JULY 19, 2026 – I have had many requests to discuss the removal of Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. However, I wanted to hold off until this update to see how issues were developing. This is still a fast-moving and chaotic story, and the fallout will only be known in a few days/weeks.

For instance, it seems that the command of General Oleksandr Syrskyi is now hanging by a thread – and one of the reasons Fedorov was removed by President Zelensky was supposedly to protect Syrskyi. There is even talk that Fedorov could be reinstated in some position.

This tweet by Fedorov last night was a really positive sign.

Also, Zelensky hinted last night that – after all the mass protests, which stretched from Ukrainian civil society to parts of the armed forces – that change was coming.

So are we witnessing the worst week for Ukraine in years turning into one of the best? 

Well, let’s start with why it was the worst? Well as this is being written, Fedorov is still out. As Defense Minister Fedorov was a key part in the efforts to modernize, re-equip and ultimately reimagine the structure and conduct of the Ukrainian armed forces. Like many who have contacts in Ukraine, I had heard for a while that he and Syrskyi were quarreling, that forces which preferred the old, corrupt ways of doing business were angry at him, and even that Zelensky was growing jealous of Fedorov’s increasing popularity. However, I never thought he would be fired – his successes seemed so manifest that I thought in the end it could not happen. The first time I came across such a report, I tried to wish it away.

However, my wishing, not surprisingly, was irrelevant and, a few days later, he was out. To understand why this is such a terrible move, it is important to understand what made Fedorov so important, why the reasons for his removal are terrible signs for the Zelensky government, and where we might go from here. So, this update will mostly be about this move.

There will be two other stories as well. The first is about the status of the US license (still not actually granted) to allow Ukraine to build Patriots or at least Patriot interceptors. Finally, we have had, once again, contrasting attacks on Moscow and Kyiv (and another example of why waiting for at least a year for Patriots is such a help to Putin). We can expect more of what we have seen the last few days.

However, before that, the main story. 

The worst week for Ukraine in years: Can it become the best?

I was in Kyiv when, in January of this year, stories about Fedorov’s possible appointment as defense minister started circulating. When the move was announced it ended up as the centrepiece of a weekend update. What I heard from Ukrainians about Fedorov was remarkable. Below is the key part of that update about him. Rarely had I had such a unanimously positive view expressed about any Ukrainian political figure. His ideas also seemed to be the right ones.

The Ukrainians I spoke to were all very enthusiastic about the appointment. One of the first people I heard from simply wrote back “Best Possible Choice.” The overwhelming sentiments were that Fedorov was “results oriented,” made decisions quickly and effectively, was able to get his way against bureaucratic inertia – systematic and thinks technologically and “out of the box.” I could go on and on, but you get the idea….

Fedorov also was explicit about what Ukraine needs to prioritize in its military needs. He put stress on air defense, the vital importance of drone production, and did not shy away from the vital question of the treatment of personnel.

Fedorov was clear that the personnel issues facing Ukraine were not ones that would be met by drafting more young people – it was about making the present system work. He claimed that 200,000 soldiers have gone AWOL while up to two million have dodged the present systems of conscription. It was clear from his remarks that one of the key ways he sees correcting this problem is by making military service more professional across the board.

Ukraine has a problem with very uneven brigade performance and command. Some units have extremely high morale and behave with extreme efficiency. Others are disorganized, poorly led and suffer from much lower morale.

Since his appointment I would go further. Fedorov revealed himself to be the most effective defense minister on the planet. He seemed to choose all the right priorities for Ukraine and improved performance in them all. Here are some quotes of his from the time he was appointed so you can see just how he had a clear (and I believe absolutely right) vision of how Ukraine needed to press ahead. Here are just some of the areas:

1. Drone production: Fedorov not only wanted to increase production, he wanted to protect and enhance supply lines to decrease Ukrainian vulnerabilities.
2. Professionalization of the military: Fedorov understood that the last thing Ukraine needed was lots of unmotivated conscripts. He wanted to make military service much more professional and appealing to draw in the right kind of motivated recruits who could fight in this environment.
3. Moving against systemic corruption: There are two kinds of arms manufacturer in Ukraine. There is a dynamic, start-up culture with companies that are adaptive and efficient, and there are some older, legacy producers that work on more corrupt practices. Fedorov wanted to support the former.
4. Mathematics of war: He just understood this as you can see from this quote. “Thanks to ePoints, we fully understand what is happening with drones. Soon, we will launch a revolutionary project, Mission Control: each crew will enter into the system the UAV type, destination, launch location, and more. This allows us to better understand the situation along the line of battle and the effectiveness of drone use.With Mission Control, we will close the entire drone cycle: procurement, delivery, and then battlefield employment. Through ePoints, we currently see only mission execution reports, while it is important for us to have the full picture, including results and accumulated experience. We worked on Mission Control functionality for two years. The next step is to launch Mission Control for artillery.It is very important that we have begun to calculate everything systematically. Soon, we will have complete information on drone crews: commanders, their monthly ratings, and statistics for the entire corps. We need to see the full picture to simplify and speed up management decision-making.”

Now, Fedorov did not start from a blank sheet. Ukrainian strategy had been moving in this direction before he became defense minister. There had been an understanding of the importance of increasing drone production, of decreasing Ukrainian casualties and raising Russian ones under accelerated attrition, of the importance of the long-range/mid-range strike campaign, etc.

However he understood all of it, and provided energy and direction that had been lacking. And, unlike earlier defense ministers, he was willing to go after corruption – hard. He also brought in the most ambitious attempt to improve the pay and conditions for Ukrainian soldiers that has ever been attempted. 

All of this brought him into conflict with older, Soviet-influenced elements in the armed forces, most prominently Syrskyi. The two looked at the war completely differently. Syrskyi wanted more soldiers for tactical operations to fight over every village, and Fedorov looked to the big picture.

And the relationship between Zelensky and Fedorov also became strained. I have never been one of those to overly praise Zelensky because as a war leader he has strengths and real weaknesses. The corruption scandal of last summer showed many of the weaknesses, which you can read about in this piece.

Basically Zelensky liked backing corrupt and inefficient cronies like Yermak and Syrskyi, and at one point threatened a political crisis in doing so. Here is a quote from that piece. The “he” in the first sentence is Zelensky.

The key reason is that he has seemingly prioritized loyalty over competence, and given a great deal of power to people who are of debatable abilities. The two most obvious, and they are not alone, are Andrii Yermak, the head of Zelensky’s office and Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander in chief of the armed forces. 

Yermak is the most controversial – arguably the most powerful person in Ukraine after Zelensky. Its very difficult to have a conversation in the country without someone complaining of his personalization of power and the damage he has (allegedly) done to the war effort. Yermak has seen other major figures go (Danilov, Zaluzhny, Resnikov, etc.) while his power has grown. From what I hear there is now an unhealthy culture of trying to suck up to Yermak about many in the diplomatic community in Kyiv, as he is seen as the real power behind the throne.

Clearly, also, Yermak is serving at Zelensky’s behest and Zelensky is in no rush to replace him. If anything, Zelensky seems to like having Yermak around as everyone can blame Yermak for things that go wrong (exonerating Zelensky unconsciously).

Syrskyi is also in post, it seems, because of his loyalty to Zelensky – more, many would argue, than for his competence in post.

In firing Fedorov and protecting Syrskyi last week, Zelensky was once again showing his worst side as a war leader. He was protecting loyal incompetence over what was better for the country. There can be no sugar-coating of the pill on this.

Fedorov, thankfully, chose not to go quietly. When his dismissal was made clear, he gave a press conference in which he outlined his vision point by point and described what he was trying to achieve. Here is an English-language translation of the press conference, which really is too long and detailed to quote but provides a great glimpse into why he was so important. 

Here is just one example from it – when Fedorov admits he wanted Syrskyi and Syrskyi’s key deputy, out. The boldfacing is mine for emphasis.

What solutions were proposed at the time? Radical personnel decisions, including replacing both the commander-in-chief and the chief of the General Staff. I promised today that we needed to speak as adults. In reality, we have no other choice if we want to defeat the enemy asymmetrically and with minimal losses, in a system where strong commanders and leaders are allowed to develop rather than being suppressed, written off, sent away, reprimanded and held back. A modern organization built around technology requires leadership in management. It involves numerous sensors, working with IT specialists and intelligent people, and attracting talent despite limited resources and the absence of high salaries. It requires an entirely different model of management. 

The reaction of Ukrainian civil society and elements of the armed services, to Fedorov’s removal showed that his vision had a wide base of support in Ukraine and that this move was not going to be quietly accepted. Ukrainians understood that Fedorov was a key part of the changes that were giving them the initiative in the war. They understood the importance of his outlook and why his fights to improve soldiers’ lives and to cut back corruption were so important. Protests started—and actually grew in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Lviv and many other Ukrainian cities (large and small).

The dissension in the armed forces seems to have been extremely worrying for Zelensky. Many of the best and most effective units had members willing to speak up against Syrskyi and for Fedorov – and at the same time, Syrskyi was pressuring them to support him. 

This really is a crucial moment. The firing of Fedorov, if it is allowed to stand along with the keeping of Syrskyi, will not mean that Ukraine will lose the war. However it will mean higher casualties, more corruption, less flexibility and more Soviet-style thinking. I can think of nothing worse.

So right now as I am writing we are still facing the worst week of the war as we have Fedorov out and Syrskyi in.

However the mood music seems to be heading to Fedorov back in some position and Syrskyi under threat. If things evolve into Fedorov back and Syrskyi out, it will be the best week for Ukraine in years.

An update on Ukraine and Patriot interceptors

I originally thought last weekend that this would be the story of the week. All the talk of Trump’s pivot to Ukraine by giving them a license to build Patriots did seem to die down in the focus on Fedorov’s firing this week. However, this story, as the attacks last night on Kyiv reconfirmed, remains vital. And, as always when it comes to Trump, the reality is far less than that which people understand.

Here is what I have been able to understand from talking to people who know. No one is going on the record, but there has been a great consistency in what I am hearing. So I cannot attribute any of this, but I can guarantee that it was what I am hearing and I believe the people I speak to.

1. There are indeed discussions now about Ukraine getting a license for some kind of Patriot production (maybe just interceptors). The companies seem willing to do this and therefore moves are being made. It might be announced soon or actually it could take longer (Trump might change his mind).
2. There was NO preparation for this. The companies had not been consulted on this by the administration and had made no preparations to help Ukraine in attempts to source their own production. This is crucial as it means Ukraine building actual copies of advanced Patriot interceptors is probably years away (if they get built at all).
3. What Ukraine might be able to hope for in a year or two is their own, less capable version of a Patriot interceptor that can fire from the Patriot system. When Zelensky is talking about getting help, this is what he is referring to. Take note of his careful language here from just a few days ago:“We have a political agreement [with US President Donald Trump], and we expect that by the end of 2026 we will have the technical ability for a Ukrainian team to produce American missiles using our own capabilities.” Note that having the technical capability to manufacture something is different from having a productive system up and running.
4. So that means at least one more winter and probably two with little in the way of much support from this initiative. Even then, to get actual Patriot-class interceptors will take longer. We can hope that the Ukrainian version of the interceptor is effective, but cannot tell now.

There is a great deal here to unpack. The fact that there was no preparation for this means that Ukraine was not included in any supply chains until now. It will need to source the advanced components in a highly competitive market with no head start. And in the meantime, the US is further running down its stocks of Patriots in its never-ending war with Iran, which means Ukraine will probably get no more Patriots from the USA. 

The upshot is that Ukraine might have a less complex (and hopefully not less effective) version of what they had in the winters of 2024-2025 and 2025-2026, but will not have them until the winter of 2027-2028 or maybe 2028-2029. That means, because of Donald Trump, Ukraine is facing a terrible winter this year, as Russia can blast it with ballistic missiles and the Ukrainians will lack the right interceptors.

What seemed to happen was this. Trump was tired of getting flack for not helping Ukraine, was hearing that Ukraine was doing much better than he expected and did not want to be left behind, so took a step to make it seem like he was helping Ukraine but that would not hurt Putin for a long time and would actually help Putin in the near term. Remember that, when some Trump backer tells you that Trump now supports Ukraine. He has actually made sure Ukraine will be easier for Putin to attack this year and the next.

Moscow and Kyiv

The two capital cities had major attacks launched against them in the last two days. Last night, the Russians launched a major attack on Kyiv using exactly the systems that they know Ukraine cannot intercept because of the Patriot shortage. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the Russians sent 25 ballistic missiles, 10 Zirkon hypersonic missiles, and six other missiles (and a number of drones) against Kyiv.

This might have been the largest ballistic missile attack on Kyiv so far. Early reports on casualties are thankfully light (one dead and a number wounded), however that could be down to luck as much as anything else. What is clear is that the bombardment of Ukrainian cities by Russian ballistic missiles is now a preferred strategy and something that we should expect to see more of.

The day before, the Ukrainians launched a long-range drone attack on targets around Moscow (and other places). The Moscow targets showed a Ukrainian favorite (an oil facility) but also something new—a Wildberries warehouse. The latter went up in a black cloud of smoke. 

Wildberries is the Russian equivalent of Amazon, an all-purpose supply company from which people can order a wide range of goods. Note that the Moscow warehouse was not the only Wildberries one attacked; a large facility near Taganrog was also hit.

The Wildberries attack is notable because it is the kind of target that the Ukrainians could have hit before but chose not to. Certainly from the fires it seems that these facilities were pretty easily attacked, were hit directly and probably not well defended.

As targets of war, these warehouses go into the more debatable category. Did they contain some components that could help war production? Undoubtedly. Do they contain elements that support civilian life? Undoubtedly as well. The interesting thing shown by these attacks is that Ukraine is more and more edging over to a broader interpretation of what is a legitimate target of war. 

It might also be a signal to Russia, particularly as Ukraine knows that in the winter of 2026-2027 there will be little it can do to stop Russian ballistic missiles. The message is: “We can strike what you do not want us to strike. Just so far we have held back. We might no longer.”

I think what we can say is that we will see more of what we have seen in the last two days – from both sides. 

Phillips P. O’Brien is professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrew. This article is republished with permission from Phillips’s Newsletter, a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support Phillips’s work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.