Line. “With the massive migration waves into Europe in recent years, even a pilot from a country that has relations with Israeli could undergo radicalization.”

Israel has also established a legal framework for collecting and analyzing passenger and crew information to help identify potential security threats.

A law enacted in 2023 provided for the establishment of the National Center for Passenger Data Analysis within the Israel Tax Authority. The legislation authorizes the creation of a database containing passenger and crew information and specifies how that information may be accessed and used by authorized agencies.

The legal framework is intended to support aviation security, counterterrorism, border control, and other authorized activities. However, the current operational status of the center, and whether it played any role in screening the Flydubai crew, has not been established.

The attempted attack has raised broader questions about whether existing information systems are adequately integrated with airline screening procedures and whether relevant intelligence reaches officials responsible for approving foreign flight crews.

“This isn’t just an Israeli problem,” Amrusi said. “An ‘insider threat’ is relevant to all airlines. A person’s nationality isn’t necessarily the main motivator once someone has decided to use their position in order to target the plane.”

Aviation security has undergone major changes since the September 11 attacks, with tighter passenger screening, reinforced cockpit doors, and stricter controls on access to aircraft.

Those measures were largely designed to prevent unauthorized individuals from bringing weapons aboard or gaining control of an aircraft.

The Flydubai incident demonstrates the different challenges posed by an authorized crew member who already has access to the cockpit and the aircraft’s controls.

“Airlines have to conduct much more thorough and frequent background checks and psychological evaluations,” Lapidot said. “Peer reviews must also be more frequent.”

Such measures could help identify concerning behavior, changes in circumstances, or information that was unavailable during initial hiring procedures.

But expanded screening raises questions about privacy, employment rights, the reliability of intelligence, and the possibility of unjustified suspicion based on nationality or personal beliefs.

Airlines also operate across numerous jurisdictions, each with different legal requirements governing background checks, professional licensing, and the sharing of security information.

Establishing a coordinated approach would require clearer rules governing what information should be exchanged, who may access it, and what action should follow when a potential warning sign is identified.

Lapidot warned that additional security requirements would also carry financial consequences.

“All of this is going to raise prices for the consumers,” Lapidot added.

Amrusi said screening improvements alone would be insufficient because no system can reliably predict every person’s future behavior.

“We need to be honest though—there is no test that can predict with certainty the malicious intentions of a person,” Amrusi said. “Therefore, we need a system that can handle the situation once a person has managed to evade the testing.”

That approach would place greater emphasis on safeguards capable of limiting the damage if an authorized crew member attempts to seize control of an aircraft.

The Flydubai incident has already produced operational consequences. The airline suspended its Tel Aviv flights following the attack, and Transportation Minister Miri Regev subsequently declined its request to resume service pending further scrutiny of its security procedures.

According to published reports, Flydubai has conducted an internal investigation, dismissed several employees, and sought discussions with Israeli authorities about measures needed to restore service.

The case has renewed pressure on governments and airlines to reconsider how they identify potential insider threats and how aircraft can be protected when prevention fails.

Any new safeguards will have to balance security requirements with the realities of international aviation. Yet the questions raised by the attack extend beyond screening technology or the nationality of individual crew members to the effectiveness of coordination among airlines, regulators, and intelligence agencies.

For the passengers aboard flight FZ1073, the existing defenses were insufficient to prevent a violent cockpit attack. Their survival ultimately depended on the wounded captain, other pilots, and passengers who intervened before the aircraft could be brought down.