On Monday, August 25, during a visit to Kyiv, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced that the UK would give Ukraine classified blueprints to produce its SCALP cruise missile (a variant of the Storm Shadow), for the explicit purpose of long-range strikes deep into Russian territory. “Russia should be in no doubt of our resolve. We will not back down until there is a just and lasting peace,” said Burnham in a released statement.
In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the UK is “playing with fire” and made the following statement: “Any British military facilities and hardware, located both inside Ukraine and beyond its borders, may become legitimate targets in response to Ukrainian strikes on Russian soil using British weapons. Those complicit in war crimes, including actions targeting our civilian population, will be punished commensurate to their deeds.”
From Russia’s point of view, Zakharova’s reference to “war crimes” is not hyperbole. In recent months, Ukraine has stepped up strikes on unprotected civilian infrastructure – particularly in the context of the “40-day influence operation” announced by President Zelensky in late June.
According to “Ukrainian officials familiar with the planning”, the operation was chiefly intended “to force Russians to experience the consequences of the war more directly, with a view to influencing [Russian] elections in September.”
Accordingly, these and other recent strikes have been widely interpreted within Russia – rightly or wrongly – as terrorist attacks on civilians using Western-supplied weapons, and therefore as deliberate war crimes in which the West is directly implicated.
The episode seems to have instigated a turning point in Russia’s attitude towards the war – both among the public and the political class – with President Putin stating recently that Ukraine’s 40-day campaign has “opened Pandora’s box.”.
Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure – particularly in and around Kyiv and Odesa – have increased dramatically and threaten to collapse what was already a teetering economy. And as tensions with Europe escalate, the possibility of direct Russian attacks on European military and defense industry targets – especially those connected with providing weapons to Ukraine – no longer seems far-fetched.
Attitudes on the European side are hardening as well, particularly among the so-called “E3” countries – Britain, France and Germany – whose combative language has intensified. French President Macron recently warned that “it’s clear that NATO countries will be targeted” by Russia, and has stated that Europeans are ready to defend the continent’s freedoms “at the cost of blood if necessary.”
The German government has also announced plans for a €12 billion arsenal of long-range missiles with the explicit purpose of “deterring” Russia. For the first time since the most volatile moments of the Cold War, a direct conflict between NATO and Russia seems well within the realm of possibility.
But what would that war actually look like? Would Europe be able to defend itself against Russian missile attack? Would the Americans get involved? What would be the long-term economic effects? To try and get a better perspective on what such a disastrous war would mean for Europe – and how it might be avoided – I spoke with Steve Jermy, a retired Royal Navy Commodore who specializes in air defense and has worked at the highest levels of the British government on policy development.
Since retiring, he has worked extensively in the offshore energy sector – becoming something of an expert on issues of energy and its connection with war and geopolitics – and has written a book on military strategy.
Most recently he has published two articles that bear directly on the question of a potential NATO-Russia war: “The Coming War with Russia” – which details not only the likely immediate impacts of such a war on Europe, but also its long-term social and economic consequences – and “The Spirit of Westphalia”, which discusses the change of direction that’s urgently needed if Europe is to avoid this potentially catastrophic scenario.
What is your take on Andy Burnham’s recent announcement that the UK will be giving to Ukraine classified blueprints for producing long range missiles to strike deep into Russia? Does this make it more likely that NATO and Russia could end up in a direct war?
I think this is bound to increase the chance of war. If you tell the Russians that you’re actually providing Ukraine with blueprints to attack them, and expect them to sit back and do nothing, I think it’s fantasy. Andy Burnham, of course, is new in the position of prime minister, and I suspect he is simply responding to briefs that he’s been given by the establishment.
But the establishment seem not to understand, or to ignore, the risk that this is inviting on Britain in particular. I think this goes for the E3 as well. None of these countries seem to understand those risks. I think that’s in part a consequence of the fact that the West is being guided by a political narrative, whereas the Russians are being guided by military strategy.
Let’s talk about those risks. You wrote an article in July that paints a pretty horrific picture of what a direct NATO-Russia war could mean for Europe, and what the long-term consequences would likely be. In spite of which, European leaders continue to threaten Russia with a future war. Could you maybe take us through that?
Well, I should make it clear, first, that it’s a scenario, not a forecast. But yes, the statements coming from the Europeans have been incredibly bellicose. When you’ve got Kaja Kallas actually calling for the breakup of Russia, who can blame the Russians for feeling threatened? So the premise of the article is that, rather than sitting on their hands until 2030, when Europe says it will be ready for war – although I doubt we can get ready by then – the Russians decide to respond.
Not by a full run into war, but by doing something to demonstrate to the West that they actually mean it. And an obvious thing for them to do would be to use hypersonic or conventional ballistic missiles to attack weapons production facilities in Britain, France and Germany – the three countries leading the charge.
And if that happens, then the next thing that happens is that we’re unable to defend ourselves against those. As a former air defender – I was Captain of an air defense destroyer – I know this area really well. And we cannot defend ourselves against those weapons.
So if Britain, France and Germany have now been attacked by Russia, doesn’t that invoke NATO Article 5? And wouldn’t that bring in the Americans?
Yes, the next premise of the article is that Article 5 is invoked. But of course, if we can’t defend ourselves against these weapons – and the rest of NATO can’t defend itself against these weapons – and we can see where the Americans stand after their experience in Iran – then actually, NATO Article 5 is fairly meaningless. In fact, it is meaningless.
And I don’t think every NATO member will want to be involved. NATO Article 5 doesn’t require countries to actually respond with armed force against Russia – it just requires them to take whatever measures they deem necessary. I’ve got a strong sense that the Americans will not want to get involved.
And as far as Europe is concerned, if you look at it from your own national interest – let’s take Spain, for example – why would you want to be involved in a war between Russia on the one side, and France, Germany and Britain on the other?
So if your thinking is correct and there will not be a united NATO fighting against Russia, and if the US stays out of it – but we’ll come back to that question – what will France, Germany and Britain do at that point?
So the next step in the war is that having undergone these attacks, such is the outrage – and the outrage will be in the establishment, I think, rather than amongst the people, who have not got a full picture of what’s going on, they don’t understand what has led to this war. But because of the outrage, the E3 decide to respond.
And the only way they can do this – because they don’t have other forces capable of doing it – is by air power. But air power too has significant limitations. We don’t have the strategic bombardment capability to do what the Russians have just done to us.
So it would have to be the air forces. And although air forces do have standoff weapons – meaning they can be fired at some distance from the target – they’ll need to get quite close to Russia, indeed over Russian territory, to be able to use those forces.
These are manned aircraft you’re talking about now, correct?
Yes, and I suspect they’ll take significant casualties. So if you decide to run, let’s say, the F-35 into Russia, you’re running these weapons in against what is probably the most well practiced air defense systems in the world. And we saw how difficult it was for the Americans to do this, even against the mid-range power of Iran.
I don’t know how many American aircraft actually operated over Iran, but I suspect that most of it was done from the edges of Iran, not deep into Iranian territory. So because of that, we get losses over Russia.
At that stage, the Russians decide that if we’re going to attack them, then they will respond. And they’re able to do so. Not with land forces – there’s no reason for them to want to respond with land forces. But they can use the sort of strategic bombardment capability that they’ve been using in Ukraine, to do the same to the E3 nations.
And what sort of things would they be targeting in these countries?
There are two things, I think, that they would attack: military targets and energy targets. Which is exactly what they’ve done in Ukraine. Just look at what’s been happening there. And again, if we weren’t able to deal with one or two demonstration missiles, then the chance of us surviving saturation attacks are slim. I think there’s an open question on what the Americans decide to do. But again, I’ve got a strong sense that the Americans will not want to spend blood and treasure in Europe.
And why do you think that? Isn’t it possible there will be enough of an uproar within the American elite – especially in terms of media coverage, they do this all the time – that it could pressure the Trump administration to get involved? Or at least to do something, even symbolically?
I would guess it would be more nuanced than that. I think there will be a neocon “wing” – although it won’t be all the neocons. A lot of neocons will look at this and say: It’s not in our interest to actually get engaged – we’ve been engaged in Iran, and we know our weapons stocks are significantly down as a result of operations there.
So I suspect the advice from the Pentagon will be that if we do get engaged, it’s very difficult to see how we could do it. We’re likely only to lose, rather than win. So if I was in Trump’s position, perhaps being advised by [US Vice President JD] Vance, I would say: Do I want another loss coming hard on the heels of Iran? And do I want that loss to be against the world’s most well-armed nuclear superpower?
So I suspect the Americans will be extremely cautious. But who knows? The problem with Trump is he’s so mercurial, you don’t know what decision will be reached. But I suspect the Americans will be looking to work as hard as they can, and quickly, to get the off-ramp moving so that the war is brought to a close. Whether they’re able to do that is an open question.
So you think they’ll be working diplomatically to try and stop the war, before it gets to the point where the Americans will be under more pressure to come in?
Yeah, I think they would. Everybody in America, I think, with the possible exception of the President, knows that Iran has been a failure. And although they’re trying to double down with economic sanctions, I suspect that’ll be a failure as well.
So putting myself in their situation – the White House, the Pentagon, the Beltway – I’d be thinking: Do I want to get engaged in yet another failure? I think the answer will be no. And in that event, Europe’s on its own.
Okay, so America is out and Europe is getting hammered. What does Europe do next?
Well, the only thing Europe can do is sue for peace. Especially if Russia is going after the energy infrastructure. And if they’re going after the energy infrastructure, the first thing to remember is that even before that war, we’re already in a position of extreme vulnerability in terms of energy.
Because firstly, we put sanctions on Russia and shut ourselves off from Russian gas and Russian diesel, which made up 40% of Europe’s supplies. That’s been running for some time, and has caused an obvious boomerang effect that was bound to have more of an impact on us than on Russia.
And indeed, so it has. Then we’ve had the Straits of Hormuz. That’s taken somewhere between five and 13 million barrels of oil a day off the world market – the effects of which we’re still just starting to feel. And the last thing is, we’ve been attacking energy targets deep into Russia. Now the Russian economy hasn’t been too badly affected by that, but what they have done as a result is they’ve taken Russian oil and gas, and Russian diesel, off the international markets.
And so we’re seeing energy price rises everywhere, and it’s having an effect on European economies especially. And with Russian attacks bringing about the destruction of the energy infrastructure, it will be much worse. So I don’t see that Europe will have much choice really, other than as quickly as possible to negotiate a settlement, largely speaking along Russia’s terms.
So then Europe sues for peace. Do you think Russia will then want quickly to bring it to an end?
I do. I don’t think Russia wants to keep going up the escalation ladder. I mean, one of the open questions is what the British and the French – both nuclear-armed states – will do in response to Russia. I was pushed on this by Tucker Carlson, and quite rightly. But my guess – and my hope – is that they won’t respond with nuclear weapons.
Because that will mean the destruction of France and Britain. It’s a suicidal move. Both nations’ nuclear deterrents exist to deter nuclear attack on their own territories, not to rescue a failed conventional war. So the options are either to take the damage and sue for peace, or commit nuclear suicide. My guess is they’ll take the damage and sue for peace.
So let’s say that happens, and the NATO-Russia war comes to an end. Continuing with the scenario, the next thing you say in the article – and I have to admit this surprised me at first – is that the end of that war is only the beginning of Europe’s problems. Can you take us through that? What could that look like for Europe?
What it could look like is what Ukraine looks like now. If you’ve had major damage to your infrastructure, when you were already in a situation of acute energy precariousness – and in a situation of acute economic precariousness – then this is the sort of thing which will tip you, I think, into an economic crisis. That might be too strong – but it might not be too strong. Even now, the bond markets are very much on the edge. British and American bond prices are going up.
I’d say Britain is on the edge of recession. I’d say France is on the edge of a recession. I think Germany is already in recession, and this is without actual damage to their energy infrastructure. Now there’s a very close correlation between the use of energy and GDP growth – the supply of additional energy allows you to grow the economy, or provides for that growth, and a reduced supply has the opposite effect.
Now, what we’re talking about here is major damage to the European infrastructure – and because of that major damage, a significant loss of energy within European economies. For economies which are already on the edge of recession, it looks to me that this could be catastrophic. And I don’t use those words lightly.
Can you give a concrete example of the sort of thing you’re talking about?
Let’s take the central fuel that I’ve been talking about for a decade now, which is diesel. Diesel is absolutely critical to the functioning of a modern economy. And people don’t understand it.
If you take out the ability to get this energy into the bloodstream and logistics of your economy – if suddenly that goes, then so too does economic activity. If you’ve ever listened to the commodity traders and the energy specialists talking about the Straits of Hormuz, they’ll talk about “demand destruction”.
Now, what they’re actually talking about is getting supply and demand back into balance. So what they’re saying is this: that we’ve suddenly taken millions of barrels per day of oil out of the global economy. So what we need to do is demand destruction – which means reducing the demand for that energy. But demand destruction is economic destruction.
So what it means, actually, is that some companies that would have prospered – haulage or trucking firms, for example – suddenly find they can’t do business. So they go out of business. That’s economic destruction. And that economic destruction plays into European economies in a particularly acute way, because these economies are already massive importers of hydrocarbons. Europe imports about 12.5 million barrels per day of hydrocarbons. The foundational element of a modern economy is energy – without it, nothing works.
People don’t see it, because they’re so used to having cheap, plentiful and high-quality energy, and they assume it will go on indefinitely. But if you start to actually move away from that, then you’re moving towards energy shock and economic destruction. In the same way that cutting off gas commercially from Russia to Germany is slowly leading to economic destruction there. It’s the same thing.
So what you’re describing in this example so far is the situation we’re in today – given the drop we’ve already had in global supply. What happens, then, when our infrastructure is bombed by Russia?
If the energy infrastructure of European countries is damaged as a result of military operations, what we’re talking about is a sort of pre-emptory shock to Europe, where those effects will happen more quickly than would otherwise have been the case. And if ports and refineries have been badly damaged, that will take months, years to repair.
The thing about the energy system is that building energy infrastructure takes ages. It really does. Here in Britain we’ve got nuclear farms, and there’s one on the Somerset coast which looks like it’ll have taken 15 years by the time it’s finally built. Wind farms take about the same amount of time. So all that damage is bound to lead to more economic destruction.
So you’re talking about major industries going under, massive unemployment, and so on. And it’s going to take years to recover from it. What happens to society in the meantime? Are we talking about a Great Depression?
The way I see this is in terms of the direct correlation between energy and economic performance that I mentioned earlier, which mathematically is close to one (1:1). So if Europe’s hydrocarbon supplies are reduced by 10%, for example, then I would expect an economic contraction of 10%. If they’re reduced by 20%, I think it’d be something like 20%.
The Great Depression of the 1930s was about a 15% economic contraction globally. And so I think at a minimum we’re talking about a severe recession. But if there’s major damage to the European energy infrastructure, I think we’re talking more. It depends on the extent of the damage. I mean, if the Russians were judicious and decided not to attack our energy infrastructure, then that’s a different story.
But we’d be putting ourselves at their mercy, wouldn’t we?
We’re extremely vulnerable in Europe. The United States is less vulnerable, but still vulnerable, because the United States is a net importer of crude oil to the tune of six and a half million barrels per day. It’s a net exporter of refined products, but a net importer of crude oil.
So given this extreme vulnerability, especially in Europe, how do you account for all the bellicosity that we’re hearing these days from European leaders?
I suspect there are two, maybe three reasons for it. I think the first is that there is this sense of outrage, because they have trapped themselves in a political narrative in which they’re saying: Russia bad, Ukraine good, plucky little Ukraine fighting up against nasty Russia, Putin’s like Hitler, and so on.
And the problem with the political narrative is that with modern spin – the way spin plays into the Western press, who are strong advocates for the narrative – first you get to the stage where the population is deceived.
Not necessarily lied to, but deceived, because they’re only given part of the story. But then you get to the stage where the leaders themselves actually believe it. And so you end up with this sort of cult thinking. So that’s the first reason – the outrage.
I think the second reason – which is also part of the narrative – is that they believe Ukraine is winning the war. Now there’s no evidence for that whatsoever. But again, if you’re in a cult, then you tend to rationalize things.
And I suspect the third reason is that there is a sense – amongst the Europeans, and in NATO – that if they can just tempt the Americans back into the conflict, then they’ll be able to prevail.
Then they’ll get the Russians back to the negotiating table on more favorable terms, they’ll have a ceasefire, probably along the current lines, and they’ll be able to take it from there. What nobody understands – because they don’t understand the nature of this war – is that Russia won’t do that.
Russia views this as existential, not merely as a negotiation. And when it comes to negotiating, the Russians have already said – as have the Iranians – that the current White House is incapable of making a binding diplomatic agreement. And I think actually we’re in a similar situation with the Europeans as well. And besides, Russia is winning the war. So why would they do that?
As to your third reason – wanting to tempt the Americans back into the conflict – why would the Europeans think their bellicose language might achieve that?
I think they’re trying to show the Americans: Look, we are standing up for ourselves, we’re spending more on defence, as you requested. Yeah, we can do this, we’re ready! So come back in and help us! But as I said, if I were the Americans, I wouldn’t. It’s not in the United States’ interest to be sucked back into this war.
Okay, so a NATO-Russia war would likely be catastrophic for Europe. The second piece you wrote recently is about what Europe can do now to avoid this scenario – which basically amounts to realistic diplomacy. But at the moment, European leaders appear extremely unwilling even to consider diplomacy. Do you see this changing anytime soon?
I think it will depend on a number of things. But I have an instinct – a strategic intuition, if you like – that the thing that will drive European leaders back to the negotiating table is the worsening economic conditions in Europe.
I think we’ve already seen that much of the €80 billion loan that was provided to Ukraine has been squandered on an ill-advised drone offensive that didn’t work. I think they had €30 billion spent on that. We also know that the money that’s been provided was provided by a loan – and we know those loans won’t be repaid.
And Ukraine is already coming back for more money – at a time when the Europeans are getting increasingly concerned about their own economic conditions. That’s particularly the case in Germany, but also the case in Britain, and I suspect it’s the case in France.
In Germany we see that the AfD are leading in the polls, and the AfD have an explicit policy of re-engagement with Russia. There isn’t such a party here in Britain, but I think there is a slowly increasing openness to some sort of dialogue with Russia. One of the biggest issues here now is energy costs.
But the fact that our energy costs are higher because of government policy, has not yet been fully explained to people. I think the British people on the whole would be in a different mindset if they really understood the full picture, including the risks to which they’re being exposed – and not just the narrow picture that’s presented to them by the government and the media.
So in my view, the thing that is likely to drive the Europeans back is self-interest – political self-interest – as things become more and more difficult. It wouldn’t surprise me if we’re looking at a different situation by the end of the year. Especially if Russia continues to make significant progress on the battlefield.
Okay, so let’s say European leaders become willing to engage in serious negotiations with Russia. My next question is, will they be able to do it in a realistic way? Will they actually understand the nature of the situation they’re in?
When it comes to the talking itself – and as you say, understanding the nature of the war – the key point I made in the articles, the critical thing that I advised, was the need to listen to Russia. Because at the moment, people are dismissing what they’re hearing from Russia. And they’re dismissing it because they’re still taking the view that Russia doesn’t need to worry about NATO expansion to Ukraine.
And my answer is always the same: It doesn’t matter what a Western pundit thinks, or what Western politicians have said. What matters is what the Russians think, and what they say. And when we go back as far as 2008, when [US Ambassador to Moscow] Bill Burns sent his “Nyet means Nyet” diplomatic telegram back to Washington, he said clearly: This is a burning red line for all Russians – not just Putin.
People think so much of this is Putin, but it’s not. So I think European leaders would need to go into those conversations with a willingness to listen and understand the Russian side of the story, even if they didn’t agree with it. That’s the critical thing. The problem is that they’re sort of trapped in the current moment – they’re trapped by a narrative that rarely if ever talks about the antecedents of the war, what actually led to it.
But I suspect that it’s probably economics that will help them – or force them – to find a way out of this. And in my view, this is where the “track two” approach is the best possible option just now.
What is “track two”?
Track two is non-official dialogue. So we know, for example, that the CIA have just talked to Russia, which is off the record. We know that Sir Tim Barrow, along with French and German former diplomats, has been talking informally to the Russians, or to a Russian non-official.
Tim Barrow’s a very, very capable British former ambassador to Moscow and to Kyiv. And so the fact that those supposedly secret conversations have happened may be evidence that there’s some sense within the E3 of wanting to have a conversation with Russia. I think it probably is.
But in any case, this sort of thing is probably where it’ll start. Because the politicians – once they realize they’ve lost, and want to move in this direction – will need to work out how they’re going to spin this. The one with the best chance to go this route is Andy Burnham, because he’s new. And I suspect he isn’t so enamored with the war, because he’s got a big home agenda.
You’ve talked a lot recently about NATO no longer being suited to the purpose, and how NATO expansion has actually undermined European security rather than increased it. What should Europeans do about NATO, and what kind of security arrangement should they be looking at long-term?
My advice to the Europeans would be to think about the relationship with Russia, and the consequences that NATO has had on that relationship. When NATO philosophically talks about the need to “deter” Russia, what that really means is a philosophy of confrontation.
And surprise, surprise – when you’re in a confrontational relationship, then you get confrontation reciprocated. And the Russians, despite trying so hard to cooperate, have been finally forced into a position, I think, where they have no other alternative.
I think the Europeans, if they had any sense, would engage in dialogue with the Russians and actually listen to them. This philosophical move from confrontation to cooperation is key. And NATO is bad at that. So the value of NATO is an open question at this point. The two fundamental pillars of European security are US support and NATO.
Both are now questionable. If I were Europe, I would not be working now on getting support from United States. Not least of all, because in the new US National Security Strategy, Europe is right down at number five, and probably getting lower. And as for NATO, it has a consistent track record of failure since the end of the Cold War.
Do you think NATO can be reformed, or should Europe be thinking about a different security structure altogether?
As long as NATO is in place, there is going to be an uncomfortable relationship with Russia. So why keep a failing institution running, which is in large part a primary contributor to the war that’s happened?
And this is why I suggest the shift towards the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The clue is in the title – cooperation. And I think the Russians would be open to this.
But the key point here is for Europe and European leaders to take responsibility for their own security, as opposed to assuming that this is all about keeping the Americans in. I would say: Accept that the Americans have gone, and accept that you will need a solid long-term relationship with Russia. Not only is it in your security interests, it’s in your economic interests.
If there was a genuine desire by the Europeans to engage and listen to Russia, I think the Russians would respond positively. It would be in Russia’s economic interests as well. There’s no desire, as far as I can see, for Russia to engage in a long-term war with the Europeans.
But having Europe as a market for its products, and being able to buy European stuff, would balance that relationship with China and the Far East. I don’t know if it’s already too late for that. I hope not. So yeah, my advice would be: Close NATO down.
Talk to Russia, and see how the Russians and Europeans can actually build a cooperative security network that acts to provide long-term peace in Europe – perhaps an OSCE+. And there ought to be open-mindedness in Russia about this, because the Russians have been asking for this from the very start of the war.
This interview first appeared on Marker and is republished here with the author’s kind permission. Read the original here.
