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With Democrats firmly in control of Congress come 2027, lawmakers will step up to defend the US-South Korea alliance’s structure. But given his constitutional powers, the president will still decide how the alliance operates. Seoul should engage the new Congress now, before positions on Capitol Hill harden.

During the 2018 midterm elections, the Democratic Party took the House of Representatives from President Donald Trump. Over the following year, 2019, they set an authorized floor for US forces in Korea (USFK) at 28,500, but they never restored the joint exercises Trump suspended after his Singapore summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un – nor did they fully restore trust in the alliance’s stability. If past is prologue, that record may be the best guide to the next two years.

In the 2026 midterms, Democrats won both congressional chambers, with a Senate majority of fifty-six seats, flipping seats in Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas. They also picked up over forty seats in the House and now control a majority of governorships. 2026 was the largest opposition landslide since 1974.

Voters ranked corruption, the cost of living, and the Iran war as their top concerns, and the war impacted voters through high gas and diesel prices. And the 2028 election cycle began the day after the midterms, when U.S. Vice President JD Vance blamed the Iran war for the Republicans’ loss.

Democrats gain the power of the purse, the gavels, subpoenas, the ability to set the legislative calendar, and the power to block confirmations. But even with the dramatic gains, they lack a veto-proof majority. For example, while tariff authority rests with Congress, reclaiming the powers Congress long ago delegated to the Executive Branch will require two-thirds of both chambers.

The most likely scenario for the next two years, then, is paralysis. Congress passes bills that the president vetoes. Congress issues subpoenas that the administration ignores. The president issues executive orders that Congress, through the Congressional Review Act, tries to overturn by striking down the implementing rules and regulations. Lawsuits abound. Senate-confirmed officials do not get confirmed, leading to acting officials that lack the power to move policy.

Traditionally, lame-duck presidents turn abroad, where they face the fewest constraints. One can expect Trump to do so now as well – but amid a slew of hearings on how tariffs were imposed, on Pentagon contracting and on corruption related to corporate and sovereign deals. These congressional efforts may impose constraints or slow the administration down.

The US-South Korea alliance’s coalition in Congress is also changing hands. Susan Collins (R-ME), Thom Tillis (R-NC), John Cornyn (R-TX), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Mitch McConnell (R-KY) in the Senate, and Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Ann Wagner (R-MO) in the House, are gone or leaving, taking with them much of the Republican bench that anchored the alliance.

Leadership passes to Democrats: Chris Coons (D-DE) at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Gregory Meeks (D-NY) at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Adam Smith (D-WA) at the House Committee on Armed Services. All three support the alliance and have questioned cutting joint exercises.

On alliance security issues, the new Congress will defend troop levels and extended deterrence. It will press harder than the administration on conditions for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) because the administration treats OPCON transfer purely as a burden-shifting measure. Nuclear-powered submarines and a revised 123 agreement both need Congress, and Democratic senators have already expressed skepticism about fuel supply, enrichment, and construction locations. If US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth leaves or is forced out, a Democratic Senate may delay confirming a successor, and acting officials will run the Pentagon through the OPCON decision.

Congress also cannot stop a summit with Kim Jong Un. The Hanoi summit and the DMZ meeting both came after the 2018 wave, and a president seeking a legacy may have reason to try again. The risk for South Korea remains a deal negotiated without a seat at the table.

On trade, expectations are that political costs will rise, but the architecture holds. Democrats will likely hold hearings on whether the Section 232 and 301 tariffs served their statutory purposes, but South Korea’s 15 percent rate stays where Trump puts it. The $350 billion investment framework will face questions about how it was negotiated, while members of both parties will want plants and jobs in their districts.

With Jamie Raskin (D-MD) replacing Jim Jordan (R-OH) as chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the committee that accused South Korea of discrimination over Coupang in July may see the issue as an anticorruption inquiry rather than just a trade complaint.

The midterm data-center backlash cuts closer to South Korea than to most US allies and partners because South Korean memory and battery investment depend on an American buildout, and voters approved 40 out of 41 local measures restricting data centers.

All of this raises three observations for Seoul to consider. First, Congress will protect the alliance but will raise some new questions. Nuclear-powered submarines, enrichment and reprocessing rights, and an early date for transferring wartime OPCON will meet harder questions, more conditions and longer timelines.

Second, the larger risks to the alliance still sit in the White House, where Congress has little reach. Trump can still raise tariffs, cut joint exercises, negotiate with Kim without Seoul at the table or simply stop paying attention.

Third, Iran has become a Korea issue. There is active debate about whether Democrats should block the defense authorization bill and threaten a federal shutdown on December 11 unless Congress cuts off funding for the Iran war, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is the vehicle that can write South Korea’s protections into law. What happens on Iran in December and January may matter more for USFK than anything Congress says directly about Korea.

What does that suggest? Seoul should make its economic case to Congress in terms of factories and jobs in specific states and districts; it should frame its approach in the context of security and economic competition with China, which remains an area of strong bipartisan consensus in Washington; it should prepare detailed answers on nonproliferation and safeguards before it presses for the submarine and the 123 revision; and it should build relationships with the new committee chairs and members now, while their positions are still forming.

If Seoul can strategically and intentionally engage with the new Congress, it can keep the alliance intact through a turbulent end to the Trump administration and keep South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s agenda moving. If South Korea waits for a new president in 2029 to set things right, it may find that the positions in Congress have already hardened—and not in its favor.

Michael Schiffer is a senior fellow for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress.

This article was originally published by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). It is republished with permission.

Source: Iwpost.com