To say Bangladesh’s former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina left office in disgrace would be an understatement by any political measure.
Ousted following the student-led uprising of August 2024, she fled the country after months of deadly protests and years of increasingly authoritarian rule marked by enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, the suppression of political opponents and severe restrictions on civil liberties.
For many Bangladeshis, particularly the generation that led the protests, her downfall represented the rejection of an entire political system built on fear, patronage and impunity.
So when Hasina announced on July 10 that she intended to return to Bangladesh in December this year alongside senior Awami League leaders, the real story was not simply whether she would return.
It was how a former prime minister facing a death sentence and the subject of a formal extradition request from Bangladesh remains able to organize political activity from Indian territory.
Since Hasina’s ouster, the Awami League has been banned from political activity, while Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal has convicted her in absentia and sentenced her to death.
Dhaka has formally requested her extradition from India, a request New Delhi has acknowledged but says remains under legal consideration.
Yet despite these developments, Hasina has continued to issue political statements, address supporters and announce plans for her return from Indian territory. This raises questions not only about her own political ambitions, but also about India’s role as her host.
No country can be faulted for offering refuge to a foreign political leader. Granting asylum, however, is fundamentally different from allowing a former head of government facing serious criminal convictions to organize political activity while remaining beyond the reach of her country’s justice system. Legal experts insist the distinction is important.
Former special adviser to the chief prosecutor at the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal, Toby Cadman, who was directly involved in efforts to bring Hasina before the court, believes India has failed to meet its legal obligations.
In an interview, he told this correspondent: “I repeatedly called for India to respect the extradition treaty and to surrender Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh to face trial. India repeatedly ignored all calls. In my view, there was no basis to refuse on any of the grounds mentioned in the treaty, but as a result of the failure, she was tried in her absence.”
Bangladesh’s political future should be shaped by its own institutions, laws and citizens, not by insidious political campaigns orchestrated from exile under the protection of a neighboring state, he said.
That Hasina has chosen December for her return is almost certainly no coincidence. Rather, it is a carefully calculated political move. December, after all, is the month in which Bangladesh commemorates its victory in the 1971 War against India’s arch-rival Pakistan, the foundational event around which the Awami League has built much of its political identity.
For decades, the party has portrayed itself as the principal custodian of Bangladesh’s independence and the guardian of the nation’s founding ideals. A return during this period is therefore a deliberate and cynical attempt to harness the patriotism and emotional resonance associated with the country’s birth.
The timing is intended to recast Hasina’s return not as the homecoming of an authoritarian ruler accused of serious abuses, but as the return of the leader of the party that led Bangladesh’s struggle for independence.
It would also provide an opportunity to portray the legal proceedings against her not as a matter of criminal accountability, but as an attack on the legacy of the war itself.
Should Hasina willingly submit to arrest or imprisonment upon her return, her supporters would almost certainly seek to cast her as a political martyr for the cause she claims to represent.
The December announcement also functions as a form of psychological pressure. Months before Hasina is due to set foot in Bangladesh, if she comes at all, the BNP government must grapple with heightened security, possible street mobilization and counter-protests.
The announcement compels Dhaka to expend political attention and state resources on a confrontation that may never materialize.
Ali Riaz, distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University and former special assistant to former chief advisor Muhammad Yunus, believes the timing is a “well-designed political ploy.”
“By announcing her return six months in advance, Hasina is trying to ensure that the political conversation in Bangladesh is dominated by herself, her party and her return,” Riaz said.
Following Hasina’s announcement, Bangladesh’s chief prosecutor Mohammad Tajul Islam reiterated that she would be arrested immediately upon entering Bangladesh to face the charges against her, declaring: “Whether you come in December or January is your decision, but we want you tomorrow.”
For years, Hasina’s government was widely regarded as New Delhi’s closest strategic partner in Dhaka. Bilateral cooperation expanded across security, counterterrorism, connectivity and trade, giving India an unprecedented level of influence in Bangladesh.
Her removal inevitably altered that equation. The new government has made clear that relations with all major powers, including India, must be based on mutual respect and sovereign equality rather than political dependence.
India’s continued protection of Hasina is not simply a legal matter. It is a geopolitical issue with serious implications for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and for the future of one of South Asia’s most important bilateral relationships.
India has consistently maintained that Bangladesh’s extradition request remains under legal review. That is, of course, New Delhi’s sovereign right. But sovereignty cuts both ways.
Bangladesh is equally entitled to expect that its request will be considered in good faith and that Indian territory will not become a platform from which a former leader facing conviction can continue to influence the country’s domestic politics.
While there may as yet be no publicly available evidence that New Delhi is choreographing Hasina’s return, India’s decision to continue sheltering her while she mobilizes a banned political party from Indian territory inevitably gives New Delhi political leverage over the BNP government.
Whether that leverage is actively deployed or simply held in reserve, its existence complicates Dhaka’s efforts to pursue a “Bangladesh First” foreign policy and reassess the transit, economic and strategic arrangements inherited from the Hasina era. Riaz argues that Hasina cannot, in practical terms, make such a decision independently.
“Unless there is a green signal from the Indian government that it is prepared to hand her over, this entire conversation about Hasina’s return is a political ploy to create instability within Bangladesh,” Riaz said.
Bangladesh has changed fundamentally since 2024. The movement that forced Hasina from office was not led by one single rival political party. It was driven by a generation of young Bangladeshis demanding accountability, democratic reform and an end to authoritarian rule.
Any attempt to revive the political order they expelled is likely to meet resistance from large sections of Bangladeshi society itself. In Riaz’s view, New Delhi is “misjudging Bangladesh.”
“Bangladesh has changed,” he says. “It is not simply that a new government has come to power; the 2024 uprising and what followed have changed how the people of Bangladesh view their relationship with India. If India does not recalibrate its policy, it is making a serious mistake once again.”
Hasina’s announcement has already reignited political tensions months before any return could occur. But the bigger question is whether India can continue to present itself as a neutral partner while simultaneously hosting, protecting and enabling the political activism of a neighboring country’s former ruler.
Bangladesh’s future should be determined in Dhaka, not from exile. As Riaz puts it, “The relationship with Bangladesh has to be based on dignity and respect, treating Bangladesh as a neighbor and resolving outstanding issues. The perception among Bangladeshis is that India wants an unequal relationship with its neighbors, particularly Bangladesh. That has to change.”
If India wishes to demonstrate that it respects the sovereignty of its closest neighbor, critics in Bangladesh say it must ensure that its handling of Hasina is seen as consistent with the principles of mutual respect and non-interference that both countries publicly claim to uphold.
Otherwise, what began as one former prime minister’s announcement risks becoming a defining test of India’s credibility as a neutral and credible partner to Bangladesh.
Simonetta Fornasiero is an award-winning Italian broadcast journalist specializing in international affairs. She has held senior editorial positions at ARD German Radio and Television and Channel News Asia.
