China is increasingly trying to diversify its connections to the region as Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan create new security and strategic problems for Beijing. The opening of a road through the Wakhan Corridor is an important step in that effort.
Afghanistan has formally inaugurated a 121-kilometer road through the corridor, running from Broghil to the Chinese border in Badakhshan Province. The road cost about 365 million afghani, roughly US$5.5 million, and was built by Afghan engineers without foreign engineers or advisers.
It gives Afghanistan a physical link to China and gives Beijing a possible alternative route into Afghanistan and the wider region.
China’s recalculation
Afghan officials accuse Pakistan of destabilizing the border region through repeated airstrikes, the use of proxy groups and other measures. In September alone, Pakistan struck multiple locations inside Afghanistan.
Islamabad said it was targeting militants, while Afghan authorities reported civilian casualties. The attacks have raised tensions between the two countries and made Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistani territory and trade routes increasingly untenable.
China fears that instability could spread to Xinjiang and give militants room to operate against Chinese interests. Beijing is particularly worried that a fractured security environment will let the Turkestan Islamic Party, historically known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, establish durable safe havens.
Chinese officials believe such groups could use unsecured Afghan territory to move supplies, train recruits and launch attacks on Chinese personnel, infrastructure and assets.
Beijing also has growing doubts about whether Pakistan can protect its interests inside Pakistan. Chinese workers, engineers and other personnel on large development projects have been killed in repeated attacks, and Beijing has pressed Islamabad over the vulnerability of its people and investments.
The problem is most acute in Balochistan, where ethnic separatist groups, most notably the Baloch Liberation Army, have systematically targeted Chinese nationals and infrastructure linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC. China must now spend resources not only on building infrastructure but on guarding it.
There are financial frustrations, too. Allegations of corruption and mismanagement involving Pakistan’s military and political elite have dogged CPEC, and concerns over irregularities, opaque dealings and delays have made it harder for Beijing to realize the economic and strategic returns it expected.
Geography adds another weakness. CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, which Pakistan administers and India claims as its own, and India has repeatedly restated that position. Beijing has always had to consider that New Delhi might one day try to reclaim the territory, which leaves a flagship Chinese project running through disputed ground.
The most pressing concern now is Pakistan’s shifting alignment. Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, Islamabad has moved closer to the United States, and China may see this as undercutting its interests while adding to the turmoil.
Beijing may also worry that Pakistan’s deepening engagement with Washington could give the United States greater access and influence in a region China regards as part of its western security periphery. From Beijing’s perspective, any larger American presence there is something to prevent.
That is where the Wakhan Corridor comes in. China is looking for other ways to connect with Afghanistan and the region so that it is less dependent on Pakistan and CPEC. The new road gives Afghanistan a route toward China and gives Beijing another potential link.
It reaches the Chinese border, but that does not mean a fully operating commercial crossing exists. What it does is create the possibility of closer ties later.
Moscow’s stake
Russia has a strong interest in these developments as well. At the eighth Moscow Format meeting on Afghanistan, which brought together representatives of Afghanistan, India, China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states, Moscow strongly backed the Taliban and pushed for closer political and economic ties with their government.
Participants focused on regional trade, counternarcotics and counterterrorism. Russia has already formally recognized the Taliban government and remains committed to opposing any expansion of Western military and intelligence activity in Afghanistan and the surrounding region.
Moscow sees instability in Afghanistan as a direct security threat, chiefly because a vacuum lets groups like Islamic State Khorasan Province expand and operate freely. The group has shown it can carry out deadly attacks on Russian soil, most notably the March 2024 assault on Crocus City Hall near Moscow, which killed more than 140 people. Russia wants neither a larger American presence on its periphery nor an Afghanistan where terrorist groups can flourish.
India has its own reasons to welcome an active Wakhan route. It objects to CPEC’s passage through Gilgit-Baltistan and wants a stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. More trade and transit options for Afghanistan serve that goal, and the Wakhan road gives Kabul another way to reach China and Central Asia without relying on Pakistan.
Afghan officials have called the route strategically, politically and economically important and said it could tie their landlocked country into Central Asian networks and global markets.
Reducing that reliance matters because Kabul accuses Islamabad of using border crossings as a political weapon, closing key points from time to time to gain leverage. Afghanistan needs routes that do not run through Pakistan. Better connections through the Wakhan Corridor could link it to Central Asia and beyond while weakening Pakistan’s traditional hold over Kabul.
Pakistan, for its part, appears to be watching the corridor. There are reports of Pakistani-backed groups trying to extend their influence in Badakhshan, along with reports of Pakistani interest in the corridor itself.
In August, Taliban officials accused Pakistan of supporting anti-Taliban opposition groups operating in Badakhshan and of offering them potential refuge in Pakistan’s Chitral region. A more active Wakhan route, and greater Chinese interest in the area, could limit Pakistan’s ability to shape regional events to its advantage.
Taliban pragmatism
The way the road was built may matter as much as where it leads. According to Afghan officials, the Taliban government used its own engineers and workers and did not rely on extensive foreign assistance.
The Taliban could have asked China for machinery, engineers and other help. They did not, which suggests they understand the risks of debt dependence and heavy foreign involvement in strategic infrastructure, and that they value sovereignty and independence.
The corridor therefore may not become another Belt and Road-style project that leaves Afghanistan heavily dependent on China.
It could instead give Afghanistan an additional trade and transit option while the Taliban retain more control over their infrastructure and strategic choices. Because Afghanistan financed and built the road itself, Kabul has a stronger sense of ownership over it than it would over a large project funded from abroad.
For India, that may be welcome news. The road could reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan, connect Kabul more closely with China and Central Asia, and help build a more stable and economically connected country.
For China, it offers an alternative to a Pakistan-centered strategy that has become costly and exposed, including the vulnerable CPEC route through Gilgit-Baltistan.
The Wakhan Corridor is thus about more than a road. It reflects the changing calculations of China, Russia, Afghanistan and India in response to Pakistan’s policies and actions. The more Islamabad uses instability and geography as leverage, the more other regional powers will want alternatives that diminish its importance.
Pakistan may be finding that the more it exploits its position on the map, the more its neighbors will look for ways around it.
