The most significant development at this week’s Conference Commemorating the Tenth Anniversary of the South China Sea Arbitration Award in Jakarta was not what was discussed. It was who failed to appear.
Every Indonesian government representative scheduled to participate reportedly withdrew before the conference began on July 13. According to the organizers, the event had secured commitments from senior government officials, including a director general from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and officers from the Indonesian National Armed Forces.
Several had agreed to deliver keynote addresses or participate as panelists. Yet, shortly before the conference opened, organizers were informed that approval for their participation had been withdrawn. The conference ultimately proceeded without a single representative from the Indonesian government.
On one level, governments cancel appearances all the time. Schedules change. Priorities shift. But this was different. According to Arie Afriansyah, one of the conference organizers, the event had been prepared over many months and initially enjoyed support from several Indonesian ministries and state institutions. Government officials had confirmed their attendance before organizers were informed that the support had been withdrawn.
Researcher Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto similarly noted that every government speaker who had accepted the invitation ultimately canceled. The result was an extraordinary absence. An event discussing one of the most consequential legal developments affecting Southeast Asia took place in Indonesia without a single official Indonesian voice.
That absence matters because this was not simply another academic seminar. Organized by the Philippines-based FACTS Asia together with Indonesian think tanks and academics, the conference marked the tenth anniversary of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s landmark ruling of 12 July 2016.
The tribunal concluded that China’s sweeping nine-dash line claim had no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, better known as UNCLOS.
It also found that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights within its Exclusive Economic Zone and that many maritime features claimed by Beijing did not generate extensive maritime entitlements under international law.
China rejected the ruling immediately and continues to reject it today. Yet the award has become one of the most influential legal decisions governing maritime rights worldwide. Far from fading into irrelevance, its importance has only grown.
On the tenth anniversary, fourteen countries issued a joint statement reaffirming that the ruling remains legally binding between China and the Philippines and rejecting maritime claims that lack a basis under UNCLOS.
The European Union separately described the decision as a landmark contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Beijing dismissed those statements, maintaining that the award remains null and void.
Indonesia has never been a claimant in the sovereignty disputes over the Spratly or Paracel Islands. That fact is often cited to justify caution whenever the South China Sea is discussed. But Indonesia has never been a disinterested observer either.
China’s expansive maritime claims overlap with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone around the Natuna Islands. For years, Indonesian governments have consistently rejected any legal basis for China’s claim to historic rights in those waters.
Immediately after the tribunal issued its decision in July 2016, then Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi reaffirmed the importance of respecting UNCLOS and resolving disputes peacefully.
Indonesia’s position became even clearer in 2020, when Jakarta submitted a diplomatic note to the United Nations explicitly invoking the arbitral award to reject China’s historical rights claims as inconsistent with international law.
In other words, Indonesia has already relied upon the tribunal’s reasoning to defend its own maritime interests. That is why this week’s empty chairs are so striking.
The past decade has only reinforced the relevance of the arbitration award. China’s rejection of the ruling has been accompanied by increasingly assertive grey zone operations throughout the South China Sea.
Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal have repeatedly faced water cannon attacks, dangerous maneuvers, military-grade lasers and deliberate collisions involving Chinese coast guard vessels. Vietnam continues to experience persistent maritime pressure. Indonesia itself has not escaped.
Between 2017 and 2021, Chinese coast guard vessels and the survey ship Haiyang Dizhi Shihao repeatedly entered Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone near the North Natuna Sea, disrupting Indonesian offshore energy exploration around the Tuna Block.
These incidents demonstrate that the legal questions addressed by the tribunal remain far from theoretical. They continue to shape the region’s security environment today.
The government’s absence is particularly striking when viewed alongside an opinion article published only weeks earlier by the state news agency Antara.
That article argued that Indonesia should not host a conference commemorating the arbitration award because doing so could undermine Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy or create the perception that Jakarta was siding with one party in the dispute. It urged Indonesia to focus instead on dialogue, neutrality and regional stability.
Those concerns deserve consideration. Indonesia’s diplomatic credibility has long rested on its ability to maintain constructive relations with all major powers while avoiding unnecessary confrontation. Yet there is an important distinction between geopolitical neutrality and legal consistency.
Participating in an academic conference discussing the arbitration award would not have required Indonesia to endorse the foreign policy of the Philippines, criticize China or abandon its carefully balanced diplomacy.
Indonesian officials could have delivered exactly the same message they have repeated for years. Respect UNCLOS. Resolve disputes peacefully. Exercise restraint. Uphold international law.
Indeed, that would have demonstrated confidence rather than confrontation. It would have shown that Indonesia’s commitment to international law is sufficiently robust to withstand open discussion, even when the legal conclusions prove politically inconvenient for one of its most important economic partners.
Instead, Indonesia’s silence created its own political message.
Diplomacy is conducted not only through speeches but also through decisions about where governments choose to be represented. When every official speaker withdraws from an event after previously confirming attendance, observers inevitably look for meaning.
Whether intended or not, the absence risks creating the impression that Indonesia is becoming increasingly reluctant to publicly associate itself with legal principles that it has privately relied upon for years.
That impression carries costs. Indonesia has long been regarded as ASEAN’s de facto leader because of its ability to combine diplomatic restraint with principled leadership.
The continuing negotiations over a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea will require precisely that combination. Jakarta’s influence depends not on choosing sides between Washington and Beijing but on consistently defending the rules that all parties have accepted, especially UNCLOS.
A decade after the arbitration award, Indonesia did not need to celebrate the ruling or use it to criticize China. It simply needed to be present.
The empty seats left behind this week represented more than cancelled speaking engagements. They represented a missed opportunity to reaffirm Indonesia’s longstanding commitment to the rules based maritime order that has served its national interests for decades.
For a country that has repeatedly defended UNCLOS, rejected unlawful maritime claims near Natuna and positioned itself as ASEAN’s diplomatic leader, absence spoke louder than attendance ever could.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an independent research institute. Yeta Purnama is a researcher at CELIOS.
