Analysts have tried to make sense of US President Donald Trump’s second term with countless, sometimes contradictory, labels. He’s isolationist and transactional. He’s a populist. Or, more recently, a neoconservative.
One way to make sense of both him and the broader state of geopolitics at the moment is to understand the difference between structure and agency.
Trump has undoubtedly exercised his agency in expansive ways since beginning his second term. Yet, at the same time, he has been constrained by structural limitations. The Supreme Court’s ruling against his Liberation Day tariffs is one example. Another is Congress’s release of the Epstein files.
Even Trump’s fiercest boosters will admit that he is, like his predecessors who also sought to expand executive powers, limited by the US constitution and its stipulation of three co-equal branches of government.
It’s similar with foreign policy. Trump can berate allies, implement tariffs and withdraw from international institutions, but he can’t fundamentally alter certain structural realities. This is helpful in making sense of the way Trump’s actions are impacting the United States’ alliances and partnerships.
A pivotal moment for the Quad
This week, the foreign ministers of the four nations in the so-called “Quad” – the United States, Australia, Japan and India – met in New Delhi.
The leaders of these nations, however, haven’t gathered for a summit since 2024, when Joe Biden was president. India was meant to host last year, but a summit never came together. It’s unclear if one will happen this year, either.
This has prompted much handwringing. Critics are saying the Quad is drifting “toward irrelevance” and is “on the brink of extinction”.
Yet, as much as the leaders of the four nations have exercised their agency in distinct ways – including, at times, changing the trajectory of the Quad to be less ambitious – the structural dynamics in the Indo-Pacific remain unchanged.
China’s rapid military buildup, extensive maritime aggression, economically destabilizing practices, wolf-warrior diplomacy and violent border clashes have altered the strategic calculations of the region for the foreseeable future.
This is why, before the Trump administration took office in January 2025, the four Quad nations dramatically expanded the group’s scope and ambitions. The members agreed to cooperate on everything from fighting cancer to developing vaccines to enhancing cyber security.
They declared at their last leaders’ summit that the “Quad countries have built a vital and enduring regional grouping that will buttress the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.”
US-India ties go downhill
This is not to say there haven’t been challenges.
No single issue has been more problematic for Quad ambitions in the second Trump administration than US-India ties.
For decades, US presidents have all touted the importance to American’s national interests of a powerful, independent and democratic India. In their view, India served as a helpful counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific. It was the first Trump administration, after all, that resuscitated the Quad in 2017. (The group was originally formed in 2007, but fell apart soon after that.)
Trump also befriended Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his first term, calling him “one of America’s greatest, most devoted and most loyal friends.”
Since 2025, however, India-US relations have soured due to the second Trump administration’s massive immigration crackdown, his tariffs on India, tensions over India’s purchases of Russian oil and Trump’s growing closeness with Pakistan.
And, after a testy exchange between Trump and Modi over the phone last June, Trump reportedly canceled his plans to travel to India for the summit.
An effective counter-balance to China
Beijing has been opposed to the Quad since its inception, accusing the four democratic members of engaging in a Cold War mentality while encircling and antagonizing China. Beijing said it would accelerate its own military modernization in response.
After the Quad disbanded in 2008 – for reasons that remain debated – one US scholar argued: “The Quad came down and China did exactly what it said it was going to do if the Quad persisted.”
Unsurprisingly, China has continued to oppose the Quad since it regrouped. It still sees the Quad the same way the four members envisioned it – as an effective albeit still nascent counterbalance to China.
At this week’s foreign ministers’ meeting in India, the Quad members agreed to jointly build a port in Fiji, increase critical minerals cooperation and expand maritime cooperation in the region.
Beijing wasn’t impressed. Almost immediately after the meeting ended, Chinese state media ran a story with the headline, “Beijing blasts exclusive cliques after Quad meeting.”
Why the Quad still matters
Public opinion in the four Quad countries also shows firm backing for the alignment. Our polling at the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney in 2025, for example, found respondents were far more supportive of the Quad becoming a formal military alliance than not.
Australians were the most supportive (49% agree), followed by Indians (44%), Americans (42%) and Japanese respondents (41%). Only a small number of respondents in the four nations opposed the Quad becoming a formal military alliance (from 7-15%). The rest either didn’t know or were unsure.
Cooperation among the Quad members is continuing to expand and deepen, as well. With every passing year, the Quad nations are engaging in an increasing number of military exercises, humanitarian and disaster assistance activities, and maritime cooperation efforts.
The individual leaders of the four nations will continue to change. And they will at times have significant reservations about each other. Yet China’s destabilising behaviour gives the Quad members few alternatives but to persist in using their agency to counterbalance Beijing’s revisionist agenda.
Jared Mondschein is director of research, US Studies Centre, University of Sydney.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
