The Trump-class battleship risks becoming more of a prestige project than a practical answer to the US Navy’s longstanding challenges in fleet modernization, emerging technologies and power projection.
This month, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report estimating that the US Navy’s proposed Trump-class nuclear-powered guided missile battleship program will cost roughly US$275 billion in 2026 dollars to build 15 ships between 2028 and 2056, averaging over $18 billion per hull.
The 35,000-ton lead ship, designated USS Defiant, is projected to cost $23.4 billion, about 13% higher than a conventionally powered alternative due to nuclear propulsion costs. The BBGN-1 would be the largest and most heavily armed surface combatant built by the US Navy since World War II.
However, the US Navy’s 2027 shipbuilding plan presents severe industrial base challenges. By replacing the canceled DDG(X) program with the battleship while retaining Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production, the plan will more than double the required annual tonnage of large surface combatants by 2035, increasing 30-year production tonnage by 60%.
Final assembly at Newport News Shipbuilding—the only certified nuclear-capable shipyard—threatens to exacerbate existing multi-year delays across aircraft carrier and submarine programs, even as smaller general-purpose FF(X) frigates reduce small-combatant tonnage burdens by 45%.
The key question, then, is whether the Trump-class battleship’s concentration of firepower, survivability and operational independence can justify its extraordinary cost, industrial burden and vulnerability in an era of distributed, networked and increasingly asymmetric naval warfare.
Geoffrey Till notes in a February 2026 report for the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore that the concept addresses vulnerabilities in modern naval doctrine, which disperses lethality across smaller, networked platforms to prevent single points of failure.
Till says that networked systems rely on unbroken data links, which are vulnerable to network disruption. He notes that sustaining dispersed, networked forces creates a significant logistics problem and poses challenges to allied interoperability through network integration.
In response to those vulnerabilities, Till suggests that the Trump-class battleships could offer a self-sufficient operational safeguard if digital networks fail, with their massive hull housing weapons, computers, and sensors that make it independent of sensor-to-shooter external data links. He points out that unlike smaller surface combatants, a massive capital ship possesses the structural design necessary to withstand heavy battle damage.
Compared with carriers, which project power through embarked aircraft over sustained campaigns, the CBO says the Trump-class would deliver immediate surface-launched firepower directly from its hull.
A typical US carrier wing consists of 74 aircraft, including fighters, electronic warfare aircraft, multi-use helicopters, and logistics aircraft. In comparison, the CBO report says that the Trump-class battleship is envisioned to have 128 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, 12 hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missiles, high-powered lasers, and a railgun, serving as a self-contained, heavy-salvo combatant rather than an air-projection capital ship.
However, Dan Grazier mentions in a Responsible Statecraft report this month that the Trump-class battleship faces acute operational vulnerability in modern naval warfare, rendering the massive warship an inviting, high-value target.
Grazier says that in an era defined by proliferating uncrewed vessels, submarines, and shore-based anti-ship and hypersonic missiles, concentrating vast capability onto a single surface hull creates severe tactical exposure.
He cites Ukraine’s effective denial of the Black Sea to Russia’s fleet using uncrewed vessels and missiles, warning that assuming large surface combatants will remain viable over a thirty-year timeline ignores modern warfare realities, leaving the expensive capital ship acutely vulnerable to cheap, lethal asymmetric threats.
While lasers and other advanced defensive systems have been proposed to counter increasingly sophisticated missile threats, many remain technologically immature. The Trump-class would also face the persistent undersea threat posed by increasingly capable attack submarines and torpedoes.
Operational viability is only part of the problem; there is also the question of how the Trump-class battleships would be built. Alex Lee argues in a Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) article this month that building the ships in the US is impossible due to severe neglect of the shipbuilding industry, soaring costs, and political paralysis.
Lee says that the Trump-class battleships could be built through foreign co-production with Japan or South Korea, outsourcing hull manufacturing and subsequently fitting those overseas-welded hulls with advanced US sensors, weapons, railguns, and nuclear propulsion systems. He points out that this hybrid construction model circumvents domestic industrial bottlenecks while leveraging efficient allied capacity.
However, Rebecca Grant, in a July 2025 Lexington Institute article, argues against outsourcing US naval construction even to close allies such as South Korea and Japan.
Grant points out that foreign shipyards remain unproven in meeting strict US combat survivability and shock testing standards. She mentions that foreign delivery schedules exclude full combat systems, while allied yards suffer labor deficits and market erosion from China.
In addition to those arguments, Grant points out security risks from Chinese surveillance in foreign ports. She adds that US laws – specifically the Byrnes-Tollefson Act – prohibit US warships and major components such as superstructures and hulls from being built in foreign yards.
Instead of relying on foreign shipbuilders, Grant advocates for domestic shipyard investments, technology transfers, and allied maintenance partnerships, warning that relying on foreign shipbuilders compromises enduring national defense capacity.
But even if the Trump-class battleships are built, Dan Grazier argues in a Responsible Statecraft article this month that the ships will be obsolete upon arrival due to severe technological over-complexity and unrealistic procurement timelines.
Grazier contends that Navy planners are repeating the same acquisition failures seen in the Zumwalt-class and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programs by relying on unproven technologies like railguns and executing construction before designs are finalized.
He argues that committing to a massive, heavily concentrated surface warship over a 30-year procurement window, while US shipyards are already heavily backlogged, ignores the rapidly proliferating threat of anti-ship and hypersonic weapons.
Looking at the economics behind the Trump-class battleships, Benjamin Giltner mentions in a January 2026 Cato Institute report that the Trump-class battleship program is financially wasteful, arguing that it makes no financial sense for taxpayers and serves primarily as corporate welfare for defense contractors.
Giltner highlights that despite the vessel’s slim likelihood of being built, defense companies will profit significantly from research and development funds before cancellation, delivering little strategic deterrence while enriching defense giants.
He argues that such programs exemplify military-industrial corruption sustained by defense lobbying and Congressional insider-trading incentive structures.
The US may therefore be better served by directing scarce industrial and financial resources toward priorities such as missile defense rather than betting them on a battleship whose cost, survivability and industrial feasibility remain deeply uncertain.
