Non-alignment once carried enormous moral prestige. For newly independent states emerging from colonial rule, it was not just a foreign policy, but a fierce declaration of identity. However, the international system has fractured. Global politics is no longer divided into Cold War camps. Furthermore, it does not resemble the brief unipolar moment of the 1990s.
Instead, we navigate an overlapping and crowded geopolitical chessboard. The US and China are locked in an intense technological and strategic contest. On the other hand, actors like Russia, the EU, India and rising Gulf powers aggressively carve out their own spheres of influence. In this environment, the classic concept of non-alignment has not disappeared, but its mechanisms have fundamentally evolved.
Modern non-alignment is a far cry from passive neutrality. Today, it is a purely transactional game: multi-alignment. Countries are not trying to claim moral high ground by staying out of the geopolitical mess.
Instead, they are actively playing competing powers against one another to get the best deal. Ultimately, diplomacy is not about catchy rhetoric anymore; it is a practical tool for keeping a nation’s options open.
This pivot is already visible among emerging powers. India, for instance, deepens its security apparatus via the Quad while simultaneously purchasing discounted Russian energy despite Western pressure. Indonesia leverages its nickel reserves to pressure global electric vehicle producers to build local infrastructure, while balancing Western tech and Chinese capital.
Brazil uses its geographic and market weight to extract concessions from both Washington and Beijing. Rather than committing to a single geopolitical bloc, these nations are integrating their security, trade, and technology policies to create adaptable strategies that prioritize their own national interests.
This raises a critical question: Is Bangladesh adjusting its diplomacy to match this ruthless new reality?
Beyond ‘friendship to all’
Bangladesh’s foreign policy has long been anchored by the constitutional principle: “Friendship to all, malice toward none.”
While this reflects the country’s historical constraints and developmental needs, simply declaring universal friendship is no longer sufficient in a hyper-competitive century. The metric of success is whether those relationships translate into tangible national gains.
Balancing between major powers is not enough; states must manufacture alternatives. Here, Bangladesh still faces a psychological barrier. Foreign policy is usually treated to avoid risks and prevent conflicts, rather than as an active strategy to create new advantages. Consequently, Dhaka’s diplomatic posturing can appear cautious, defensive, and out of step with the country’s actual weight.
And that weight is substantial. A strategic location on the Bay of Bengal places Bangladesh squarely at the center of the Indo-Pacific theater. It boasts a rapidly expanding economy, a demographic dividend, and a highly credible voice on climate vulnerability.
To convert these assets into raw geopolitical influence, Dhaka must adopt the logic of the new non-alignment.
Excessive reliance is a strategic vulnerability. Currently, Bangladesh’s export earnings remain dangerously concentrated in the ready-made garment (RMG) sector and a handful of Western markets, while development financing revolves around a similarly narrow geopolitical circle. Although this arrangement offers short-term stability, it leaves Dhaka exposed to economic coercion.
To counter this, Bangladesh must aggressively pursue both export and diplomatic diversification by targeting markets in ASEAN, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. True diplomatic strength requires having multiple doors to knock on, which in turn demands that a state make itself strictly necessary to others.
To wield real influence, Bangladesh must build strategic indispensability. Just as Indonesia weaponized its nickel and Brazil leveraged the Amazon, Dhaka has latent assets ripe for diplomatic leverage that extend far beyond low-cost labor.
The development of deep-sea infrastructure like the Matarbari port, combined with its strategic coastline and connectivity potential, positions the country as a vital commercial bridge between South and Southeast Asia. By transforming into a regional energy hub and a leader in the blue economy, Bangladesh’s relevance to major powers will compound organically.
With this heightened relevance, Dhaka can fundamentally shift how it interacts on the global stage. The modern approach to non-alignment dictates that a state must not simply react to frameworks engineered by external powers. Currently, when a superpower introduces an Indo-Pacific strategy, Dhaka often finds itself awkwardly explaining its place within that external vision.
Bangladesh needs to flip this dynamic. By taking the lead on critical global dialogues like climate justice, the loss and damage fund, maritime security, and safe migration, Dhaka can proactively define its terms of engagement. In international relations, those who set the agenda hold the power.
Ultimately, executing this vision requires a rigorous focus on economic statecraft. Foreign policy can no longer be restricted to the traditional corridors of the foreign ministry; it must serve as the engine of national transformation.
Economic diplomacy must supersede ceremonial courtesy calls. Moving forward, the efficacy of Bangladesh’s external relations should be measured by concrete outcomes: securing industrial tech acquisition, attracting foreign direct investment, and ensuring energy security.
To make this a reality, the country’s embassies must pivot from functioning as traditional diplomatic outposts to operating as aggressive commercial platforms.
The choice ahead
Bangladesh faces a binary choice. It can maintain an overly cautious posture designed primarily to avoid offending anyone, or it can pivot to a smarter, sharper strategy, one that maintains broad relationships but bargains aggressively for maximum national yield.
The first path offers the illusion of safety. The second is the only viable route to securing state power in a volatile century. The states enjoying the most sovereignty today are those that embed themselves inextricably into global supply chains and regional security architectures.
“Friendship to all” will remain the bedrock of Bangladesh’s worldview. But in this multipolar age, it requires an unspoken corollary: “We will maintain relations with everyone, but every decision will be ruthlessly guided by our own national interest.”
Dhaka’s diplomacy must evolve past the language of mere balance and learn to speak the language of leverage, capability and strategic purpose.
Md Obaidullah is a visiting scholar at Daffodil International University, Dhaka. He is also a graduate assistant at the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Mississippi. He has published extensively with Routledge, Springer Nature and SAGE.
Obaidullah also regularly contributes to prominent platforms, including Asia Times, The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, Modern Diplomacy, The Business Standard, Daily Observer, New Age and Dhaka Tribune.
