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Immigration Roulette: Husband Granted Asylum, Wife Locked Up Awaiting Deportation

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Immigration Roulette: Husband Granted Asylum, Wife Locked Up Awaiting Deportation


An Iranian couple seeking refuge in the U.S. has been separated for nearly two years after separate immigration judges issued sharply diverging rulings on their nearly identical asylum applications.

Mohammadjamal Azizi and Hannaneh Alikaram requested asylum after arriving in the United States in late 2024, for fear of the persecution they would likely face as Christian converts in Iran, where they had twice been arrested due to their faith.

Since arriving in the U.S., they have faced sharply different versions of American justice, the result of a process advocates refer to bitterly as “immigration roulette”: Azizi — who goes by the name Liam — has been free for more than a year, after his asylum claim was granted, while Alikaram has suffered 21 months in detention, more than a year of that coming after her claim was rejected. 

Until recently, it is likely that Alikaram would not have spent nearly as much time in detention as she has. But amid the twin agendas of mass detention and mass deportation, the Trump administration has swept aside years of precedent by locking up people who would previously have been allowed to fight their cases from outside detention, while going after communities formerly protected from deportation due to the likelihood of persecution back home.

Iranians have found themselves the crosshairs. Last year, amid the so-called 12-Day War between the U.S.–Israel and Iran, senior officials with Immigration and Customs Enforcement launched a scheme to begin deportations to Iran, a plan that resulted in three planes full of Iranian deportees being sent back to Iran on charter flights.

Those flights were suspended earlier this year after the U.S. and Israel launched the ongoing war on Iran, but multiple Iranians with final orders of removal have been deported to countries where they have no ties, including Panama and the Central African Republic. With so-called third-country flights leaving every month or so, Azizi and his wife live in constant fear that Alikaram might be put on a plane to a country where she knows no one and from which she has little hope of escaping.

Leaving detention after seven months, Azizi headed to the Iranian American hub of Los Angeles, where he has spent the past year working any job he can find to raise money for legal bills and fighting for his wife’s release. By the logic of the U.S. immigration system, that should be a simple prospect: As the spouse of an asylee, Alikaram is eligible for a status known as derivative asylum, a process intended to ensure family unification and act as a backstop against situations like the one in which Azizi and Alikaram find themselves, according to Carmen Maria Rey Caldas, a former immigration judge fired by the Trump administration last year.

“This is your money and my money that are being wasted in detaining this woman who is unquestionably eligible for asylum.”

“The person gets to have derivative asylum because family unity is a central tenet of our immigration system,” said Rey Caldas. “This is your money and my money that are being wasted in detaining this woman who is unquestionably eligible for asylum as the spouse of an individual that has been granted asylum.”

The couple currently has a petition for derivative asylum before U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and have filed a petition for habeas corpus seeking to secure Alikaram’s release on the basis of prolonged detention. Amid the uncertainty, with no end in sight to his wife’s detention, Azizi said their separation — and his feeling of helplessness in the face of bureaucratic cruelty — weighs on him daily.

“Being separated from Hananneh is unbearable,” Azizi wrote in a statement to the court filed earlier this year. “Every night I go to sleep wondering if she is safe in detention. Every day I wake up with anxiety that she might be taken away from me and sent back to a country where she could be imprisoned, tortured, or even killed just because she sought freedom.”

Azizi and Alikaram married in 2018 and lived together in Isfahan, Iran, where both had gone to university. Azizi worked as a software engineer, while Alikaram ran a greenhouse business, cultivating plants and posting playful videos to YouTube in which she coached plant lovers on topics ranging from prepping plants for autumn to guarding against pests. In the videos, which include jokey, spliced-in clips from “Lord of the Rings” and Miyazaki films, Alikaram comes across as a happy young woman enamored with the natural world.

The couple found their way to Christianity first through friends, members of Isfahan’s sizable minority of Armenian Christians. Christians have lived in Iran for more than a millennium, and Iran’s constitution affords protections allowing ethnoreligious communities, most notably Armenians and Assyrians, to practice their faith and organize their families and communities accordingly.

But the situation is very different for converts like Azizi and Alikaram, who are considered by Iran’s theocratic government to be apostates, and are subject to harsh punishments — up to and including execution. As a result, converts must worship in secret, in an underground network of so-called home churches.

It was in these home churches that the couple began exploring Christianity and where, in January 2024, they were baptized into the Anglican church. But it was also in a home church where the two met with their first experience of state terror, Azizi and Alikaram told The Intercept in telephone interviews and related in court documents. On March 5, 2024, they were worshipping with a handful of others in a home church in Isfahan when members of the pro-government Basij militia burst in, having been informed of the gathering by neighbors. Alikaram and Azizi, along with others, were taken into custody. Alikaram was beaten so badly she passed out and had to be hospitalized.

On June 9, 2024, after relocating for their own safety to the capital of Tehran, Alikaram and Azizi were arrested again on charges of practicing a foreign religion and inviting others to practice Christianity. She was held for two days, and he for four. After that ordeal, they decided it was time to leave. They secured a visa to enter Brazil, and left Iran on November 3, 2024. Five days later, a court in Tehran issued warrants for their arrest, according to court documents.

Azizi and Alikaram entered the United States on December 26, 2024, after an arduous trip overland from Brazil that took them through more than half a dozen countries. En route, they traveled through the infamous Darién Gap and spent two days as captives of a criminal group in Tapachula, Mexico, an ordeal that ended only after paying thousands of dollars for their release. 

In Mexico, they registered for CBP One, the mobile app designed by the Biden administration as the only method by which potential asylees could file a claim. Due to the danger in Mexico, including threats from a smuggler, Alikaram and Azizi said smugglers forced them to join a group of migrants from India, Iran, and a number of African countries in crossing the border wall separating Tijuana and San Diego.

“They told us, ‘You have to cross the border, you cannot stay in Mexico,’” Azizi recalled the smugglers saying. “It was out of our hands.”

On the other side, they soon found themselves in the custody of the U.S. Border Patrol, who searched the migrants and separated the men from the women. 

“We told them we are married, we showed them our marriage certificate,” Azizi told The Intercept. “But they didn’t care. They separated us.”

In early January 2025, Alikaram was sent to Richwood Correctional Center in Monroe, Louisiana, while Azizi was sent to another facility in Louisiana before ending up at a detention center in Houston, Texas. 

They have been apart ever since.

Alikaram went before Judge Jennifer A. May for her asylum hearing on July 2, 2025. May, who was appointed in 2018 under the first Trump administration, appears to be in line with the policy objectives of the current administration. Between 2021 and the end of 2025, she denied asylum in 91.8 percent of the cases she heard, according to data from Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, which collects data on immigration judges.

The hearing took place at a time in which judges were under ever greater pressure to deny claims, according to Rey Caldas, the former immigration judge, who was fired last year amid a purge of the immigration court system by the Trump administration.

“It was evident to me when I was on the bench, and it’s certainly evident to me now that they are exerting massive pressure so that judges deny all applications,” Rey Caldas said. 

“They are exerting massive pressure so that judges deny all applications.”

In the hearing, which was conducted over Webex, May drilled into Alikaram’s claim, asking for details about her baptism, whether or not she had owned a Bible, and her reasons for converting to Christianity. Alikaram, clearly nervous, stumbled over her words at times, and at others gave answers that clashed with evidence provided to court. Some details also appeared to get lost in translation. At one point, a reference by Alikaram to the Basij, the paramilitary arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was transcribed as “a siege.” 

May did not find Alikaram to be credible. In her decision denying Alikaram’s asylum case, May focused mostly on what she described as inconsistencies in Alikaram’s testimony, including how long she’d been attending home churches and details of her arrest — inconsistencies that Alikaram and Azizi later blamed on her nerves while testifying. But May also tried to downplay the likelihood that Alikaram would face persecution if she returned to Iran.

“I find there is no independent evidence to show that the respondent would likely be tortured in Iran,” May wrote. “[T]his court is aware that Christians have been arrested and sent to jail for some period of time. But looking at the amount of people in Iran, the amount of people who are converts to Christianity, I cannot find that that percentage would be more than likely or not torture or persecution [sic] for this respondent.”

Six days later, Azizi who at the time was being held at a detention facility in Texas, went before Judge Nimmo Bhagat, fully expecting that his claim would be denied as well. To his shock, however, the judge approved his claim for asylum, and just two weeks later he was a free man.

“I was shocked,” Azizi said. “I thought if my wife couldn’t get asylum that I’d have no chance. But they gave me asylum.”

A spokesperson for the Executive Office of Immigration Review, the branch of the Justice Department that oversees immigration courts, declined to comment. Neither ICE nor USCIS responded to requests for comment.

In light of his wife’s asylum denial, Azizi’s successful claim was a godsend for them both. Despite May’s decision, Alikaram should now be eligible for derivative asylum, upon which her own claim and its denial has no bearing.

The couple filed for derivative asylum in December, after the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Alikaram’s appeal of May’s decision. USCIS issued a notice of receipt, and even scheduled an appointment in Jackson, Mississippi, for a biometrics appointment. But ICE failed to produce Alikaram for the appointment, and the derivative asylum process now appears to be languishing in limbo.

In April, Alikaram’s attorney, Emily Trostle, filed a petition for habeas corpus in an attempt to secure Alikaram’s release from detention. That case, too, has stalled, forcing Trostle to file a petition last week to expedite the process.

In detention, meanwhile, Alikaram is suffering from poor nutrition, failing eyesight, and severe anxiety and depression. 

“I can’t bear it anymore,” she told The Intercept in a telephone interview. “I know God has a plan for me, but sometimes now I say, ‘Just kill me so my husband and my family can move on with their lives.’”

Welcome to the great AI freakout

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Welcome to the great AI freakout

This roundup has a lot of AI in it. Fortunately or unfortunately, it seems like a lot of the news is going to revolve around AI for the rest of our lives.

That was true of industrial technology in 1870-1970; people basically got used to the idea that railroads and factories and oil and industrialized warfare and such matters were central to the way the world was run and to the collective future of humanity.

AI is going to be like that going forward, and we’re just going to have to get used to that. So let’s make it as fun and interesting as we can!

1. Americans are getting scared about AI risk

AI risk has exploded onto the national scene. AI companies and AI researchers generally believe that the technology they’re building has the capacity to do great harm — perhaps even to end the human race — if it’s not developed more slowly and deliberately. There are five main groups of people opposing the slowdown:

  1. The Trump administration, which is worried that an AI slowdown might also slow down economic growth
  2. Investors who think a slowdown might hurt their bottom line
  3. Libertarians and techno-optimists who think regulating technological progress is bad on principle
  4. China hawks who worry that a slowdown would let China take the lead in the AI race
  5. Progressives who spent the last few years telling themselves that AI doesn’t work, that AI is a huge economic bubble, and so on, and who now can’t bring themselves to admit that yes, the techbros actually built something that works.

This is a strange alliance indeed. The last of these — the progressives who simply couldn’t admit that billionaire-funded private industry could build something powerful enough to endanger humanity — were the strangest of all, since their refusal to acknowledge the effectiveness of AI basically put them in an alliance with libertarians, hawks, and Trump.

In fact, in recent days there has been a tremendous civil war within the progressive movement between the “AI is dangerous” and “AI is fake” camps, with Bernie Sanders supporting the former and his former comms director David Sirota supporting the latter.

But although it has the support of the president (for now), the anti-slowdown coalition is losing in the court of public opinion. Nate Silver has a post rounding up the evidence.

A bipartisan majority is now worried about existential risk from AI:

Source: Politico via Nate Silver

And a bipartisan majority thinks AI is moving too fast:

Source: YouGov via Nate Silver

Barack Obama, probably the most successful American politician of this century so far, is telling Democrats to make AI safety one of their tentpole issues.

This is remarkable. I don’t think I’ve ever seen such bipartisan national unity on any issue in my adult lifetime. Trump is standing firm against the tide of public opinion here — as he has on the Iran war, tariffs and other issues. But it’s not clear how long he’ll be able to hold out.

2. A very cool debate about AI and growth

Quite apart from the question of whether AI will kill us is the question of whether AI will deliver explosive economic growth. There’s a pretty epic public bet on this:

The people on the “fast growth” side are mostly AI researchers, while the people on the “slow growth” side are mostly (but not entirely) economists. This is an exaggerated version of a broader disconnect — AI researchers are generally more optimistic about AI’s impact on economic growth than economists are:

Source: Forecasting Research Institute

But the people publicly betting on fast growth are making an even more extreme forecast — they’re forecasting 15% growth, which is much higher than the 5.3% that AI experts forecasted as their most optimistic scenario.

That’s an absolutely stupendous growth rate — China has hit it only in one year (1984) since it began its rapid growth, and that was when it was a very poor country. And yet, a number of people in the AI industry think it’s going to happen to us very soon.

Economists — even those who work on the economics of superintelligent AI, like Alex Imas — are skeptical. In a recent blog post, Imas and Ben Moll explain their thinking.

Basically, they foresee a bunch of factors combining to limit AI’s contribution to economic progress in the short term:

  • Slow diffusion of AI technology throughout the economy,
  • The “J-curve” effect where productivity tends to fall right after a big innovation comes out (because companies need to spend resources adopting the new technology rather than on their existing businesses)
  • The difficulty of automating the physical world with robots
  • Political barriers to adoption
  • The difficulty of reorganizing production processes around AI
  • The persistence of activities that consumers want to keep having humans do (the “relational sector”)
  • Bottlenecked inputs to the AI industry (e.g. chips)
  • Baumol’s cost disease
  • AI disasters that slow adoption

That’s a lot of reasons! It makes sense that at least some of these will end up having an effect. Whether AI’s rapid improvement is enough to overcome all of these, and propel us to 15% growth, is something I guess we’ll have to see for ourselves. Personally, I lean toward the economists’ more measured expectation, but I’m prepared to be surprised on the upside.

3. AI keeps stubbornly refusing to kill SaaS

One of the most entertaining storylines about AI is how it keeps refusing to destroy all the things people say it’s about to destroy. On Labor Day, I noted that AI keeps stubbornly refusing to kill jobs. A month ago, I noted that AI keeps stubbornly refusing to kill Indian back-office outsourcing companies.

Now Ernie Tedeschi and the excellent folks over at Stripe Economics have a post about how AI is stubbornly refusing to kill the Software as a Service industry.

Earlier this year, when coding agents came out, there was a bloodbath in software stocks. Why would anyone pay Salesforce or other companies big bucks to make and maintain software for them when Claude Code could just do it all for a lot cheaper?

That logic made some intuitive sense, except things didn’t turn out that way — at least, not yet. In fact, SaaS companies started making more money in the age of AI! Tedeschi and the Stripe team tracked an index of publicly traded SaaS companies and found that their revenue has grown faster since coding agents came out:

Source: Ernie Tedeschi

And SaaS stocks have made up all of the ground they lost:

Source: Ernie Tedeschi

Ernie’s post has many more fun charts.

What’s going on here? Well, for whatever reason, companies are still willing to pay for software instead of trying to roll their own with Claude Code. And SaaS companies are probably improving their own productivity by using AI. As in so many other areas of the economy, AI is proving to be a complement when people thought it was going to be a substitute.

That could all change, of course, if and when AI gets good enough, or when new AI-centric business models disrupt older ones. But for now, the simple story of AI replacing everyone and everything just isn’t happening.

4. America’s quiet, boring rich people

Owen Zidar is one of my favorite economists. His meticulous empirical research with Eric Zwick on inequality in America has fundamentally changed how I think about the issue. Now that research has become a book, entitled “The Everywhere Millionaire: Who Is Really Rich in America and How They Got There.” I haven’t read it yet, but I’ve read some of the underlying papers, so I know it’s going to be good.

Anyway, Zidar and Zwick have an article out in The Atlantic explaining their findings. Here are some excerpts:

When Americans picture the ultrarich, they typically think of tech billionaires such as Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, whose wealth lies predominantly in shares of publicly traded companies. They might also think of Wall Street financiers and celebrities such as Taylor Swift. But far more typical are…owners of successful privately held businesses…By our calculations, about 1.7 million Americans have each built a net worth of at least $10 million by owning a private business. For every CEO of a public company, there are more than 1,000 private-business owners with a net worth of more than $25 million…

What we found changed how we think about inequality…Today, when Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders propose making the rich pay their fair share, they aim at Wall Street and Silicon Valley. But far more relevant to the story of inequality in America are the everywhere millionaires who quietly press their elected representatives for favorable treatment. The tax code bears their imprint far more than it does Musk’s…

A loophole that lets private-business owners avoid Medicare taxes has similarly been justified as a break for the little guy. Preserving the family farm has been a pretext for passing ever larger exemptions to the estate tax, to the point that a married couple can now pass on $30 million to heirs tax-free. Hiding behind small business, in short, has proved a devastatingly effective strategy for the rich…[T]he everywhere millionaires have one thing in common: They own what have become known as pass-through businesses…[L]awmakers have carved out multiple loopholes, so a dollar earned from owning a business is routinely taxed much less than a dollar earned in wages. [emphasis mine]

In fact, though I haven’t yet joined the ranks of Zidar and Zwick’s “everywhere millionaires”, I probably will do so — Noahpinion is a pass-through business (an S-corporation), and although I haven’t yet managed to get Congress to create tax loopholes for Substack writers, the generally favorable tax treatment these businesses receive has certainly lowered my tax bill.

So perhaps it’s not in my financial interest to promote Zidar and Zwick, but I will do so anyway. Expect to see more about their work on this blog in the months to come!

5. Christians vs. Nazis

Christians and Nazis should be natural enemies. The original Nazis in Germany persecuted the Catholic Church, and attempted to create a new state religion that co-opted some elements of Christianity while rejecting the Old Testament. Christianity is, at its core, a universalist faith, open to human beings of all races, while Nazis are…not that.

In the US, neo-Nazis have been weak enough where they haven’t tried to usurp leadership of the Right from conservative Christianity. But as Christianity wanes and online rightism rises, the two may now be coming more into direct conflict. Erick Erickson, a Christian conservative pundit, recently wrote a post exposing one network of neo-Nazi influence on the Right.

Some excerpts:

Charles Haywood made his fortune selling shampoo…[H]e has spent the years since writing out, at length and under his own name, what he would like to do with your country.Rod Dreher, who is no man of the left, read Haywood’s online ramblings and described Haywood as pouring out vile from “deep in his Midwestern Führerbunker”

In a document he calls the Foundationalist Manifesto, Haywood explained that his preferred government “will not be democratic.” The state “will have unlimited means,” because “properly viewed, the state is not constrained externally.”…The state will seize the assets of “any citizen who views himself as a global citizen.”…Those are his words, from the manifesto that earned him a friendly sit-down with Tucker Carlson in September 2022…Elsewhere he has speculated about serving as a “warlord” at the head of an “armed patronage network,”

Haywood’s personal foundation has given the Claremont Institute $390,500 since 2022…Haywood sits on the publication committee of Claremont’s American Mind, one of four men who do. Claremont let Haywood’s fraternal order get itself incorporated under Claremont’s own nonprofit status. That order is the Society for American Civic Renewal…[T]he president of Claremont, the chief executive of New Founding, and the chief marketing officer of the Blaze are all members

Haywood himself…has argued that the Allies, not the Nazis, were the genuinely barbaric power in World War II, has insisted the war was not much motivated by the horrors of Nazi aggression, and gushed that Tucker Carlson and Darryl Cooper “boil down all my political plans.” Cooper argues that Churchill, not Hitler, was the villain of World War II…In a 2023 debate…Haywood raised the hypothetical of a real white nationalist with real political power, and answered that you should cooperate with that person in order to destroy the power of the left.

There’s a lot more in Erickson’s post, but you get the point. Erickson notes that the Haywood/Claremont nexus is separate from the “groyper” network organized around Nick Fuentes, which has received a lot more attention; the two parallel rightist networks share similar ideas, but the Haywood/Claremont group is an intellectual movement aimed at elite influence, while Fuentes is an entertainer in search of an audience of disaffected overly-online young men. Erickson also notes that both the Haywood/Claremont people and the groypers have ties to JD Vance, who has emerged as the paramount leader of the New Right.

Anyway, this should go without saying, but I’m rooting for Erickson, Dreher, and the Christians in this fight, and I think they deserve help exposing the neo-Nazi moneymen and elite influence channels. There’s a tendency among progressives — and especially among leftists — to view everyone on the

Right as essentially part of one solid undifferentiated bloc, but this has never been true. I have many differences with conservative Christianity, but it was never Nazism, and it has never been ambiguous which one was worse.

6. Japan is not a “Confucian” society

One thing that has always annoyed me is when people call Japan a “Confucian” society. Confucianism certainly had a historical influence in Japan — it was an important school of political thought in Japan from around 1300 to the late 1800s, especially during the latter half of that period. It did have some influence on the development of Japan’s education system (though not nearly as much as in China and Korea). But it was never nearly as dominant as it was in China and Korea, and it never morphed into a quasi-religion the way it did in those other countries. Japanese people will regularly tell you about how Koreans are much more Confucianist than they are.

Anyway, I’m not the only one who gets annoyed by the “Confucian” label. Here’s Richard Hanania:

Hanania’s entire post about differences between Japan and other East Asian nations is worth reading, but his invocation of the Inglehart-Welzel World Cultural Map is especially powerful. The World Values Survey, which goes around asking people from various countries about their values, puts out this map periodically. Here’s the more recent version:

Source: WVS

You can see a little movement from Hanania’s earlier version — Hong Kong and South Korea have become a bit more secular — but Japan is still the clear outlier in the “Confucian” category. Its values are far more in the direction of “self-expression” — very close to the US, in fact (though North Europe and the Anglosphere still reign supreme in this regard).

To anyone who has lived in Japan, this is hardly a surprise. The country is highly individualistic, creative, and socially nonconformist, despite a penchant for following rules and procedures. Japanese parenting is also far more laissez-faire and far less education-obsessed than Chinese parenting.

If you want to read more, I recommend the book New Japan: Debunking Seven Cultural Stereotypes“, by David Matsumoto; it’s two decades old at this point, but still perfectly relevant.

In other words, “Confucian” is lazily applied to Japan as a racial category, rather than any kind of a useful description of the culture and society.

7. State capacity: It works

One unpopular position I’ve stuck to over the years is that a strong bureaucracy is good. I don’t mean “bureaucracy” as in red tape and regulation; I mean a competent, empowered civil service that can perform crucial government functions efficiently and well using in-house expertise.

This is also called “state capacity.” Over the past half-century, conservatives and progressives made a devil’s bargain to slash state capacity — conservatives got to cut the size of government, while progressives got to outsource core government functions to progressive nonprofits.

The problem was that this often ended up costing the government much more money to do things like build trains and roads, because the government ended up getting ripped off by expensive consultants, ineffective and sometimes corrupt nonprofits, opportunistic unions, etc. — as well as suffering constant delays that increased costs even more and sometimes prevented anything from being completed at all.

A decade ago, the New York Times published a story called “The Most Expensive Mile of Subway Track on Earth”, detailing how lack of state capacity had made NYC’s famous train system increasingly dysfunctional and unaffordable.

So I was very happy to see a story (by Tahra Hoops) about how NYC’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority has actually invested in state capacity, and how this investment is yielding results:

Some excerpts:

Last week, the MTA…finished a major infrastructure project 60 months ahead of schedule and $195 million under budget…Since October 2023, crews replaced 196 bridge structures and more than 12,600 feet of railroad along the Park Avenue Viaduct…And to top it all off, they did it over 28 weekends without delaying a single train…

The project was done effectively through prefabrication, sequencing, and a project team empowered to actually manage the work…Phase 1 wrapped 21 months ahead of schedule in October 2025. Phase 2 finished the weekend of July 25, five full years early, with the final cost coming in $195 million under the initial $960 million budget…

Before 2019, capital projects at the MTA were run separately by each operating agency…In 2019, the MTA consolidated all of it into a single delivery organization, MTA Construction & Development, bringing nearly 2,000 employees from those scattered capital divisions under one roof.

One agency, one accountable executive, one set of lessons learned that actually compound from project to project…In 2023, C&D awarded more than $8 billion in new contracts at prices 6.2 percent below the engineer’s estimate, saving nearly $300 million, and in 2025 it reported another $1.2 billion in savings while completing 41 elevator replacements, double its previous single-year record, each finished about two months faster on average…

C&D shifted to design-build contracts, which put design and construction under one contract so the builder owns the gap between the drawings and the dirt, and bundled similar projects into single procurements rather than bidding out ten station upgrades ten separate times. It also started pulling work back in-house instead of defaulting to consultants[.]

This is great progress, and shows the value of the state capacity approach to infrastructure. Whether other states and cities will pay attention is another question. Hoops notes that L.A.’s D Line extension is mired in the typical endless series of delays and cost overruns. Five decades of going in the wrong direction is hard to reverse overnight.

Still, the MTA’s success shows that in most cases, all you really need in order to get infrastructure built cheaply is the political will to do so.

8. Will self-driving cars make cities more dense or less dense?

A lot of people just assume that self-driving cars will make cities less dense. After all, simple logic dictates that if a car trip is less burdensome — if you’re able to get work done or watch TV or scroll social media during your commute instead of being forced to keep your eyes on the road — then people will be willing to live farther away from their places of work.

That suggests that like the car itself, self-driving cars will lead to urban sprawl — which is why many urbanists don’t like the notion of self-driving cars, despite the obvious safety benefits.

But in fact, the economics of self-driving cars and city size are a lot more complex and subtle. Ed Glaeser, one of the greatest living urban economists, has a new paper exploring the topic. After explaining the relevant economic theory, he argues that Waymos and other autonomous vehicles will make people want to live in dense urban areas more, rather than less.

Glaeser notes that people who live in dense cities actually spend more time commuting than people who live in the suburbs (something I wrote a post about a couple of months ago). That means urbanites stand to benefit more from self-driving car trips than suburbanites, who generally already have shorter (and probably less stressful) commutes.

Thus, he argues, self-driving cars will complement urban life more than suburban life, and make people want to live in denser cities. He expects the effect to be modest, but it’s still in the exact opposite direction from what people’s intuitions suggest.

Fundamentally, this is because people typically misunderstand the nature of American suburbia. They imagine bedroom communities where people commute to and from a central business district.

Some suburbs definitely do behave like that, but most are like little cities themselves, with office parks where people work and strip-malls where people shop. Suburbanites trade the variety and financial opportunity of the big city for the convenience and safety of the suburbs. But self-driving cars make big cities more convenient.

Urbanists who throw a lot of hate at self-driving cars should stop to consider that perhaps their anger is misplaced.

This article was first published on Noah Smith’s Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

Military milestone: Ukrainian naval drone sinks Russian kamikaze drone boat

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military-milestone:-ukrainian-naval-drone-sinks-russian-kamikaze-drone-boat
Military milestone: Ukrainian naval drone sinks Russian kamikaze drone boat

In the world’s first clash of the drone boats, a Ukrainian naval drone destroyed a Russian explosive drone boat using a remote-controlled machine gun turret. This comes as the war in Ukraine has already seen widespread deployment of such uncrewed surface vessels in combat, along with swarms of flying attack drones and ground robots.

The lopsided battle took place on September 12 when members of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence detected the Russian uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in the Black Sea and directed a Ukrainian Navy drone boat to intercept. The Russian vessel was “positively identified” as an Orcan surface drone with a “jet ski type steerable water jet” designed to ram targets and explode, according to naval analyst HI Sutton in Naval News.

Such Orcan drones have already been used to attack Ukrainian ports and ships. These often work in coordination with flying drones such as Russian Geran drones that provide aerial reconnaissance and can boost communication between drone operators and drone boats, Sutton explained.

In this case, the Russian drone was hunted down by a Ukrainian Sargan-3000 drone boat armed with a 12.7 mm machine gun mounted on a remote weapon station made by the Norwegian company Kongsberg.

“It was inevitable that there would be USV-on-USV combat,” Sutton told New Scientist. “We have seen the same in the air and on the ground.”

The Ukrainian Navy released a video showing the Sargan-3000 firing upon the Russian drone from a distance of one kilometer, disabling the latter’s communications antenna before riddling the Russian drone until it sank, according to the Ukrainian government media platform United24.

Ukrainian media have described the Sargan-3000 drone as being able to reach speeds of 40 to 55 knots and travel up to 1,600 kilometers (994 miles) while carrying a payload of 450 kilograms (992 pounds), United24 reported.

The multipurpose Ukrainian drone can also be equipped with an explosive payload for ramming attacks—the Ukrainian Navy claimed one such drone successfully struck and sank a Russian border patrol ship named the Izumrud in July 2026.

Ukraine has focused heavily on developing and deploying drone boats to wage asymmetric warfare against the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet of warships, sinking some and forcing the surviving ships to hunker down in port. Ukraine has also used a combination of aerial and surface drones to attack ships transporting sanctioned Russian oil and gas, along with targeting ships carrying supplies to the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula that Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014.

Naval drone innovations have also extended to Ukraine using drone boats to deploy ground robots in amphibious assaults and using uncrewed surface vessels as motherships for launching FPV drones to attack Russian positions near the Black Sea.

But Russia has similarly adapted by deploying its naval drones to go after Ukrainian targets—and Europe as a whole may face growing threats from such naval drones in the future. In August, a Russian drone boat loaded with explosives was disabled by a Romanian fighter jet after it drifted near a vital European natural gas platform in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, drone boats have also participated in the US-Israeli war with Iran. The US military’s drone boats made their combat debut by attacking an Iranian port facility in July, along with rescuing a pair of US Army pilots after their helicopter gunship was taken down by an Iranian flying Shahed drone near the contested Strait of Hormuz. However, such US military weapons are unlikely to seriously challenge Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

How Trump’s repeal of the greenhouse gas rule could double new emissions from Georgia

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How Trump’s repeal of the greenhouse gas rule could double new emissions from Georgia

This coverage is made possible through a partnership between Grist and WABE, Atlanta’s NPR station.

Environmental and public health groups are challenging the Trump administration’s proposal to repeal greenhouse gas standards for power plants — a change that’s likely to increase Georgia’s emissions, according to advocates. In their lawsuit, groups including the Natural Resources Defense Council and American Public Health Association argue the proposed change threatens public health and the environment.

“Clean air is a basic human right. Power plant pollution threatens the health of millions of Americans and fuels climate change, worsening extreme heat, poor air quality, and other serious health risks,” said Georges C. Benjamin, CEO of the American Public Health Association, in a statement. 

The rule that the Environmental Protection Agency wants to repeal gives coal plants the option to either use technology designed to capture carbon emissions or to close entirely, with a deadline of 2032 to comply. For new natural gas plants, utilities would need to either install carbon capture or simply run the plants less often.

In Georgia, the Biden-era rule, which most experts agree was geared toward phasing out coal, was starting to work. In its 2022 long-term plan, Georgia Power, the state’s largest electricity utility, determined that it was too expensive to keep its coal plants running with carbon capture systems and decided to retire them. When Trump came back into office, though, the company’s calculus changed. According to Maggie Shober of the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, utilities have been planning for the repeal of the Biden rule since President Trump was elected to a second term. 

Indeed, more than a year ago, Georgia Power got approval from the Georgia Public Service Commission to put off retiring two coal plants, extending one unit at Plant Scherer and three at Plant Gaston. In 2024, the most recent year for which the Energy Information Administration has published data, Plant Scherer, near Macon, emitted more than 8 million tons of carbon dioxide. Plant Gaston, in Alabama, emitted more than 2 million tons that year.

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When the company did this, Shober said, “technically the regulation would have been still in effect, but everybody understood it was not going to stay in effect. So they could roll back those coal retirements without planning to put carbon capture on them.”

During resource planning hearings in 2025 — the process that resulted in the delay of the coal retirements — Georgia Power officials said that in order to account for the regulatory uncertainty, the company ran nine planning scenarios, three of which included compliance with this rule and six of which did not.

“These scenarios provide a flexible framework for the company to evaluate its options among differing plausible future scenarios, positioning it to make informed resource planning decisions,” said Jeff Grubb, the utility’s director of resource policy and planning.

The planning agreement approved in 2025 called for Georgia Power to pursue compliance with the Biden-era EPA rule for plants Bowen and Scherer and report updates regularly to the commission, including “the Company’s assessment of the current legal status” of the rule.

Currently, Georgia Power is still running several coal plants and, as a result of the rising demand from data centers, is building a lot of new generation from methane gas, also known as natural gas. Without the EPA restrictions, Shober said emissions from those new gas turbines could more than double.

Under the Biden-era EPA rules, the utility would only have been able to run the new gas turbines about 40 percent of a year, producing about 4 million tons of carbon dioxide a year, according to Shober. Running 85 percent of a year, as they’d be allowed to do if the EPA’s proposed changes go through, she estimated the turbines would produce 8.5 million tons.

The EPA’s rule change isn’t final yet. There will still be a public comment period, and several groups have sued to block it. But as we have seen with the Trump administration, the existence of a given rule doesn’t necessarily translate to how utility companies operate. 

Georgia Power’s parent company, Southern Company, did not grant an interview or answer specific questions. Instead, a spokesperson sent a statement saying the company “supports regulatory certainty with a durable framework that leads to reliable and affordable electricity for our customers.” The statement made no mention of the company’s greenhouse gas reduction goal of net zero by 2050.


Many presidents have had a bad press – but Donald Trump’s decision to ban selected media from the White House is extreme

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Many presidents have had a bad press – but Donald Trump’s decision to ban selected media from the White House is extreme

Donald Trump’s fight with the media has escalated with the news that five major broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox News and NBC, have suspended their pool coverage of the White House. Their decision comes after the Trump administration banned CNN, along with MS Now and Politico, from the White House for alleged “fake news” and “negative news” reporting.

CNN was due to be the White House broadcast network responsible for covering the White House for the week beginning September 21. In a joint statement the networks said: “The public has a vital interest in receiving accurate, independent information about its government. No administration should restrict a news organisation because it objects to its reporting.”

CNN, MS Now and Politico have filed a lawsuit “to protect our First Amendment rights and defend the principle that the government does not decide what the press reports or publishes”.

According to the US constitution, the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The once mighty White House Correspondents Association said on September 19 that the “action revoking access for journalists from CNN, Politico and MS Now violates the First Amendment […] The WHCA calls on the administration to immediately restore our colleagues’ access.”

On the day after the ban was announced, CNN’s Betsy Klein, MS NOW’s Akayla Gardner and Politico’s Cheyenne Haslett all reported on having their badges taken away from them after showing up to work at the White House.

Klein’s report on CNN argued reporting would continue and “we can do our job anywhere”. But while this is a commendable aim, it is a wrongheaded argument to make when you are also maintaining that you ought to be doing that job from inside the White House because access is an inalienable right.

Trump’s media battles

Trump likes to characterise his relationship with the press as open and transparent. And yet he has been embroiled in multiple court cases which have seen some media outlets, such as CBS, hoist the white flag, paying stupendous amounts of money for alleged unfair reporting or editing. The BBC is still facing a US$10 billion (£7.4 bllion) lawsuit over a so-called “unfair edit” in a Panorama programme dating back to 2021.

Meanwhile, the Associated Press (AP) is also involved in its own ongoing court action against the Trump government over its banning from Oval Office and Air Force One pool reporting. The ban was imposed following AP’s decision to continue using the internationally recognised geographical term the “Gulf of Mexico” – which Trump demanded be changed to the “Gulf of America”.

CNN reporter Betsy Klein speaks to camera outside the White House.

Banned CNN reporter Betsy Klein has to do her reporting from outside the White House. Abaca Press

Some media advocacy groups are condemning this latest blow to press freedom. Seth Stern from the Freedom of the Press Foundation said: “It’s difficult to imagine a more blatant violation of the First Amendment than Trump banning news outlets from the People’s House for criticizing the government. It’s also hard to imagine a dumber move.” Given that this White House, in particular the vice-president, J.D. Vance, is often heard parroting the cause of free speech, it is also deeply ironic.

Bad press precedents

Many previous heads of government have clashed with the press in the past but stopped short of bans. Joe Biden restricted the number of press “hard passes” to the White House in 2023 from 1,417 to 975, but as Politico reported at the time, the administration argued this was “about ensuring those who hold them are actively working the beat”.

Barack Obama’s Treasury Department was accused back in 2009 of intentionally trying to exclude a Fox News reporter from interviewing his administration’s “pay czar”, Kenneth Feinberg. This was put down to a miscommunication and was rectified by the administration. On September 19, Obama told an audience at Colgate University which was discussing the newly introduced Trump press ban: “I’m trying to think what would have happened if I had said, you know what, Fox News, you’re outta here!”

But perhaps the former president whom Trump most resembles is Richard Nixon. One must not forget Nixon’s comments on the press, captured on his own secret audio tapes made from the White House in 1972. In a meeting with his national security advisors Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig, he said: “Never forget the press is the enemy. The establishment is the enemy, the professors are the enemy.”

Today, the organisations that have oversight of press access and coverage are toothless. There was a time when the WHCA was in charge of organising the press pool rotations and access to briefings and Air Force One. But now it has to bow before Trump’s decisions on granting access to media outlets that extol the virtues of his administration.

According to Pew Research data (2022) only one in six media workers in the US are in a union. The country’s largest media union, the NewsGuild-CWA, with its 25,000 members, has still to comment.

President Trump Calls Off Planned US Strikes on Houthis Despite Saudi Request  

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President Trump Calls Off Planned US Strikes on Houthis Despite Saudi Request  


President Donald Trump called off planned US airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen on Sunday despite a renewed request for military intervention from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, as administration officials raised concerns about widening the conflict and further straining US munitions supplies.

Military commanders had approved targets and munitions had already been loaded onto warplanes before Trump halted the operation by midday Sunday, The New York Times and Axios reported.

Most members of Trump’s inner circle were either strongly skeptical of or directly opposed to entering Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthis, according to a senior administration official cited by the Times. Officials were concerned that another sustained military campaign could place additional pressure on US forces already involved in the conflict with Iran.

The Houthis had also signaled to Washington that they would refrain from targeting US vessels in the Red Sea. Trump said indirect communications through Oman indicated that the group wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States.

Bin Salman had reportedly asked Washington 10 days earlier to provide military assistance against the Houthis. Trump rejected that request but agreed to provide intelligence support.

The latest decision comes as fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has intensified along Yemen’s Red Sea coast. The Houthis have also launched ballistic missiles and drones at Saudi infrastructure, including targets near Riyadh and Yanbu.

Washington has continued supporting Riyadh without directly joining its military campaign against the Houthis. The United States recently approved a major arms sale that includes F-35 fighter jets and has continued providing Saudi Arabia with intelligence and advisory assistance.

Oprah Winfrey Makes Heartbreaking Confession (Video)

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Oprah Winfrey Makes Heartbreaking Confession (Video)


Oprah Winfrey is opening up about one of the most painful relationships of her life, revealing that she grew up without feeling loved or emotionally supported by her late mother, Vernita Lee.

In a deeply personal appearance on The Mel Robbins Podcast, the 72-year-old media mogul said she now believes her mother loved her in the best way she knew how. But as a child, Winfrey said that love was something she simply did not feel.

“I don’t actually remember feeling loved by my mother or my grandmother growing up,” Winfrey told Robbins. She said she later came to understand that both women likely loved her, even if they struggled to show it in ways she could recognize. (Mel Robbins)

Winfrey said the lack of validation at home pushed her to find encouragement elsewhere. She excelled in school, became a strong speaker and sought approval from teachers because, in her words, that was where she felt a sense of worth.

The full conversation can be heard on Mel Robbins’ official podcast page, where Winfrey discusses everything from purpose and family to forgiveness and the lessons that shaped her life.

One memory involving her mother still stands out.

Winfrey recalled driving with Lee in Chicago when her mother casually remarked that although the family did not have much money, they had plenty of love.

Winfrey said the statement stunned her so badly that she “almost wrecked the car.”

Her reaction came from how differently she remembered those years.

Winfrey said she could not recall her mother complimenting her or telling her she was proud of her. She also remembered being criticized as a young girl for choosing to sit indoors and read rather than go outside with other children.

“I remember being punished for wanting to read,” she said. (Mel Robbins)

Yet Winfrey said her view of her mother changed dramatically as she got older.

A lesson from Bishop T.D. Jakes helped her reconsider what people are actually capable of giving emotionally. Winfrey described the idea as expecting “10-gallon” levels of love and affirmation from someone who may only have a “pint-size” emotional capacity.

For Winfrey, that realization eventually applied directly to her mother.

She began focusing not only on what Lee had failed to give her, but also on the ways she did show care. Winfrey pointed to her mother’s cooking and her efforts to keep food and shelter available for the family as expressions of love that she had not necessarily recognized that way as a child. (Mel Robbins)

There was also another part of Lee’s life Winfrey said she came to understand.

Her mother spent years working as a maid and domestic worker, caring for other people’s homes and children before returning to her own family. Winfrey said she eventually realized her mother may have been emotionally drained by the time she came home.

“By the time you came home, you had nothing left for me,” Winfrey said of that realization. “I recognize that now and I forgive that.” (Mel Robbins)

That perspective allowed Winfrey to make peace with Lee well before her mother’s death.

Lee died at age 83 on Thanksgiving Day in November 2018 at her Milwaukee home. In the period surrounding her death, Winfrey also publicly described being able to spend time with her mother during her final days and telling her that she believed she had done the best she knew how to do under difficult circumstances. (Oprah Daily)

Years later, Winfrey has continued to describe their relationship as complicated. In a 2024 reflection on what she has called the “mother wound,” she said she was grateful that they eventually reconciled despite the pain that marked much of her childhood. (Oprah Daily)

Winfrey told Robbins that forgiveness ultimately became less about excusing the past and more about accepting that it could not be rewritten.

Her longtime definition of forgiveness, she explained, is letting go of the hope that what already happened could somehow have been different.

For Winfrey, that acceptance appears to have been what finally allowed her to move forward.

“Until you get there,” she said of acceptance, “you’re still just living in the past.” (Mel Robbins)

Dangerous logic behind America’s emerging nuclear war strategy

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Dangerous logic behind America’s emerging nuclear war strategy

Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of defense for policy, wants to make American nuclear threats more credible to make nuclear war less likely. However, achieving the first objective may undermine the second.

In recent remarks to the US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, Colby outlined an emerging approach to deterrence built around providing the US president with credible and “rational” military options.

Colby’s core proposition is that deterrence is credible only when political leaders have a broad range of military options to respond to aggression without ever being forced to choose between accepting defeat and initiating catastrophic nuclear war.

Colby appears to be channeling the rationale that animated the Kennedy administration’s notion of “flexible response” and attempting to adapt it to the contemporary context.

The original “flexible response” emerged from a similar crisis of credibility. By the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration’s doctrine of “massive retaliation” looked increasingly implausible as the Soviet Union acquired a survivable nuclear capability.

Would Washington really initiate general nuclear war in response to limited aggression? American responses to crises over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954 and 1955 and to the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 suggested not.

General Maxwell Taylor, who would go on to be an influential military adviser to President John F. Kennedy, famously argued that this left an American president choosing between “humiliation or general nuclear war.”

The Kennedy administration consequently sought military options appropriate to different levels of aggression to ensure, as President Kennedy put it, that it could be met with a response that was “suitable, selective, swift and effective.”  The primary objective, then, was to reconcile deterrence credibility with escalation control.

Colby suggests that the US confronts much the same dilemma today. As he puts it, Washington needs “options” to “be able to defend the far-flung interests that the United States has in the world” without risking people “ducking under their school tables like it’s 1955.”

His emerging strategy has three components. First, strong conventional forces should deny adversaries the ability to achieve limited military objectives.

Second, credible limited nuclear options are necessary to prevent adversaries from exploiting the gap between conventional defeat and all-out nuclear war.

Third, allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific must shoulder more of the conventional burden, reducing the likelihood that Washington confronts an early choice between capitulation and nuclear escalation.

Colby argues that this is particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific, where he analogizes American strategy to the Allies winning the Battle of Britain rather than “marching on Berlin.”

In a clear reference to a Taiwan scenario, Colby says that Washington’s objective is to “prevent anybody from crossing a body of water and sustaining operations in the face of determined resistance” rather than threatening the destruction of China itself.

Conventional denial, however, is the first step on the escalation ladder – one on which the US nuclear arsenal reinforces rather than substitutes for conventional deterrence.

Colby makes this explicit with reference to Europe, arguing that the “best thing” European allies “can do for nuclear deterrence” is “to invest in their conventional forces” as weakness here could create “conventional gaps that could be exploited” by adversary
“brinkmanship” to “put us in a very unfavorable position.”

Credible allied conventional forces, in combination with US “strategic” and “theater-level” capabilities, Colby maintains, would “provide a very effective deterrent.”

But for nuclear weapons to reinforce conventional deterrence, Colby argues, the US president must have “credible, rational nuclear options” including “counterforce” and “strategic counterforce options” designed to support “denial defense” and escalation management.

Colby argues that this is less about the “range of the weapons” within the US arsenal and “more about rationally employable, limited options that advantage us and stand the chance of favorably managing escalation and not getting us into an inexorable spiral” with an adversary.

This logic may be intuitively compelling, but it rests on the problematic assumption that escalation can be calibrated with sufficient precision.

Colby specifically points to Ukraine’s strikes deep inside Russia, including against strategic capabilities, as evidence that conflict can move high up the escalation ladder while remaining controlled.

Perhaps. More problematically, he appears to extend this understanding of escalation dynamics to a potential US-China conflict over Taiwan. Such a conflict, however, would be profoundly different to the Russia-Ukraine war, as it would involve not only different geography, interests and perceptions but also two sophisticated conventional and nuclear powers.

US reliance on counterforce options could make this especially dangerous. American strikes on Chinese missile forces, command systems, satellites, or mainland bases might appear limited and rational in Washington because they support conventional denial. Beijing, however, would likely interpret the same operations as preparation for a disarming attack on its nuclear deterrent.

Colby contends that such an outcome can be avoided by a “realistic attunement to the reactions not only of our allies and others but also to red” (i.e., adversary perceptions). But recognizing the security dilemma does not resolve it, particularly when Colby appears to believe that American nuclear strategy can be “cost-benefit rational” and proportionate.

However, as numerous studies have shown, nuclear crises are complicated by uncertainty, imperfect intelligence, organizational pressures, domestic politics and misperception.  The notion that policymakers can “rationally” ascend and descend an escalation ladder, one carefully calibrated step at a time, is at best wishful thinking.

A further credibility problem remains – one that more nuclear options cannot solve. Colby argues that credible nuclear options should strengthen American extended deterrence. But this risks conflating the credibility of US capabilities with the credibility of its commitments.  

Providing an American president more plausible ways to use nuclear weapons demonstrates that Washington can respond, but it does not necessarily mean that Tokyo, Seoul, Manila or Canberra will be convinced that the president will respond when doing so exposes American cities to nuclear retaliation.

Indeed, Colby himself emphasized in his remarks the need to ask whether something happening “halfway around the world” was in fact “worth it” for the US to justify action. That may be consistent with the administration’s proclaimed “America First” principles, but it will do little to dispel allied doubts about US security commitments.

Colby has identified a genuine problem. A nuclear guarantee that leaves a president choosing between surrender and Armageddon is not credible, and stronger allied conventional forces, backstopped by US nuclear capabilities, may be part of the solution.

Yet the danger in Colby’s construct lies in the apparent belief that making nuclear war more “limited” and controllable necessarily makes deterrence safer.

The more “usable” nuclear weapons become, the more credible American threats may appear – but adversaries, too, will take their use more seriously, potentially intensifying fears of counterforce attack, increasing pressures for pre-emption and blurring the boundary between conventional and nuclear war.

Dr Michael Clarke is an associate professor of international politics and strategy at the Deakin Center for Future Defense and National Security, Deakin University, Canberra, Australia and an adjunct associate professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney.

Clarke’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy and the PLA, American grand strategy, nuclear strategy and non-proliferation and Australian defense and strategic policy.

Russel Vought will reportedly be given veto power over all NIH grants

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Russel Vought will reportedly be given veto power over all NIH grants

On Friday, The Washington Post reported on a contentious White House meeting in which the director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Jay Bhattacharya, tried to fend off yet another effort to place funding decisions under political control. The move came from Russell Vought, head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which has sought to limit and control research funds. The Post suggested that Bhattacharya ended up on the losing side of the fight.

This initial leak has been confirmed and expanded on by outlets such as The New York Times and Politico. It now appears that the administration is drafting an executive order that would give Vought veto power over every individual grant awarded by the NIH.

If at first you don’t succeed

The NIH is the largest funder of biomedical research on the planet, and its $47 billion budget is larger than that of the next 10 research funders combined. Its funding, distributed largely through grants to academic researchers at universities, supports everything from basic biological research to clinical trials and has helped the biotechnology industry flourish.

But Vought seems to feel that it has funded a lot of “woke” research. Immediately after Trump re-entered the Oval Office, the agency terminated a broad range of grants on topics like pandemic preparedness and health disparities and proposed a budget that would shrink the NIH by nearly half. That cut was rejected by Congress, and the policy behind the NIH grant terminations was also voided by a court. Vought responded to these setbacks by proposing new grant funding rules that would make political considerations key determinants in which grants get funded. Congress put that rule on hold, too.

Apparently dissatisfied with simply blocking funding for entire fields of research and frustrated by Congress, Vought decided to have another go at the NIH’s grants. According to the Politico report, he leveraged one of Trump’s weaknesses: a desire to harm Harvard University. Early in his second term, Trump suspended all grant funding to a number of universities, seeking large payments from them in exchange for restoring the funding and dropping investigations. Harvard declined to go along and eventually won a lawsuit that restored the funding. But when news reports suggested that Harvard had agreed to a settlement without a payoff, Trump immediately demanded $1 billion from Harvard as part of any settlement.

In the White House meeting, Vought reportedly presented OMB control of NIH grants as an alternate means of targeting Harvard. Bhattacharya, to his credit, objected.

Impractical and potentially illegal

That objection was not a foregone conclusion. Bhattacharya remains upset that his ideas regarding the COVID pandemic—let it spread largely unchecked—were sidelined, and he has treated his NIH post as an opportunity to right perceived wrongs. In addition to terminating funding to a wide range of politically sensitive research, Bhattacharya has also underplayed the blatantly unscientific and dangerous ideas of his boss, Secretary of Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. So there were plenty of reasons to think that he might be equally willing to go along with Vought’s ideas.

But he appears to have lost, so all NIH grants will now be subject to approval by a committee that includes both Vought and Bhattacharya. Unless that committee agrees unanimously that the grant should go forward, the funding will be rejected.

It’s not at all clear how this will work in a practical sense. During the Biden administration, the NIH funded over 64,000 grants a year. As heads of their respective agencies, Vought and Bhattacharya presumably have other duties and would be hard-pressed to give each proposal a serious evaluation. The committee would also presumably act only after funding decisions have been made. In the absence of a system for shifting the funding to other grants, though, this runs the risk of leaving the NIH unable to spend all the money Congress allocates to it (which may well be Vought’s intention).

In the past, the NIH determined funding by ordering grants based on scientific merit scores assigned by expert peer reviewers. That system provides an obvious way to shift money from rejected grants to the highest-quality unfunded proposals. But Vought has also been attempting to limit the use of peer review in evaluating grants, making it unclear if such a system would still be viable.

Ultimately, this move will almost certainly be rejected by the courts, as it clearly fits the key standard for illegal administrative actions: arbitrary and capricious. It solves no problems, it’s not required by any law, and it’s difficult to imagine any legal justification for it. “Vought wants to stop the NIH from spending its budget” is not a legal justification.

But for the policy to reach the courts, someone will have to first have to prove that they are sufficiently harmed to have standing to sue. As with so many other administration actions, that means the pending executive order could do a lot of damage before the courts can intervene.

India’s Tata Sons marks a reckoning for Asia’s private-control bargain

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India’s Tata Sons marks a reckoning for Asia’s private-control bargain

Image: AI-Generated

The Reserve Bank of India’s refusal to deregister Tata Sons has been cast as the prelude to a blockbuster initial public offering. That overstates what actually happened. No prospectus exists, no price has been set and no timetable announced. The RBI has simply closed the holding company’s clearest route around a listing rule.

But the decision matters well beyond India because Tata Sons belongs to a model found across Asia: a private controller sitting above public operating companies, using concentrated ownership to make long-term bets while asking investors and regulators to trust its stewardship.

Tata’s version of that model has an unusual twist. Charitable trusts own roughly two-thirds of the parent company, and its dividends help fund hospitals, universities, research and philanthropy. That gives concentrated capital a moral gloss, and it buys patience for expensive ventures like rebuilding Air India, or building out semiconductor, battery and electronics capacity.

Noel Tata has argued that a public listing would damage this character, and he has a point. Quoted holding companies come under constant pressure to raise payouts, sell off valuable stakes and judge every project against short reporting cycles.

Much of Asia’s industrial transformation depended on controllers willing to absorb years of weak returns before a new industry reached scale and found its competitive footing.

But Tata Sons is not simply a patient owner. It is the promoter, the principal investment holding company and the owner of the Tata brand itself. More than 90% of its net assets consist of investments and loans to group companies, according to its own disclosures.

What happens at the parent ripples through listed companies, into strategic sectors and down to the portfolios of millions of ordinary shareholders.

That combination puts three legitimate claims in tension. Property gives owners the right to deploy capital and bear risk. Trusteeship asks them to use that capital for purposes larger than immediate profit. Regulation asks what disclosure is owed when private choices create public consequences.

The Shapoorji Pallonji Group’s roughly 18% stake in Tata Sons illustrates why private control can’t resolve all three. The stake is enormously valuable but illiquid.

Tata Trusts has floated a proposal to pay SPG at least 25,000 crore rupees (about $2.6 billion) through a selective capital reduction, drawing on some combination of Tata Sons’ own cash flow, sales of listed shares, outside investment in newer businesses and public offerings of subsidiaries.

Each option moves the conflict rather than ending it. Selling down listed holdings weakens Tata’s strategic influence and shrinks future dividends. Bringing in outside investors into newer ventures creates fresh valuation benchmarks and new governance rights. Using the parent’s resources to buy out one shareholder raises the uncomfortable question of whose interests the holding company serves when its owners disagree.

A public listing wouldn’t automatically fix this. Minority investors in Tata Sons would still be sitting beneath charitable control and above a portfolio of listed operating companies. More disclosure would make the balance sheet more visible but would not decide when one group company should support another, how losses from new ventures should be shared or what duties the parent owes to shareholders lower in the structure.

Pricing Tata Sons would also be a governance judgment disguised as arithmetic. Any valuation must account for controlling stakes, unlisted ventures, tax exposure, the value of the Tata brand and the discount markets apply to holding companies generally. A rupee held inside TCS is not equivalent to a rupee held by a parent company that may never sell the share — and may instead route the dividend into an airline or a chip factory.

The current board dispute adds urgency. Tata Trusts and Tata Sons directors disagree over whether a vote tied to N. Chandrasekaran’s reappointment was even legally valid. Courts may eventually settle the merits. But the institutional weakness underneath the dispute is already visible: the people responsible for running the same organization can’t agree on who has the authority to run it.

The lesson for Asian capitalism is not that listed ownership is an inherently superior model. Markets often over-reward short-term behavior, and disclosure is no substitute for sound judgment. The lesson is that systemic importance changes what private control must explain.

Conglomerates have often defended concentrated ownership as the price of patience. That bargain can endure only if control remains legible on who decides, who bears losses, how capital moves and what protection exists for those outside the controlling circle.

Tata’s reputation was built over a century, but reputation alone can no longer serve as the group’s only system of assurance. The RBI’s decision does not yet force Tata Sons to open every door. It signals that, for Asia’s largest private controllers, keeping those doors closed is no longer a sufficient claim to public trust.

 Sidhhant Kapai is an India-focused opinion writer and an incoming scholar at Columbia Journalism School.

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