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ICE Raid on Ilhan Omar Shows How Dangerous Two Years of Flailing Trump Could Get

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Natasha Lennard
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ICE Raid on Ilhan Omar Shows How Dangerous Two Years of Flailing Trump Could Get


In the mode of historic fascist regimes, President Donald Trump’s administration sent federal agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to raid the home of a political opponent, singled out for her race and religion, in a transparent effort to strip her of her citizenship.

On Monday, agents with Homeland Security Investigations, ICE’s investigative wing, conducted a search of the Washington, D.C., home of Rep. Ilhan Omar, D-Minn., with federal officials describing the incursion as part of “an ongoing federal criminal investigation.”

HSI was previously known for targeting human traffickers, drug smugglers, and war criminals. But under the second Trump administration, the unit has been increasingly focused on investigating protesters and immigration fraud.

That latter category is exactly what Trump administration officials have been prejudiciously applying to Omar for months. In March, Vice President JD Vance said, “We actually think that Ilhan Omar definitely committed immigration fraud against the United States of America.”

And, last month, Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said that “something is going to happen” on the Omar case, with immigration czar Tom Homan confirming an investigation.

The ICE raid against Omar, however, is an extremist escalation in Trump’s long-running threats to denaturalize the member of Congress, who was born in Somalia but came to the U.S. as a refugee when she was a young child. Omar, who has denied the repeated allegations of immigration fraud, is on the ballot for reelection in November.

Not only does the raid send a chill to all naturalized citizens who, like Omar, oppose the Trump regime, it is also one of the most ominous signs to date of how dangerous Trump and his acolytes can get in the next two years.

With his popularity tanking and his grip on power growing tenuous, Trump is becoming a flailing tyrant. Meanwhile, he has been granted extraordinary executive power by a loyalist Supreme Court and has purged the federal government of practically all checks and balances. It’s a recipe for immense harm.

A Nakedly Fascist Move

Debates about whether the Trump regime qualifies as fascist are old, tired, and not worth retreading here.

There can be little doubt, though, that targeting a racialized political opponent for deportation three weeks before an election is a nakedly fascist move — especially in the context of the far right’s evermore vitriolic attacks on Somali communities nationwide.

“Minnesota is being taken over by Somali Immigrants,” Trump wrote in a Truth Social post last week. “The Somalians should not be allowed to get away with what they are doing. They view you as weak and stupid people. Fight back Minnesota, fight back!”

 It was nothing short of an exhortation to a race war.

As his popular support continues to wane, we can be sure that the president and his white supremacist Cabinet will marshal the force of the federal government in even more fascistic ways.

Many means of stopping Trump have been defanged, as the raid itself makes clear.

We cannot rely on the courts. The warrant to search Omar’s home, for instance, was signed by a judge.

The judicial system, indeed, has permitted vast swaths of Trump’s anti-immigrant excesses. Courts have also sent activists to prison for decades for attending protests against the federal government. And, while some federal judges and even the Supreme Court have pushed back on some of Trump’s agenda, it is also the courts that have covered the president with impunity. We know, too, that this administration routinely disregards court orders in the knowledge that it will not face consequences.

There is little more optimism to be had on the congressional front. Even if Democrats take back Congress in November, they must reckon with an embattled authoritarian executive with a fully funded standing militia — namely, ICE.

Democrats should unite to stop Trump’s efforts to lawlessly deport a colleague based on a racist political witch hunt, but we can expect little congressional action beyond condemnatory statements. Indeed, all too many centrist Democrats have been happy to throw left-wing colleagues, particularly Muslims like Omar and Rep. Rashida Tlaib, D-Mich., to the wolves.

Elected leaders, from the national to municipal level, should be strategizing about how to protect their constituents from Trump’s worst extremes in the knowledge that he and his allies will escalate further. Impeachment should be a priority, yes, but so too should passing laws to dismantle and defund ICE, among other measures — just the sorts of things mainstream Democrats have refused to countenance.

If not the courts or elected leaders, what then? The answer is clear: Trump’s desperate authoritarianism must also be met by mass popular and militant opposition.

It is not enough to vote in November, then cross our fingers for two more years.

It is not enough to vote in November, then cross our fingers for two more years. Organizers on the front lines defending immigrant neighbors against ICE are exhausted and need numbers and support.

Activists facing trial or already sentenced to decades in prison for resisting Trump’s regime need ongoing legal support and funding. Readiness is all.

This is not to suggest that we must live in a state of paralyzing fear of an evermore delusional tyrant. The point, rather, is to recognize the danger and go on.

Resistance to Trump, to the border regime, and to racist state violence already exists; it must be supported, expanded, and the subject of an escalation of our own.

China fast on Ukraine lessons, slow on command reform

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IwPost
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China fast on Ukraine lessons, slow on command reform

The Russia-Ukraine War has become a real-time laboratory for the Chinese military, spurring rapid defensive modernization while exposing deep friction between its centralized command hierarchy and the decentralized demands of modern combat.

This month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report detailing how China is aggressively leveraging the Russia-Ukraine war as a real-time testing ground to overhaul the People’s Liberation Army’s  (PLA) doctrine, procurement and force structure without engaging in direct conflict.

Analyzing more than 90 Chinese military and defense-industry publications from mid-2022 to mid-2026, the study shows that Chinese defense institutes identify emerging frontline tactics in an average of four months, then translate them into specialized hardware and training within a year.

Viewing the conflict primarily from the perspective of a defender, China is prioritizing countermeasures against Ukrainian-style sea drone ambushes and deep airfield raids—perceived as precursors to potential attacks against Chinese facilities.

Consequently, the PLA has accelerated deployments of interceptor drones, directed-energy weapons, and jamming suites, while also copying Russian reconnaissance-strike integration and fiber-optic first-person-view drones immune to electronic warfare.

To support mass uncrewed warfare, China restructured its military academies in 2025 to train specialized drone commanders and leaned heavily on its dominant commercial manufacturing base for components.

However, the study notes that the PLA’s rigid, centralized command structure still struggles to emulate the frontline tactical improvisation that battlefield forces achieve under live combat pressure.

This operational gap becomes acute when examining why China chose a defender’s perspective in the maritime theater. In the Black Sea, Ukraine transformed naval warfare by using explosive, low-profile sea drones and unmanned minelayers alongside anti-ship missiles to dismantle Russia’s naval dominance systematically.

These asymmetric strikes damaged or sank numerous warships, forced Russia to withdraw core vessels from Sevastopol to distant ports like Novorossiysk, and reopened grain export routes from Odesa.

In a conflict over Taiwan, US and allied forces could employ sea drones to wage low-cost asymmetric campaigns against China’s naval vessels and amphibious transports. Drawing on Ukrainian wartime tactics, sea drones such as Taiwan’s Endeavor Manta could provide affordable denial in the Taiwan Strait, while mothership-launched sea drones expand reach into contested waters.

By generating constant tactical friction and uncertainty, sea drone swarms would restrict China’s naval maneuver and render amphibious landings prohibitively risky.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb saw operatives infiltrate deep inside Russia to launch over 100 first-person-view drones from civilian trucks, striking strategic bomber bases and damaging or destroying dozens of irreplaceable Soviet-era aircraft.

For PLA observers, the attack shows how low-cost, expendable uncrewed systems can bypass conventional layered air defenses to inflict disproportionate strategic damage.

It underscores that sovereign rear bases are no longer sanctuary zones, forcing defense planners worldwide to mandate hardened aircraft shelters, tighter physical perimeter security, and counter-drone electronic warfare suites.

Despite a January 2025 Hudson Institute report stating that China has extensively fortified its airfields since the 2010s, doubling hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) to over 800 and building 2,300 unhardened shelters—enough to protect the vast majority of its combat aircraft—China’s forward airfields in the South China Sea may still be vulnerable to such an attack.

Specifically, China’s forward island airfields in the South China Sea sit beyond the immediate umbrella of mainland fighter sweeps and surface-to-air coverage.

Because these artificial features lack strategic depth and natural cover against saturation drone and missile raids, local garrisons must rely on lighter steel hangars rather than subterranean mountain bunkers. With limited apron space, combat aircraft must park intermittently in the open, creating prime opportunities for deep-strike asymmetric saturation.

Beyond adapting Russia’s use of fiber optic drones and its reconnaissance-strike complex, China may also be looking at Russia’s specialized drone units, notably the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.

In an April 2026 report, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted that PLA Daily commentaries highlight Rubicon’s success as a model for structural reform, praising its centralized control, battlefield successes in Kursk, and rapid feedback loops between frontline operators and developers.

The ISW also notes that Chinese sources stress the creation of dedicated unmanned warfare units as an inevitable trend in modern warfare, adding that the PLA is considering creating similar units. However, it also notes that China’s politicized military, centralized command structure, and risk-averse leadership may hinder the bottom-up initiative that originally made Rubicon successful.

Given the tension between China’s political imperatives for centralized command and battlefield initiative, it is actively debating whether to adopt a version of the Western mission command concept, which emphasizes initiative at lower levels of command.

An October 2025 RAND report emphasizes that the central issue in this debate is how the PLA would adopt the mission command concept to survive future “intelligentized” warfare, in which rapid, data-intensive operations outpace centralized command capabilities.

The RAND report says that proponents argue that delegating authority to frontline units preserves operational speed, flexibility, and communication resilience while maintaining political control through commander’s intent.

However, it points out that systemic obstacles hinder broad adoption: Chinese Communist Party (CCP) orthodoxy prioritizes absolute control, leadership doubts officer competence, and institutions favor AI or skip-echelon networks to retain central oversight.

Furthermore, Milan Vego points out in a May 2025 Proceedings article that the mission command concept cannot easily be transplanted from one military to another without uprooting it from its deeper philosophical and cultural context.

Vego underscores that mission command rests on socio-political concepts of the German Enlightenment, which cultivate “thinking obedience”—a culture where officers are morally obligated to deviate from original orders when fast-shifting realities demand independent initiative to achieve the commander’s broader intent.

He stresses that such philosophy demands a highly educated and well-trained officer corps, deep trust between higher command and subordinates, and rejection of micromanagement and a “zero-failure” mentality – pointing out that other military cultures struggle to accommodate or trust authorized disobedience.

Consequently, the RAND report says that China’s implementation of mission command will likely remain stunted and uneven, with strategic forces staying strictly centralized while selected naval and special units experiment with delegation.

As China balances rapid technological absorption with institutional hesitation, the PLA is more likely to field an uneven hybrid force—combining cutting-edge counter-drone networks with pockets of local tactical initiative, while remaining vulnerable to decision-making latency whenever operations scale beyond pre-scripted plans.

Iran’s IRGC says 3rd ‘offending’ supertanker hit in Strait of Hormuz in 2 days

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IwPost
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Iran’s IRGC says 3rd ‘offending’ supertanker hit in Strait of Hormuz in 2 days

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) navy said Monday that a third supertanker it described as “offending” was struck in the Strait of Hormuz in two days and caught fire, Anadolu reports.

In a statement issued by its public relations office, the navy said the tanker was hit Monday morning after switching off its navigation system and ignoring warnings.

It alleged that the vessel, like those previously hit, had attempted to leave the strait and disrupt order and security in the waterway.

The statement did not identify the tanker, its flag or operator, or specify how it was struck.

The IRGC navy warned that any cooperation by commercial vessels and oil tankers with the US military in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf would face a “decisive response.”

READ: Iran says reviewing US proposals for talks as indirect messages continue

Separately, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said Monday it had received a delayed report on Sunday of an incident in the Strait of Hormuz involving an outbound tanker that was struck by an unknown projectile.

The crew was confirmed safe, while the environmental impact remained unknown and authorities were investigating, UKMTO said.

Tehran has threatened to target vessels using routes other than those designated by Iranian authorities or attempting to cross the waterway without permission.

The US and Israel launched a war against Iran on Feb. 28. Tehran responded with missile and drone attacks across the region and effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington later imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The US and Iran subsequently signed a memorandum of understanding in June concerning freedom of navigation in the strait, but implementation stalled over disagreements related to security in the strategic waterway.

READ: IRGC commander calls Strait of Hormuz a ‘red line,’ rejects presence of extra-regional forces

How Israel Votes: A Guide to the Knesset, Political Parties, and Coalition Governments

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IwPost
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How Israel Votes: A Guide to the Knesset, Political Parties, and Coalition Governments


Israelis vote for party lists rather than individual lawmakers or a prime minister. A proportional electoral system, mathematical seat-allocation rules, and coalition negotiations determine who governs.

In Israel, voters do not directly elect their prime minister or individual members of parliament. Instead, each voter chooses a single list of candidates, usually representing a political party or an alliance of parties. The votes determine how the 120 seats in the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, are distributed.

What happens after the election can be just as important as the vote itself. Parties negotiate alliances, agree on policies, and divide government responsibilities. The leader of the largest party does not automatically become prime minister, and a smaller party can sometimes determine who governs.

Israel uses a system called proportional representation, which helps explain its many political parties, complicated coalition negotiations, and frequent early elections.

Why Does Israel Have So Many Political Parties?

Unlike the United States, where two major parties dominate national elections, Israel has a multiparty system. Its parties represent a broad range of political, religious, ethnic, and social interests.

Some focus on security, diplomacy, and economic policy. Others represent particular communities, including ultra-Orthodox Jews, religious Zionists, and Arab citizens of Israel. Parties also differ over relations with the Palestinians, religion’s role in public life, and the balance between government authority and judicial power.

The Knesset has 120 seats, a number inspired by the Great Assembly, a council of Jewish religious leaders and sages traditionally associated with the period following the return from the Babylonian exile in the fifth century BCE.

Unlike the US Congress, the Knesset has only one chamber. The entire country is treated as a single electoral district, meaning there are no separate parliamentary constituencies for Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, or other cities. Parties win seats according to their share of the nationwide vote, provided they receive enough votes to qualify.

How Do Israelis Vote?

Israeli citizens who are at least 18 years old are generally eligible to vote. Citizens can run for the Knesset beginning at age 21, although certain restrictions apply. The president, judges, the state comptroller, the military chief of staff, the two chief rabbis, and certain senior civil servants, military officers, police officers, and prison officials cannot run while holding their positions. Depending on their position, some must resign well before an election. Certain criminal convictions can also disqualify candidates.

Knesset terms are legally set at four years, but the interval between elections can be longer. Regular elections are scheduled for a Tuesday in the Hebrew month of Heshvan, which falls in October or November. The precise Tuesday depends on whether the preceding Hebrew year was a leap year. Following an early election, the next regular election is scheduled for Heshvan after four years have elapsed, potentially extending the interval beyond four years. Early elections are also common, and the Knesset can postpone elections in exceptional circumstances with the support of at least 80 of its 120 members.

At polling stations, voters select a paper slip bearing the name and identifying letters of their preferred electoral list, printed in Hebrew and sometimes also in Arabic, place it in an official envelope, and deposit it in a ballot box.

Each voter chooses one list. There is no separate vote for prime minister, no vote for a local representative, and no ranking of individual candidates.

Every list presents its candidates in a predetermined order. If a list wins 15 seats, its first 15 candidates enter the Knesset. Parties use different methods to select and rank candidates, including primary elections, party committees, and decisions by party leaders.

A list can represent one party or several parties running together. Voters selecting a joint list vote for the combined slate, not its individual components.

What Is the Electoral Threshold?

To enter the Knesset, an electoral list must receive at least 3.25% of all valid votes cast nationwide. This is known as the electoral threshold.

If 4 million valid votes are cast, for example, a list needs at least 130,000 votes to qualify. A list receiving 3.24% wins nothing, while one receiving 3.25% would ordinarily receive about four seats, depending on the overall results.

The threshold was originally 1%, increased to 1.5% before the 1992 election, rose to 2% in 2004, and reached 3.25% in 2014. The increases were intended to reduce parliamentary fragmentation and encourage smaller parties to run together.

Votes cast for lists that fail to cross the threshold are excluded when distributing the 120 seats.

Suppose three parties each receive 3% of the vote. Together, they attract 9% of voters, but none enters the Knesset because each ran separately and fell below the threshold.

Their votes are not transferred to any other party. Instead, all 120 seats are divided among the qualifying lists, increasing those parties’ proportional shares.

This can alter the balance of power between political blocs and helps explain why parties with similar positions sometimes run on joint lists.

How Are Knesset Seats Distributed?

After excluding votes for lists that fail to cross the threshold, election officials add the votes received by all qualifying lists and divide the total by 120. The result is an initial electoral quota representing the approximate number of votes needed for one seat.

Each list’s vote total is divided by this quota, with the whole-number result determining its initial allocation.

For example, if qualifying lists receive 3.6 million votes altogether, the quota is 30,000 votes per seat. A list with 310,000 votes initially receives 10 seats, with 10,000 votes left over.

Because this calculation normally leaves some seats unassigned, Israel uses a mathematical formula known as the Bader-Ofer method, named after former Knesset members Yohanan Bader and Avraham Ofer, to distribute the remaining seats.

Rather than simply awarding these seats to parties with the largest number of leftover votes, the formula divides each list’s vote total by the number of seats it has already received, plus one. The list with the highest resulting figure receives the next seat, and the calculation is repeated until all 120 seats have been assigned.

Suppose Party A receives 310,000 votes and has 10 seats. Its figure for an 11th seat is 310,000 divided by 11, or approximately 28,182.

Party B receives 205,000 votes and has six seats. Its figure for a seventh seat is 205,000 divided by seven, or approximately 29,286.

Party B would have priority for the next seat, despite receiving fewer votes overall.

The complete calculation also accounts for agreements between parties over their excess votes.

What Are Excess-Vote Agreements?

Before an election, two lists can sign an excess-vote agreement, sometimes called a surplus-vote agreement. This allows their votes to be combined when calculating eligibility for the remaining seats under the Bader-Ofer method.

If their combined votes qualify them for an additional seat, a further calculation determines which partner receives it.

The agreement can improve the chances of one partner gaining another seat, although it does not guarantee one.

Both lists must independently cross the 3.25% electoral threshold for the agreement to take effect. If either fails, the agreement cannot save its votes or transfer them to its partner.

These arrangements differ from joint electoral lists. Parties running together on one list combine their votes before the threshold is applied. Parties signing an excess-vote agreement remain separate, appear independently on the ballot, and receive their own Knesset seats.

An excess-vote agreement also does not require its participants to cooperate in forming a government. Its immediate purpose is mathematical, not political.

Why Doesn’t the Largest Party Automatically Form the Government?

Once the seats have been allocated, the next challenge is forming a government.

A party needs 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats to hold an outright parliamentary majority. No single party or electoral list has ever won that many seats in an Israeli election, so every Israeli government has been formed through a coalition of several parties.

A coalition is an agreement among parties to govern together, usually involving compromises over policy, government ministries, budgets, and legislation.

Consider an election in which Party A wins 35 seats, Party B wins 30, Party C wins 18, Party D wins 15, Party E wins 12, and Party F wins 10.

Although Party A is the largest, Parties B, C, and D could form a coalition with 63 seats, giving them a majority.

This also gives smaller parties considerable bargaining power. A party holding just five or six seats can sometimes determine whether a prospective coalition reaches the 61-seat mark. In exchange for joining, it may demand cabinet positions or commitments on policies important to its voters.

However, coalition partners must also make compromises, and disagreements can eventually threaten the government’s survival.

Relatively small shifts in voting can dramatically change the outcome of an Israeli election. The balance between right-wing and center-left blocs may come down to just a handful of Knesset seats. A party gaining or losing one or two seats, or narrowly crossing or missing the electoral threshold, can determine which bloc has enough support to form a government.

The outcome also depends on parties that do not fit neatly into either bloc. Some centrist, religious, or other parties may be willing to join coalitions led by different political camps, depending on their priorities and the agreements they can negotiate. As a result, even when the overall vote changes only slightly, the composition of the next government can be very different.

What Does Israel’s President Do After the Election?

Israel’s president is the head of state, with mainly ceremonial and representative responsibilities, while the prime minister leads the government.

After an election, the president plays a central role in deciding who gets the first opportunity to form a government.

Once the official results are published, the president consults representatives of the newly elected parliamentary factions. Each can recommend a Knesset member to form a government.

The president considers these recommendations and assigns the task to a willing Knesset member, generally choosing someone who appears capable of assembling sufficient parliamentary support.

The president is not legally required to choose the leader of the largest party or even the candidate receiving the most recommendations.

The assignment must be made within seven days of the official publication of the election results.

How Is a Government Formed?

The candidate selected by the president receives 28 days to negotiate a governing coalition. The president may grant extensions totaling up to 14 additional days, allowing a maximum of 42 days.

Negotiations typically cover coalition policies, government ministries, budgets, legislation, and arrangements for resolving disputes.

Once an agreement is reached, the candidate informs the president and the Knesset speaker that a government has been formed.

The proposed government is presented to the Knesset, including its policy guidelines, ministers, and their responsibilities. Lawmakers then vote on whether to express confidence in it.

Although a coalition normally seeks the support of at least 61 members, an initial confidence vote requires a majority of those voting, not necessarily 61 affirmative votes.

This means Israel can have a minority government if enough lawmakers outside the coalition support it or abstain. Such governments, however, can have difficulty passing budgets and legislation.

If the confidence vote succeeds, the new government takes office, and the person who formed it becomes prime minister.

What Happens if the First Candidate Fails?

If the first candidate cannot form a government within the allotted time, or the proposed government fails to win the Knesset’s confidence, another election does not automatically follow.

Within three days, the president can assign the task to another willing Knesset member, who receives 28 days without an extension. Alternatively, the president can inform the Knesset speaker that there appears to be no possibility of forming a government.

If the second attempt fails, or the president has declared that no government appears possible, Knesset members have 21 days to propose their own solution.

During that period, at least 61 lawmakers can submit a written request asking the president to assign the task to a particular willing Knesset member. That candidate then receives 14 days to form a government.

If no candidate receives 61 signatures during the 21-day period, or the final candidate fails, the Knesset is considered dissolved, and new elections must be held within 90 days.

The outgoing government remains in office until a new one takes over.

Can a Government Fall Before the Next Election?

Yes. Coalition partners can withdraw their support, a prime minister can resign, or the Knesset can dissolve itself and call early elections.

Israel also uses a system known as constructive no-confidence. Rather than simply voting to remove a government, at least 61 Knesset members must vote to express confidence in a specific alternative government that is ready to take office.

This prevents lawmakers from dismissing a government through a no-confidence vote without agreeing on its replacement.

A failure to pass the state budget within the legally required period can also trigger early elections.

Between April 2019 and November 2022, Israel held five general elections, largely because of repeated difficulties forming and maintaining governing coalitions.

The combination of proportional representation, multiple parties, and coalition politics means election night rarely settles every question about who will govern.

Voters determine which parties enter the Knesset and how many seats they receive. The government that emerges depends on which parties can assemble enough parliamentary support to take office and remain there.

Epic Games reportedly pivoting to “AI first” game development model

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IwPost
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Epic Games reportedly pivoting to “AI first” game development model

Epic Games is shifting to an “AI first” development strategy for its collaboration with the Walt Disney Company, letting AI models write all the code and guide all the artwork for an upcoming shooter. That’s according to a Bloomberg report, which cites unnamed people familiar with the project who commented on the significant pivot in internal development at the Unreal Engine maker.

Human developers will be tasked with managing and guiding code and art assets generated by models such as Anthropic’s Claude, according to internal Epic employee messages viewed by Bloomberg. That means “no more hand-written code” and art assets “generated with full AI workflows,” according to the report.

The $1.5 billion collaboration between Epic and Disney, announced in early 2024, was slated to release a Marvel- and Star Wars-themed shooter in March 2027. That project has now been delayed indefinitely amid the AI-related shakeup and understaffed, slower-than-expected development thus far, according to the report.

“We’re embracing AI-accelerated development, led by Epic developers who are the visionaries and creative drivers for everything we do,” an Epic spokesperson said in a statement.

“We have a huge pivot underway here at Epic, moving developers around to retool for maximum AI acceleration,” Epic CEO Tim Sweeney wrote on social media shortly after the Bloomberg story was posted. “The aim isn’t to do the same stuff with fewer people, but to enable everyone here to build MORE and BETTER stuff, and to bring the benefits to all teams using Unreal.”

Let’s get efficient, baby

Sweeney and Epic have long been bullish on what they see as an impending game development revolution spurred by AI. In an interview with IGN in June, Sweeney saw the technology resulting in games with “the possibility of infinite dialogue with a really simple setup for creators,” leading to situations where “small teams will be able to create games with immense amounts of characters and immense and interactive worlds.”

Sweeney said last November that AI usage disclosure tags such as those required by Valve’s Steam platform “make no sense” because AI tools “will be involved in nearly all future production.”

Epic laid off over 1,000 employees in March, citing a “downturn in Fortnite engagement” as the main reason behind the move. Months later, Fortnite Senior External Development Manager Stephanie Arnette said that “I know everyone’s biggest fear is, ‘Oh my god, AI is going to take all our jobs.’ That’s not our goal. The goal is to make us more efficient.”

Last May, Epic and Disney faced some embarrassment when an AI-voiced Darth Vader character added to Fortnite started repeating curse words and uttering some baffling opinions before a hotfix was rolled out.

A survey of over 2,300 game industry professionals ahead of this year’s Game Developers Conference found that 36 percent used generative AI tools as part of their jobs, including 30 percent of those at game development studios. But those AI tools were used for tasks like research and brainstorming (by 81 percent of AI-using respondents) much more than for code assistance (47 percent) and prototyping (35 percent).

A once-in-a-generation opportunity for California’s ocean

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A once-in-a-generation opportunity for California’s ocean

The ocean surrounding California’s Channel Islands can feel like another world. Beneath the surface sway towering kelp forests that are patrolled by huge sheephead fish, striking in pink and black with protruding teeth, along with refrigerator-sized giant sea bass. Seals and sea lions swim among colorful sponges and sea stars. “We sometimes think of the Channel Islands as our Galapagos in California,” said Doug McCauley, a professor of marine science at UC Santa Barbara. 

The cornucopia of marine wildlife here wasn’t always this vibrant. Violet Sage Walker, the chair of California’s Northern Chumash Tribal Council, recalled documentary footage showing the Channel Islands before marine protections were enacted, in an era when intensive commercial fishing had damaged kelp forests and key species. “It looked like Mars, like a dead planet,” she said.

But beginning in 2003, areas around the Channel Islands were designated as California Marine Protected Areas, or MPAs — a conservation strategy akin to creating underwater state parks. With roughly 150 square miles of protected waters, the islands now function as a safe haven for marine flora and fauna, essentially acting as nurseries for baby fish and protecting dozens of iconic species like kelp bass, rockfish, leopard sharks, and more.  

Now, for the first time in 15 years, California officials are considering proposals to create new areas and expand existing ones, as part of the state’s first-ever review of its MPA network. “This is a historic opportunity that we don’t want to miss,” said McCauley.

Building California’s marine protections

MPAs are designated ocean zones where restrictions on activities such as fishing, oil and gas drilling, and other seafloor disturbances can help preserve marine ecosystems and give damaged habitats room to recover. Protections vary by site, but in areas where these kinds of disturbances are removed, “you have larger fish, more abundant wildlife, and a healthier habitat,” said Sandy Aylesworth, director of the Pacific Initiative, Nature, at the Natural Resources Defense Council, or NRDC.

Among the 2026 potential additions are two new proposals for protected areas on the state’s Central Coast: the Point Sal and Mishopshno State Marine Conservation Area proposals. Each of these sites is co-sponsored by a California Tribe in collaboration with NRDC, and in the case of Mishopshno, also by the Environmental Defense Center, a Santa Barbara-based non-profit. These Tribally sponsored proposals represent a first for California’s MPA network, and offer the state an opportunity to formally recognize the longstanding role of California Tribes as ocean stewards and make good on its commitment to Tribal marine stewardship. 

A rare convergence of habitats

The proposed Point Sal State Marine Conservation Area would include roughly nine square miles off the Santa Barbara County coast. Here, a headland shelters the waters on its southern side from the wind, creating calmer conditions where fish larvae can linger and mature safely. Nearby Lion Rock is a gathering place for seals and sea lions and a roosting area for seabirds, while kelp forests and rocky reefs provide habitat for fish, sharks, sea otters, and other wildlife. Over 880 sea lions have been documented there by scientists in a single day. “It’s a little tiny paradise,” Walker said.

For the Northern Chumash Tribal Council, which co-sponsored the proposal, Point Sal is also a place of deep cultural significance. Chairwoman Walker described ancient village sites up and down the coast and a relationship to the area woven through Chumash history. “Our people lived and thrived there for thousands of years,” she said. 

Preserving marine ecosystems and cultural connections

That history is central to another feature of the current MPA review: Tribal stewardship. California’s current MPAs don’t have formal Tribal co-management systems, though the Tribes  have stewarded the lands and waters of the Central Coast for over 10,000 years. The Point Sal and Mishopshno proposals are among the first potential additions to the MPA network led by California Tribes.

Walker said she wants California to create a clearer pathway for coastal Tribes to continue to participate in ocean stewardship, including access for cultural practices and a role in management. “Being able to reconnect and offer our vision and our help with dealing with climate resiliency and coastal stewardship is critical,” she said.

The proposed Mishopshno State Marine Conservation Area offers another example of what that kind of Tribal stewardship could look like. Farther down the coast, near Carpinteria, is another unusual convergence of habitats. Just offshore sits a 1.6-mile rocky reef supporting one of the Central Coast’s most enduring kelp forests. 

Nearby sandy-bottom habitat, beach, and a protected salt marsh create connected nursery and feeding areas for marine life, supporting hundreds of bat rays, large fish species, and juvenile white sharks. The Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians, NRDC and the Environmental Defense Center have sponsored a proposal to protect the area, which is named for a historic Chumash village in the region.

A refuge for marine wildlife

Shark filmmaker, documentarian, and researcher Carlos Gauna has spent thousands of hours filming the marine environment that would be protected by the Mishopshno MPA. “I live and breathe sharks daily, and this is one of the most amazing spots in the world to see a great white shark. There is literally nothing like it anywhere else on the California coast,” he said. 

In his years of filming there, Gauna said, he’s documented illegal fishing, jet skiers purposely ramming into wildlife, and other harms to the local marine population. “I’ve seen sharks get hit and injured by boats, or even deliberately killed,” he says, noting that the proposed MPA might help guard against such damaging actions because its status as an MPA would signal to visitors that it’s a safe haven for marine wildlife. 

He also points to successful protected areas as a model for what the new Mishopshno MPA might achieve. At Cabo Pulmo in Baja California, Gauna said, the contrast across the protected-area boundary is night and day. Inside is a thriving, abundant ecosystem. “It’s one of the most stable and beautiful areas in the world for marine wildlife,” he said. Outside, where there is intensive  fishing activity, “it’s an underwater desert.”

An urgent moment

The state’s voters treasure California’s iconic coastal waters and advocate for keeping them healthy: Roughly 70% of California voters support expanding MPA protections at both Point Sal and Mishopshno. And while a small group of fishing interests opposes the new MPA proposals, there is no scientific evidence that California’s MPAs cause financial harm to fisheries. In certain circumstances, the opposite is true: a 2021 study of two Southern California MPAs established in 2012 found that fishing boats in the surrounding areas had increased lobster catch by about 225% over six years.

The California Fish and Game Commission final votes on the proposed changes to the California MPA network are scheduled for October 14th-16th. “We have an opportunity now to protect the areas where California has jurisdiction, at a time when the Federal government is undoing protections more broadly,” McCauley said. Given that the periodic reviews of California’s MPA network only happen once every ten years, the Fish and Game Commission is unlikely to consider these two proposals again for many years. 

The outcome of the October 2026 process could help define the next chapter of California’s marine protection network. For Walker, the stakes extend beyond this unique moment. “The ocean, given the opportunity, will thrive,” she said. “But we have to give it the space and the time to heal itself.”

California’s Fish and Game Commission are deciding whether to expand MPAs this month. Now is our chance to protect these precious areas and the marine life that call them home. Join NRDC in calling on the California Fish and Game Commission to conserve these special areas of our Coast.

FCC product testing ban deepens US-China tech decoupling

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FCC product testing ban deepens US-China tech decoupling

The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is moving to bar every Chinese lab from testing electronics for the US market, a sector China dominates. And Chinese media and commentators say that Beijing, having already retaliated with three countermeasures, is ready to strike back again.

The FCC said on October 7 that it will vote on October 29 on a rule barring all labs in China from testing smartphones, cameras, computers and other electronic devices for the US market. The ban, due to take effect on December 1, 2028, will also cover labs in any country that denies reciprocal treatment to US-based labs.

The move follows US tariffs, export controls and Covered List bans. Some observers say it gives Washington’s “China plus one” strategy another push to move production bases outside China.

The impact on manufacturers is likely to be mixed. Some may relocate their production lines to Southeast Asia if they eventually have to test their products there. Others may keep producing in China and absorb higher logistics costs as they ship samples back and forth to overseas labs.

“Less than 4% of all electronic devices are tested in labs located inside the US,” FCC Chair Brendan Carr said on October 7, noting that 82% were tested in China in 2025. He added that the FCC will demand fair and reciprocal treatment in international commerce.

“President Trump has revolutionized America’s approach to the world by putting reciprocity at the heart of our international commercial relations,” Carr said in April, when the FCC first proposed the rule. “Today, more than 75% of testing occurs in countries that have refused to commit to reciprocal treatment of US-based labs and certification bodies.”

According to Chinese media reports, Beijing announced three countermeasures against the FCC on August 5, and the Ministry of Commerce warned that it would take further action if Washington introduced new restrictions. The launched measures include:

  • a rigorous case-by-case review of exports of drones, key drone components and related technologies to the US, with no licensing facilitation;
  • a suspension of US-based certification bodies’ authorization to conduct follow-up factory inspections under the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) system; and
  • a ban on Chinese organizations and individuals dealing with Compliance Testing LLC, an Arizona-based firm that Beijing said had supported the FCC’s measures.

The planned ban caps a series of FCC moves against Chinese labs and devices since May 2025, when the agency adopted rules barring labs controlled by foreign adversary governments. Starting in September last year, it withdrew or denied recognition of 23 such labs.

Last December, the FCC banned imports of new models of Chinese drones, followed in March 2026 by new models of Chinese-made consumer routers. In April, it proposed phasing out, over two years, labs in countries without mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with the US, a reciprocity requirement it had dropped in 2015.

In June, it banned imports of more equipment from a group of Chinese manufacturers including Huawei and ZTE. In July, it voted to bar US sales of devices containing key hardware from Chinese firms deemed national security risks, and added foreign-made advanced robots and power inverters to its Covered List.

“The rule uses regulation to shut Chinese third-party testing firms out of the US market. It artificially drives up the cost of compliance for Chinese electronics makers selling overseas,” Liu Zhenqi, a former professor at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Logistics Academy, says in an article.

“Washington has banned these firms across the board in the name of national security without offering any concrete evidence. This is really about stretching the idea of security to justify technological protectionism,” he says.

He says that if the rule passes, Chinese electronics makers will have to test their products abroad, which will take longer and cost more. In turn, US companies and consumers will pay through higher prices, fewer choices, and less efficient supply chains.

He adds that, although there is a two-year transition period, China must see the trend that US efforts to contain its technology have moved beyond core sectors such as chipmaking and are now reaching into the rules governing testing, certification and standards.

A Henan-based writer using the pen name “Gummies” says cross-border e-commerce sellers and small electronics factories, whose profit margins are already thin, will feel the pain first. He says the long testing cycles will hurt them even more than the higher fees.

He notes that a basic test costs US$400 to US$1,300 in China but US$3,000 to US$4,000 in a US lab. Shipping samples abroad takes two weeks and, with lab queues and retests, a full round can take more than a month. A month or two of delay can wipe out sales of short-lived consumer gadgets and force some firms out of the US market.

Higher costs for exporters

On September 8, 2025, the FCC took its first action under the “Bad Labs” rules, beginning proceedings to withdraw recognition from seven labs it said the Chinese government owned or controlled, including CVC Testing, TÜV Rheinland-CCIC Ningbo and UL-CCIC. It also said the recognition of four others, including the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, had expired and would not be renewed.

“US media have called the September 8 move a new turning point in the technology cold war. It looks like tighter regulation, but it is actually a targeted strike,” Zhong Chengda, a Guangdong-based columnist and logistics expert, says in an article published after the FCC’s September 2025 decision.

“In the past, Washington sanctioned products and brands. Now it is blocking channels and targeting the whole system. No matter how good your product is, if your certification is not recognized, it is not a legal product and cannot even get through the door,” he says.

He says the move will also drag US supply chains into decoupling, as global manufacturers whose products were certified by Chinese labs will have to retest and reapply, doubling their time and financial costs. He notes that Chinese labs not only issue certificates but also help set rules in sectors from electric vehicles to industrial controls.

He adds that China’s most direct retaliatory measure is to hit back in kind by refusing to recognize US testing bodies, turning a trade war into a war over rules. Such a move would be a disaster for multinationals, which would need two sets of research, testing and paperwork for each product, doubling costs and halving efficiency.

Under US rules, all electronic devices that emit radio frequencies must be certified by an FCC-recognized lab before they can be sold in the American market. As of September 8, China had 175 FCC-recognized labs, more than the number of testing labs in the US, and handled about 75% of FCC-recognized testing, according to China’s STDaily.com.

“Washington is politicizing technical testing services and artificially creating technical barriers to trade. This will not only raise costs and supply chain risks for the US electronics industry but also disrupt the stable operation of the global electronics industry,” Zhou Mi, a senior research fellow at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, told the Global Times.

“The US claims to be upholding the principle of reciprocity. In fact, it is trying to change long-established market practices and stop Chinese testing institutions from serving products bound for the US market,” he said.

He said World Trade Organization (WTO) rules require members to prevent technical barriers from obstructing international trade. He added that by changing testing rules at will and imposing unreasonable burdens, the US would turn testing services into a de facto trade barrier and undermine the stability of international trade.

After the FCC said in April it planned to vote on a proposal to ban all Chinese labs from testing electronic devices used in the US, Mao Ning, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said China firmly opposed the US overstretching the concept of national security.

She said such moves hurt normal trade between Chinese and US companies and served no one’s interests, including those of American consumers.

Read: For rare earth leverage, US caps aircraft parts licenses to China

Follow Jeff Pao on X at @jeffpao3

TV Meteorologist Refuses to Apologize After Interrupting Georgia Football Game

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TV Meteorologist Refuses to Apologize After Interrupting Georgia Football Game


A Georgia meteorologist is standing by her decision to interrupt one of the biggest college football games of the season after frustrated fans complained that her severe weather coverage went on far too long.

WSB-TV Channel 2 meteorologist Ashley Kramlich found herself at the center of a heated debate Saturday night, October 10, when a tornado warning forced the Atlanta television station to cut into its broadcast of the highly anticipated Georgia-Alabama showdown.

The interruption came during a tense second quarter as Alabama was driving downfield with just 40 seconds remaining before halftime. Instead of hearing the game’s announcers, viewers suddenly found themselves listening to urgent weather updates.

Kramlich appeared in a split-screen broadcast alongside storm radar, explaining that a potentially dangerous tornado was threatening parts of central Georgia.

Although the game remained visible, the weather coverage replaced commentary from ESPN announcers Chris Fowler and Kirk Herbstreit, leaving some football fans furious.

The warning was not a false alarm or routine weather advisory. The National Weather Service issued a tornado warning at 9:11 p.m. for portions of Butts and Jasper counties after radar detected rotation in a thunderstorm capable of producing a tornado.

The storm was moving northeast at approximately 25 mph, with forecasters warning that flying debris, damaged homes and downed trees were possible. Residents in the affected areas were urged to seek shelter immediately.

By 9:20 p.m., the warning had been canceled for Butts County, although it remained in effect for part of Jasper County until 9:30 p.m.

The dangerous weather was part of the aftermath of Hurricane Isaias, which had made landfall along Florida’s Gulf Coast the previous evening before bringing heavy rain, strong winds and tornado threats into Georgia.

But for fans watching the crucial Southeastern Conference matchup, the timing could hardly have been worse.

Georgia, ranked No. 2 nationally, was battling sixth-ranked Alabama in a game with major conference championship and College Football Playoff implications. The Bulldogs eventually pulled off a dramatic 20-17 victory, handing Alabama its first loss of the season.

The following day, Kramlich addressed the backlash and made it clear that protecting viewers would always take priority over football.

She acknowledged that she was a football fan herself and understood why the interruption had upset viewers.

However, she insisted that a tornado warning represented a serious threat that required immediate attention.

“When a tornado warning is issued, your safety has to come first,” Kramlich explained.

She also defended the station’s decision to use a split-screen format, allowing viewers to continue following the game while receiving information about the storm.

“We have a responsibility to interrupt programming to bring you potentially life-saving information when severe weather threatens our communities,” she said.

Despite her explanation, several viewers continued to argue that the problem was not the initial warning but how long the coverage continued.

One frustrated viewer complained that the broadcast spent too much time explaining weather terminology instead of quickly identifying which communities were in danger.

Another encouraged the station to review the broadcast and eliminate information that was not immediately necessary.

A third viewer argued that repeated explanations became excessive after the warning and safety instructions had already been delivered.

The criticism highlights a difficult balancing act for local television stations during severe weather emergencies.

Tornado warnings are issued when a tornado has been spotted or when radar indicates one may be developing. Unlike a tornado watch, which means conditions are favorable for tornadoes, a warning calls for immediate protective action.

Broadcasters must also consider viewers who may have just tuned in or missed earlier announcements, making repeated location updates and safety instructions important during an active threat.

Saturday’s dangerous weather had already disrupted plans surrounding the game. President Donald Trump canceled his scheduled appearance in Tuscaloosa, citing Hurricane Isaias and the need to keep emergency personnel focused on storm response rather than presidential security.

On the field, Georgia ultimately secured the victory with a 23-yard field goal by Peyton Woodring late in the fourth quarter.

For Kramlich, however, the biggest controversy of the night had nothing to do with the final score.

The meteorologist’s response made her position clear: Fans may disagree with how long a broadcast interruption should last, but when a tornado threatens local communities, keeping viewers safe comes before keeping the game on television.

WHO report on Russian lab worker death highlights “key uncertainty”

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WHO report on Russian lab worker death highlights “key uncertainty”

Over the weekend, the World Health Organization released a disease outbreak report on the events surrounding the death of a Russian infectious disease researcher earlier this month, highlighting that Russia has yet to report a confirmed cause of death. With that “key uncertainty,” the United Nations health agency said it remains impossible to assess the risk of the event or whether the public health measures Russia took were adequate to prevent spread of the unknown disease.

The WHO reported that, so far, it has seen no evidence of ongoing transmission of the mystery disease. “However, confidence in the assessment remains limited by the absence of a confirmed etiological diagnosis, and the remaining uncertainty regarding the source and mode of exposure,” the agency wrote in its report.

The agency laid out the order of events as information trickled out from Russian authorities, noting that it only became aware of the death via media reports on October 2. The WHO subsequently made contact with Russian authorities and requested information on October 3, 6, 7, and 8.

Limited information released

Early media reports indicated that the lab worker had become ill on September 29, possibly following an incident at the lab, the Irkutsk Antiplague Research Institute (APRI) of Siberia and the Far East. Some early reports suggested that the researcher—who was identified by media as 28-year-old Darya Shipilova—died of the plague after breaking a test tube.

On October 2, the Irkutsk branch of Russian health agency Rospotrebnadzor (RPN) said in a statement that a “special sanitary-epidemiological expert commission” had already met over a suspected case of a high-threat pathogen. Sanitary and epidemic control measures were put in place, including identifying, monitoring, and testing all contacts. At the time, RPN said that all contacts had tested negative for high-threat pathogens.

On October 6, Russia’s National Focal Point for the International Health Regulations (NFP) first responded to the WHO’s information requests, saying that no case of plague had been recorded in Irkutsk Oblast. The NFP confirmed that an APRI lab worker had died from a severe case of pneumonia after developing symptoms compatible with an acute respiratory viral infection. The worker was tested for a number of high-threat pathogens, but all the tests had come back negative. Doctors categorized the cause of death as being from pneumonia of undetermined etiology.

The NFP also reiterated information from RPN about the public health measures taken and that people in contact with the lab worker all tested negative for high-threat pathogens. The NFP added that the widest range of possible contacts were identified and tested in accordance with Russia’s public health laws.

Uncertain risk

In follow-up responses, the NFP gave more details about testing and some results that weren’t concerning. It said authorities conducted 5,500 laboratory tests on contacts. They tested for a range of pathogens, including influenza, SARS-CoV-2, other respiratory infections, and bacterial infections, including plague and Streptococcus. Among the contacts, they identified two cases of COVID-19, three cases of rhinovirus, and one case of Haemophilus spp., a common bacteria group that includes those that can cause respiratory infections and pneumonia. They also found a few opportunistic infections.

As of October 9, Russian authorities told WHO that they had not detected any high-threat pathogens in the laboratory’s research portfolio in any of the contacts, and they were no longer being monitored. The monitoring period was set for seven days for all the contacts.

Authorities also added that the worker who died was not infected with plague bacteria, Yersinia pestis, and the worker had been vaccinated against the infection due to the occupational hazard. They added that no lab biosafety or biosecurity incident had occurred at APRI, and the deceased worker had not traveled outside the region within the two weeks before becoming ill.

Reviewing all the information coming out of Russia, the WHO was largely at a loss as to what happened and what risk the event posed, concluding: “A key uncertainty for this event is the absence of a confirmed diagnosis in the deceased laboratory worker.” Without the cause of death, the agency can’t “independently assess whether the duration of the reported monitoring period for contacts was sufficient to exclude all plausible causes of the fatal illness.” They also aren’t ruling out the possibility of a laboratory-associated exposure.

Four major European Parliament groups reject Irish Presidency’s EU budget proposal

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Four major European Parliament groups reject Irish Presidency’s EU budget proposal


Leaders of four major political groups in the European Parliament on Monday rejected the Irish Presidency’s revised proposal for the EU’s 2028-2034 budget, saying it cannot serve as a basis for Parliament’s consent.

The leaders of the European People’s Party, the Socialists and Democrats, Renew Europe and the Greens/EFA groups issued a joint statement expressing “utmost dismay” over the revised Negotiating Box. The document was presented ahead of the European Council meeting on Oct. 15-16 and covers the Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU’s long-term budget.

The groups said Parliament adopted its mandate for the next budget in April in its Interim Report. They said that position is “not an opening bid” but the democratic stance of the only directly elected EU institution.

The leaders objected most strongly to the size of the proposed budget. They said that, compared with the current budget and accounting for inflation and economic growth, the Irish proposal would cut the real value of the EU budget by 161 billion euros, or 10%. They said the European Commission’s proposal of 1.15% of EU gross national income represents the same share of the economy as the current budget, and that starting talks below that level would shrink the budget relative to the economy at a time when Europe is being asked to do more.

The statement listed proposed cuts it said would undermine key priorities:

  • The European Competitiveness Fund would fall by 13% and Horizon Europe by nearly 10%.
  • Strategic infrastructure and military mobility funding would drop by 14%.
  • The Union Civil Protection Mechanism would be reduced by 35%.
  • Global Europe would be cut by nearly 16%.

The leaders asked how Europe can close its competitiveness gap, strengthen security, protect citizens from forest fires and climate-related disasters, and remain a credible global actor with such reductions. They urged the European Council to answer those questions before using the Negotiating Box as a basis for discussion.

The groups also said a smaller budget would not make Europe’s challenges disappear but would shift more of the financial burden to national governments. They called the Irish Presidency’s claim of a 30% increase in the EU budget misleading because it ignores inflation and economic growth. National budgets have grown by 68% over the same period, they said, while national contributions to the common budget have fallen in relative terms. They rejected what they described as an attempt to present the budget as an exercise in “budgetary discipline.”

The leaders said the way to finance common priorities while limiting pressure on national budgets is to agree on new sources of EU revenue. They noted Parliament has proposed a levy on online gambling and betting services, a contribution linked to crypto-assets, and a digital levy on major digital platforms. The digital levy alone could generate up to 25 billion euros a year, in addition to the 57.4 billion euros envisaged in the Commission’s July 2025 own resources package, they said.

The leaders urged the European Council to consider Parliament’s proposals alongside the Commission’s. They said that without agreement on new own resources, they will not be ready to support Parliament’s consent to the budget.

The statement noted that Parliament’s position was backed by an absolute majority, the same majority needed to give consent to the final budget.

“We will not support a budget that weakens the Union’s ability to deliver,” the leaders said.

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