With the US increasingly distracted by the Iran war and China becoming more assertive, Taiwan is reshaping its defenses for a more uncertain era.
This month, Reuters reported that Taiwan is executing a major strategic defense shift by dramatically expanding its anti-ship missile arsenal to more than 1,800 weapons by early 2029 to counter the mounting threat of a Chinese blockade or invasion.
This massive stockpiling initiative relies heavily on acquiring 400 advanced US-made Harpoon cruise missiles, with full delivery scheduled between 2026 and March 2029, alongside the mass production of roughly 1,000 domestic Hsiung Feng II and III missiles.
By dispersing these precision, sea-skimming weapons across mobile, ground-based launchers, Taiwan’s military aims to implement an asymmetric “kill zone” strategy within the highly contested Taiwan Strait.
Inspired by Ukraine’s successful naval drone strikes against Russia and Iran’s resilience under bombardment, the strategy focuses on inflicting devastating initial losses to shatter a Chinese invasion fleet’s landing capabilities rather than attempting to destroy the entire People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
To effectively synchronize this surge in coastal firepower and aerial drones, Taiwan will officially inaugurate a unified Littoral Combat Command in July, a structural overhaul engineered to stall invading forces long enough for allied nations to intervene during a prolonged war of attrition.
As Taiwan accelerates its shift toward asymmetric defense, the key question is whether an indigenous, missile-centric deterrent can compensate for growing uncertainty over the reliability and availability of US military support.
Taiwan’s push to acquire more anti-ship missiles comes on the heels of the US Trump Administration’s decision to pause a US$ 14 billion arms package to Taiwan.
Acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao mentioned at a May 2026 US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the pause is intended to ensure the US has enough weapons for its Iran war effort. However, Cao stressed that foreign military sales will continue when the US Trump Administration deems necessary.
According to Rush Doshi and David Sacks in a May 2026 Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) article, the pause could affect the sale of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and TOW and Javelin anti-tank missiles.
Looking at US interceptor expenditure rates during the Iran War, Will Smith and Michael Cohen note in a May 2026 Stimson article that in the first two days of the war, the US fired about 1,300 Patriot interceptors, representing up to 60% of its stockpiles and over two years of production at 2025 rates.
Smith and Cohen also add that it may take two to three years to replenish Patriot and other interceptor stocks, creating a window of vulnerability for a potential conflict in the Western Pacific. That vulnerability may also have factored into the Trump Administration’s calculus regarding Taiwan.
“I’m not looking to have somebody go independent. And, you know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down,” US President Donald Trump said in a Fox News interview last month, potentially underscoring that vulnerability.
Aside from that, Trump said he “may or may not” approve the weapons sale to Taiwan, adding that Taiwan is “a very good negotiating chip” for the US, highlighting his transactional foreign policy.
Despite the pause in arms sales to Taiwan, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated in a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing this month that “the most important thing to understand is we want to see the (Taiwan) status quo preserved as-is at this moment. That’s our policy, that’s what we’ve said, that’s what we continue to say.” He added, “It’s a very delicate relationship to balance, but our policy on Taiwan is not changing.”
In contrast to the ambiguity of the Trump administration, China has been consistent and adamant in its position on Taiwan, with state mouthpiece Xinhua reporting in May 2026 that Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed that “Taiwan independence” and cross-strait peace are as “irreconcilable as fire and water.”
The US Trump administration’s decision to pause arms sales to Taiwan may be sending mixed messages to international audiences. For one, US arms sales to Taiwan have been a preferred means for the US to demonstrate commitment to defending the self-governing island, short of explicit recognition of sovereignty or direct military intervention that could threaten the longstanding Taiwan Strait status quo.
In line with that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, in a May 2026 Facebook post quoted by Politico, said that “China has never abandoned its intention to annex Taiwan by force and continues to expand its military capabilities in an attempt to alter the regional and cross-strait status quo,” stressing that “the US’s continued arms sales to Taiwan and deepening of Taiwan-US security cooperation are not only necessary but also key elements in maintaining regional peace and stability.”
With the US facing a significant capability gap from the Iran war and suspending its arms sales to Taiwan indefinitely, Taipei may need to invest more heavily in asymmetric warfare capabilities that can be sustained domestically and with assistance from alternative partners.
Taiwan has backed that approach with sustained investments in missile production, long-range strike capabilities and defense-industrial partnerships aimed at reducing reliance on foreign resupply.
These efforts underscore Taiwan’s shift from dependence on US arms purchases to developing an indigenous deterrent capable of withstanding a blockade, prolonged conflict, and political uncertainty.
Rather than relying solely on US intervention, Taiwan is seeking to create a self-sufficient defense ecosystem that raises the cost of aggression for China through locally produced missiles, munitions and asymmetric capabilities.
However, Taiwan’s push for indigenous capabilities and for alternative defense partners beyond the US faces significant hurdles.
In a March 2026 article for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), John Dotson mentions that the US pausing critical arms sales ahead of major diplomatic summits creates delivery uncertainty and disrupts Taiwan’s rapid, regular acquisition of essential capabilities.
Dotson adds that due to sustained Chinese diplomatic pressure, the US remains the only major arms-manufacturing country willing to sell defense systems to Taiwan.
He also states that a divided government has led to the opposition-controlled legislature repeatedly blocking the executive branch’s proposed US$40 billion special defense budget, stalling critical funding for asymmetric systems.
As US strategic bandwidth narrows and China intensifies pressure, Taiwan’s long-term security may depend less on the quantity of foreign-supplied weapons than on its ability to build a resilient, self-sustaining deterrent that can withstand attack and outlast political uncertainty.
