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The U.S. Has Killed 227 Civilians in Boat Strikes During “A Year of Murders”

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The U.S. Has Killed 227 Civilians in Boat Strikes During “A Year of Murders”


Top military officers from a secretive command watched a speedboat cut through the waters of the Caribbean Sea, early last September. A plane above provided live video of the vessel and the 11 men on board. In the early morning hours, Adm. Frank Bradley sought the counsel of his top legal adviser, Col. Cara Hamaguchi. Then he ordered SEAL Team 6 operators to attack the packed boat.

After the vessel exploded, two helpless survivors pulled themselves onto a fragment of the overturned hull, drifting with the current for roughly 45 minutes. Bradley — then the head of the Joint Special Operations Command and now the four-star chief of Special Operations Command — again turned to Hamaguchi for guidance. Soon, a second missile screamed down, killing the survivors. Two more missiles followed in rapid succession, sinking the remnants of the boat.

That strike, carried out on September 2, 2025, began a campaign of attacks that has never ceased.

“It’s been a year of murders,” said a defense official who was horrified by the first strike and has remained so as the U.S. has targeted scores of so-called “drug boats” in the year since. “The Trump administration has normalized murder.” The official added: “It’s absolutely criminal.”

“The Trump administration has normalized murder.” 

In all, the U.S. has conducted more than 65 attacks, resulting in over 225 civilians killed in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean in the last year. The most recent strike, in the Caribbean on August 25, killed four people.

classified opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel — drawn up by an interagency lawyers working group including representatives of the CIA, State Department, White House, Department of Justice, and Defense Department — claims that narcotics on supposed drug boats are lawful military targets because they generate revenue for cartels whom the Trump administration claims are engaged in a “non-international armed conflict” with the United States. Attached to that secret memo is a similarly secret list of “designated terrorist organizations.”

A second government official who has reviewed the OLC opinion called it “flimsy yet expansive,” but said the Trump administration had “nonetheless managed to overstep” its bounds. The official said that despite being crafted to “excuse what is clearly murder,” the U.S. had killed people beyond those the OLC opinion claimed were legal targets.

U.S. Southern Command pushed back on the allegation. “Each operation is planned and executed within the full bounds of our legal framework,” said spokesperson Steven McLoud, “ensuring that every target meets the legal criteria established by our Office of Legal Counsel.”

“There is no plausible legal justification for the strikes.”

Experts in the laws of war, as well as members of Congress from both parties, say the strikes are illegal, extrajudicial killings because people are deliberately slain outside the law. The strikes may also constitute crimes against humanity, violating fundamental rights to life and due process. “There is no plausible legal justification for the strikes. They’re obviously not occurring in the context of an armed conflict and outside of armed conflict, the term for premeditated killing is murder,” Brian Finucane, a former State Department lawyer and specialist in counterterrorism issues and the laws of war, told The Intercept.

The Intercept broke the story of the September 2 double-tap strikes, within days of the attack. Months later, follow-up reporting by the Washington Post, The Intercept, and others resulted in a public firestorm that forced the Pentagon to admit the survivors were killed while shipwrecked — a clear breach of international law — and provide members of Congress additional briefings and access to classified footage of the attack.

The Intercept was also the first outlet to report on Hamaguchi’s identity and role in the attack, as well as an admission in a classified briefing by Rear Adm. Brian H. Bennett — a military officer overseeing Special Operations for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff — that some of the 11 people aboard the boat could have been human trafficking victims. Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., who serves on both the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, sent a letter to President Donald Trump last month pressing for accountability and referencing The Intercept’s reporting on Bennett’s disclosure. Kaine found, after reviewing highly classified materials, that the “available evidence suggests that the United States has killed individuals who are not involved in narcotrafficking.”

Even a year later, much about the attacks and the victims remains unknown. “This is probably one of the hardest U.S. campaigns to track — searching an area double the size of the continental U.S. for clues, with limited satellite imagery, few witnesses and little physical aftermath. The ocean swallows up all the information we would usually rely on,” said Emily Tripp, the executive director of Airwars, a U.K.-based group that monitors conflicts all across the globe. “The more than 200 people killed across these waters have a right to be remembered — and their loved ones have a right to know what has happened.”

“The ocean swallows up all the information we would usually rely on.”

Twenty-six of the 227 total killed have been identified by name, according to an Airwars analysis. All are apparently men and, for those whose ages are known, were between 24 and 46 years old. Of 41 victims identified by nationality, 18 were from Venezuela, 13 from Mexico, three from Colombia, three from Ecuador, two from Trinidad and Tobago, and two from Saint Lucia. Among those identified by a consortium of journalists from Venezuelan outlets were a bus driver, a mototaxi driver, men involved in fishing or the seafood trade, and a futsal player. They hailed from poor communities, and their ties to the drug trade were at the very lowest levels.

Reporting by The Intercept also found that claims by the White House and Defense Department about the boat strikes stopping the flow of fentanyl and saving more than 1 million American lives are baseless, phony, or both.

“The administration is killing for online content and spectacle,” said Finucane, referencing the Trump administration’s use of highly edited snuff-film footage of attacks on social media. At the same time, the Pentagon has consistently withheld basic information about the strikes, the legal justifications for them, the “designated terrorist organizations” being targeted by the campaign, and the victims. The administration has been so secretive that the bipartisan 2026 annual defense policy bill withholds 25 percent of travel funds from Hegseth’s office until overdue reports on execute orders and unedited video footage of strikes are delivered to Congress.

The boat strike campaign, dubbed Operation Southern Spear, hit its peak intensity just over a year ago. October 2025 was its deadliest month with 12 boats attacked and 44 declared deaths. December was the most active period, with 14 vessels struck. In almost all the attacks, between one and four people were killed. In only one strike did the death toll of a single boat reach double digits: the first attack on September 2, 2025.

While all September 2025 strikes took place in the Caribbean, the attacks moved west. By December, all 14 were conducted in the Pacific Ocean. The Intercept’s boat strike tracker counts 50 strikes in the Pacific out of a total of 68 attacks in the past year.

In almost every month of the campaign, the U.S. failed to immediately kill all crew members in its initial strike. But of the 28 survivors, only three were successfully rescued and remain alive. In nine of 11 survivor announcements, the U.S. Coast Guard was named as the primary responder. The Intercept revealed that the U.S. rescue strategy was leaving survivors to drown. Eight men leapt into rough seas on December 30, 2025, for example, after the U.S. rained down a barrage of munitions, sinking three vessels. They required immediate rescue; chances were slim that they could survive even an hour. In announcing its strike, SOUTHCOM said it “immediately notified” the Coast Guard to launch search and rescue protocols to save the men. But an investigation by The Intercept and Airwars found that it took the Coast Guard almost 45 hours to begin searching the attack zone for survivors.

Strikes slowed dramatically in January 2026 — with just one strike that killed two people — during the same month that the U.S. invaded Venezuela and abducted its president, Nicolás Maduro. In late June, U.S. forces took a hiatus from attacks. Officials offered conflicting reasons for the pause, with some reports centering on equipment and personnel being used for earthquake relief in Venezuela. After 63 days, the U.S. resumed strikes on August 23, in the Pacific, quickly followed by the Caribbean attack on August 25.

The boat strike campaign was, in many respects, the opening salvo of an aggressive military and diplomatic effort in the Americas — dubbed the Donroe Doctrine — that has spawned more violence, increased impunity by local security forces, and heightened danger from cartels across the Western Hemisphere, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project.

In addition to the war in Venezuela, the U.S. also launched or ramped up numerous initiatives and interventions. This includes the now 19-member Americas Counter Cartel Coalition — also known as the Shield of the Americas — which Hegseth recently christened with the motto: “We do bad things to bad people.” The U.S. also launched a CIA campaign — which may involve private contractors and authorities from other countries — targeting boats near the Galápagos Islands; covert CIA operations in Mexico; a military airstrike inside Venezuela in June that allegedly killed Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, the head of the Tren de Aragua street gang; and joint counter-cartel operations in Ecuador dubbed “Operation Total Extermination,” which include ground operations by elite U.S. troops.

“I also want to commend Honduras and Guatemala for inviting the United States to partake in combined operations against narco-terrorists in their countries,” Hegseth announced recently, adding: “We look forward to working with you in killing bad guys.” Jamaica also signed a status of forces agreement with the U.S., which sets terms for troop deployments, including joint operations. Hegseth said the partnership would “cripple narco-terrorists that transit through the Caribbean.” Beyond this, the Trump administration has also repeatedly bullied Panama and threatened CanadaColombia, Cuba, Greenland, and perhaps also Iceland.

Last month, SOUTHCOM chief Gen. Francis L. Donovan announced the creation of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, which the command called an “evolution from Operation Southern Spear.” JTF-WHEM will, said SOUTHCOM, “provide unified command and control at the tactical and operational levels, integrating military capabilities with the … partner nations of the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition.” SOUTHCOM failed to clarify if so-called A3C partner troops were under the operational control of U.S. officers, as is the case under other low-profile proxy-war programs

Hegseth told coalition partners that the new task force would “continue the targeting and killing of narco-terrorists,” whom he dubbed “the ISIS and Al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.” Days later, the boat strikes resumed. And on Friday, JTF-WHEM and Ecuadorean forces interdicted what SOUTHCOM claimed was “a floating refueling station in support of illicit at-sea drug trafficking” linked to “the Los Choneros violent narco-terrorist organization” in the Pacific. Marines and sailors “boarded, searched, and cleared the vessel without incident,” turned the crew over to Ecuador, and then sank the vessel.

Acting Pentagon press secretary Joel Valdez did not reply to a request for comment on whether the U.S. had killed people beyond those the Office of Legal Counsel opinion claimed were legal targets.

“The boat strikes are, perhaps, the most stark testament to the lawlessness of the Trump administration,” Finucane told The Intercept. “It’s essentially serial killing at sea — murder under federal law — being carried out as a matter of state policy.”

Is Russia’s rival to Starlink failing? Here’s what we know.

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Is Russia’s rival to Starlink failing? Here’s what we know.

Russia’s attempt to replicate SpaceX’s Starlink satellite network seems to be moving as slowly as the front lines in eastern Ukraine.

The Rassvet program, often billed as Russia’s answer to Starlink, started launching its first operational satellites earlier this year. Two launches, one in March and a second in July, have delivered 32 Rassvet satellites to low-Earth orbit, some 10 percent of the roughly 300 Rassvet spacecraft Russia aims to put into orbit by the end of next year to provide connectivity for military and civilian users. The company in charge of Rassvet, Bureau 1440, wants to deploy 924 satellites by 2035.

But none of the 32 satellites launched so far have reached the 500-mile (800-kilometer) orbit they were designed to operate in. The rockets that launched the first two batches of Rassvets released the satellites much closer to Earth, and the satellites were expected to use their own plasma engines to raise their orbits over the next few months.

The highest altitude achieved by the Rassvet satellites so far is a little more than 300 miles (500 kilometers). Twelve of the 16 Rassvet satellites from the first launch in March have settled into orbits at this altitude, according to an assessment released Monday by the Institute for the Study of War. A chart published by Jonathan McDowell, an independent tracker of global launch and satellite activity, indicates one more Rassvet satellite may soon climb above 300 miles.

One Rassvet satellite from the March launch never made any significant maneuvers and reentered the atmosphere in June. The remaining two satellites have not raised their altitude in the last two months, an indication that they, too, may be experiencing problems.

Some satellites in the second batch of Rassvets also show signs of trouble. Two of them never maneuvered after launch in July and appear to be heading for reentry, according to Anatoly Zak, a journalist and editor of RussianSpaceWeb.com. Eleven of the 16 satellites launched in July were “noticeably climbing” by early August, Zak reported. Three more appeared to stop maneuvering after initial attempts to raise their orbits.

Too soon to know

What are we to make of all this? What we can say for sure is that at least three of the first 32 Rassvet satellites likely suffered outright failures.

Some technical anomalies were expected. About 5 percent of SpaceX’s first batch of Starlinks failed almost immediately after launch. Over time, this group of 60 Starlink prototypes suffered a failure rate of about 13 percent, according to McDowell. With more experience, SpaceX’s next 420 Starlink satellites had a failure rate of about 3 percent. SpaceX’s current generation of Starlink Version 2 satellites has a failure rate of about 0.01 percent, according to McDowell’s tabulations.

The US military’s Space Development Agency is fielding its own constellation of data relay satellites for applications in missile targeting and command and control. Some of the agency’s first 42 operational satellites encountered thermal and propulsion problems after launching last year, and they have taken longer than anticipated to raise their orbits.

In its assessment on Monday, the Institute for the Study of War wrote that the second batch of Rassvet satellites “appears to have failed to reach intended operational altitudes.” Zero Rassvets have reached 500 miles, and none of the second group have climbed above 300 miles, whereas much of the first cluster seems to have settled into stable orbits.

However, there’s a lot we don’t know. Perhaps, for untold reasons, Russian officials decided to abandon plans to orbit the Rassvet satellites at 500 miles. Starlink satellites, after all, fly closer to 300 miles. This would put the Rassvet satellites closer to users on the ground, which comes with performance benefits. But there’s a trade-off in that lower-altitude constellations require more satellites for seamless global coverage.

Also, networks like Starlink, Rassvet, and China’s Guowang and Qianfan fly their satellites in numerous orbital planes, or pathways. Russian ground teams may be intentionally keeping some of the Rassvet satellites at lower altitudes to allow their orbital planes to drift over a period of many months before eventually lining up with final pathways.

What we do know is that putting a megaconstellation into orbit is hard to do. At best, Russia’s entire satellite manufacturing sector has produced just a few dozen spacecraft per year since the fall of the Soviet Union. “It turned out we weren’t ready for this,” Yuri Borisov, the former head of Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, said in an interview in 2023.

Russian forces are clamoring for Rassvet after SpaceX cut off access in February to the Starlink network by unregistered user terminals in Ukraine, circumventing Russia’s illicit use of satellite communications for military operations. Rassvet had been in the works for years, but the timing of the first Rassvet launch the following month offered Russian military commanders hope of soon regaining access to ubiquitous satellite broadband through a domestic network.

It’s not all that surprising that those hopes failed to materialize. Russia’s satellite industry has long suffered from chronic underfunding, corruption, production bottlenecks, and reliability problems. Russia’s war in Ukraine has brought on new threats, from Ukrainian cyber, drone, and missile attacks on space industry infrastructure to personnel and funding redirected from the Russian space program to support the war effort.

The 12 Rassvet satellites currently flying at 300 miles are lined up in a formation to bring them over Ukraine twice per day for communication windows of up to 90 minutes.

“The existing Rassvet satellite constellation still presents a threat to Ukraine as it may allow Russian forces to conduct more precise strikes against Ukraine using remotely controlled unmanned systems and leverage Rassvet satellite communications even during limited windows of connectivity,” the Institute for the Study of War wrote in its assessment.

It will take 16 more launches to bring Rassvet’s coverage over Ukraine anywhere close to continuous, and the Ukrainian military is taking steps to make it more difficult for Russia to launch more Rassvet satellites.

Earlier this month, Ukraine struck the factory that builds the Soyuz rockets needed to launch Rassvet payloads. Soyuz rockets are the workhorse for Russia’s space program, launching navigation satellites, spy spacecraft, and crew missions to the International Space Station. Ukraine has dispatched drones to attack the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in far northern Russia, home to the Soyuz launch pad used for Rassvet missions. So far, the drone strikes have not landed a direct hit on Plesetsk.

“Ukrainian strikes against facilities and sites key to Russia‘s satellite and space industry may hinder Russia’s ability to launch satellites and further delay Russia’s goal to establish its own analogue of Starlink in the near-term, including for use on the battlefield in Ukraine,” the Institute for the Study of War wrote in its report this week.

The missing foundation of Prabowo’s economic vision

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The missing foundation of Prabowo’s economic vision

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s administration has placed food security, energy self-sufficiency and military modernization at the center of Indonesia’s national development agenda.

Under the framework of Asta Cita, these strategic and defensive sectors are expected to serve as the primary stepping stones toward transforming Indonesia into a welfare state.

The underlying assumption is straightforward: physical sovereignty and sectoral stability will naturally generate a leap in economic prosperity. Yet a closer examination through the lens of public policy and political economy suggests that this assumption rests on shaky foundations.

History offers plenty of evidence that strong food security, energy resilience and military capabilities are not the primary engines of economic growth capable of lifting a country out of the middle-income trap.

Rather, they are typically the outcomes of a productive and prosperous economy, not the starting point. The true foundation of national advancement lies in broad-based prosperity generated through abundant employment opportunities and high-quality jobs.

When most of the labor force is absorbed into productive formal-sector employment, household welfare improves organically without excessive reliance on government assistance programs. More importantly, a growing formal workforce automatically expands the tax base, both horizontally and vertically.

A broad and healthy tax base strengthens the state’s fiscal capacity, enabling governments to fund agricultural research, accelerate energy transitions, and modernize defense capabilities without undermining macroeconomic stability.

Ignoring labor-market quality while concentrating primarily on defensive physical sectors risks trapping Indonesia in a vicious cycle of weakening purchasing power, a shrinking tax base and rising social expenditures that do little to improve long-term economic productivity.

Prabowo’s development paradigm therefore requires a fundamental rethinking. National prosperity does not emerge from physical security alone; labor productivity ultimately generates both wealth and resilience.

From America to Scandinavia

The United States’ experience during the post-World War II golden age through the mid-1970s shows how near-full employment can dramatically reduce inequality. During this period, gains in labor productivity moved largely in tandem with rising real wages for middle-class workers.

That dynamic changed sharply from the late 1970s onward as labor protections weakened and financial deregulation accelerated. Between 1980 and 2005, labor productivity increased by roughly 71%, yet median real wages grew by only about 14%.

In his landmark work Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty argued that extreme inequality emerged because the return on capital consistently exceeded the overall rate of economic growth.

Matthew Rognlie later challenged this interpretation, suggesting that much of the increase in capital’s share stemmed from soaring housing values driven by urban land scarcity rather than limitless industrial capital accumulation.

Despite their differences, both perspectives point to the same conclusion: when labor markets fail to distribute the benefits of growth through fair wages, shared prosperity eventually deteriorates.

Japan offers another powerful example. Under Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and his National Income Doubling Plan launched in 1960, surplus labor was gradually shifted from low-productivity agriculture into high-value manufacturing industries.

During Japan’s three decades of rapid economic expansion, stretching into the early 1990s, unemployment remained exceptionally low, generally hovering between 1% and 2%. It was this large-scale employment creation and continuous investment in human capital, not merely logistical or physical security, that propelled Japan into the ranks of the world’s leading economies.

The Scandinavian social democracies followed a similar path. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway sustain generous welfare systems because broad tax bases and highly productive labor markets support them. Denmark, for example, maintains one of the world’s highest tax-to-GDP ratios, along with substantial personal income tax rates.

Why has such a model remained politically sustainable? The answer lies in the labor market. Because most working-age citizens are employed in formal jobs with decent wages, they possess both the ability to pay taxes and the confidence that they will receive reliable public services and social protections in return.

China’s economic transformation after 1978 further reinforces this lesson. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, China gradually shifted labor from agriculture to export-oriented manufacturing.

Tens of millions of rural workers migrated to urban centers and found employment in newly established factories that became the engines of growth. China lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty not through large-scale consumption subsidies, but by integrating them into productive non-agricultural employment that generated sustained income growth.

The informality trap

When these international experiences are compared with Indonesia’s labor-market reality, a troubling structural imbalance is apparent. Indonesia’s economic growth has remained relatively stable at around five% annually, yet the quality of that growth has steadily deteriorated. Its capacity to generate employment has weakened significantly.

Today, every 1% increase in economic growth creates only about 110,000 new jobs. This inefficiency is compounded by Indonesia’s persistently high Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR), which hovers around six. This figure suggests that investment remains expensive and inefficient at generating additional economic output.

The formal industrial sector’s inability to absorb new entrants into the labor force has pushed a large share of Indonesians into informal employment. According to national statistics, informal workers still account for nearly 60% of the workforce, equivalent to more than 84 million people.

The dominance of informality carries serious economic consequences. Workers face unstable incomes, limited legal protections and heightened vulnerability to economic shocks. The result is the risk of prolonged economic involution, where business activity expands in quantity, but productivity and living standards stagnate.

A major source of this problem lies in the quality of Indonesia’s human capital. Roughly half of the country’s workforce has only completed primary or lower-secondary education. These educational limitations significantly constrain competitiveness at a time when digital disruption and the green transition are reshaping labor markets worldwide.

Without sweeping reforms to vocational education and workforce training that genuinely align with industry needs, Indonesia’s much-celebrated demographic dividend could easily become a demographic burden characterized by widespread underemployment and declining productivity.

Limits of the state

A recurring misconception in development policy is the belief that the state can become the dominant provider of employment. In reality, the government’s fiscal and organizational capacity is inherently limited.

Indonesia’s entire public sector, including civil servants, employees of state-owned enterprises, and active military and police personnel, accounts for less than five percent of total employment. By contrast, the private sector, small and medium-sized enterprises, and the informal economy collectively absorb more than 95% of the labor force.

When governments attempt to expand their role too aggressively by weakening private-sector dynamism through excessive bureaucratic control, the likely outcome is a crowding-out effect that suppresses entrepreneurship and reduces the creation of high-quality formal jobs.

These limitations also invite closer scrutiny of large-scale populist initiatives such as the Prabowo administration’s Free Nutritious Meals program, which now consumes hundreds of trillions of rupiah in public spending.

The program has already generated constitutional controversy regarding budget allocations and continues to face operational challenges ranging from procurement inefficiencies and nutritional standardization to food safety concerns.

In other words, sustainable prosperity cannot be achieved solely through free meal programs, the establishment of thousands of village cooperatives or massive increases in defense spending.

Such initiatives may serve as temporary safety nets, but they should not evolve into universal programs that place excessive strain on public finances. Social assistance should be carefully targeted toward those experiencing extreme poverty and genuine vulnerability.

If Indonesia hopes to achieve its ambitious goal of 8% economic growth by 2029, development priorities must be reoriented toward strengthening the labor market. Resources currently devoted to broad-based populist spending should be redirected toward labor-intensive productive sectors.

Policymakers would be wise to reduce the country’s high ICOR through logistics and regulatory reforms while overhauling vocational education to ensure closer integration with industry demand.

Only by enabling more Indonesians to secure productive, high-quality formal employment can the country build a robust tax base, strengthen fiscal resilience and ultimately achieve the durable national prosperity and security that every welfare state aspires to.

Ronny P. Sasmita, Ph.D, is senior international affairs analyst at the Indonesia Strategic and Economic Action Institution, a Jakarta-based think tank.

UK plans measures against Israeli settlements as Sa’ar warns of response

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UK plans measures against Israeli settlements as Sa’ar warns of response

Britain is preparing a package of measures targeting Israeli settlement activity in the occupied West Bank, prompting Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to warn that Israel could respond with measures of its own.

British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said London would announce a “comprehensive” package of measures concerning Israeli settlements in the coming weeks.

Miliband warned that continued settlement expansion, particularly plans in the E1 area east of Jerusalem, threatens the viability of a future Palestinian state and prospects for a two-state solution.

In response, Sa’ar warned that Israel would retaliate if Britain takes measures against it.

READ: UK foreign secretary condemns ‘appalling settler terrorism’ in occupied West Bank

“If Britain takes action against Israel, we will respond,” Sa’ar said, adding: “We have the tools.” He did not specify what measures Israel could take.

The exchange comes amid renewed international criticism of Israeli plans to expand settlement construction in E1, a strategically sensitive area of the West Bank between East Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim.

Palestinians and several foreign governments argue that construction in E1 would further fragment the West Bank and undermine the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state. Israel maintains that it has the right to develop the area.

READ: Palestinian commission records 2,030 Israeli army and settler attacks in West Bank in August

Google Maps renames “Lake Ontario” to “Lake America” even faster than US government

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Google Maps renames “Lake Ontario” to “Lake America” even faster than US government

Trade talks between the US and Canada broke down last week, leading to a wave of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs. US President Donald Trump also fell back on an old favorite to needle his opponents, signing an executive order on Thursday to rename Lake Ontario to “Lake America.”

The body of water, which straddles the US-Canada border, gave its name to the Canadian province rather than the other way around. Regardless, the US government now refers to this great lake as Lake America—or it will soon. Official US government maps have yet to be updated, but Google wasted no time adopting the new, Trumpian name.

Google began rolling out this change for US users on Saturday. The company posted a brief update on its Google Maps blog, noting that it follows the US Geographic Names Information System (GNIS) for its maps, so the company implies it had no choice but to rename Lake Ontario in Google Maps, which is the most popular mapping platform in the US by a wide margin.

However, Google was even quicker to switch over to Lake America than the US government. While the GNIS database acknowledges the name change in a summary report, the base map layer still reflects the internationally recognized name of Lake Ontario. A message across the top of the USGS-operated website notes that the change to official maps is still pending.

As of Monday, the official GNIS map still shows “Lake Ontario,” but a message says the change is coming.

As of Monday, the official GNIS map still shows “Lake Ontario,” but a message says the change is coming. Credit: USGS

But people don’t generally go looking for GNIS maps—they check Google Maps when they want to find something. According to Google, those in the US will only see the new Americanized name. Meanwhile, Canadians will continue to see the standard Lake Ontario label. In the rest of the world, Lake Ontario will take precedence, but Lake America will be included in parentheses.

This mirrors how Google handled the “Gulf of America” situation in 2025. The company changed the name for US users, left it unchanged in Mexico, and showed both names in the rest of the world. It also reverted Mount Denali to Mount McKinley in accordance with the same order. However, the company did wait several weeks after the executive order before making that shift. Google’s rapid adoption of the new official US name for the body of water suggests that it will continue to rename geological features based on executive orders, which may only embolden the administration to rename more things.

Lake Ontario names around the world

One body of water, multiple names.

One body of water, multiple names. Credit: Google

While Apple Maps did adopt the Gulf of America name shortly after Google last year, it has not yet scrubbed Lake Ontario from its maps as of this posting. Some less-used mapping apps like MapQuest have vowed not to make the change at all.

Trump To Meet Hasidic Leaders Over Israeli Draft Dispute

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President Donald Trump is scheduled to meet Thursday at the White House with several prominent Hasidic and ultra-Orthodox Jewish leaders, including figures identified as anti-Zionist or non-Zionist, in talks expected to address concerns over the enlistment of yeshiva students in the Israel Defense Forces.

The planned meeting, arranged ahead of Rosh Hashanah, has prompted debate in Jewish communities in the United States and Israel because some expected participants reject Zionism and oppose the State of Israel’s claim to represent Judaism.

Invitees include Rabbi Aaron Teitelbaum and Rabbi Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, leaders of rival Satmar Hasidic communities; the Skverer rebbe; the Bobov rebbe; the Vizhnitzer rebbe of Monsey; and Rabbi Malkiel Kotler, a leading figure at Beth Medrash Govoha, a major yeshiva in Lakewood, New Jersey.

Belaaz, an ultra-Orthodox news outlet, first reported that White House Jewish liaison Martin Marks had worked for months to organize the gathering. The plans called for short individual meetings with President Trump and a possible group discussion, though some of the invited leaders were reported to be considering sending representatives instead.

The question of Israeli military service is expected to feature prominently. Israel’s long-standing exemptions for many full-time yeshiva students have become a major domestic political and legal issue, with court rulings and public pressure pushing the government to increase haredi enlistment.

Rabbi Aaron Teitelbaum said he had initially considered declining the invitation, but cited “tens of thousands of Jews in Eretz Yisroel [the Land of Israel] are in distress because of the decree to draft yeshiva students.”

“We hope that we will be able to appeal to the president to help with this situation,” Teitelbaum said.

Satmar and several other haredi groups distinguish their religious identity from Zionism and have often opposed Israeli state institutions. Their views do not represent all Orthodox Jews, and many haredi communities in Israel and the Diaspora support Israel while seeking continued protections for Torah study.

The meeting is unusual because President Trump has generally met Jewish leaders who focus on US-Israel relations and combating antisemitism. Critics fear the gathering could be used to seek US pressure on Israel over the enlistment dispute. Supporters describe it as a chance for religious leaders to present their community’s concerns directly to the American president.

UN says global warming likely to exceed 1.5C within a few years

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UN says global warming likely to exceed 1.5C within a few years


Global temperatures are likely to exceed the key 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) warming threshold within a few years, the United Nations Environment Programme said Wednesday, warning of more extreme weather and growing pressure on ecosystems, glaciers and low-lying coastal cities.

UNEP said bringing global temperature increases back below 1.5C remained possible but was “highly uncertain” and would require rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, alongside measures to remove carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere.

The warning comes as countries face the growing likelihood that the temperature target set under the 2015 Paris Agreement will be temporarily exceeded.

UNEP urges focus on limiting the duration of any overshoot

Under the Paris Agreement, governments committed to keeping the rise in global temperatures within 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in an effort to limit the impacts of extreme weather.

With a temperature “overshoot” now considered extremely likely, countries should focus on limiting how long global temperatures remain above the 1.5C threshold, UNEP said in its report.

“Every year of delay and every fraction of a degree above 1.5C increases risks and makes recovery harder, with irreversible losses possible even if temperatures later decline,” the agency said.

The most optimistic scenario would see global temperatures peak at 1.8C above pre-industrial levels if all existing national pledges are implemented. However, UNEP said warming was likely to be significantly higher.

“Under current policies, median projected global warming reaches around 2.6C by 2100,” the report said.

UNEP also said carbon dioxide removal measures, including planting new forests, would be “critical” to controlling rising temperatures.

However, the agency stressed that such measures could not replace deep cuts in current emissions.

Best propaganda money can buy can’t sell Americans on Iran war

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Best propaganda money can buy can’t sell Americans on Iran war

A demonstrator holds a placard in front of the White House in Washington, DC, the United States, on April 7, 2026. Photo: Li Rui / Xinhua

A new University of Massachusetts-Amherst opinion poll, conducted August 21-26, finds profound American disillusionment with President Donald Trump, with his Iran war, and with its economic fallout in their lives.

Apparently, the Ellison family’s attempt to drum up support for Donald Trump and his Iran war by buying up CBS News and gutting it as a respected news organization was a costly failure.

Likewise, Rupert Murdoch’s NewsCorp and his various pro-Trump organs, from Fox Cable News to The Wall Street Journal, have not pulled the wool over the public’s eyes in the ways that Murdoch hoped.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted of the effort he expended convincing the American people to go to war with Iran, saying he had a thousand hours on US television , but while he may have prevailed on the gullible and avaricious Trump to fall on that country like a ravenous wolf, he did not succeed in altering the views of the American public on the desirability of such a war.

The only significant impact of Netanyahu on most Americans has been to convince them that the Israeli government is a combination of genocidal maniacs and welfare queens that Americans should cut off economically and perhaps even militarily.

The UMass poll asked a weighted sample of respondents how well Trump has handled his Iran war. The response of 55% of those asked this question was “not well at all.” Ouch. Another 13% replied “not too well.”

So 68%, over two-thirds, think he has done a piss-poor job on his Iran war, which was his war of choice. Two-thirds is the percentage needed in the Senate to impeach and remove a president, so if our representatives actually mirrored public opinion, Trump would be toast.

That question had to do with Trump’s handling of the war. Asked whether they approved of the war on Iran, a majority, 54%, said they strongly or somewhat disapproved, and another 20% were noncommittal, which I would interpret as not actively supporting the war even if they didn’t particularly oppose it.

Those statistics yield a picture of a war that nearly three-fourths of Americans either oppose or about which they just don’t care. It isn’t what the commander of a war would want to hear from his own public.

A majority think the war was a mistake and question whether it has made the US safer or forestalled an Iranian bomb. Another way of putting it is that only about a quarter of respondents think the US should have gone to war with Iran, and that the US is winning.

The UMass report on the opinion poll noted that Raymond La Raja, professor of political science at UMass Amherst and co-director of the poll, said, “Americans are overwhelmingly negative about Trump on the Iran situation.”

He continued: “Only one in four Americans thinks he is handling Iran well. The real divide is increasingly between Trump’s hardcore MAGA base and almost everyone else. Among Republicans who identify very strongly with MAGA, 87% approve of Trump’s handling of Iran.

But that falls to 58% among Republicans who are ‘somewhat MAGA’ and just 30% among Republicans who say they are ‘not MAGA at all.’ The more loosely attached Republicans are to the MAGA identity, the more skeptical they are of the war.”

Conducting a war in the Middle East, as even the cowboys in the G. W. Bush administration recognized, requires at least some allies. But Americans don’t think Trump plays well with other children.

Asked how he has handled working with allies in global affairs, 52% say “not well at all” and 12% say “not too well,” showing that nearly two-thirds view his foreign policy performance negatively.

Based on this sounding, we can further project that Americans are even more angry about the main fallout of the failed war on Iran, which is high inflation. Fully 80% of respondents said that the Iran War has increased the cost of gasoline and groceries. Asked about how Trump has dealt with inflation, 57% responded, “not well at all.”

A further 18% said “not too well.” That is 75%, fully three-fourths, who disapprove of his handling of inflation. Trump and the Republicans are always campaigning on being the party of business and therefore the party that knows how to handle the economy.

But only a tiny minority, 7%, think Trump is handling the economy very well, and I presume they are wealthy investors in Trump’s casino stock market. The tech-heavy Nasdaq is up 14-16% so far this year.

Juan Cole teaches Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan. His newest book, “Muhammad: Prophet of Peace Amid the Clash of Empires” was published in 2020. He is also the author of “The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation Is Changing the Middle East” (2015) and “Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East” (2008). He has appeared widely on television, radio and on op-ed pages as a commentator on Middle East affairs, and has a regular column at Salon.com. He has written, edited or translated 14 books and has authored 60 journal articles.

Common Dreams

Think twice before installing this device promising free movies

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Think twice before installing this device promising free movies

As online services get better at blocking malicious traffic, the attackers and scammers behind them have been forced to find new ways to reach their targets. The alternative of choice is now what are known as residential proxy networks. These systems funnel millions of home Internet connections into a unified network, and the proxy operators allow attackers to route their malicious traffic through these connections for a fee. The online services see only IP addresses with good reputations and geolocations that don’t stand out.

More often than not, the home users have no idea that their connections are being used to facilitate crime and occasionally even nation-state attacks. Users who do know often don’t care much. In exchange for leasing out part of their unlimited bandwidth to others, many get free movie and TV show streaming. Several less tech-savvy people I know who own such digital media players have told me, after I explain how the media players piggyback off their connections, that the bonanza of content is worth it. They find the tangible benefits outweigh the abstract harm they pose.

Infecting already compromised devices

Research published Monday brings the threat into much clearer view. Security firm Plume cataloged a vast ecosystem of malware that preys squarely on users of SuperBox, just one of many media players offering pirated content. These malicious apps can be surreptitiously installed by remote attackers even when the devices are positioned behind a router. While Monday’s deep-dive analysis focused exclusively on SuperBox, Plume warned that dozens of similar streaming devices pose precisely the same threat.

“Our researchers found that these residential proxy networks are not simply monetization tools,” Plume researchers wrote. “They are actively being used as a target for additional malware delivery, enabling cybercriminals to infect already-compromised devices with entirely new malware families while remaining largely invisible to the device owner.”

The Android-based SuperBox is configured with almost all the OS-based security protections turned off. Apps that come pre-installed, or those that are available through the SuperBox app store, then run as root, meaning they have unfettered administrative system rights on the device. Paying proxynet customers can also gain root by issuing a handful of Linux commands. With that, either the app or the paying customer can install their own apps and surveil and join the local network the device is connected to, where they have the same system rights as any other connected device.

The SuperBox neuters default Android defenses, including signature verification, the “unknown sources” restriction, the permission-review dialog, and Play Protect scanning. As a result, the box’s ADB (Android Debug Bridge) is exposed to the Internet. Worse, the su binary—the code that provides the command-line interface allowing users with low-level system rights to temporarily gain administrator-level access—is set to grant root without any authentication. The combination of the ADB being exposed to the Internet and the lack of authentication for root access means that both apps and users of the proxy service can execute virtually any command they want on the device.

More often than not, users position their SuperBox behind their home router, where they may think their device is safe from Internet-connected remote attackers. In fact, that sense of security is completely false. The binary that provides proxy functions inside many SuperBox apps opens an outgoing connection to a proxy server and keeps it open as a communication channel indefinitely. Routers are unable to block the communications because the connections they rely on are outbound and encrypted between the SuperBox and the proxy server. Even users who are savvy enough to monitor traffic on their network never see anything that looks like an inbound connection to the ADB port.

“The open ADB port plays the central role,” Plume researcher Gergely Eberhardt wrote in an email. “Combined with root access, a single pm install command can silently install any APK. This bypasses every one of Android’s default protections at once: signature verification, the “unknown sources” restriction, the permission-review dialog, and Play Protect scanning.”

Intruders at gates

The open ADB, along with the default presence of apps that have built-in proxy functionality, creates a dangerous mix that makes SuperBox a potent threat.

“This combination results in further infections involving additional residential proxies or IoT botnets, and the attackers are often the very customers of the primary proxy network,” Plume wrote. “The device owners get multiple bots they never asked for and are not aware of, all competing for the same hardware, and an IP address whose reputation now reflects whatever those bots utilize it for.”

Some of the proxy networking services that make use of SuperBox take measures to prevent their customers from accessing the local networks of SuperBox users. The recently disrupted Popanet, for instance, blocks local IP address ranges from outside the local network. Even then, Popanet users can access local IPs by specifying the special wildcard address 0.0.0.0, which Android then routes to the SuperBox IP 127.0.0.1. From that vantage point, proxy users can access the rest of the local network.

Monday’s post also reported that even the Popanet network was facilitating live exploit attempts. Plume wrote:

The internal-network protection issue that we described in the previous part isn’t just a theoretical concern. To confirm whether anyone is actually exploiting it, we ran a controlled experiment. We joined the Popanet network as a residential exit node and instructed the host that any connection coming through the tunnel targeting either port 5555 or 5858 (these are the most common ADB ports) would be redirected to our local honeypot. From the operator’s perspective, our node looked like any other regular residential endpoint serving customer traffic; from the inside, every attempt aimed to reach an ADB port through our node was captured.

We let the node run for over three weeks; over that period, the honeypot recorded 1,352 distinct attempts at reaching the ADB through the gap we identified earlier. All the attacks could be split into two families of loopback addresses targeting the local machine. The first is 0.0.0.0, supplied either as a raw address or embedded in a hostname via a wildcard DNS service such as nip.io. The second is 127.0.0.1, which the proxy blocked via isLoopbackAddress() as we explained earlier.

An email sent to info@mysuperboxtv.com seeking comment didn’t receive a response before this story’s publication.

Intruding traffic attempted to install multiple malicious apps that made SuperBoxes a node in yet another proxy network or join botnets for use in DDoS attacks. The three primary apps were CECbot, a variant of Mirai, and Maskify.

It’s hard to walk away from Monday’s report with anything other than the strong conviction that SuperBox—and virtually all of its peers—pose a tangible and imminent threat to the networks they’re connected to. Even savvy people who think they can be cordoned off from the Internet are at risk. If you’re using one, you should disconnect it and throw it away. If you find a family member using one, you should intervene. With the Popanet proxy service alone running through 2 million devices, according to Google, chances are good that a home network near you is, too.

Bangladesh should think twice before joining Mecca pact

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Bangladesh should think twice before joining Mecca pact

Last week, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman told parliament that the country would view an invitation to join the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement “positively.”

Then he also went on to add that an expanded pact could essentially become a self-defense mechanism for the world’s Muslim-majority states, and described Bangladesh’s possible membership as “an internal matter of our family, the Muslim family,” on which outsiders had no basis to raise issues or concerns.

So, the invitation may or may not come from Riyadh, but the “Muslim family” argument has already come from Dhaka – and that is where the trouble starts.

Nobody asked Bangladesh to define a military alliance in terms of religious kinship. The question was whether joining a collective-defense arrangement with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan would serve Bangladesh’s interests.

Turning that into a matter of the Muslim family does something rather convenient: it makes scrutiny sound like an insult to faith, when it is actually the most basic responsibility of foreign policy.

If Bangladesh is going to assume obligations under a military pact, its government should be able to explain why, since religion in itself cannot be an explanation.

Bangladesh is a People’s Republic, not an Islamic Republic. While its Constitution recognizes Islam as the state religion, secularism also remains one of its fundamental principles of state policy.

More importantly, the Constitution’s principles governing international relations speak in the language of sovereignty, equality, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes.

That does not require Bangladesh to keep Muslim-majority countries at arm’s length. Quite the opposite: there is nothing wrong with deep relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan or any other Muslim country. But friendship between states is one thing; turning a religious identity into the basis for military commitments is quite another.

Among the three countries that signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7, Pakistan is a self-declared Islamic Republic, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy whose political identity is inseparable from its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest sites and Turkey remains constitutionally secular, though the AK Party that has governed it for two decades emerged from the country’s Islamist political tradition.

These countries have their own reasons for wanting closer security ties, but Bangladesh must decide whether those reasons are also its own. Saying that the matter belongs to the “Muslim family” neatly avoids that question rather than answering it.

The agreement itself is not a ceremonial declaration of brotherhood. Its central provision says that an armed attack against one member will be regarded as an attack against all. That is an Article 5-style collective-defense commitment, even if nobody should pretend that the Mecca pact has NATO’s institutions or military machinery.

Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has called the agreement “purely defensive”, while Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has compared its central provision with NATO’s Article 5.

There is no contradiction in calling a collective-defense arrangement defensive while acknowledging that it can create obligations that pull members into a war that starts elsewhere. That is precisely why the details matter before, rather than after, a country signs.

And the pact’s details remain thin. The three countries have spoken about political and military coordination, joint exercises and defense-industry cooperation and plans for mechanisms to coordinate their senior officials and armed forces.

But there is still no publicly disclosed integrated military command comparable to NATO’s, and the precise obligations of a future member in a crisis are not nearly as clear as they would need to be before Bangladesh voluntarily takes them on.

There is another problem. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan do not have identical security maps. Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns include the Houthi threat in Yemen and the wider confrontation involving Iran.

Turkey’s security calculations are shaped by Syria, Kurdish militancy, the Black Sea and its own regional ambitions, alongside its longstanding territorial disputes with Greece. Pakistan’s security concerns are concentrated on Afghanistan and, much more consequentially, India.

These countries may have found useful common ground, but their strategic problems are hardly interchangeable. Whether they can turn that political convergence into a coherent collective-defense system remains to be seen.

Bangladesh, meanwhile, has an entirely different neighborhood. Its immediate security concerns involve India, Myanmar, the Bay of Bengal, maritime security, the Rohingya refugee crisis and the protection of its trade and energy routes.

None of those problems suddenly becomes easier because Dhaka acquires a mutual-defense commitment with Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad. Also, Bangladesh does not need a promise to fight somebody else’s war to maintain friendly relations with any of the three.

Other prospective members are treating the invitation with caution rather than solidarity. Pakistan has said the agreement is open to other regional countries, while Turkey has discussed expansion.

Egypt is examining the legal and constitutional implications of joining. Other major Gulf states have yet to sign on. Their restraint is not necessarily rejection, but it shows that countries far closer to the region’s actual security flashpoints are weighing membership as a strategic choice, not a family obligation.

For Bangladesh, the biggest complication is not thousands of kilometers away in the Gulf. Rather, it is across its western border. Pakistan is one of the three pillars of the pact, and Pakistan’s defining strategic rivalry is with India.

Bangladesh does not need to take India’s feelings as a commandment. But pretending that New Delhi’s interpretation of such a move is irrelevant would be dangerously naive.

Bangladesh-India relations are already strained over Dhaka’s extradition request for toppled ex-leader Sheikh Hasina, allegations of forced push-ins along the border and the unresolved renewal of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty.

Putting a formal defense pact with Pakistan into that already perilous mix would change the political meaning India attaches to Bangladesh’s subsequent choices, whether Dhaka likes it or not.

This is not an argument for making Indian displeasure the compass of Bangladeshi foreign policy. Bangladesh’s water, trade and border-security interests are deeply entangled with India in a way they simply are not with Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan.

Riyadh can provide investment and employment opportunities. Ankara can provide defense technology and political support. Islamabad can offer historical and diplomatic links that Dhaka may want to strengthen.

None of that changes the fact that India is Bangladesh’s neighbor, its largest immediate security counterpart and the country with which many of Bangladesh’s most consequential bilateral disputes must eventually be managed.

History also suggests caution. In 1955, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, a Western-backed collective-security arrangement meant to contain Soviet influence. Iraq’s withdrawal after the 1958 revolution ended the original pact; its successor, CENTO, lasted until 1979, but never developed anything resembling NATO’s integrated military structure.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh has spent decades trying, with varying degrees of success, not to become an appendage of somebody else’s strategic rivalry. Joining the Mecca pact would make that harder.

It would place Bangladesh closer to a security arrangement built around three countries whose relations with India, Iran and the wider Middle East carry consequences that have little to do with Bangladesh’s own security needs.

Iran’s relevance to Bangladesh is economic, not strategic. Bilateral trade stood at roughly $15.89 million in FY2023-24 against nearly $2 billion with Saudi Arabia. Tehran is not Riyadh’s equal in Dhaka’s calculus. That is exactly why Bangladesh has no interest in inheriting someone else’s security antagonisms.

It can maintain working relations with countries on opposite sides of regional rivalries without formally attaching itself to one side. If the Mecca pact comes to be read as a hedge against Iran, Dhaka gains little by joining the contest.

None of this, however, requires Bangladesh to turn its back on the pact’s founders. It can expand defense training, military exchanges, trade, investment, labor agreements and defense-industrial cooperation with all three.

It can welcome Saudi support, buy Turkish defense equipment, work with Pakistan on various grounds and maintain warm political ties without signing a collective-defense clause that could one day oblige Bangladesh to take sides in a conflict that has nothing to do with its own territory or people.

The question Dhaka should therefore answer is embarrassingly simple: what specific security threat does joining the Mecca pact address for Bangladesh that its existing bilateral relationships cannot already address?

If the answer is a credible threat in the Bay of Bengal, along the Myanmar border or somewhere else directly affecting Bangladesh, the government should name it. If the answer is that Bangladesh belongs to the “Muslim family”, that is not a security assessment but an identity argument dressed up as foreign policy.

Jannatul Naym Pieal is a Dhaka-based journalist, writer and researcher with over a decade of experience in professional journalism. He is also the author of 10 published books and a researcher focusing on Bangladesh’s media industry and its intersections with broader social and academic fields.

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