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Saudi Arabia executed two Bangladeshis on October 14 but Dhaka’s response was conspicuously restrained. Its consulate in Jeddah reportedly sought formal confirmation and the foreign ministry requested details. Officials then reassured Riyadh that bilateral relations would remain unaffected.
Public sentiment, reflected in a flood of angry and frustrated social media posts, stands in sharp contrast to the government’s muted response. The executions of Nazrul Islam Abdul Basir and Siti Akhtar, convicted of what Saudi authorities described as immoral acts inside a mosque in Mecca, have provoked widespread anger among Bangladeshis.
The alleged offense of kissing in a holy place was grave under Saudi law, and the punishment was irreversible. Yet fundamental questions remain unanswered.
What exactly happened? Did the defendants receive competent legal representation? Were interpreters provided? Could they appeal? And where were Bangladesh’s diplomats throughout the proceedings? These questions concern due process which so far has been largely absent.
Bangladesh State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed Islam acknowledged that neither Dhaka nor its Saudi mission had received advance notice. She called the executions “unexpected” and described them as a “major lesson.” A lesson for whom?
Bangladeshis working abroad must obey local laws. But their government must also protect their legal rights. These obligations are complementary, not competing. Dhaka has emphasized the first. It has offered little clarity on the second.
On October 18, Foreign Ministry Secretary Md Nazrul Islam discussed the executions with Saudi Ambassador Abdullah Zafer bin Abiyah. Officials made a point of clarifying that the ambassador had not been summoned. They also stressed that the incident would not damage bilateral relations.
The diplomatic arrangement was revealing. Dhaka seemed more concerned with avoiding Saudi displeasure than with protecting its citizens. None of this proves Bangladeshi diplomats were absent throughout the judicial proceedings. Their involvement remains unclear. But that uncertainty is precisely the problem.
A functioning consular system should know when its nationals face capital punishment. It should know who represents them, what remedies remain available and whether their families have been informed. Saudi Arabia has the authority to enforce its laws. Bangladesh has the responsibility to protect its citizens. Neither principle cancels the other.
The sentences were reportedly imposed under ta’zir, a category of Islamic punishment involving judicial discretion rather than a fixed hadd penalty. That makes questions about proportionality and judicial reasoning especially important.
Mecca’s religious significance is undeniable. Violating the sanctity of a mosque is deeply offensive to Muslims, including Bangladeshis. But religious reverence cannot replace judicial scrutiny. Questioning a death sentence is not an attack on Islam. Bangladesh’s government should understand that distinction.
Its reluctance has an obvious economic explanation. Saudi Arabia remains Bangladesh’s largest overseas labor market. More than 752,000 Bangladeshis traveled there for employment in 2025, roughly two-thirds of the country’s overseas worker deployments.
An estimated 3.5 million Bangladeshis live and work in the kingdom. Saudi Arabia supplied $5.85 billion in remittances during FY2025-26, making it Bangladesh’s largest source. Those numbers explain Riyadh’s importance to Dhaka.
Bangladesh needs Saudi jobs. Gulf remittances support millions of households, strengthen foreign exchange reserves and help finance imports. A serious diplomatic rupture could carry substantial economic costs. But dependence should make consular protection more urgent, not less.
Bangladeshi workers build Saudi infrastructure, staff its businesses, drive its vehicles and maintain its households. Riyadh benefits from their labour. Dhaka benefits from their earnings. This is mutual dependence, even if the bargaining power is unequal.
Yet Bangladesh’s diplomacy remains heavily focused on recruitment agreements, labor quotas and remittance figures. Legal protection receives far less visible attention. Workers often arrive burdened by recruitment debts, unfamiliar with Arabic and unable to afford lawyers. Some face exploitation or detention without understanding their legal options.
Saudi labor reforms have addressed parts of the sponsorship system. They have not eliminated the vulnerability of low-paid migrants. For these workers, consular assistance can determine whether they understand the charges and exercise their rights.
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations provides a framework for consular communication and access. Dhaka must establish whether the applicable protections were respected.
There is another contradiction. Bangladesh has been exploring participation in the proposed Mecca Pact, a Saudi-led security arrangement involving Pakistan and Türkiye.
In August, [another] State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humaiun Kobir spoke favorably about the initiative. In September, State Minister Shama said Dhaka was examining its implications, although no formal invitation had arrived. The proposed arrangement raises questions about military commitments and regional alignments. It also exposes a strange hierarchy.
Bangladesh is contemplating deeper security cooperation with Saudi Arabia while struggling to establish whether its citizens received adequate protection before being executed there. Before considering collective defense, Dhaka should demonstrate that it can defend the legal interests of individual Bangladeshis.
Military alliances and consular responsibilities are different. But both test the seriousness of a state’s commitments. Religion complicates that calculation.
Saudi Arabia’s custodianship of Mecca and Medina gives it enormous religious influence. Bangladesh’s attachment to those cities is profound. Yet religious solidarity cannot confer diplomatic immunity from criticism.
Saudi judicial decisions remain state decisions. They can be examined against standards of due process, legal representation and proportionality without questioning Islam or the sanctity of its holy places. Nor does seeking accountability constitute hostility towards Saudi Arabia.
Dhaka should now establish when the defendants were arrested, whether its mission was notified, what legal assistance was available and whether appeals were exhausted. It must also explain why the executions apparently proceeded without advance notification.
The findings should be made public, with appropriate privacy safeguards.
Beyond this case, Bangladesh needs a reliable system to identify nationals facing capital charges, provide legal assistance, arrange interpreters and maintain contact with families. These are basic functions of a state whose economy depends on migrant labor.
Successive governments have celebrated overseas Bangladeshis as “remittance warriors”. Their earnings are counted meticulously. Their protection is harder to measure. The contradiction has become impossible to ignore.
Dhaka need not threaten Riyadh or manufacture a diplomatic crisis. It must, however, establish that friendship does not require silence when citizens face execution. The issue is larger than two deaths. It concerns the value Bangladesh places on citizenship beyond its borders.
A government considering new military partnerships should first demonstrate that its existing diplomatic relationships offer meaningful protection to ordinary Bangladeshis. Bangladesh knows precisely how much its overseas workers contribute in dollars. The question is how much their lives count when those dollars are no longer at stake.
Faisal Mahmud is the managing editor of Daily Waadaa
