Myanmar’s traditional New Year, Thingyan, is a time of renewal and public celebration. This year, it brought the release of some 4,300 prisoners in a mass amnesty ordered by the military. The release of President Win Myint, a close ally of well-known leader Aung San Suu Kyi, added to a sense that something, perhaps, was shifting.
But to understand what these annual releases mean, they must be placed within the wider architecture of detention, violence and control that has developed since the military coup in 2021. The releases do not constitute a meaningful reduction in the vast population of political prisoners.
According to the latest figures from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, more than 30,000 people have been arrested for opposing the military government. Of these, over 14,000 remain in detention, with thousands more cases that cannot be fully verified due to legal and extra-legal obfuscations by the authorities.
Annual mass amnesties have also become routine since the military coup. This year’s release was, in fact, slightly smaller than the roughly 4,900 prisoners freed around the same time in 2025. As in previous years, only a small fraction, estimated at around 150, were political detainees.
In addition, many people have been killed while participating in peaceful protests, during interrogation or in custody. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report figures of around 2,000 deaths in custody. These figures are likely to be underestimates.
Using a broader definition that includes civilians, pro-democracy activists and members of armed groups “who were arrested or captured and then killed”, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners places the total number of deaths in detention at around 8,000 as of May 2026.
What is striking is not only the magnitude of the numbers, but their persistence. Arrests have continued year after year, even as amnesties have been announced. The overall system has not shrunk.
It has stabilized at a high level, and the expansion of prison building suggests something of a long-term systemic trend. The releases are part of the system of terror.
A recent report from the UN Special Rapporteur states that even small expressions of grief and solidarity such as banging pots and pans; participating in a “silent strike” by staying at home; buying, selling or carrying flowers on Suu Kyi’s birthday or posting a blank black panel on social media to mourn a deadly attack have led to the arrest and imprisonment of the individual or their family members.
Rumors, obfuscations and contradictions are part of a campaign of fear. Earlier this year, there were persistent rumors that four senior members of the Suu Kyi government were to be released. This did not materialize.
The release of President Win Myint had generated some optimism, but his residence reportedly remains heavily guarded, giving the appearance of a house arrest rather than release.
Extremist views spread on social media, as well as in Myanmar’s traditional media, around the time of the prisoner releases have added to concern. For example, a video post by Hla Swe, a former high-ranking army officer and member of parliament, gained more than 1,000 Facebook shares and 14,000 “likes.”
Hla Swe, nicknamed “Bullet”, stated, “Recently released people like Win Myint are not important. They are like snakes without a head. The important thing is not to put the head back on the body of the snake.” Many read this as a direct threat to Suu Kyi’s safety, or a precursor to or even an acknowledgment of her death.
During the same New Year period in which prisoners were freed, military operations continued. Airstrikes in the Sagaing region targeted villages and a monastery, killing some civilians and injuring others. These incidents are consistent with a broader pattern of attacks on non-military targets.
The legal system functions less as a mechanism of adjudication than as an instrument of control. Charges can be added, modified or reinterpreted. Individuals may be detained under one provision, released and later re-arrested under another.
A slew of new laws have been proclaimed and existing laws amended to allow the regime to justify the imprisonment of peaceful protesters.
The continued detention of Suu Kyi is emblematic. Tried behind closed doors, she has not been seen in public since the start of her trial in 2022. There is a complete blackout over the location where she has been held since her conviction in mid-2022.
It is understood that her lawyers have not seen her since the end of that year. Her family and supporters, as well as senior foreign diplomats, say that they have no independent, verifiable evidence that she is alive.
Uncertainty, opacity and contradictory messaging — including the cycle of imprisonments, releases and rearrests — in this context are not incidental. They are part of the system of terror in Myanmar.
Krishna Sen is professor at the School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia, and a fellow at the Australian Academy of the Humanities. Ma Thida is an award-winning Burmese writer, surgeon and former political prisoner.
A longer version of this article was published by Melbourne Asia Review, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.
