The Financial Times published a piece on July 15 alleging that “Ukraine to buy Chinese drone parts with EU funds.”
According to the newspaper’s sources, “Kyiv has obtained a carve-out for part of a €6 billion tranche to purchase drone components from China”, following the disbursement of the first €1 billion.
President Volodymyr Zelensky said the goal of the drone deal is to double annual production to 20 million by tapping the European Union’s financial and industrial capacity – something that can only happen with Chinese assistance.
Ukraine’s former deputy defense minister confirmed in summer 2023 that his country’s “volunteers” procure Chinese drones for their armed forces.
The New York Times reported earlier this year that “by 2024, the vast majority of drones that Ukraine sent to the front were assembled domestically — but still almost entirely with Chinese components. A year later, however, the share of parts from China in Ukraine’s drones had fallen to about 38%.”
The Times added that “Ukraine still buys cheaper Chinese components because the Ukrainian military needs huge numbers of drones and has a limited budget to buy them … According to a Ukrainian official who asked for anonymity to discuss sensitive procurement issues, Ukrainian and Russian companies often buy parts from the same factories in China.”
These facts contextualize the reported carve-out in the EU loan. Neither the EU nor Ukraine has the industrial capacity to double drone production; only China does.
Some might doubt that China would accept payment from the EU to help Ukraine kill Russians, assuming that China and Russia are allies. In reality, they are only strategic partners, and Russia has armed India and Vietnam against China for decades as part of its regional balancing acts.
It’s arguable that China doesn’t want anyone to win in Ukraine, largely because the conflict’s indefinite continuation cynically serves its grand strategic interests.
The US would be unable to “pivot (back) to (East) Asia” to more forcefully contain China, while Russia could become weak enough to become China’s junior, not equal, partner.
The first goal’s importance is self-evident, while the second could let China secure the bargain-basement prices it has reportedly demanded for the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline and press Russia to curtail or halt military-technical exports to India – giving China a trump card in its dispute with India.
Additionally, Xi declared a new vision of “constructive strategic stability” with the US during Donald Trump’s recent visit to Beijing, so it’s possible that China’s newly robust military balancing act between Russia and the EU-Ukraine axis – whereby China ramps up EU-funded drone sales to Ukraine – is part of a quid pro quo with the US.
For instance, China might avoid the tariffs that the late Lindsey Graham’s bill could impose on it if Trump waives them in the name of “national interests”, effectively rewarding Beijing for arming Ukraine at scale.
The intensification of the new US “war of attrition” against Russia therefore hinges on whether China helps Ukraine for profit and “detente” at the cost of Russian civilian lives, or refuses out of solidarity with Russia in the spirit of their strategic partnership.
Russia’s arms sales to India and Vietnam preserve the regional balance and haven’t killed civilians, while China’s drone sales to Ukraine would upset that balance and cost civilian lives.
