The US-China technology rivalry is expanding into biotechnology, with export controls and investment restrictions opening a new front in strategic competition. East Asia’s push for biotech autonomy is gaining momentum — but it risks slowing innovation.

A turning point came in January 2025, when the US restricted China’s access to advanced biotechnology equipment, including high-parameter flow cytometers and mass spectrometry systems used in drug development and biological data analysis.

US policymakers are now moving to widen these controls. A bipartisan bill introduced in June 2026 would extend outbound investment screening under the COINS Act to biotechnology, targeting licensing deals and research partnerships with Chinese firms. Parallel proposals have signaled interest in limiting the use of clinical trial data generated in China.

Across East Asia, governments are responding by tightening control over biomedical technologies and building domestic capacity. In doing so, they may be fragmenting the international networks that made the region one of the most dynamic centers of biotech innovation.

These policies carry costs that policymakers often underestimate. Measures designed to strengthen resilience are also beginning to weaken the cross-border networks that make biotechnology innovative and scalable.

Unlike traditional manufacturing, biotechnology relies on cross-border collaboration between research institutions, access to diverse patient populations for clinical trials and shared datasets used in drug discovery.

Breakthroughs in genomics and advanced therapies have been driven by shared datasets and continuous cross-border collaboration. As clinical trials and research partnerships become segmented by country, innovation slows even if domestic capacity continues to expand.

East Asia is not simply becoming more self-reliant. It is moving toward a more segmented system that could ultimately erode its long-term competitiveness.

For decades, the biopharmaceutical industry operated on an efficiency-driven model that reinforced this interdependence. Companies distributed trials and manufacturing across jurisdictions based on expertise and cost. This model created deep cross-border dependencies that now sit uneasily within a more fractured geopolitical environment.

Export controls and industrial policy are changing how companies operate. Access to bioprocessing equipment, advanced reagents and other critical inputs is increasingly politicized. Biotechnology is being redefined as strategic infrastructure.

Across East Asia, this shift is producing diverging national strategies that are already reshaping the regional landscape.

China is pursuing the most comprehensive model of biotech autonomy. State-backed investment is expanding domestic capacity across the full value chain, from early research to large-scale biomanufacturing.

Regulatory pathways are being adjusted to accelerate development in areas such as cell and gene therapies, while local substitution efforts reduce reliance on imported equipment and inputs.

This approach strengthens supply security and accelerates technological catch-up. But over time, this inward tilt could limit China’s influence over global standard-setting even as its domestic capabilities expand.

South Korea offers a contrasting model built on global integration. Firms such as Samsung Biologics have positioned the country as a key node in international biomanufacturing, while regulatory frameworks remain closely aligned with US and European standards. South Korean companies scale through partnerships and global market access rather than domestic insularity.

This openness supports competitiveness and rapid growth, but it also leaves the sector exposed to external shocks — from regulatory divergence to geopolitical restrictions. South Korea’s model highlights a central tension: Integration drives scale, but dependence creates vulnerability.

Japan charts a third path. Its strength lies in upstream innovation, particularly in areas such as AI-enabled drug discovery and precision medicine. Japanese firms often rely on overseas partners for late-stage development and commercialization through licensing agreements with global pharmaceutical companies.

This approach reduces financial risk and preserves focus on high-value innovation. At the same time, it limits Japan’s control over downstream development and weakens its leverage in global markets. Japan remains deeply embedded in international ecosystems even as localization pressures rise.

These strategies point to a region that is becoming more capable but less coherent. Regulatory divergence is intensifying, accompanied by increasingly siloed data environments. East Asia remains economically interconnected, yet its biotech ecosystem is fragmenting into parallel tracks.

For multinational pharmaceutical and biotech firms, this fragmentation is no longer theoretical — it is already reshaping day-to-day operations. The idea of a single, globally integrated development pipeline is giving way to region-specific strategies.

Companies are separating China operations from global networks, duplicating clinical trials to meet local requirements and building parallel manufacturing capacity to ensure supply continuity.

This shift comes at a cost. Duplication raises research and development expenses and complicates regulatory strategies. Clinical development becomes less efficient as trials are segmented by jurisdiction. Data becomes harder to integrate.

The deeper concern is what this means for innovation. Biotechnology advances through continuous interaction between scientific communities and diverse patient populations. Barriers to data sharing, tighter controls on technology transfer and diverging regulatory standards introduce friction into these interactions. Over time, this could slow the pace of discovery even as investment rises.

None of this suggests that the push for resilience is misplaced. Recent disruptions exposed genuine weaknesses in global supply chains, particularly in critical inputs and manufacturing capacity. Governments are right to reduce single points of failure and build domestic capability.

The risk is that autonomy strategies overshoot. A system optimized for control can undermine the openness that biotechnology depends on. Policymakers often assume that domestic capacity and global integration can be balanced easily.

In practice, the tension is structural: every restriction on data flows, technology transfer or cross-border collaboration carries an innovation cost.

A more sustainable approach is beginning to emerge in parts of the region. Selective integration combines domestic capability building with targeted international collaboration in areas where scale and diversity matter most — including clinical trials and early-stage research. The challenge lies in execution and in aligning national policies with the realities of a deeply interconnected industry.

The stakes extend well beyond East Asia. The region has become a central pillar of global biotechnology — from manufacturing capacity to clinical development and, increasingly, innovation.

East Asia’s push for biotech autonomy is reshaping the sector in real time. It will deliver greater supply security and technological independence. But if current trends continue, it may also erode the cross-border knowledge flows that made the region’s rise possible.

In biotechnology, resilience without openness risks limiting efficiency and, ultimately, constraining discovery.

Damien Ng, PhD, is a senior research analyst at Bank Julius Baer in Zurich, specializing in longevity, demographics and future health. His work has been featured in publications including IMD Business School, LSE Business Review (forthcoming), The Straits Times, and The Business Times.