Russia today wants to intensify its relationship with China and complains that China is not equally warm in return, treating Russia as a junior partner.

Francois Godement observed acutely that Russia had “let out some public anxiety about China’s behavior. On May 16, RT, the official Russian media outlet, published a criticism of China:

China still often behaves as though it can enjoy the benefits of strategic partnership without fully committing itself to the burdens that come with it.

“It’s indeed very rare for Russia to acknowledge such sentiments publicly,” Godement continued, categorizing those as sentiments “which apply so well to China’s lesser partners such as Venezuela, Cuba or Iran.”

The Russian analyst Alexey Martynov wrote:

Russia and China are moving, slowly but unmistakably, toward a structural alliance that is reshaping the global balance of power. But the two sides are progressing through this transformation at different speeds. Moscow has largely accepted the logic of deep strategic interdependence. Beijing, by contrast, still behaves as though it can preserve a carefully managed partnership in which China remains the senior partner while minimizing its own obligations. That model is reaching its limits.

But China appears irritated even by this new Russian warmth/jealousy. Russia is cultivating a very close relationship with North Korea — regarded by China as almost its own periphery — which certainly affects the security of all of Asia. North Korean rearmament impacts on the rearmament of South Korea and Japan as well.

On May 3, ahead of US President Donald Trump’s May 13-15 visit to China, the South China Morning Post, with special channels to Beijing, reported that “China may be feeling uneasy about talk of a rare five-year defense cooperation plan between North Korea and Russia that could accelerate Pyongyang’s military modernization on multiple fronts.”

The timing could also be interesting, as it might have been a signal to the US as well as to Russia. It’s unclear whether and to what extent Trump broached the subject with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their summit and what was agreed. 

Moreover, today’s Russian warmth comes after China felt somehow betrayed by Russia, which had promised that the war in Ukraine would be concluded within a few days, whereas it has now dragged on for over four years.

The most delicate point is that this Russian affection stands in contradiction to what China may believe it knows about Russia — namely that for years Moscow used its relationship with China as a bargaining chip with America to improve bilateral relations, effectively “selling” China in exchange.

This Russian warmth toward China therefore may betray Russia’s great difficulty at this moment and perhaps also plans for future betrayals yet to come.

The sentiment may have percolated around the planned expansion of the bilateral pipeline. Russia wants it; China drags its feet. A sticking point is certainly the price, but there may be strategic considerations.

What today looks like a Russian lifeline to China could become tomorrow a Russian stranglehold on China. Russia proved in Europe its determination to use oil supplies as political leverage. An agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin today can become something else tomorrow. A pipeline lasts decades; Putin may last years or maybe only months.  

No distance

This does not mean China will distance itself from or abandon Russia. China fundamentally does not trust America; it does not structurally trust the American-led international order, to which it has no desire to fully adapt. It will not abandon Russia because it does not want Putin defeated or humiliated — an outcome that would leave Russia in chaos or in America’s hands.

But it might seek to keep Russia on a tight leash, precisely by emphasizing what Russia is complaining about. China will want to prevent a possible Russian betrayal by every means available, precisely because it expects one.

In reality, it is very difficult for Russia to change sides today. There may be thousands of Chinese technicians in Russia, keeping much of the national economy running. Doing without them would paralyze Russia, with no certainty that any eventual Western assistance could replace or improve upon the Chinese contribution. 

Moreover, if Russia is suspicious of China, it is equally suspicious of the West, which, in its view, has mistreated it for decades despite Russia’s overtures.

The outlook is one of growing friction and tension that will affect the Russian war effort. Moscow could face increasing difficulties because it senses that its relationship with China is becoming less fluid and that the Ukrainians have regained momentum.

Therefore, the Moscow elites who know how to read the Kremlin’s tea leaves could find themselves uneasy. This tension in Moscow could be reflected in Putin’s own tension, which might lead him to make mistakes and worsen the situation.

The two cannot afford to quarrel — not least because of the difficult relationships both have with America — but neither can they ignore or move past the real or perceived tensions and abuses between them.

In this, naïve or hasty Western initiatives could push the two together and prevent fissures from widening. It should be a time for patience.

Francesco Sisci is director of the Appia Institute in Rome, which originally published this article. It is republished with permission.