China’s construction of what may be the world’s largest naval replenishment ship signals its growing expeditionary ambitions — and highlights the vulnerability of the US’s base-dependent model of power projection.
This month, multiple media outlets reported that satellite imagery and state media indicate that a state-owned subsidiary of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) has been rapidly constructing what appears to be the world’s largest naval replenishment ship on Longxue Island, near Guangzhou, China, since at least February 2026.
Measuring approximately 270 meters long with a 37-meter beam, the scaled-up fleet auxiliary vessel significantly surpasses China’s current 45,000-ton Type 901 replenishment ship and the US Navy’s newest John Lewis-class oilers.
Featuring a broad, slab-sided hull optimized for volume, the ship incorporates dual-aperture hangars and a stern flight deck to facilitate vertical helicopter replenishment, as well as midship pillar-like vertical structures engineered to transfer fuel, munitions, and dry stores at sea.
This massive logistics asset appears designed to sustain the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) expanding carrier strike groups, including conventionally powered aircraft carriers such as the Fujian and advanced amphibious vessels such as the Type 076, during prolonged blue-water operations far from mainland ports.
The vessel’s rapid assembly underscores a widening disparity between Chinese and US naval shipbuilding capacity, potentially providing China with the critical logistical reach necessary to project maritime power across the Pacific and globally without relying on foreign shore infrastructure.
For a major military power, it may be surprising that China has only one foreign military base at Djibouti, compared to the US, which has around 750 bases worldwide.
As such, China’s power projection efforts have been relatively constrained by the lack of foreign basing, forcing it to rely on an extended supply chain of vulnerable auxiliary ships for such missions.
Although China has an extensive network of dual-use infrastructure associated with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is primarily framed as economic, it could also support PLA operations worldwide. Facilities like Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukpyu, and Honiara could enable China to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
From a military perspective, these isolated facilities are vulnerable and hard to defend. Additionally, political instability in BRI host countries threatens their long-term viability.
China’s logistics limitations could become more pronounced if its fourth carrier—widely speculated to be nuclear-powered — enters service. Nuclear propulsion could give the carrier itself exceptional endurance, but its aircraft, escorts, crew and weapons would still require replenishment.
In line with those constraints, China’s new naval replenishment ship could, to some degree but not fully, mitigate the vulnerabilities that come with a lack of foreign basing capabilities.
The massive auxiliary may indicate that China is developing a more self-sufficient expeditionary capability, potentially reducing its dependence on the overseas basing network central to US power projection.
During World War II, before the US had its global network of bases, it had true expeditionary capability, meaning it could project power from its mainland without dependence on foreign bases.
As the US consolidated its global network of military bases, the US Navy arguably became a “garrison force” – one that was dependent on access to foreign bases for power projection.
By the end of the Cold War, US bases were assumed to be sanctuaries against attack and to enable an unimpeded buildup and staging of forces.
The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also reinforced the idea that coalition-building and foreign basing were more feasible means of power projection than maintaining independent capabilities for that purpose.
However, those assumptions are now seriously challenged. China has developed long-range missiles such as the DF-21 and DF-26 that can threaten US air and naval bases in the Pacific.
Recent fighting in the Middle East offers a warning of what happens when supposedly secure forward bases come under sustained missile and drone attacks.
The ongoing Iran war has seen Iranian missiles and drones leave many of the 13 regional bases used by US troops all but uninhabitable, destroy costly military equipment and inflict casualties.
The Iran War may have forced US regional allies to ask hard questions about the strategic value of US bases in the region and the credibility of US security guarantees. They would now have to contend with the hard reality of Iran’s geographic advantage at the Strait of Hormuz and an entrenched regime that arguably now has every reason to push forward with developing nuclear weapons.
Still, the US will most likely remain in the Middle East, but its regional footprint may change significantly after the conflict. Strategic bases, such as the US 5th Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain and the Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, may remain, as withdrawing from these facilities could have serious strategic consequences for US interests.
Smaller US forward bases near Iran, many of which proved vulnerable to Iranian drone and missile attacks, may be closed. In parallel, the US could explore new basing options, possibly in Israel or Jordan.
But what do those lessons mean for the US force posture in the Pacific? Large hubs such as Guam and Okinawa are critical anchors of US presence in the region, but they are increasingly vulnerable to attack. Smaller US “lily pad” facilities in remote Pacific islands may also face similar vulnerability.
China’s growing economic and political influence in the region, coupled with military overmatch against regional states, could prompt US allies and partners that are economically constrained, politically sensitive, and militarily vulnerable to think twice about hosting US forces.
Facing a potentially degraded Pacific basing posture, the US may have to rely more on power projection from the US mainland, as it did during World War II.
In terms of air power, this could mean increased reliance on hypersonic weapons, strategic bombers, and tanker aircraft based on the US mainland for standoff strikes.
At sea, the US may have to relearn how to use the oceans themselves as bases of operations. This could mean re-exploring the sea-basing concept, which uses the sea itself as a base for power projection rather than relying on potentially vulnerable bases and uncertain allies.
While the US Navy maintains formidable strike capabilities, it must also ensure it can stay in the fight after the initial salvos have been fired.
This would entail significant reinvestment in neglected capabilities, such as the Sea Base Ship and other replenishment at sea (RAS) assets, which would enable the US Navy to remain longer in a potential Pacific fight and reduce dependence on potentially vulnerable and politically unreliable foreign basing.
Hence, China’s development of what could be the world’s largest replenishment ship could signal its increasingly ambitious blue-water ambitions while addressing its lack of foreign basing options.
It could also serve as a mirror-image warning to the US, prompting a re-examination of its longstanding assumptions about power projection and a re-evaluation of how it envisions a future Pacific conflict – one in which it could neither use its regional bases nor depend on its allies.














