Japan’s decision to supply advanced frigates to Australia marks a major step in defense cooperation between the two countries as questions over US commitment in the Pacific coincide with China’s expanding naval reach.
Multiple media outlets reported that Australia and Japan signed contracts in Melbourne to launch an A$10 billion (US$6.5–US$7 billion) warship program to supply the Royal Australian Navy with next-generation frigates, marking Japan’s most consequential military export since lifting its arms export ban in 2014, according to statements by Australian and Japanese defense officials.
The agreement, signed by Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi aboard the Mogami-class frigate JS Kumano, covers an initial three ships to be built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan, with the first due for delivery around 2029, followed by eight more to be constructed in Western Australia.
The vessels, designed for anti-submarine warfare, surface strikes and air defense, will replace Australia’s aging ANZAC-class fleet and are intended to secure vital sea lanes and northern approaches amid China’s expanding military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
The deal, first agreed in August 2025 after Japan beat Germany’s bid, underscores deepening bilateral security ties as Japan broadens partnerships beyond its alliance with the United States and Australia accelerates naval modernization, with both sides highlighting the project as a rapid, strategically significant upgrade to Australia’s maritime capabilities.
Looking at the possible motivations behind Japan’s sale of high-end frigates to Australia, George Friedman, in a Geopolitical Futures interview this month, frames it as part of a significant evolution in Pacific geopolitics, as Japan and Australia move to assume greater responsibility for regional security amid a reduced US role.
Friedman argues that both countries—maritime island nations positioned to the north and south of China—share a common strategic interest in maintaining control of surrounding sea lanes. He emphasizes that their cooperation is driven less by trust than by a “common fear” that China could expand its economic and potentially military influence if the US is not present to constrain it.
Delving into doubts over the US commitment in the Pacific, Zack Cooper said in a March 2026 interview for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US Pivot to Asia was long on rhetoric but short on action, noting that Washington has struggled to follow through on prioritizing the region.
He pointed to the continued pull of Middle Eastern conflicts, including the redeployment of US forces from Asia, as evidence that US policy has repeatedly fallen short of its stated ambitions in the region.
Against this backdrop, the frigate deal is less a procurement decision than a test case for how far regional powers can go in securing their interests without the US.
Such US shortcomings in the Pacific may have increased security anxieties in Japan. A December 2025 International Crisis Group (ICG) report notes that Japan fears a conflict over Taiwan could directly undermine its security amid China’s growing military power.
The report states that Japanese strategists worry China may seek to take Taiwan by force, potentially leaving Japan isolated in a region where China is increasingly dominant and projecting power beyond the first island chain.
It adds that tensions have intensified following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks that a blockade of Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation,” highlighting concerns over Japan’s proximity to Taiwan and the risk that a contingency there could escalate into a wider regional crisis involving US forces based in Japan.
Highlighting Australia’s concerns over China’s expanding naval reach, Zong He notes in a February 2026 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that the February 2025 deployment of a Type 055 destroyer-led task force into the Tasman Sea — operating about 150 nautical miles off Sydney and circumnavigating Australia — demonstrated long-range navigation capabilities and sustained operational endurance.
He notes that while Australian officials stated the deployment complied with international law and posed no threat, they emphasized the need to “carefully study” the mission and conduct a “comprehensive assessment” of its objectives, reflecting caution over China’s growing ability to operate in Australia’s surrounding waters.
Regarding how Japan’s frigate sale to Australia could become a focal point of minilateralism between the two countries, Moyuru Tanaka notes in a November 2025 CSIS article that the Mogami-class frigate program could deepen Australia–Japan defense cooperation by strengthening interoperability, enhancing deterrence and reinforcing supply chain coordination.
He adds that operating common platforms and systems would support long-term sustainment over a roughly 40-year service life, enabling shared maintenance, spare parts production and closer industrial collaboration between Japan and Australia.
Furthermore, Alex Bristow notes in a December 2025 report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) that Australia and Japan are pursuing a “partial division of labor” in the Pacific to better coordinate defense activities, particularly in securing sea lines of communication and preparing for potential conflict with China.
He adds that such coordination would improve efficiency, reduce duplication and strengthen deterrence, while still operating alongside the US, which remains central to both countries’ security planning in the region.
Yet this emerging minilateralism carries structural limits. Shiro Armstrong notes in a July 2025 article in Asia-Pacific Review that middle powers such as Australia and Japan are “lacking the power to unilaterally alter the global status quo” and depend on the US for security while relying on China as their largest trading partner for economic prosperity.
He adds that their coalition-building efforts are constrained by a “collective action problem,” as differing national interests, domestic constraints and competing priorities undermine coordination among like-minded states.
China is also likely to push back forcefully against minilateralism it perceives as containment. In a January 2026 report for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Xue Gong notes that China uses economic punishment against Japan not primarily to compel an immediate policy reversal, but rather as a form of strategic signaling to demonstrate resolve and defend its core interests.
Gong adds that such measures are intended to impose visible costs and send a deterrent message to third parties, particularly US allies and partners, that crossing China’s sovereignty-defined red lines—such as in Taiwan—will carry consequences.
Similarly, Nathan Attrill notes in a March 2026 ASPI article that in a Taiwan contingency, China would seek to keep Australia “intimidated, distracted and internally consumed enough to stay put.”
He says China would likely “turn every coercive dial” simultaneously — political warfare, cyber operations, economic coercion, maritime pressure and diplomatic maneuvering — while deploying naval forces near Australia’s maritime approaches, probing critical infrastructure such as ports, energy grids, financial systems and communications networks and conducting disinformation campaigns highlighting economic costs, alliance entrapment and escalation risks.
Ultimately, the durability of the Japan–Australia security alignment depends less on shared threat perceptions than on both countries maintaining political will, economic resilience and industrial capacity to resist prolonged Chinese coercion and strategic pressure.
