Cyril Widdershoven, senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, told TML that “Gulf leadership increasingly doubts that US power is able actually to prevent missile attacks, drone warfare, and maritime disruption”
Two days after Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed their new joint defense agreement in Mecca on Friday, the Houthis claimed a drone attack against Saudi Aramco’s Jazan refinery.
The fire was extinguished without reported casualties, but the timing brought into immediate focus the central question surrounding the new pact: If an attack against one member is considered an attack against all, what does that commitment actually require from the other two?
Signed on August 7, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement commits the three countries to regard an armed attack against one as an attack against all. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has compared its collective-defense provision, technically, to NATO’s Article 5, and officials from the three countries have insisted that the agreement is defensive and not directed against Iran—or any particular state. A permanent secretariat is expected to be established in Saudi Arabia, alongside regular coordination among the parties’ foreign and defense officials.
Yet describing Mecca simply as a new “Sunni NATO” risks obscuring what may be more important about it.
The pact brings together three countries with substantially different strategic priorities: Saudi Arabia, still deeply dependent on American defense systems and intelligence; Turkey, a NATO member pursuing increasingly autonomous regional policies; and nuclear-armed Pakistan, whose primary strategic competition remains with India.
It also emerged from discussions that predated the latest phase of the Iran conflict. Talks over a broader Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish framework had already advanced earlier in 2026, building on the bilateral Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed in September 2025. The continuing war involving Iran, however, appears to have accelerated the logic behind institutionalizing regional defense cooperation at a moment when missile attacks, maritime disruption and pressure on Gulf infrastructure have exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing security order.
For Cyril Widdershoven, senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, the agreement should not be understood as a clean break with Washington, but rather a “post-dependence insurance policy,“ reflecting a regional conclusion that while Washington may still possess the greatest military capabilities, “its willingness to use those capabilities, the conditions under which it will intervene and the identity of the threats against which it will provide protection have become uncertain,” Widdershoven told The Media Line.
“The Gulf leadership increasingly doubts that US power is able actually to prevent missile attacks, drone warfare, and maritime disruption,” he said. “It does not question the capabilities of the US to attack Iran, defend Israel, deploy carrier groups, reinforce bases, and sell billions of dollars of weapons.”
That distinction is central to understanding Riyadh’s position.
Saudi Arabia is not replacing Washington with Ankara and Islamabad. Its military relationship with the United States remains difficult to replicate, particularly in high-end weapons, intelligence, logistics and integrated air and missile defense. Rather, the kingdom appears to be increasing the number of security relationships it can activate simultaneously.
Widdershoven described this as an attempt to create “strategic redundancy.”
From a Saudi viewpoint, there is only one main strategy: to build strategic redundancy
“From a Saudi viewpoint, there is only one main strategy: to build strategic redundancy by linking to the United States for high-end weapons and global deterrence, Pakistan for workforce, training, and possible strategic deterrence, and, right now, Turkey for operational experience, defense technology, and geopolitical reach,” he said.
“At the same time, Riyadh wants to have China for economic leverage and diplomatic balance, while using it also for a selective engagement with Iran to reduce the probability of war. This is not coherence. It is hedging under pressure,” he argued.
Abdulaziz Alshaabani, a Saudi political analyst, sees the same diversification but places greater emphasis on regional autonomy rather than declining confidence in Washington. “Saudi Arabia is building a more diverse and balanced network of security partners. While continuing to deepen cooperation with its traditional partners, it is also strengthening defense cooperation with important regional countries in order to enhance greater regional security, autonomy and stability,” Alshaabani told The Media Line.
For Turkey, the benefits are different. Ankara enters the pact with NATO experience, a large conventional military and an increasingly important domestic defense industry. Its companies have become significant exporters of drones, missiles, electronic warfare systems, armored platforms, and naval technology, giving Turkey both a military and a commercial incentive to deepen its access to Gulf defense markets.
But Turkish participation does not necessarily mean Ankara has accepted Saudi strategic leadership, nor that it would automatically enter every conflict involving Riyadh.
Barın Kayaoğlu, chair and assistant professor of American Studies at the Institute for Area Studies at the Social Sciences University of Ankara, cautioned against interpreting the agreement as a sectarian military bloc.
“It is no more a ‘Sunni NATO’ than it is a ‘Muslim NATO.’ So far, the three actors that have made the most noise about it are Israel, Iran, and the Houthis, none of which have contributed much to regional peace in a long time,” Kayaoğlu told The Media Line.
“This is a defensive pact that, over time, could come to resemble the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] more than NATO. It is also important to remember that even NATO’s Article 5 does not amount to an automatic declaration of war,” he said.
That qualification is important. Even though the agreement contains language resembling collective defense, the operational consequences remain less defined than the political commitment.
Kayaoğlu argued that collective-defense provisions should not be interpreted as automatically placing each signatory at war with every adversary of another member.
“The same principle applies here. Turkey and Pakistan will not suddenly find themselves at war with the Houthis, just as Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not automatically find themselves at war with the Taliban,” he said.
Turkey and Pakistan will not suddenly find themselves at war with the Houthis
The comparison also highlights one of Mecca’s biggest unanswered questions: whether it evolves from a political commitment into an integrated security institution.
No publicly available evidence yet indicates the existence of a NATO-style integrated military command. How intelligence will be shared, which threats trigger collective action, what military contributions each state must provide, and how disagreements among the signatories will be resolved will determine whether Mecca becomes an operational alliance or remains primarily a mechanism for strategic coordination.
Alshaabani similarly cautioned against prematurely treating it as a conventional military alliance, noting that it currently functions more as a strategic coordination mechanism that could, over time, deepen into a broader security platform.
Pakistan presents perhaps the most sensitive variable. Islamabad has decades of military relations with Riyadh and longstanding defense ties with Ankara. But its participation also introduces a nuclear-armed state into a Middle Eastern collective-defense framework, immediately raising questions about deterrence.
The agreement itself should not be equated with a Pakistani nuclear guarantee for Saudi Arabia. Publicly available details do not establish an automatic nuclear umbrella, and Pakistan’s strategic posture remains overwhelmingly structured around India.
For Widdershoven, the ambiguity itself may nevertheless have deterrent consequences.
“It is currently unclear whether the 2025 agreement also covers Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. This ambiguity is important, as Pakistan does not need to transfer nuclear weapons or explicitly place Saudi Arabia under a formal nuclear umbrella to generate deterrent value,” he said.
It is currently unclear whether the 2025 agreement also covers Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities
“Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, command structure and force posture are overwhelmingly designed around India. To redirect its strategic deterrent also to Iran or Israel could have severe consequences,” he added.
That India dimension is also one reason the consequences of Mecca may extend well beyond the Gulf.
The agreement links Saudi Arabia directly to Pakistan while strengthening Turkey, another close Pakistani defense partner. India, meanwhile, has developed a substantial defense-industrial relationship with Israel. Israel and India signed a memorandum in November 2025 to expand defense, industrial, and technological cooperation, while Israeli officials have continued to push for deeper strategic relations with New Delhi.
In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Greece and Cyprus already have their own increasingly institutionalized security relationship. The three signed a Joint Action Plan for military cooperation for 2026, adding to an established trilateral framework covering security, energy and regional coordination. Those relationships have fueled speculation that a more explicit Israel-India-Greece-Cyprus alignment could develop as Turkey and Pakistan consolidate their own position.
But that possibility should not yet be described as a counter-pact.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has specifically rejected reports that New Delhi approached Israel seeking a new defense treaty in response to the Mecca agreement. What exists instead is a collection of deepening bilateral and trilateral relationships that could acquire greater strategic relevance if regional bloc-building accelerates.
Israeli officials had also discussed broader cooperation connecting Israel with India, Greece and Cyprus before the Mecca agreement was signed, meaning the emerging geometry cannot be explained solely as a reaction to the August pact.
This is where the consequences of the current war involving Iran may prove larger than the agreement itself.
The conflict has not simply pushed countries into two fixed camps. Instead, it is accelerating a regional system in which states maintain multiple, sometimes contradictory partnerships simultaneously.
Saudi Arabia can expand defense cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan while remaining strategically connected to Washington, economically linked to China and diplomatically engaged with Iran. Turkey can remain inside NATO while building autonomous security structures outside it. Pakistan can deepen Gulf involvement while keeping India at the center of its military planning. India can maintain major economic relations with Saudi Arabia while simultaneously strengthening defense cooperation with Israel.
Alshaabani argued that this increasingly autonomous approach is one of the agreement’s most significant features. “… Middle Eastern countries are becoming increasingly proactive in participating in regional security arrangements, rather than relying entirely on external powers to provide security. Saudi Arabia’s stronger defense cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan is one example of this trend,” he said.
He also rejected the automatic interpretation of the framework as an anti-Iranian or anti-Chinese alignment. “Overall, the agreement is not directed against any particular country. Rather, the three countries are seeking, through institutionalized cooperation, to strengthen their collective deterrence capabilities and improve strategic coordination in responding to future regional security challenges.”
Iran may nevertheless assess the pact through a different security lens.
Saudi Arabia views Iranian missile capabilities and Iran-aligned armed groups as threats to its infrastructure and territorial security. Tehran, conversely, could perceive tighter military coordination among a wealthy Gulf power, NATO’s second-largest military, and nuclear-armed Pakistan as an emerging containment structure, regardless of the signatories’ declared intentions.
Widdershoven described the resulting dynamic as a classic security dilemma. “Saudi Arabia sees Mecca as defensive insurance; Iran sees encirclement by a wealthy Arab monarchy, a major NATO military power, and a nuclear-armed Sunni neighbor,” he said. “Defensive measures on both sides begin to look offensive.”
That may ultimately be the more consequential legacy of the Mecca pact.
The agreement does not yet establish a Middle Eastern NATO, nor does it replace American military power. It does, however, formalize a trend accelerated by the Iran war: regional powers are increasingly building overlapping security networks of their own, even while retaining their older alliances.
And if one new arrangement incentivizes another—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan on one side; deeper Israeli, Indian, Greek, and Cypriot coordination on the other; Iran turning further toward its own partners—the region may not be moving toward two stable, opposing blocs at all.
It may instead be entering a more complicated system of competing and overlapping alignments, in which countries hedge across several partnerships until a crisis forces those commitments to be tested.
What we see emerging is not a replacement regional order, but an increasingly competitive network of overlapping security pacts
As Widdershoven put it: “What we see emerging is not a replacement regional order, but an increasingly competitive network of overlapping security pacts, corridors, and transactional alignments. Still, this is not stability, but armed hedging,” he said. “Armed hedging, as history has shown, only works until the same crisis tests contradictory alliances.”
