Iran’s reported use of a Chinese-built satellite, combined with alleged Russian intelligence support, signals a shift toward a new model of warfare in which commercially enabled space assets reshape how US forces are tracked and targeted.
Reuters reported that Iran covertly obtained a Chinese-made TEE-01B spy satellite to improve its capacity to observe and potentially target US military bases throughout the Middle East. The report was based on information from the Financial Times (FT), which referenced alleged leaked Iranian military documents.
Linking possible ties between Chinese commercial satellite companies and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2025 China Military Power Report states that “as of August 2024, China-based commercial satellite companies participated in business with the IRGC,” but does not go into detail about the depth of such transactions.
Iranian commanders reportedly tasked the satellite with surveilling key US installations, using time-stamped coordinates, orbital data and imagery captured in March, including before and after drone and missile strikes on those sites.
Targets reportedly included Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, where US President Donald Trump confirmed aircraft were hit on March 14. Other targets were Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, regions near the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and Erbil airport in Iraq. Additionally, Iran obtained access to ground stations operated by Beijing-based Emposat, expanding its satellite control capabilities worldwide.
If conclusively proven, the integration of Chinese-enabled satellite imagery and alleged Russian targeting assistance could enhance Iran’s ability to conduct more effective strikes on US and partner forces, highlighting gaps in deterrence, attribution and defense.
Delving into the capabilities of China’s TEE-01B satellite, Earth Eye Co lists it as a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) optical remote-sensing satellite deployed at a 535–545 kilometer altitude, equipped with a panchromatic/multispectral camera delivering 0.52–0.53 meter panchromatic and 2.08–2.12 meter multispectral resolution, with a 14.8 kilometer swath width.
Earth Eye Co mentions that it carries spectral bands including panchromatic, green, red, and near-infrared, supports push-broom, stereo, and along-track imaging, and weighs under 112 kilograms, forming part of a constellation designed for global coverage and a rapid 1.2-hour response.
Similarly, Russia has allegedly provided targeting data to Iran, given their aligned interests against the US and Russia’s substantial space-based ISR infrastructure, though its optical reconnaissance capabilities may be particularly thin, with just a handful of dedicated reconnaissance satellites.
As for how these Russian and Chinese systems complement each other, China’s TEE-01B could provide routine, high-resolution intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, while state-controlled Russian space-based ISR capabilities contribute selective cueing, targeting intelligence, and non-optical inputs.
In addition, space-based Russian ISR is likely to be strategic, constrained, and politically sensitive. In contrast, Chinese commercial satellite imagery could enable Iran to monitor more targets than Russia would prioritize.
If conclusively proven, Russian ISR and targeting support to Iran could be politically escalatory, while the commercial nature of similar support allegedly extended by China to Iran provides a veneer of plausible deniability.
A more dangerous scenario is an ISR mesh. Here, Chinese-origin commercial satellites operated by Iran, combined with state-controlled Russian space-based ISR assistance and maritime tracking from Iran’s coastal radar stations, form a more resilient and capable targeting complex.
In this construct, Chinese commercial satellites provide high-resolution imagery for target identification and battle-damage assessment; Russian ISR capabilities provide target cueing and prioritization; and coastal radars enable real-time tracking, forming a “kill chain” to detect and track Iranian missile and drone attacks against US warships in the Strait of Hormuz.
After more than five weeks of aerial bombardment of Iran, the US has declared a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with more than a dozen warships enforcing it. However, that move could bring US warships closer to Iranian shores, making them potentially vulnerable targets.
But even with Russia and China allegedly providing space-based ISR capabilities to supplement Iran’s shore-based targeting, Iran still faces significant challenges in pulling off a successful attack against a US warship.
For one, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ISR and targeting capabilities, alongside Iranian missiles and drones, have to keep up and hit a fast-moving maneuvering target with layered defenses.
It could be argued that if Iran could hit a US moving warship, it would have already done so, but constraints in its ISR capabilities may have prevented it. Highlighting how difficult it is to hit such a target, between November 2023 and February 2025, the Houthis in Yemen – an Iranian proxy – launched more than 100 attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea using drones and missiles, but failed to score a hit on a US warship.
Beyond that, China and Russia may restrict their ISR support to Iran, as an Iranian successful hit on a US warship could result in further escalation of hostilities. Both China and Russia may be benefiting from a protracted but controlled US conflict in Iran, as it draws US strategic attention, resources, and military capabilities away from Ukraine and the Pacific.
While a US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be enforced by stationing US warships farther out in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, beyond the reach of Iranian attacks, that move could reduce the chances of a successful Iranian attack but would introduce additional operational challenges.
Beyond the immediate military risks, the more consequential effect of such a scenario may be the cumulative strain it places on US force posture and strategic bandwidth.
China could use its warships to escort its tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, or Chinese-flagged ships may have military security details aboard, complicating US attempts to enforce a blockade. Also, the sheer scale of a US blockade enforced in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea – spanning roughly 647,000 square kilometers – could tie up several US warships indefinitely.
Also, tying up multiple US warships in the Strait of Hormuz could leave the US ill-equipped to deal with a Pacific polycrisis involving a simultaneous or near-simultaneous resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, a blockade or invasion of Taiwan, or a maritime skirmish in the South China Sea.
The model of an Iran-China-Russia mesh could be exported to the Pacific, where Chinese and Russian space-based ISR capabilities could enable North Korea to target US bases in South Korea, Japan, and further afield in Guam and beyond.
In this emerging model of distributed warfare, the greater strategic danger may not be Iran’s ability to strike US warships, but its role in drawing US attention and resources into a prolonged contest, creating strategic openings for China and its partners in the Indo-Pacific theater.
