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The liberal Zionist dilemma

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The liberal Zionist dilemma

There is a particular kind of essay that appears every few years, usually after some fresh convulsion in Jerusalem or Gaza, asking whether “liberal Zionism” can still hold together as a coherent political project.

The question is not new. It has haunted the Israeli left since at least 1967, and arguably since 1948. But it keeps getting asked because the tension it names has never actually been resolved, only managed, postponed or papered over by whichever crisis happened to be dominating the news cycle at the time.

Strip away the polemics on both sides, and the structural problem is fairly simple to state. Zionism, as a historical movement, was a 19th-century national-liberation project: the claim that Jews constituted a nation entitled to self-determination on a specific piece of territory.

Liberalism, as a political tradition, is committed to individual rights, pluralism, and, in its more universalist versions, a certain skepticism toward ethnic or religious particularism as the organizing principle of a state.

Liberal Zionism is the attempt to hold both of these commitments simultaneously: a state that is both a Jewish national home and a liberal democracy extending equal rights to all who live under its authority, including the roughly five million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who have no vote in the government that controls their lives, and the two million Arab citizens of Israel proper who do vote but have long complained of structural inequality.

The case that it’s viable

Defenders of the project, and there are serious ones, argue that the tension is real but not fatal, because Israel within the Green Line has functioned, however imperfectly, as a liberal democracy with an independent judiciary, a free press, competitive elections and legal protections for minorities that, whatever their gaps in practice, exceed those found almost anywhere else in the region.

On this view, the occupation is a political choice rather than a structural inevitability of Zionism itself, and a two-state settlement, or some other form of separation, would resolve the contradiction by returning Israel to something like its pre-1967 boundaries, where the demographic and democratic arithmetic works out far more comfortably.

The unfinished business of 1948, in other words, is a bug, not a feature, and can in principle be fixed by political will and a peace agreement.

The case that it isn’t

Critics, from both a Palestinian nationalist direction and a growing post-liberal current within Israeli and diaspora Jewish thought, argue that this framing understates how deep the contradiction runs. Nearly six decades of occupation, they note, is not a temporary deviation.

It is now the median condition of the state’s existence since 1967, administered by a permanent bureaucratic and military apparatus, sustained across governments of every ideological stripe and increasingly entrenched by a settler population approaching half a million in the West Bank alone.

A political arrangement that has persisted this long, on this view, has effectively become the system rather than an aberration from it.

Add to this the events of 1948 themselves, the displacement of roughly 700,000 Palestinians, a foundational fact that any honest reckoning with the state’s origins has to sit with and the argument is that liberal Zionism has always required a certain selective attention: a discipline of looking at the Green Line and not much past it.

There is also a demographic argument that sits underneath both positions and rarely gets said out loud in polite company: between the river and the sea, Jews and Palestinians are now roughly at parity in numbers.

A state that governs that entire territory while extending full and equal citizenship only to one of the two groups is, by most standard definitions, not a liberal democracy over the whole territory it controls, whatever it may be within the 1967 lines.

Liberal Zionists have generally answered this by insisting on separation, two states or some other partition, precisely because they recognize that permanent, unequal rule over millions of people is incompatible with liberal commitments.

The trouble is that the political conditions for separation have arguably gotten further away, not closer, over the three decades since Oslo, as settlement expansion has proceeded under governments of the right and center-left alike, and as the Palestinian national movement has fractured between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

Where this leaves the debate

None of this settles the empirical question of what Israeli or Palestinian publics actually want, which is itself contested and shifting, particularly after October 7 and the war in Gaza hardened positions on both sides.

What can be said with more confidence is that “liberal Zionism” functions less as a settled ideology than as a bet: a bet that the political conditions for genuine separation, or some other rights-respecting arrangement, can still be created before the facts on the ground make that bet permanently unpayable.

Whether that bet is still live, or whether it quietly lost some years ago and its adherents simply haven’t noticed, is precisely the argument now underway. And empirical trends (settlement growth, the weakening of the two-state consensus in both societies, the aftermath of the Gaza war) will keep forcing it back onto the table, however uncomfortable that is for people who would rather not choose between their nationalism and their liberalism.

This article was originally published on Leon Hadar’s Global Zeitgeist and is republished with kind permission. Become a subscriber here.

Questions and Answers on Fair Labour Mobility Package

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Questions and Answers on Fair Labour Mobility Package


How will the package make labour mobility fairer for people moving across EU borders?

Documents proving social security and health insurance as well as qualification will be available digitally in the EU Digital Identity Wallet. It means they will become easier to check across borders and will help citizens use their social security rights, health insurance and qualifications.

The skills portability initiative will make it easier for workers to use their qualifications across the EU, both in regulated and non-regulated professions. New qualifications will be issued digitally free of charge for everyone, whether or not they work in another Member State.

People returning to their country will also benefit from the new rules. Ensuring that that the rules which apply will be properly enforced, wherever the worker comes from, will bring better protection from abuse for mobile workers, and it will protect those who stay from unfair competition.

The package will also strengthen the role of the European Labour Authority (ELA) in supporting people working abroad and enforcing EU labour mobility and social security coordination rules.

How will the package support businesses?

The European Social Security Pass (ESSPASS) will reduce paperwork and provide more legal certainty for businesses operating across EU borders. It will be easier for them to follow the rules when sending employees abroad for a short time. Standardised procedures, binding issuance deadlines and faster verification will reduce administrative burden and waiting times. Common information requirements for requesting the so-called ‘portable document A1′ (PD A1), which is needed for posting workers temporarily in another EU country, will provide better interoperability with the e-declaration portal. That way, the same data is not submitted twice for the posting of workers. This is particularly important for SMEs, which represent 99% of EU businesses, and sectors such as construction and services.

The skills portability initiative will enable employers to better understand and compare qualifications and skills obtained across the EU and to instantly check their authenticity. This can make hiring people easier and faster, while also reducing the risk of diploma fraud. Qualifications needed to access regulated professions will be recognised more swiftly across borders. As processing times are shortened from 4 months to 11 weeks (and to 5 weeks in the case of automatic recognition), employers will have faster access to qualified professionals across EU Member States.

Common rules for the recognition of qualifications of non-EU nationals will also help EU employers accelerate recruitment of talent from outside the EU. The strengthened mandate for ELA will also make it easier for businesses to hire workers from other EU countries. Through better information, advice and job-matching via EURES, employers will more easily find the skills they need across the Single Market.

How will the package support national administrations?

Public administrations will have stronger tools to fight fraud and enforce existing EU rules. ESSPASS will help social security offices, labour inspectors and healthcare providers verify the authenticity and validity of social security documents quickly and directly across Europe with estimated total savings up to €205 million over 12 years. Digital signatures could make forgery significantly harder to commit and easier to detect, with potential fraud savings of up to €277 million.

With the revision of the mandate of ELA, cooperation between administrations in solving cross-border disputes will be easier though an enhanced mediation procedure. Cooperation in joint and concerted inspections will further be strengthened with the creation of dedicated national inspection liaison officers and with enhanced capacity of the authority to provide risk analysis based on access to personal data and EU level databases.

The skills portability initiative will make it easier for national authorities to process recognition applications from EU citizens across the Single Market and from non-EU nationals. In addition, it will facilitate more efficient exchanges both between authorities and with applicants and will reduce administrative workload.

Using digital documents across borders

How will ESSPASS work in practice?

ESSPASS will allow people to request, receive and use social security documents fully online. The European Health Insurance Card will be issued in 24 hours maximum.  The request for the “A1” document for posted workers, which shows which country’s social security system covers a posted worker will be further standardised. Through the EU Digital Identity Wallets, people will be able to store and present these documents digitally on their phone, while administrations will be able to verify them instantly and securely. Paper versions will remain available and will carry verifiable security features so that they can also be checked instantly.

What does it mean that qualifications obtained in the EU will have to be issued digitally?

Under the proposed Skills Portability Act, new and recent qualifications will be issued in a standard digital format in the EU Digital Identity Wallet, making them portable and easier to verify across EU borders. This will cover all qualifications most relevant for the labour market, from secondary school to doctoral degrees. Qualifications awarded in the ten years before entry into force will be available digitally within two weeks, upon request, and a mechanism will be put in place to also issue older qualifications.

In addition, a new EU online tool in Europass – the EU platform for skills, qualifications and career information – linking all national databases of qualifications, will provide an easy and free resource for employers and workers who would like to compare the content of qualifications gained in different Member States. Digitalisation changes the format, not the value of a qualification. Whether a qualification gives access to a regulated profession remains a decision for national authorities.

When will these digital documents be available?

The Digital Wallet should be available to people and companies across the EU by the end of 2026. Digital qualifications will be integrated into the wallet three years after the proposal enters into force. The portable document A1 for posted workers will be digitalised one year after entry into force, followed by the European Health Insurance Card and other social security documents after three years. Paper and alternative channels remain available throughout.

After entry into force of the new rules on the digitalisation of qualifications, Member States will have three years to implement them. The revised Professional Qualifications Directive and the directive on the recognition of qualifications of non-EU nationals provide for transition periods of two years.

Will people still be able to use paper documents or access services without a digital wallet?

Yes. Paper versions will remain available on request for social security documents and qualifications, even as digital formats will become the default. No one is required to hold a digital wallet. Paper social security documents will carry security features allowing them to be verified and must continue to be accepted by the administrations.

Recognising skills and qualifications across the EU

What will change for the recognition of professional qualifications?

The skills portability initiative will modernise procedures for recognising professional qualifications in the single market. The new initiative makes targeted changes to the Professional Qualifications Directive to reduce paperwork, shorten processing times (from 3 months to 5 weeks in the case of automatic recognition and from 4 months to 11 weeks for all other recognition applicants) and improve accountability of administrations, lower fees, improve the information provided to citizens, and strengthen administrative cooperation between national authorities. The legal framework is also extended to cover EU citizens who obtained qualifications outside of the EU.

Introducing a unified European digital workflow will accelerate processing times while cutting administrative burden and costs for both competent authorities and applicants. Applications and supporting documents will be accepted in all EU languages, cutting certified translation costs. Administrative costs savings for competent authorities and applicants jointly are estimated at EUR 486 million until 2040. The  

The initiative also introduces the first common training framework for physiotherapists, allowing those who meet common minimum skills and competences defined under the framework to have their qualifications recognised automatically across participating Member States. This will help address shortages where they are most acute. Furthermore, the Commission has identified a list of priority professions in key sectors for which future common training frameworks could be developed. Member States remain free to decide which professions they regulate and what training leads to them.

What do the new rules mean for people with qualifications obtained outside the EU?

A new Directive will set common rules for recognising qualifications obtained outside the EU. It will simplify procedures through aligned documentation requirements, fixed deadlines and appeal rights, reducing waiting times and paperwork for both applicants and employers. The recognition of a qualification does not confer any right to enter, reside or work in the EU.  

The Commission will provide support services to verify the authenticity of qualifications issued outside of the EU. The new rules framework also includes automatic recognition for learning programmes in professions with EU-wide minimum training requirements. This will help address labour shortages in professions such as doctors and nurses, while maintaining high standards of patient safety and professional service. Recognition decisions will not be transferrable between Member States.

When will people start benefitting from the skills portability initiative?

People will start seeing the benefits of the Skills Portability Initiative as the new measures are adopted and implemented. Some benefits could be available around two years after entry into force, with further key measures expected around three years after entry into force.

  • Regulation on digital and comparable qualifications:  three years after entry into force, digital qualifications should become available through the EU Digital Identity Wallet, making them easier to access and share.
  • Amending Directive on professional qualifications:  three years after entry into force, faster and more secure recognition procedures should start to apply.
  • Directive on simpler recognition rules for non-EU citizens: two years after entry into force, simpler procedures should make it easier to have qualifications obtained outside the EU recognised.
  • The common training framework for physiotherapists will apply once the scrutiny period for the Council and European Parliament has concluded, i.e. is after a maximum of four months.

Could automatic recognition of non-EU qualifications lower European professional standards?

No. Automatic recognition does not mean that all non-EU qualifications are automatically accepted. It will apply only to qualifications from specific, pre-approved training programmes that meet EU-wide minimum training and quality standards.

The system will cover specific regulated professions, such as doctors, general care nurses, dentists, midwives, veterinarians, pharmacists, and architects. Before recognition, the relevant training programmes and institutions will undergo a rigorous EU-level assessment, including independent EU review, on-site visits and direct checks of the training environment. Approvals will be time-limited, publicly reported, and open to challenge by Member States if justified doubts arise. This applies only for professions for which EU minimal training requirements are already in place. Member States remain in control of language, registration and professional conduct requirements. The cost of reviewing training programmes is borne by the applying institutions.

Strengthened mandate for the European Labour Authority

What does the European Labour Authority do?

ELA helps EU countries cooperate to apply and enforce rules that guarantee fair labour mobility. It coordinates labour inspections, resolves cross-border disputes between national authorities, and helps people and businesses work and operate across borders. Since 2021, ELA has supported 347 cross-border labour inspections, rising from 10 in 2021 to 138 in 2025). These inspections checked almost 25,000 workers in sectors like transport, construction and agriculture. Many revealed serious breaches, including underpayment or non-payment of wages and undeclared or underdeclared work.

ELA also coordinates EURES, the European network of 1,000 advisers who provide information and employment support services for jobseekers, workers, and employers. EURES. ELA facilitates cooperation and information exchange between EURES members and partners, who publish millions of job vacancies every year on the EURES website.

How will the package help tackle undeclared work, underpayment and the exploitation of workers?

Mobile workers will receive better information and advice on their social and employment rights. This will help them better understand their rights when living or working in another Member State.

Better targeted inspections by Member States will also help identify undeclared work, underpayment and other abusive practices. Simpler dispute resolution between Member States and stronger support for enforcement will also contribute to better protection of workers, including more vulnerable non-EU nationals living in the EU.

ELA’s mandate will also be expanded to cover non-EU nationals residing in the EU. In particular, joint and concerted inspections will be reinforced to cover also cases related to undeclared work, underpayment and exploitation of workers that involve non-EU nationals. ELA will assist Member States on specific employment and social security provisions under the Employers Sanctions, Seasonal Workers, Temporary Protection Directive and Single Permit Directives.

Is ELA becoming an EU labour inspectorate?

Concerted and joint inspections will remain voluntary, and Member States will decide whether or not to take part in them.

At the same time, ELA will be better able to carry out data analysis and risk assessment and to propose inspections to interested Member States.

In addition, the introduction of new national inspection liaison officers for all Member States will help improve cooperation between EU countries and support inspections.

The same principle applies to mediation, which also remains voluntary.

How will the package address illegal practices in subcontracting chains?

Today’s package focuses on strengthening enforcement within the existing framework. In that context, the reinforced mandate of ELA will improve support to Member States in enforcing workers’ rights in cross-border situations, including in subcontracting chains.

Potential new EU action on subcontracting chains is currently being assessed as part of the second-stage consultation of social partners on the upcoming Quality Jobs Act. In addition, following the report on the application and implementation of Directive (EU) 2018/957 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers, ELA is currently mapping existing subcontracting liability schemes across the Member States. This package is not changing subcontracting liability rules.

How will the ELA’s mandate be expanded to cover non-EU nationals?

Some non-EU nationals are particularly vulnerable to workplace abuse such as underpayment, excessive working hours, illegal deductions, and bogus self-employment. Excluding non-EU workers from the ELA’s activities would create enforcement gaps, enable unfair competition and put pressure on employment and social standards.

To address this, ELA’s mandate will be expanded to cover non-EU nationals. In particular, joint and concerted inspections will be facilitated to include cases of undeclared or illegal employment and exploitation of non-EU workers. In addition, ELA will assist Member States on specific employment and social security provisions under the Employers Sanctions, Seasonal Workers,  Single Permit Directive and Temporary Protection Directive.

How will EURES change?

The proposed revision of the EURES framework will make the network simpler, stronger and better connected to other digital tools and services for employment.

The revision will transfer ownership of the EURES portal from ELA to the European Commission. This will enable closer integration with other major EU tools and services, for instance Europass, the EU Talent Pool, and the European Skills, Competences, Qualifications and Occupations classification system (ESCO). This will support more seamless, efficient and user-friendly services for jobseekers, employers and the organisations that assist them.

The revision will also reduce complexity and make the framework easier to manage and more effective by including key operational rules directly in the EURES Regulation, replacing the current fragmented structure of six implementing acts. This streamlining will help to strengthen job matching and improve support for labour mobility across Europe.

How is the proposal on recognition of qualifications of non-EU nationals consistent with the EU policy on migration?

The proposal is consistent with EU migration policy because it helps attract talent and make better use of skills from non-EU countries. By making recognition faster and more transparent, it can help non-EU nationals access jobs that match their qualifications and address labour and skills shortages. This will apply whether non-EU nationals already work and reside in the EU or plan to migrate to the EU for work.

It also complements EU legal migration initiatives, including the EU Talent Pool, which is designed to facilitate international recruitment for occupations facing labour shortages, as well as the Talent Partnerships, by supporting labour market integration through easier recognition of skills and qualifications.

At the same time, recognition of qualifications does not give a right to enter, reside, or work in the EU. These rights remain governed by EU and national migration rules, as the proposal does not affect Member States’ right to determine how many non-EU nationals to admit. The Commission’s proposal only focuses on recognition procedures as such and does not affect Member States’ competences in migration or professional regulation.

King Charles Was ‘In Love’ with His Male Valet?

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King Charles Was ‘In Love’ with His Male Valet?


Princess Diana allegedly told her brother that her crumbling marriage to then-Prince Charles was headed for divorce because she believed her husband was “in love with his valet,” according to an explosive new memoir.

The startling claim comes from Charles Spencer’s upcoming book, Swan Song: Diana, My Sister, which is due to be released in the United States on September 22.

Spencer says the deeply personal book tells Diana’s story from the perspective of the brother who grew up alongside her and remained one of her closest confidants. Publisher Penguin Random House describes it as the first time Spencer has spoken at length about his famous sister and the dramatic final week of her life.

One of the book’s most eye-catching passages reportedly centers on a private lunch between the siblings at San Lorenzo restaurant in London.

According to Spencer’s account, Diana told him she planned to divorce Charles.

Spencer recalled being stunned by the news and warning his sister that the public had embraced their marriage as a royal fairytale and might blame her if it fell apart.

Diana then allegedly gave him a startling explanation.

She told him that her husband was “in love with his valet,” according to excerpts from the memoir reported by People and other outlets.

Spencer does not identify the valet in that passage.

That distinction is important because some reports have linked the comment to Michael Fawcett, a longtime member of Charles’ household who became one of his most trusted aides. There is no established evidence, however, that Charles and Fawcett had a romantic relationship.

Fawcett’s name became caught up in a very different royal controversy in 2003, when he obtained an injunction aimed at stopping publication of allegations involving himself and a senior member of the royal family.

The Guardian later successfully challenged restrictions preventing it from identifying Fawcett as the man who had sought the injunction. Court reporting at the time revealed that the underlying story involved an alleged sexual incident, but the newspaper expressly noted there was no evidence establishing the allegation as true.

Charles’ office took the unusual step of publicly pushing back against the rumors.

His private secretary at the time, Sir Michael Peat, called the unspecified allegation “totally untrue” and said it was “without a shred of substance.”

The episode generated enormous tabloid speculation but never produced proof of an affair between Charles and Fawcett.

Spencer’s new account is therefore best understood as a claim about what Diana allegedly believed and told her brother, not evidence that such a relationship actually existed.

The memoir arrives as old wounds surrounding Charles and Diana’s troubled marriage are once again being reopened.

Their separation was formally announced in December 1992. The Royal Family’s own historical account says the couple continued living separately before divorcing on August 28, 1996.

By then, their marital problems were very much public.

Charles acknowledged adultery during a televised interview in 1994, saying the relationship occurred after the marriage had become “irretrievably broken down.” His office subsequently confirmed that he was referring to Camilla Parker Bowles, now Queen Camilla.

Diana delivered her own seismic television moment during her November 1995 Panorama interview, famously referring to the presence of another person in the marriage while discussing Charles’ relationship with Camilla. The interview intensified an already extraordinary public breakdown of the royal marriage.

The new valet claim is only one of several allegations in Spencer’s book that have put Buckingham Palace on the defensive.

Spencer also alleges that Charles made a deeply insensitive remark shortly after Diana’s August 1997 death while the two men argued over arrangements for her funeral.

Buckingham Palace has taken the unusual step of responding.

“While we do not comment on books as a matter of principle, His Majesty is mindful that the pain of fraternal grief can cloud reason, affect judgment and colour memory in ways others do not recognise, even many years after such a loss,” a palace spokesman said this week.

The statement was directed at Spencer’s recollections surrounding Diana’s death and funeral rather than serving as a specific denial of the newly reported valet conversation.

Spencer, meanwhile, is standing by his memories.

In an interview published Friday, September 18, he said he was telling the truth about his recollection of a contentious conversation with Charles after Diana’s death and rejected the suggestion that grief had distorted his memory.

Nearly three decades after Diana died in Paris at age 36, the intensely scrutinized collapse of her marriage continues to generate new claims, old disputes and questions that may never be definitively answered.

What Spencer’s book does provide is something different: his account of what Diana was telling her own family as her royal marriage unraveled.

Whether her belief about Charles and a valet reflected reality, suspicion or the extraordinary tensions surrounding the couple remains unproven.

OPINION – Where Did That Britain Go?

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OPINION – Where Did That Britain Go?


From Shaftesbury and Balfour to today’s Labour government, Britain’s changing relationship with Israel raises a larger question about the country’s sense of history, national purpose, and moral inheritance

While Prime Minister Andy Burnham and Foreign Secretary David Miliband busy themselves sanctioning and passing judgment on Israel, Scottish First Minister John Swinney has made a remarkable prediction: Burnham, he suggested, may go down in history as the final prime minister of the United Kingdom.

Is Burnham blind to the irony? Miliband delivered his ill-conceived judgments on Israel with visible unease, and some observers suggest the government’s posture is less about principle than about courting Britain’s Muslim vote away from the Greens and back toward Labour.

Even as they push a two-state solution for Israel in pursuit of that questionable political gain, they face a coordinated push from their own regional leaders demanding the right to hold independence referendums.

Two states instead of Israel, and how many states will it take to solve the United Kingdom? There is something painfully symbolic in that question.

Empires and kingdoms have risen and fallen throughout history according to how they treated the Jewish people and Jerusalem. It is a pattern strange enough to notice and persistent enough to take seriously.

A Different Britain

The United Kingdom of today would be almost unrecognizable to Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 7th Earl of Shaftesbury, the great Victorian reformer and early advocate of Jewish restoration to the Land of Israel. In 1840, Lord Shaftesbury wrote to Queen Victoria:

“May it be during your reign that, according to the hopes of this unique people now laid before Your Majesty, ‘Judah shall be saved and Israel shall dwell in peace.’ Such is the prayer of the loyal and devoted servant of Your Majesty.”

Shaftesbury was not a lone eccentric. He represented a remarkable current of British Christian concern for Jewish restoration that ran through influential levels of government, church, and society throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.

That movement found one of its most consequential, and today most forgotten, representatives in William Hechler, who declared, “It is the duty of every Christian to love the Jews.”

In 1896, Hechler encountered a remarkable new publication: Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). On March 10 of that year, he met its author, Theodor Herzl, and immediately recognized in him the man he believed could become the political instrument of Jewish restoration.

Herzl and Hechler appealed in turn to the great powers—Germany, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Britain—seeking international backing for a Jewish homeland. Germany had its opportunity first.

Kaiser Wilhelm II considered the matter but ultimately declined to make the Jewish national project a German cause. Fifteen years later, Germany lost the First World War and stood accused of having started it.

The vast Ottoman Empire collapsed. Russia descended into revolution and decades of communist tyranny.

Britain made a different choice and met a different fate. On November 2, 1917, Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour issued the declaration that His Majesty’s Government viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”

A month later, British forces under Gen. Edmund Allenby entered Jerusalem. Prime Minister David Lloyd George famously described the capture of the city as “a Christmas present for the British people.” It is almost impossible to imagine a British prime minister speaking that way today.

Britain was subsequently entrusted with the Mandate for Palestine by the League of Nations, a mandate that incorporated the Balfour Declaration and formally charged Britain with facilitating the establishment of the Jewish National Home. Britain had been given an extraordinary place in history.

Britain at Another Crossroads

There was once a Britain whose leading statesmen could speak openly about the restoration of Israel: a Britain of Shaftesbury, who prayed that Judah would be saved and Israel would dwell securely; a Britain that lent Balfour’s name to one of the decisive declarations of modern Jewish history; a Britain whose prime minister could celebrate the liberation of Jerusalem as a Christmas present.

That Britain was far from perfect. British policy later betrayed many of the hopes raised by the Balfour Declaration, closing the doors of Palestine to desperate European Jews as the Holocaust approached.

Today, Britain stands at another crossroads: What kind of Britain will survive? A nation does not hold together merely because its politicians negotiate another constitutional settlement. Nations are held together by shared conviction, by a sense of history, purpose, and moral inheritance.

I do not know whether Burnham will be remembered as the final prime minister of the United Kingdom. But if Britain’s leaders wish to understand what is happening to their country, perhaps they should look beyond Westminster, beyond the opinion polls and constitutional commissions, and even beyond Brussels and Washington.

Let them read Shaftesbury’s letters again and the Balfour Declaration—the foundations that helped make Britain great. And perhaps someone might remind them to read their Bible, too.

Rings around a tiny body have changed over the past decade

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Rings around a tiny body have changed over the past decade

For decades, astronomers thought rings were something only giant planets had. That changed in 2013, when a small, dark body orbiting between Saturn and Uranus passed in front of a star and blinked twice on either side of the main event, revealing two narrow rings around an object barely 250 kilometers across. “It was a surprise,” says Pablo Santos-Sanz, an astronomer at the Instituto de Astrofísica de Andalucía in Granada, Spain. Ever since, the question has been what such rings are made of and how long they can last.

In a recent study, Santos-Sanz and his colleagues used the James Webb Space Telescope to watch the same body, now known as Chariklo, pass in front of a background star again. They found one of its rings had grown denser and the other had almost vanished. We don’t know exactly why.

Shadowing a star

The technique behind the observation is simple. “We predict when a Solar System object passes in front of a star,” Santos-Sanz said. The starlight dims for a moment, and the shape of that dip reveals the size, shape, and surroundings of the object that caused it. “This is particularly challenging for minor bodies, and more challenging for distant minor bodies,” he said.

The difficulty is that the target’s silhouette on the sky is minuscule, and knowing when it will cross a particular star requires very precise positioning data for both. Still, in 2013, we used ground telescopes to discern Chariklo’s two rings, C1R and C2R. These sat 390 and 405 kilometers from its center and were only a few kilometers wide and about 7 kilometers apart.

Doing this with a space-based telescope, though, makes lining things up considerably harder. JWST sits at the L2 Lagrange point, and controllers need to nudge the telescope every few weeks to keep its orbit stable. “It’s a kind of tricky task,” Santos-Sanz said. His team identified a possible Chariklo occultation in August 2022 and redid the prediction every week. Between the first prediction and one of the last, the projected line of sight shifted by about 110 kilometers, which was enough to move it off the body entirely. Unfortunately, JWST requires observations like this to be planned at least 14 days in advance.

“We did this maybe a bit blindly, because we didn’t know exactly where the line of sight was,” Santos-Sanz said. “I’m going to move one of the biggest, best telescopes in space, and we don’t know if finally we will catch this or not.” But it all worked out.

The occultation came on October 18, 2022. The reconstructed geometry shows JWST’s sightline to the background star skimmed 7.4 kilometers above Chariklo’s surface, missing the body but catching its rings.

The ring that thickened

JWST recorded the event simultaneously in two near-infrared bands, at 1.5 and 3.2 micrometers, which made it the first time anyone has caught a minor body’s rings in a band beyond three micrometers—a range Earth’s atmosphere puts out of reach for ground telescopes.

The inner ring showed up unmistakably, with abrupt, distinct edges, but it was much darker than before. Averaged over roughly 10 previous ground-based occultations, C1R’s normal opacity (the fraction of starlight it blocks) sat at 0.303. JWST measured it at 0.431. “We didn’t believe it at the beginning, so we fought a lot with the data,” Santos-Sanz said.

The most straightforward explanation was geometry. Rings are not always uniform, and JWST might simply have cut through a denser clump. To rule this scenario out, the team built a lumpy ring model and ran 10 million simulated occultations. Reproducing an opacity as high as JWST recorded came out at a roughly 1 in a 1,000 chance at 1.5 micrometers, and 4 in 100,000 at 3.2 micrometers for a single measurement. The telescope caught the ring twice, going in and coming out, which made the odds even smaller than that.

Santos-Sanz concluded that the inner ring most likely got thicker. At the same time, the outer ring did the opposite.

The ring that faded

C2R barely registered at 1.5 micrometers and did not appear at all at 3.2, even though the telescope was recording the same stretch of ring in both bands at the same instant. “At the beginning we didn’t even see the outer ring in the light curve,” Santos-Sanz said. “We had to use models. It was really barely visible, so we said, ‘What is happening here?’”

The team came up with two possible explanations. The first is that JWST, looking at wavelengths where almost no occultation has ever been recorded, is simply seeing grains that scatter light differently in the infrared. The other is that the rings really have physically changed. Santos-Sanz argues radiative transfer models point toward the latter. The older visible-light observations were consistent with a mixture of ice and silicates, but once the JWST data points are added, no combination of materials and grain sizes could explain what the telescope has seen.

“We are witnessing a real evolution of the rings with time,” Santos-Sanz said. “Of course it is not a certainty, but for me it is the preferred explanation.” What’s more, this evolution most likely was not just the material from the fading outer ring migrating inward to the inner ring. Measured as equivalent width, the inner ring gained about 10 times more than the outer ring lost.

“We don’t know where the extra material is coming from, but there are some hypotheses,” Santos-Sanz said.

The ghost moon

The leading explanation, Santos-Sanz explains, is a small shepherd satellite sharing the outer ring’s orbit. Such an object should explain the rings’ stability and their sharp edges and could also shed debris that replenishes C1R. “This satellite has not been detected yet, if it exists,” Santos-Sanz said.

A computer model based on JWST data also hints at what the two rings are made of. Santos-Sanz, though, makes it clear that this part of the work is unfinished. “Our feeling after this model is that the inner ring should be composed of bigger particles than the outer ring. The outer ring we think is more dusty,” he said. “But this is a work in progress. I can’t say with certainty, well, this is dusty, this is not.”

The best test, the team argues, would be to catch another Chariklo occultation, this time using visible light, which would separate genuine change from a wavelength effect. “We are searching for new occultations,” Santos-Sanz said. Understanding how rings around small bodies evolve over time, he explains, matters, because Chariklo is not the only one to have them.

Rings are now known around another body from the same category as Chariklo, called Chiron, the dwarf planet Haumea, and the trans-Neptunian object Quaoar. Giant-planet rings are already known to shift over months and years; Saturn’s D ring has measurably shrunk, and Neptune’s Adams arcs rearrange themselves. Now small bodies appear to do it as well.

“I think this work is just a piece of the puzzle,” Santos-Sanz said, “but it could be an important clue for broader studies about the rings around minor bodies and around giant planets.”

Santos-Sanz’s study is published in Science Advances: https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aeh4794

US-Saudi F-35 fighter deal runs into a China-sized problem

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US-Saudi F-35 fighter deal runs into a China-sized problem

A potential multi-billion-dollar transfer of advanced US stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia has thrust US Middle East policy into a delicate balancing act between regional deterrence, Israeli air superiority and rising geopolitical skepticism.

The US State Department approved a potential US$24.3 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, issuing a formal Congressional notification for a landmark transaction intended to bolster Saudi Arabia’s deterrence against recurring Iranian drone attacks and heightened combat with Yemen’s Houthi forces, multiple media outlets reported.

This possible transfer follows a November 2025 US-Saudi strategic defense pact that authorizes the latter to acquire F-35 stealth fighter jets directly from US manufacturers.

Under the proposed defense package, Saudi Arabia would acquire 48 conventional takeoff and landing stealth aircraft, 49 Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, precision navigation components, cryptographic devices and comprehensive logistical and weapons support to modernize its frontline air fleet.

While the Trump administration contends the procurement will reinforce partner interoperability without altering the Middle East’s regional balance of power, the initiative has faced immediate pushback from US legislators.

Skeptical US lawmakers warned that Saudi Arabia’s commercial and defense ties with China could expose sensitive US stealth aviation technology to Chinese intelligence exploitation, echoing past disputes that stalled similar arms proposals to the United Arab Emirates.

The transfer additionally tests the US’s statutory commitment to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge, given Israel’s status as the region’s sole F-35 operator. US Congress now holds authority to review the agreement before prime defense contractors can negotiate final procurement contracts.

If the US F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia pushes through, it may enable the latter to operate more effectively in heavily defended airspace over Iran and Yemen, operational areas wherein older 4th-generation fighters such as F-15s were shot down.

Notable F-15 losses during the Iran war include the first US F-15 combat loss in April 2026 and a claimed Houthi shootdown of a Saudi Arabian F-15 over Yemen this month.

In an October 2025 Business Insider article, Royal Air Force (RAF) Director of Capabilities and Programs Air Vice Marshal James Beck stated that 5th-generation stealth fighters are now the baseline minimum and the entry requirement for any effort to control the skies against basic threats temporarily.

As The War Zone (TWZ) pointed out in April 2025, an eclectic mix of radar-guided surface-to-air missiles, repurposed air-to-air infrared-guided missiles, and loitering munitions pose serious threats through mobile “shoot-and-scoot” tactics paired with passive infrared seekers and electro-optical targeting that produce no telltale radar emissions before launch.

But even 5th-generation fighters such as the F-35 may not be invulnerable to such threats. In March 2026, a US F-35 was damaged by Iranian anti-aircraft fire, forcing it to make an emergency landing at an undisclosed US base.

To address the strategic balance, the US must also navigate statutory requirements. While the US sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia may undermine Israel’s assured qualitative military superiority, Reuters reported in November 2025 that the aircraft supplied to Saudi Arabia will lack the advanced features of Israeli units.

Reuters says that Israel has special authorization to modify its F-35 aircraft, including integrating its own weapons and equipping them with radar-jamming systems.

In addition to those permissions, the report states the US is unlikely to sell Saudi Arabia advanced weapons such as the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), which would likely be sold to Israel. Also, it states that the US may equip Saudi Arabia’s F-35s with an inferior software suite to keep them qualitatively behind those of Israel.

Simultaneously, technology security concerns remain paramount on Capitol Hill. As for China obtaining sensitive F-35 data via Saudi Arabia, Defense Security Asia notes in a November 2025 article that the close defense ties between the two countries, spanning ballistic missiles, drones and military cooperation with Pakistan as a proxy for the former, increase the risk of data leakage.

The report notes that China could access sensitive F-35 data through shared workshops, integrated production lines, or via Pakistani engineers rotated through Saudi Arabia’s facilities.

However, the question remains whether Saudi Arabia actually needs the F-35. John Ferrari and Dillon Prochniki mention in an April 2026 War on the Rocks article that while the F-35 performed brilliantly during short, pre-planned strikes against Iran, relying predominantly on the platform creates a brittle force unsuited for a protracted conflict.

Ferrari and Prochniki point out that the F-35’s heavy ground footprint, reliance on vulnerable forward bases, fragile aerial refueling requirements, and low mission-capable rates make it exceptionally difficult to sustain under sustained missile salvos.

They add that the F-35’s US$ 80 million-per-plane cost and low annual production ceilings mean combat losses cannot be easily replaced, necessitating an urgent pivot toward cheaper, attritable uncrewed systems. Still, the US sale of F-35s to Saudi Arabia may be driven more by political than by military considerations.

Authors such as Vali Nasr, in a September 2026 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article, and Marc Lynch, in an August 2026 Foreign Affairs article, note that Gulf monarchies may have lost confidence in the US security umbrella, as Iranian strikes exposed the limits of US primacy and destroyed its basing architecture, leaving installations viewed as existential liabilities rather than defensive assets.

Furthermore, Azeema Cheema and Mohanad Hage Ali mention in an August 2026 Diwan article that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, recognizing a deepening regional security vacuum, formed an autonomous defense pact – the Mecca Agreement – replacing traditional reliance on an unraveling US umbrella with collective deterrence and expanding indigenous military-industrial cooperation.

Amid that rupture with the US, the US decision to approve F-35 sales to Saudi Arabia may aim to ensure strategic alignment and secure obedience. While Saudi Arabia might gain access to cutting-edge fighter technology if it proceeds with its F-35 purchase, the US could quickly neutralize foreign-operated F-35s by cutting off access to proprietary sustainment and digital ecosystems.

Because the F-35 relies heavily on centralized US supply chains and contractor-operated maintenance for sealed critical components, fleets deprived of spare parts quickly face severe cannibalization and grounding.

Cutting an operator off from the centralized ALIS/ODIN cloud networks, which generate vital, US-compiled Mission Data Files for threat emitter routing and survivability, and from US satellite communications renders surviving airframes functionally degraded and highly vulnerable.

Ultimately, whether this multi-billion-dollar transaction materializes into a durable instrument of US leverage or accelerates Saudi Arabia’s sovereign pivot toward autonomous regional alliances will be pivotal in shaping the Middle East’s future security architecture.

Learning another language may be one of the best ways to keep your brain healthy

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learning-another-language-may-be-one-of-the-best-ways-to-keep-your-brain-healthy
Learning another language may be one of the best ways to keep your brain healthy

Learning another language is a highly complex mental activity. It requires people to remember words, distinguish unfamiliar sounds, recognize patterns, work out grammatical rules, and retrieve the right expression at the right moment. All of this happens while listening, interpreting, and preparing a response.

Could all this mental activity also help keep an aging brain healthier? Research suggests it can.

Concerns about memory and dementia can send aging adults looking for ways to exercise their brain and maintain cognitive function, whether it is solving crossword puzzles or playing a musical instrument. Language learning might not seem like the same kind of brain exercise, but it is a complex activity that engages several mental processes at once.

I am a linguist who studies language acquisition, use, and loss. My new book, Beyond Words: How We Learn, Use, and Lose Language, examines language and the mind across people’s lifespans.

Research increasingly suggests that language learning and bilingualism can offer cognitive benefits—including for older adults. Learning another language can also create opportunities for communication and social connection.

A workout for the brain

A person’s brain remains capable of change throughout their life. This ability to adapt in response to experience is known as neuroplasticity.

Learning unfamiliar sounds, vocabulary, and grammatical patterns requires the brain to form and strengthen connections. Language learning engages several mental processes at once, requiring people to absorb and retrieve information, notice when something does not work out, and adjust. This sustained mental effort makes language learning a particularly rich form of cognitive exercise.

Research on bilingualism has found differences in both the brain’s gray matter, which contains neurons and their connections, and white matter, which consists largely of nerve fibers linking different parts of the brain.

Studies have shown greater gray matter density or stronger white matter integrity in bilingual people, compared with people who speak one language. These findings suggest that language experience can be reflected in the brain’s structure, as well as its activity.

But brain differences are only part of the picture.

The brain as it ages

One reason researchers are interested in language and aging is the idea of cognitive reserve. This term refers to the ability to maintain cognitive function despite age-related changes or damage to the brain.

Bilingualism has been proposed as one factor that can help the brain cope with the effects of aging, because managing two languages places ongoing demands on people’s attention and cognitive control—ultimately helping to strengthen cognitive reserve.

Some studies have found that bilingual people who develop dementia show symptoms at a later age than people who speak one language. This suggests that bilingualism may provide some protection against the effects of brain aging, although it does not necessarily prevent dementia or the brain changes associated with it.

The potential benefit may therefore be greater resilience in the face of those changes, rather than prevention of the underlying disease.

Learning later in life

This raises another question: If lifelong bilingualism may help protect the brain as we age, can people gain similar benefits by learning a language later in life?

Age changes the way languages are learned, but adults remain capable of learning new languages throughout life. Adults and kids bring different strengths to the task. Children tend to have advantages with pronunciation and some aspects of grammar, while adults bring larger vocabularies and better-developed strategies for learning.

Research involving older adults suggests that learning a language can produce cognitive benefits, although the findings are mixed. The potential benefit may come less from achieving fluency than from the process of learning itself. Language learning is a sustained challenge that keeps people learning, practicing, and adapting.

There are social benefits, too. Learning another language can deepen cultural understanding, improve interpersonal communication and encourage people to empathize with other people’s perspectives and experiences. It can also connect people with others from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, creating opportunities for conversation and friendship.

There is no established formula for how much language learning is needed to provide these benefits. Studies have used everything from intensive classroom instruction to short daily sessions with language-learning apps, over periods ranging from weeks to months, to see whether language learning can improve cognitive function. Rather than a magic number of hours, what matters may be sustained engagement in a challenging activity like learning a new language.

Building cognitive resilience

Learning another language is not a miracle cure for aging, and it cannot guarantee protection against Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia.

But it is an unusually rich form of mental activity.

Perhaps the most useful way to think about language learning is not as a way to keep the brain young, but as a way to support cognitive resilience—the ability to keep learning, adapting and functioning despite the changes that come with age.

Aging inevitably changes the brain, but people retain the capacity to learn throughout life. Keeping our brains engaged in demanding new activities may contribute to that resilience.

Karen Stollznow, Senior Research Fellow of Linguistics, University of Colorado Boulder; Griffith University; University of New England. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Israeli fire kills 3 more Palestinians in latest Gaza ceasefire violations

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Israeli fire kills 3 more Palestinians in latest Gaza ceasefire violations

Three Palestinians, including the son of Gaza Health Ministry Director-General Munir al-Bursh, were killed by Israeli army fire in the enclave on Saturday, as Tel Aviv continues its violations of a truce in place since October 2025, a medical source said.

Basir al-Bursh was killed in a strike targeting him in the al-Zahra neighborhood west of the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, the source told Anadolu Agency.

Another Palestinian was killed in an Israeli drone strike on the Shujaiya neighborhood east of Gaza City, the source added.

A Palestinian girl also died of wounds she sustained earlier from Israeli army fire north of the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, the source said.

READ: Red Cross spokesperson: ‘Death and destruction for Palestinians in Gaza continues every day’

Meanwhile, Israeli military vehicles intermittently opened fire east of the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza, witnesses said. No injuries were reported.

Israeli army forces also opened fire in the al-Shakoush area southwest of Khan Younis in southern Gaza, while drones dropped bombs in the area. Israeli helicopters opened heavy fire south of the al-Mawasi area west of Khan Younis and in adjacent areas of Rafah, witnesses said.

According to the latest figures from Gaza’s Health Ministry, Israeli violations of the Oct. 10, 2025 ceasefire agreement have killed 1,386 Palestinians and injured 4,784 others.

Since October 2023, the Israeli army has killed nearly 74,000 Palestinians and injured over 174,000 others in a genocidal war that has also destroyed about 90% of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure.

READ: Gaza refugee committee alarmed over service, staff cut in UN agency for Palestinian refugees

Is NATO ready to fight? The Ukraine war is raising doubts among military analysts

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Is NATO ready to fight? The Ukraine war is raising doubts among military analysts


Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has killed hundreds of thousands of people. It has also served as a proving ground for new weapons systems and raised an uncomfortable question for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: ​Is the alliance prepared for the next war it might have to fight?

Five Ukrainian and Western defense officials told Reuters that developments on ‌the battlefield are moving so quickly that some NATO weapons and tactics risk becoming outdated. While Ukraine – which is not an alliance member – adapts in weeks, NATO buys and develops systems over years, sometimes decades.

The Ukraine war and U.S. President Donald Trump’s haranguing of European allies have prompted many NATO members to dramatically increase their defense spending. The Pentagon is currently reviewing its military presence in ​European countries, which Trump has accused of sponging off U.S. protection and refusing to help prosecute his unpopular war against Iran.

Denys Shtilerman, the co-owner and ​chief designer of Fire Point, a leading Ukrainian missile and drone builder, told Reuters that tanks are now “worthless” because a drone ⁠costing about $5,000 can destroy one. Yet Europe still spends heavily on tanks – which, say many military analysts, still have a key role to play in future battles.

Cheap ​drones have also transformed warfare in other ways. Troops gathering in groups or large vehicle convoys all become far easier targets.

“They are good at storming positions,” Oleksandr Pivnenko, Commander ​of the National Guard of Ukraine, said of the international troops his units trained with last year. “But if there’s a drone overhead and you don’t even look up, what do you think will happen to your squad?”

In June, Reuters attended a NATO military exercise near Paldiski in Estonia – a small Baltic country now fortifying its 210-mile border with Russia – in which American and European troops ​treated dozens of simulated casualties at wartime field hospitals. But the exercise took place with the assumption that NATO would command the airspace above the hospitals – no ​longer a given in the age of cheap, stealthy, long-distance drones.

Rather than simply receiving NATO training and assistance, Ukrainian officials described a growing role for Ukraine in teaching the alliance lessons drawn ‌from the ⁠war with Russia. Yet they also said NATO’s military bureaucracy struggles to absorb those lessons. A Ukrainian officer who underwent NATO psychological operations training in Romania told Reuters that some alliance training materials still relied on case studies from World War Two. NATO didn’t respond to questions about the officials’ criticism of its training and bureaucracy.

The Ukraine war has also exposed a vulnerability that NATO officials say is far harder to solve: air and missile defense. Russia’s relentless barrages against Ukrainian cities have highlighted Europe’s dependence ​on sophisticated U.S. anti-missile systems such as ​the Patriot, first used in the ⁠1991 Gulf War. Ukraine has a critical shortage of Patriot interceptors – the missiles fired to destroy incoming threats.

Fearing that its reliance on Patriots might become a strategic vulnerability, Europe is building non-U.S. alternatives. Ukraine is awaiting delivery of the new French-Italian SAMP/T-NG ​air-defense system, designed to intercept ballistic missiles. France has promised to accelerate its deployment to Ukraine, and European diplomats previously told ​Reuters it was expected ⁠to arrive by next spring.

In a statement, the Ukrainian defense ministry said its soldiers and NATO’s had much to learn from each other, hailing Ukraine’s use of drones and radioelectronic warfare as “globally unmatched” and praising European efforts to help tackle Russia’s drone and missile bombardments.

In July, Ukraine and nine European allies launched an air-defense coalition that includes plans to jointly develop ⁠a new anti-ballistic ​missile system. Known as Freyja, the project is a consortium of about a dozen companies with ​Fire Point as the lead private-sector partner. The goal is to build a system that is cheaper and faster to produce than the Patriot, while ensuring that Europe, not the U.S., controls its manufacture.

“If you ​spend $20 billion on your air defense system, you must be independent in your security,” said Fire Point’s Shtilerman.

Source:  Reuters

“Our Dear Friend Umar”: How We Uncovered That a Russian Oligarch Bankrolled Donald Trump Jr.’s Wedding

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“Our Dear Friend Umar”: How We Uncovered That a Russian Oligarch Bankrolled Donald Trump Jr.’s Wedding

My colleagues and I had been digging for days. We’d heard a rumor that a Russian oligarch close to President Vladimir Putin named Umar Kremlev had attended Donald Trump Jr.’s wedding this past May in the Bahamas. But to confirm that, we needed visual proof. 

First, we scoured everything the Trumps had released from the event, held on a pair of private islands. On social media and in the pages of tabloids such as Page Six and Hello! magazine, official photos from the weekend showed an intimate chapel ceremony alongside lavish beach parties. Several photos depicted guests, including Jared Kushner and Eric Trump, and we scanned them all for signs of Kremlev. Still, nothing had turned up yet.

We then turned to Kremlev’s social media profiles on the off chance that he’d posted about the wedding. Incredibly, on Telegram, Kremlev had posted videos over the same weekend as Trump Jr.’s wedding that appeared to be from someplace tropical. In one, a single detail caught our attention: As Kremlev speaks in Russian to the camera, the frame gives a partial view of an outdoor patio setting. It wasn’t palm trees or crystal water we noticed, but the wicker furniture.

A screenshot of a Telegram post by Umar Kremlev shows him talking into a camera in front of a wicker chair with a white bow.
The wicker patio furniture in the background of a video posted by Russian oligarch Umar Kremlev the same weekend as Donald Trump Jr.’s wedding provided a clue as to his whereabouts. Via Umar Kremlev’s Telegram account

The chair and its affixed cushion in Kremlev’s post matched what we’d seen in photos of the private islands elsewhere online, such as the promotional image below:

A set dining table with wicker chairs in a tropical setting.
A promotional photo taken at one of the islands that was the site of Trump Jr.’s wedding events depicted the same wicker patio furniture as seen in Kremlev’s video background.

But of course, we couldn’t hang such a big claim — that this Russian oligarch had attended the president’s son’s intimate wedding weekend — on a wicker chair analysis. The Trump family appeared to be curating the wedding’s visual footprint, and not much seemed to exist outside of its control. 

So when my colleagues Justin Elliott, Brett Murphy, Joshua Kaplan and I finally found a photo that confirmed what we’d been looking for, we were floored. The proof had been hiding in an Instagram gallery posted months earlier by a swimsuit model and friend of the bride, nestled among glamour shots and lifestyle photos.

The sunset group shot on a white sand beach shows wedding guests, barefoot and smiling against a backdrop of palms. One guest throws up a shaka. Front and center is the president’s eldest son and his bride, Bettina Trump, surrounded by close friends and family.

An Instagram post of a group photo shows about 35 people, including Donald Trump Jr.; his wife, Bettina Trump; Ivanka Trump; Jared Kushner; Tiffany Trump; and Russian oligarch Umar Kremlev.
A group photo posted on Instagram by a swimsuit model and friend of the bride shows wedding guests. Instagram

But in the back row, just behind the newlyweds, the top half of a man’s shaved head is visible.

We recognized him instantly: Kremlev.

That photo was at the center of our story this week, in which we revealed that Kremlev secretly bankrolled much of Trump Jr.’s wedding weekend, paying to rent out a private island, among other big-ticket items, according to records reviewed by ProPublica and interviews with three people familiar with the events. The photo also showed two others associated with Kremlev, part of a larger group of Russians whose presence puzzled some attendees. That made their absence from all other official wedding photos all the more noteworthy — especially for a gathering of only 50 or so guests.

A group photo shows Donald Trump Jr.; his wife, Bettina Trump; and Russian oligarch Umar Kremlev. An arrow points toward Kremlev with the words “Don Jr.’s secret benefactor.”
Kremlev is visible in the back of a group photo from the wedding weekend. Laura Gordon Photography via Instagram

The story spread quickly. Within hours of publication, the top Democrat on the House Oversight Committee opened an investigation into Trump Jr.’s relationship with Kremlev, asking for communications between the two and records of “all purchases made for your wedding by foreign nationals.” (Trump Jr. did not respond to a request for comment on the investigation.) It also prompted Bettina Trump to post a joint statement with Trump Jr. on her Instagram, which included even more photos from the wedding weekend.

In response to detailed questions, a spokesperson for Trump Jr. did not dispute the wedding payments from Kremlev. “Umar is a personal friend of Don,” he said. The spokesperson said that Kremlev is “not someone he has a business relationship with.” In a statement, Kremlev’s press office said, “Mr. Kremlev and Mr. Trump Jr have a friendly relationship,” and they first met “a couple of years ago.”

Other than the photo we’ve shared, the images from that weekend remain tightly curated and don’t seem to tell the full story. So we thought we’d share a few examples with the added context from our findings. Sometimes, what — or, in this case, who — isn’t pictured is just as important as what is.

The Setting

An aerial view of tropical islands surrounded by turquoise water.
The island where the reception party was held can rent for about $100,000 per night. Kremlev paid for multiple nights. Little Pipe Cay/Lux Hospitality Bahamas

The weekend festivities were spread across two ultra-exclusive private islands in the Exumas, a chain of storybook Caribbean destinations with white sand beaches and brilliant turquoise water. Islands there have been owned by the likes of Johnny Depp, David Copperfield and LVMH CEO Bernard Arnault. People arrived by helicopter and seaplanes to infinity pools and oceanfront villas. 

The island where Trump Jr. and his bride exchanged vows on Friday was featured in “Pirates of the Caribbean” and “Casino Royale.” (Kremlev was not present for the Friday ceremony, which involved an even smaller group.) 

On a second nearby island, about 10 minutes by boat from where the ceremony took place, a reception party was held. This island can rent for around $100,000 per night, and Kremlev paid for multiple nights. 

The Caribbean-Themed Party

Donald Trump Jr. wears a multicolored Junkanoo headpiece while dancing with Bettina Trump.
The magazine Hello! shared an image of Trump Jr. wearing a Junkanoo headpiece while dancing with his new bride. Laura Gordon Photography via Hello!

On the second night, more guests arrived for a party on the same island where the ceremony took place. The evening was Caribbean themed, with a beachside DJ and a performance by a Junkanoo band. On Instagram, Bettina Trump described the night as “an unforgettable night of pure joy, music, sunset, and dancing barefoot in the sand, surrounded by nothing but love in paradise…It was everything we dreamed of and more… pure magic.”

“Paper Trail” Podcast

Learn more about this story on ProPublica’s podcast “Paper Trail.”

Among the guests was Kremlev, arriving just days after accompanying Putin in China as part of a Russian delegation, according to Chinese state media. (Kremlev’s press office said that he was not part of Putin’s “official delegation” in China.) Kremlev’s ties to Putin and the Russian security services prompted the Ukrainian government to impose sanctions on him personally. 

In their joint statement on Instagram, the couple said that Kremlev paid for the parties on both the second and third night of their wedding weekend, but they drew a distinction between the ceremony itself and the rest of the events. 

“Our dear friend Umar very generously hosted two incredible nights of celebrations for us AFTER our wedding. It was an extraordinarily generous wedding gift from a friend, and something for which we were and remain incredibly grateful,” the couple wrote.

The First Dance

A photo of Donald Trump Jr. and his wife, Bettina, kissing on a dance floor.
Kremlev paid for the Sunday night wedding party during which the couple shared their first dance. Kremlev paid for the Saturday night party, too. Laura Gordon Photography via Hello!

On Sunday, the newlyweds shared their first dance to Elvis Presley’s “Can’t Help Falling in Love.” Photos published in Hello! magazine showed the couple on the dance floor underneath disco balls strung up among palm trees. They embraced as guests watched. Bettina Trump wore her wedding dress. The night was nautical themed, complete with a seafood boat buffet, an illusionist and scantily clad dancers in stilettos and sailor outfits.

Lobsters, mussels and other seafood displayed in a boat labeled “Bettina & Don.”
The Sunday night party that Kremlev paid for featured a seafood boat buffet. Laura Gordon Photography via Hello!
A photo of women dancing in revealing sailor outfits.
Scantily clad dancers in stilettos and sailor outfits perform for guests at the Sunday night party, which Kremlev paid for. Laura Gordon Photography via Instagram

The wedding payments came from a Dubai entity affiliated with the International Boxing Association, a scandal-plagued sports group that Kremlev heads. The IBA has been financed by the Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom. Kremlev picked up the tab for the festivities on Saturday and Sunday.

Kremlev’s press office described him as a businessman and philanthropist, adding, “Mr. Kremlev has never discussed political matters with any of his American friends and acquaintances,” including Trump Jr. It said the boxing organization itself did not incur expenses for the wedding but did not comment on the payments from the Dubai entity.

The Fireworks

A man and woman stand on a beach as fireworks explode above the water.
Trump Jr. and his wife, Bettina Trump, watch fireworks paid for by Kremlev. Laura Gordon Photography via Lewis Miller Design

At the Sunday reception, Trump Jr. and his new wife stood on the beach, gazing out as a barge launched a spectacular fireworks display over the ocean. It was an extravagant cap off the wedding weekend. 

Kremlev picked up the tab for the fireworks display. The company that put it on typically charges around $70,000 for such shows.

There are still lingering questions we didn’t get to the bottom of. Among the most pressing: Why did a Russian oligarch who is close to Putin pay for much of the president’s son’s wedding? What is the nature of Trump Jr.’s relationship with Kremlev, and, importantly, how might it change over time? Frank Montoya Jr., a retired career FBI official who held senior counterintelligence roles, put it this way:

“If I’m paying for your wedding, at some point, you’re going to owe me something.”

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