Beijing’s long courtship of Indonesia’s Muslim communities reached a new milestone this month, when the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), the nation’s top body of Islamic scholars, traveled to China.
The five-day “Digital Silk Road” program brought MUI council members to Guangzhou and Shenzhen, with a focus on technology, halal industries, education and cultural exchange.
But the trip’s significance extended further: Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population, making the MUI a uniquely valuable partner for Beijing’s soft-power ambitions in the region.
Over the past decade, China has expanded its outreach to Indonesian Islamic organizations through educational exchanges, scholarships, economic cooperation and religious dialogue, scholars note, alongside a steady stream of visits and social programs aimed at building people-to-people ties.
The latest MUI visit should therefore be viewed not as the start of China’s Muslim diplomacy in Indonesia, but as its newest expression.
Earlier exchanges often centered on religious understanding and social relations. In contrast, MUI’s visit placed greater emphasis on technology, digital communication and economic cooperation.
The MUI delegation, drawn from MUI’s international relations, halal affairs, economics and digital communication divisions, visited Islamic institutions, universities and technology companies in southern China.
For Beijing, engagement with Muslim organizations provides another potent channel of diplomacy beyond government relations. Indonesia’s Islamic organizations have considerable social influence, shaping local and national conversations on religion, education and community affairs.
Building relationships with these institutions allows China to communicate directly with influential Muslim actors while strengthening its broader ties with Indonesian society.
Yet this diplomatic outreach coexists with a harder problem for Beijing: since 2017, its often harsh treatment of ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang has drawn sustained criticism from governments, rights groups and researchers.
Chinese authorities reject these accusations, maintaining that their policies focus on counterterrorism, economic development and the protection of religious practices.
China has sought to counter criticism over Xinjiang by inviting foreign delegations, including representatives from Muslim-majority countries and organizations, to visit the region and observe conditions firsthand. These trips are part of Beijing’s broader effort to shape the narrative around Xinjiang and push back at international criticism.
MUI took part in one such visit in 2019, when a delegation traveled to China to examine reports concerning Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, meeting first with the China Islamic Association before continuing on to the region. MUI described the trip as an effort to gather information directly, amid conflicting accounts of the situation.
The episode showed that MUI’s engagement with China has not been one-directional. Before the visit, MUI also received representatives from the Uyghur diaspora, who shared their concerns about conditions in Xinjiang. MUI’s approach reflected an effort to hear multiple perspectives while maintaining dialogue with Chinese institutions.
The current MUI visit shifted away from Xinjiang and toward areas where both sides see practical opportunities, with digital technology a major theme. MUI officials have argued that religious communication is increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence, search engines and social media platforms.
For an organization seeking to maintain influence among younger generations, understanding digital platforms has become an institutional priority.
Economic cooperation is another important factor. Indonesia is seeking to strengthen its position in the global halal economy, while China has a large manufacturing base and growing interest in halal markets.
Cooperation between Indonesian Muslim institutions and Chinese companies could create opportunities in areas such as halal products, supply chains and technology.
These exchanges also carry diplomatic weight. For China, ties with Indonesian Muslim organizations offer a channel to engage Muslim communities directly and provide opportunities to explain Beijing’s positions on issues that have drawn international scrutiny.
For MUI, cooperation with China supports its own objectives – expanding international networks, developing halal industry ties and promoting Indonesia’s model of moderate Islam abroad.
The significance of MUI’s visit lies less in the delegation itself than in what it reveals about China’s evolving diplomatic playbook. Beijing is increasingly investing in relationships with influential Muslim institutions alongside its traditional state-to-state ties, recognizing that organizations such as MUI shape opinion far beyond government circles.
The strategy also serves another purpose: creating trusted interlocutors as China continues to defend its record on Xinjiang and expand its economic footprint across Southeast Asia.
Whether that strategy succeeds will depend not only on Beijing’s outreach but also on how Indonesian Muslim organizations respond. MUI has shown that it is willing to engage China, but on its own terms — seeking economic opportunities, technological cooperation and religious dialogue while balancing domestic expectations and international scrutiny.
MUI’s China visit, then, is best understood not as an isolated exchange, but as the latest sign that Indonesia’s Muslim organizations have become an increasingly important arena in China’s competition for influence, legitimacy and partnerships across Southeast Asia.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an independent research institute. Yeta Purnama is a researcher at CELIOS.
