Reports of explosions, US self-defense strikes, and renewed clashes near the Strait of Hormuz show how unresolved maritime leverage, Gulf vulnerability, and political deadlock could push the conflict into another round
New reports of explosions late Thursday and early Friday near Iran’s Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province put new pressure on a fragile US-Iran diplomatic track that had yet to produce even a temporary settlement.
As of May 8, 2026, Washington and Tehran were reportedly still working toward a short-term memorandum rather than a full peace agreement, mediated by Pakistan, with Iran still reviewing the latest proposal. The framework under discussion would aim to halt the fighting, stabilize shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and open a 30-day negotiation window, while leaving unresolved core disputes over Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missile arsenal, proxy networks, and expanded control over maritime passage.
What has emerged instead is a landscape of partial gains, exposed vulnerabilities, and shifting alignments. The United States demonstrated military reach but lost political confidence among allies and voters. Iran suffered serious blows but preserved the regime and key coercive tools. Israel restored parts of its deterrence but failed to translate battlefield achievements into a political endgame. Gulf states moved further apart, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia increasingly pursuing different models of power. Pakistan gained diplomatic relevance, while Qatar’s mediation role became less exclusive. China and Russia absorbed pressure but also gained diplomatic and strategic space in a more fractured international order.
Gulf states sit at the core of the war’s main contradiction. They rely on US protection, but their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran.
According to Iranian state and semiofficial media, explosion-like sounds were heard late Thursday and early Friday near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other parts of Hormozgan province. Reuters reported that Iran’s Fars news agency said the origin and precise location of the sounds near Bandar Abbas were not immediately known. US Central Command later said US forces had intercepted Iranian missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on three US Navy destroyers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and carried out self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, including missile and drone launch sites, command-and-control locations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance nodes.
Iran accused the United States of violating the ceasefire by targeting Iranian vessels and coastal areas, while Iranian state media said Iranian forces exchanged fire with “enemy units” on Qeshm Island. CENTCOM said no US assets were struck. Iranian claims that US vessels suffered significant damage were not independently confirmed. Reports suggesting Emirati involvement in strikes inside Iran also remained unconfirmed.
The renewed reports around Hormuz matter because they expose the central weakness of the emerging diplomatic track: It seeks to pause fighting without resolving Iran’s maritime leverage, Washington’s dependence on force, Israel’s lack of a political endgame, or the Gulf states’ vulnerability to retaliation.
Those reports do not confirm a full return to the first phase of direct strikes and maritime confrontation. But they show that the conflict has already produced new armed exchanges before any political settlement has been consolidated.
US: Military Reach Without Political Control
Washington’s strongest card remains its capacity to shape the battlefield and global energy flows. The US and Israel eliminated key Iranian regime and military figures, while US airstrikes destroyed significant portions of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile production infrastructure. The crisis also forced China and other importers to reassess their energy exposure. But the broader American strategy produced uncertain results. Iran’s regime survived, its missile capabilities were damaged but not eliminated, and the fate of its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. Its regional posture was weakened but not broken. Instead of producing a decisive diplomatic surrender, the war pushed Washington back into negotiations under pressure from Gulf allies, energy markets, and disrupted shipping.
President Donald Trump’s handling of the conflict also came under growing domestic pressure. A Reuters/Ipsos poll published April 28 found President Trump’s approval at 34%, the lowest level of his current term, while only 34% of Americans approved of the US conflict with Iran. A Fox News Poll released five days earlier showed a somewhat higher level of support for the military campaign, at 45%, but still found a 55% majority opposed to US action in Iran. An NPR/PBS News/Marist Poll published May 6, based on interviews conducted April 27–30, found that 81% of Americans said current gas prices were placing either a major or minor strain on their household budgets, while 63% said President Trump deserved a great deal or a good amount of blame for the increase. The domestic backlash mattered because Iran did not need to defeat the United States militarily to affect Washington’s calculations. By threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and adding pressure to global energy markets, Tehran could raise the political and economic cost of the war for the United States, Europe, and Gulf states.
Project Freedom, the US-led operation to escort commercial shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, became the clearest operational test of Washington’s position. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly halted or restricted American use of bases and airspace in their countries after the operation began. The restrictions were later eased, but the episode showed that Washington could no longer assume automatic Gulf alignment in a military escalation with Iran.
New reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, Iranian claims of clashes with US naval forces, and confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities sharpened that perception. The UAE said three people were wounded after its air defenses engaged two Iranian ballistic missiles and three drones, though it was not immediately clear whether all were successfully intercepted. Commercial vessels belonging to third countries were also targeted or endangered. Reports circulated of attacks affecting US naval assets, although US Central Command denied some of those claims.
Even without accepting every contested report, the strategic damage was clear: A US-led operation designed to reopen one of the world’s most important waterways had become another sign of how difficult it was for Washington to guarantee Gulf security without widening the war.
This is not peace at all, but crisis management under pressure
Cyril Widdershoven, senior adviser at Blue Water Strategy and a geopolitical energy analyst, told The Media Line that the current US-Iran framework falls well short of a settlement. “In my eyes, not at all. It should be seen only as a pause mechanism. The reported framework would end hostilities, open a short negotiating window, ease restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, address sanctions, and begin nuclear talks. Reality shows that this is not peace at all, but crisis management under pressure. All critical issues remain unresolved, including missile programs, proxy networks, IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] influence, and regional competition. If these issues are not addressed and resolved, the agreement will serve only as a tactical reset rather than a strategic solution. The likelihood of a relapse into confrontation remains high.”
Washington showed it could strike Iran, but it did not prevent Iran from imposing costs on Gulf infrastructure, shipping, energy markets, and allied territory. Widdershoven described the deal as both necessary and damaging for perceptions of US power. “For the Gulf, the current deal is all three. It is a compromise because nobody can afford permanent Hormuz paralysis. A necessity because the oil, LNG [liquefied natural gas], shipping, and insurance markets are cracking and will continue to do so. A failure because Iran may receive economic oxygen while core strategic capabilities remain intact. Washington now could be only buying time, as it stabilizes markets and avoids escalation. For most Gulf countries, the current US deal will make it seem as if there is no longer a basis to trust US deterrence and security.”
At the level of NATO, the war amplified disagreements that had already emerged during the Ukraine conflict over military burden-sharing, strategic priorities, and energy vulnerability. Several European governments remained reluctant to become directly involved in a broader maritime confrontation in the Gulf, fearing another energy shock at a time when Europe was already dealing with economic stagnation, industrial pressure, and unresolved dependence on external suppliers. Roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption and a significant share of LNG exports transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Insurance premiums for shipping crossing the Gulf surged during the peak of the escalation, while energy traders and European policymakers discussed contingency plans in case of prolonged disruption.
Rajat Ganguly, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs and a political analyst, told The Media Line that the war forms part of a broader weakening of Western cohesion. Offering a sharply critical view of US policy that remains contested in the European security debate, Ganguly linked the war to the fallout from Ukraine and the Nord Stream sabotage, for which no conclusive public finding has established US responsibility. “America used the Ukraine war to go after another peer competitor of America, which was Germany. Germany has been destroyed by the Ukraine war. Biden destroyed one of the Nord Stream pipelines, which used to bring very cheap Russian gas to Germany. It created energy security for Germany and through Germany to central Europe.”
Ganguly argued that the Iran conflict deepened existing doubts about Washington’s alliance management. “Trump is probably going to destroy NATO. And then, as he said, the Greenland issue is not over yet. He might decide to confiscate Greenland. So that would be another thing that he can do.”
For the United States, the war produced mixed results: greater pressure on Iran and China, but also deeper uncertainty among allies, voters, and Gulf partners.
The Gulf: Protection Without Immunity
Gulf states rely on US protection, but that protection does not make them immune to retaliation. Their ports, airspace, energy infrastructure, and commercial corridors become exposed whenever Washington escalates against Tehran. Iranian attacks toward the Emirates appeared to resume after the latest reported escalation, reinforcing the vulnerability that has run through the entire conflict.
The Gulf did not act as a single bloc
Widdershoven said the crisis exposed a basic Gulf dilemma. “The Gulf did not act as a single bloc. Some countries wanted a hard deterrence against Iran, while others feared escalation. Several Gulf states were much more concerned about the threat to trade, LNG credibility, ports, aviation, and investment confidence. The crisis exposed the old Gulf contradiction: everyone wants US protection, but nobody wants their economy turned into a battlefield.”
The most visible rupture is between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Reports that the UAE would leave the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) effective May 1, 2026, weakened confidence in the broader OPEC+ alliance and deepened existing tensions with Saudi Arabia. But the split was not only about oil quotas. It reflected two competing models of Gulf power.
Widdershoven said the Saudi-UAE split now reflects competing models of Gulf power. “The split is no longer only about oil quotas but, in reality, about two different state models. The Kingdom wants strategic centrality, price stability, and regional leadership. Abu Dhabi wants optionality, route control, access to technology, and freedom from cartel discipline. The UAE’s departure from OPEC has turned a quiet rivalry into a structural divergence.”
He added, “The divergence is already evident across several domains, including ports, logistics, defense partnerships, and capital allocation. Saudi Arabia is still looking at internal capacity, while the UAE externalizes power through networks. The risk is that competition will increasingly spill into overlapping geographies such as the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.”
That divergence was already visible in Sudan, Yemen, port politics, Red Sea strategy, and relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia still seeks regional centrality and leadership, but the UAE is building optionality: alternative corridors, Fujairah bypass capacity, non-OPEC flexibility, logistics networks, maritime infrastructure, Israeli defense technology, and deeper links across the Indian Ocean.
The UAE is the relative strategic winner because it has used the crisis to validate its long-standing bet on alternative corridors, Fujairah, ports, logistics, Israel-tech links, and non-OPEC flexibility
Widdershoven said the UAE appears to have gained more than most regional actors, though the outcome remains messy. “At present, there are no clean winners. The UAE is the relative strategic winner because it has used the crisis to validate its long-standing bet on alternative corridors, Fujairah, ports, logistics, Israel-tech links, and non-OPEC flexibility. Iran is the tactical winner if it gains sanctions relief without dismantling core capabilities. Saudi Arabia is the uncomfortable loser: still central, but less able to command Gulf discipline. Qatar loses some diplomatic shine. Global markets remain exposed.”
Closer UAE security cooperation with Israel fits this model, Widdershoven said. “The UAE is not simply reacting to war. It is building a post-Hormuz architecture that includes Israeli security technology, Indian Ocean trade depth, Fujairah bypass capacity, Red Sea/Horn links, and energy-logistics diversification. It is pragmatic, being too systematic to be temporary.”
He continues, “All cooperation in place, cybersecurity, surveillance, missile defense, and maritime domain awareness point to institutionalization. Even if political optics fluctuate, the underlying infrastructure and intelligence links are likely to persist. It is no longer an ideology-based axis but one centered on technology and trade resilience.”
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, appears more cautious. Riyadh pressured Washington over Project Freedom and resisted becoming a platform for escalation that could expose its territory, oil infrastructure, Red Sea routes, and Vision 2030 projects to Iranian or Houthi retaliation. This does not mean Saudi Arabia has moved toward Iran strategically. It means Riyadh wants deterrence without becoming the battlefield.
Kuwait’s restrictions on US access similarly showed that smaller Gulf states are recalibrating. They want US protection, but not unlimited exposure to Iranian retaliation. For the Gulf, the outcome is protection without immunity.
Iran: Damaged, Not Defeated
Tehran appears to have lost commanders, infrastructure, and economic stability, but it retained the assets that mattered most for coercion: missiles, maritime leverage, domestic control, and diplomatic delay.
The war damaged parts of the regime’s leadership and military infrastructure while exposing vulnerabilities inside the Islamic Republic. The closure and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz damaged Iran’s own economy as well as global shipping, insurance, and energy markets. The crisis also accelerated domestic repression, with rights groups describing continued executions, severe pressure on detainees and families, and internet restrictions that limited the ability of citizens and journalists to document events inside the country.
At the same time, Tehran preserved major sources of leverage. It kept the regime in place. It retained significant missile capabilities despite strikes. Its enriched uranium stockpile remained unresolved. It maintained parts of its proxy architecture, even if weakened. It imposed costs on US allies in the Gulf. And it turned the Strait of Hormuz from a strategic chokepoint into a bargaining instrument and revenue mechanism.
Iran’s creation of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority to vet and tax vessels seeking passage through Hormuz marked a significant change. Before the war, Tehran could threaten the Strait; during the crisis, it began institutionalizing control over maritime passage. This gave Iran both economic and diplomatic leverage. Even if the new system remains legally contested and operationally fragile, it showed that Iran used the crisis to claim a form of authority it did not previously exercise openly.
Ganguly argued that even heavy bombing could not resolve the question of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. “America and Israel underestimated that these 450 kilos of enriched uranium are so well hidden and so protected that even if you drop the biggest conventional bombs, the bunker busters, they would not be able to destroy that stockpile of uranium. Iran would retain it. The only way you could destroy it would be through a ground invasion. You would have to occupy the country and then try to get your hands on the material and destroy it.”
He said US planners misunderstood the nature of the Iranian state. “America has no clue that Iran is a civilizational state. We are talking about Persian civilization, which goes back thousands of years. These people have endured a lot of hardship throughout their history. They are very proud people. They do not simply give up and surrender because bombs are falling on their heads.”
The planning appeared to rely on a chain of assumptions that did not hold, Ganguly said. “On what basis did the US make this calculation that if they went and dropped bombs, the uranium stockpile would be destroyed, the regime would collapse, the people would rise up in revolt, and they would put Reza Pahlavi in power and be able to control Iran? And Russia and China would not intervene on Iran’s side? And the IRGC would just give up without fighting back? These are all American miscalculations.”
Instead, Iran appears to have moved into a less centralized wartime structure, which Ganguly said had been anticipated in Tehran’s contingency planning. “There was always this perception in Iran that an attack like this would come. So, I think nobody was surprised that Ayatollah Khamenei, before he died, prepared a detailed plan of how Iran would react if its leaders were to be killed. And the IRGC was scattered into 31 or 32 autonomous commands all over the country. The mosaic model, as it is called, happened.”
Internal resilience did not mean Iran emerged unscathed. Its economy suffered from the closure of Hormuz, and its own energy and export infrastructure faced pressure. But Tehran played its strongest cards effectively: the Strait, missiles, regional escalation, domestic coercion, and diplomatic delay. It also managed to frame itself in parts of the global media space as a state resisting US-Israeli aggression, even while tightening control at home.
That coercive apparatus is central to understanding the regime’s survival. The absence of large-scale anti-regime uprisings did not necessarily reflect legitimacy; it also reflected fear, exhaustion, executions, and an information environment shaped by internet shutdowns and security pressure. Rights groups cited in the reporting said executions had continued during the crisis, and the war environment gave the regime more room to suppress dissent away from international scrutiny.
Support from China, Russia, and North Korea is another contested but important part of the picture. Ganguly said Washington had expected Moscow and Beijing to protest diplomatically but avoid deeper involvement. “The other big miscalculation, if you ask me, was the reaction of Russia and China. I think America probably thought that Russia and China would protest diplomatically. They would condemn this, but they would not physically intervene in a strategic way. But we know now that they have. Russia has provided Iran with military hardware; so have the Chinese. And Iran has even got quite a lot of North Korean drones and other stuff made by North Korea. So North Korea, China, and Russia did provide military hardware to Iran.”
For Iran, the outcome is severe damage without strategic surrender.
China: Energy Risk and US Volatility
Beijing has been facing real pressure from disruptions to Iranian and Venezuelan oil flows, especially where transactions bypass the dollar. The United States used the war and related sanctions to attack one of Beijing’s strategic vulnerabilities: energy security. China buys large volumes of discounted oil from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, and some of those flows are structured outside traditional dollar-centered mechanisms. Disrupting them gives Washington a bargaining chip ahead of President Trump’s planned meeting with Xi Jinping next week.
Ganguly frames this as part of the deeper contest between American hegemony and Chinese power. “One thing they have talked about is this paranoia, almost this fixation, that the US is locked in a hegemonic competition with China,” he said. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative, started under President Xi in 2013, has led China to become a major player in Latin America, in Venezuela, in the Middle East, and elsewhere.”
He said Iran and Venezuela fit into that broader strategic picture because of their energy ties to Beijing. “Take Iran as an example: 90% of Iranian oil goes to China. The same story applies to Venezuela. Probably 80-90% of Venezuelan oil was bought by the Chinese,” Ganguly said. “So by attacking Venezuela and Iran, I think America’s game plan is to disrupt this oil supply to China, which would undoubtedly create economic pressure for China.”
But Beijing also gained diplomatically. While Washington projected military power and coercive rhetoric, China increasingly projected itself as a stable and predictable actor focused on continuity of trade, long-term infrastructure, and controlled diplomacy. This contrast became especially visible in Europe and parts of the Gulf, where policymakers worried about the volatility of President Trump’s rhetoric, the possibility of sudden escalation, and uncertainty surrounding American commitments.
Ganguly said the conflict also reflected deeper anxiety in Washington over changes in the global financial order, including the growing role of BRICS. The grouping originally included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and has since expanded. “The development of BRICS and the serious discussion taking place within BRICS about abandoning the American dollar as the currency of international trade has deeply unnerved the United States. The idea is that countries would no longer use the American dollar for trade, but instead use the Chinese yuan or other local currencies. Within BRICS, there are also countries supporting the creation of a common BRICS currency.”
For China, the war brought energy pressure but also a diplomatic opportunity.
Russia: Energy Relief and a Weaker NATO
Moscow also benefited from the crisis in indirect but important ways. First, the war revived the attractiveness of discounted Russian energy. As Hormuz became unstable and Gulf energy flows more uncertain, buyers in Asia and elsewhere had stronger incentives to look again at Russian barrels, despite sanctions. Moscow did not need to defeat sanctions entirely; it needed the crisis to make its energy exports harder to ignore.
Pressure also increased on Europe. After cutting much of its dependence on Russian energy following the Ukraine war, Western Europe now faced renewed concerns over high prices and disrupted oil and LNG supplies tied to the Hormuz crisis. That did not mean Europe was returning fully to Russian energy, but it strengthened Moscow’s argument that Western sanctions had left Europe more vulnerable.
Ganguly said Russia’s position has been strengthened by expectations that failed to materialize. “If you think about the massive sanctions imposed on Russia, everybody expected Russia to collapse. That did not happen. In some ways, Russia surviving the sanctions can be seen as a victory. We kept hearing during the Ukraine conflict that the Russian military was demoralized and close to collapse. That did not happen.”
The possibility of transferring Iranian enriched uranium to Russia remains contested and would require separate verification before being stated as fact. If Moscow becomes part of any future mechanism for storing, supervising, or transferring Iranian enriched uranium, Russia would move from being a spoiler or outside supporter to becoming a central node in nuclear diplomacy. That would give Moscow leverage not only over Tehran but also over Washington, Europe, and Israel.
That pressure also brought Russia and China closer strategically. Both powers benefited from observing US and Israeli military operations, missile defense performance, Gulf vulnerabilities, and the behavior of American allies under pressure. Even if Moscow and Beijing do not form a formal alliance, the conflict reinforced a shared interest in weakening US dominance and accelerating alternatives to Western-controlled financial, military, and diplomatic systems.
A weakened NATO is also strategically useful for Russia. If President Trump’s rhetoric, European hesitation, and transatlantic disputes continue to erode alliance cohesion, Moscow gains a less unified Western front. The same applies to energy vulnerability: The more Europe fears supply shocks and US unpredictability, the more Russia can present itself as an unavoidable strategic factor.
For Russia, the war offered higher energy relevance, closer ties with Iran, and a less cohesive Western front.
South Asia: Pakistan Rises, India Balances
Islamabad is one of the clearest diplomatic beneficiaries of the crisis. Its role as mediator in the current US-Iran track gave Islamabad a level of diplomatic relevance it had not enjoyed in years. For Washington, Pakistan offered access, military credibility, proximity to Iran, and relationships with both Saudi Arabia and elements of the wider Muslim world. For Tehran, Pakistan was less politically branded than Qatar and less directly associated with Israeli or Gulf pressure. For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan remained a familiar security partner with Islamic legitimacy and military weight.
Widdershoven said Pakistan became more useful because of the kind of leverage required in wartime diplomacy. “Diplomatic influence is currently focused on the transactional. Qatar is still relevant, but Pakistan has offered something different: military credibility, proximity to Iran, links to Washington, relations with Saudi Arabia, and a less politically branded mediation channel. In a high-volatility environment, the Pakistani option became much more acceptable. Pakistan’s involvement is a sign of a shift toward mediators who can combine diplomacy with implicit security leverage. In a wartime scenario, this is preferred.”
Pakistan’s rise also affects India. New Delhi maintained its balancing posture throughout the crisis, preserving ties with Washington, Moscow, Israel, Iran, and the Gulf. Some Indian-linked shipping reportedly received selective passage or more flexible treatment during the Hormuz disruption, reflecting India’s tactical diplomacy and its importance to multiple sides. But Pakistan’s emergence as the central mediator was uncomfortable for India, given the historic rivalry between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
Ganguly said India’s balancing strategy gives it room to maneuver but also carries risks. “India is the classic fence sitter. It is not committing fully to one side or the other. Some might say this allows India to benefit from multiple relationships. India can be friends with Israel, buy Iranian oil, do business with the United States, and also buy cheap oil from Russia. But this strategy also has limits. There will come a point when India will not be able to continue doing this indefinitely.”
Ganguly offered a speculative political reading of Pakistan’s sudden prominence, interpreting it partly through President Trump’s frustration with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. “Trump is not being able to get his way with Modi. And therefore, he is trying to teach Modi a lesson by saying, if you are going to play hardball with me, I will promote the Pakistanis.”
The India-Pakistan angle goes beyond mediation. It shows how the Iran war has widened the diplomatic field beyond the traditional Gulf and US-Israel-Iran triangle. Pakistan gained relevance by being useful in a specific wartime context. India retained flexibility but saw its rival gain diplomatic visibility.
Israel: Battlefield Gains Without a Day-After Plan
Militarily, Israel gained. Politically, it remains stuck. Its deterrence improved after operations in Lebanon and Iran. The shekel strengthened against the dollar on hopes of a US-Iran ceasefire deal. Israel also reportedly deepened defense cooperation with the UAE, including reported transfers of laser, surveillance, and air defense-related technologies to help intercept Iranian missiles and drones.
Yet Israel remains diplomatically isolated in key arenas. Gaza, Lebanon, and Tehran are all still open chapters. Hamas remains the dominant force in Gaza. Hezbollah has been severely degraded but not eliminated. Iran has been hit but not strategically neutralized. Israel’s military achievements have not translated into a clear political framework for the day after.
Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Forum at the Dayan Center in Tel Aviv, told The Media Line that Israel’s military achievements have not delivered the outcome promised by the government.
There is no total victory or total defeat of the enemies—not Hezbollah, not Iran, not the Palestinians, not Hamas
“If you ask the prime minister or the government about this question, the answer will be ‘total victory’ and that ‘we are very close to total victory,’” Milshtein said. “But let us admit that almost three years after this ongoing war started, the three prominent arenas of this war remain open, and there is no total victory or total defeat of the enemies—not Hezbollah, not Iran, not the Palestinians, not Hamas.”
He said many Israelis recognize the gap between Israel’s military accomplishments and its broader strategic position.
“We are standing in front of an open front with no defeat of the enemies,” he said. “I think a broad part of the Israeli public understands that there have been dramatic military achievements and really impressive moves, but they also understand that there is no total victory.”
According to Milshtein, Israel has not converted battlefield gains into a coherent postwar plan. “It is not enough only to achieve military victories. You also need to translate these achievements into strategy. Unfortunately, we became stuck in a situation where we could not really do that, mainly because of the leadership’s insistence on not speaking about the day after or about strategy.”
Polling showed that the same tension was visible inside Israeli society. The Israel Democracy Institute found broad Jewish Israeli support for the campaign against Iran, including 93% support for Operation Roaring Lion in early March and continued majority support for pressing the war into late April. But other surveys pointed to growing doubts about the government’s ability to turn military pressure into a decisive result. A March survey by Reichman University’s Institute for Liberty and Responsibility found that while 65% of Israelis still supported the decision to go to war, only 37% expressed high confidence in the current leadership’s ability to manage the campaign, and respondents rated the IDF far higher than Netanyahu or the government. The polling captured the political tension Milshtein described: many Israelis backed confrontation with Iran, but confidence in the government’s broader management of the war was more fragile.
Milshtein said Israeli expectations of regional alignment do not match Arab political realities. He argued that Israel’s belief in a common anti-Iranian front with Sunni Arab states does not erase the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Arab diplomacy.
That issue remains central to Saudi calculations, he warned. “There is one very prominent condition of the Arab world regarding negotiations with the Palestinians. Until there are negotiations with the Palestinians, I do not see the Saudis mainly promoting normalization with Israel. Unfortunately, we still believe in this misconception that we can promote relations with the Arab world even if there are no negotiations with the Palestinians.”
Israel has also become dangerously dependent on President Trump personally, Milshtein said. “Israel, like a gambler, decided to rely totally on Trump—not only on the American administration, but on Trump personally. The other problem is that many ideological figures leading this government, mainly from the religious Zionist camp, do not really think there is any importance to external, diplomatic, or international relations.”
For Israel, the outcome is battlefield success without strategic closure.
Qatar and Turkey: Smaller Openings in a Fragmented Order
Doha remains important on issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, but the Iran war reduced the exclusivity of Qatar’s mediation role. Pakistan’s rise as a mediator showed that in high-risk wartime diplomacy, neutrality alone may not be enough.
Widdershoven said Qatar’s role has narrowed in the new wartime environment. “Doha has clearly lost its monopoly on mediation. For issues such as Gaza and the Taliban, Qatar remains important. However, in the Gulf-Iran war environment, Pakistan is much more useful. Qatar’s perceived neutrality has now become its weakness. Geopolitical tensions have hardened, and neutrality alone may no longer suffice.”
Turkey has remained more ambiguous. Ankara criticized Israeli military operations and attempted to position itself diplomatically between NATO, the Gulf, and the broader Muslim world, while also benefiting from the fragmentation of the regional order. Widdershoven said Ankara is also positioned to benefit. “Turkey will exploit diplomatic and defense openings.”
Qatar remains useful where communication channels matter. Pakistan became useful where wartime diplomacy required proximity, military credibility, and Saudi ties. Turkey is trying to preserve room for maneuver across multiple blocs.
The Next Round: Why the Pause May Not Hold
Current diplomacy leaves two possibilities open: a temporary deal that reduces immediate pressure, or a relapse into confrontation if core issues remain unresolved. Iran has not yet formally accepted all US terms, while President Trump has publicly signaled optimism. The reported framework may halt fighting, ease restrictions on Hormuz, and reopen nuclear talks, but it does not resolve the structural drivers of the conflict.
Fresh reports of explosions near Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and other sites in Hormozgan province, confirmed US self-defense strikes on Iranian military facilities, renewed Iranian claims of naval clashes near the Strait, and the UAE’s report of another Iranian missile and drone attack suggest that the relapse scenario may already be taking shape before the diplomatic track has produced a durable result.
Even if a temporary agreement is reached in the coming days, the consequences of the war are already reshaping not only the region but the international system itself. The UAE is redesigning trade and energy routes beyond Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is recalibrating its dependence on Washington while facing strategic competition from Abu Dhabi. Europe is reassessing its energy vulnerabilities and its dependence on American security guarantees. China is accelerating efforts to position itself as a stable and predictable alternative pole of power. Russia has regained influence through energy diplomacy and geopolitical positioning. Iran has institutionalized influence over maritime routes while surviving militarily and politically. Israel is adapting to the reality of a prolonged multifront confrontation rather than a decisive closure.
This is not a peace settlement. It is a pressure valve.
Widdershoven said the emerging order is unlikely to resemble the old one. “This is not a peace settlement. It is a pressure valve. Nothing fundamental has changed on the ground yet. The Gulf is not returning to the old order. It is entering a fragmented system in which route control, storage, security technology, and diplomatic optionality are becoming the decisive variables.”
Ganguly said any renewed fighting could broaden quickly. “Once the fighting resumes, there are always two lines of escalation. One is the horizontal escalation, meaning targets that had not been hit before will now be targeted, including desalination plants. Then comes the vertical escalation risk, where more and more lethal weapons begin to appear because the lesser weapons have failed to achieve the objective.”
The diplomacy now being discussed may still reduce the immediate pressure. But the Strait of Hormuz was never only a battlefield; it was the test of whether force could create a political settlement. So far, it has shown the opposite.
