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US continues to shun Ebola-infected citizens; second American sent to Germany

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US continues to shun Ebola-infected citizens; second American sent to Germany

A US citizen doing humanitarian work in the Democratic Republic of Congo has tested positive for Ebola, marking the second American infected amid the DRC’s explosive Ebola outbreak—and the second to be sent for care in Germany rather than the US.

The Ebola outbreak, which was first declared on May 15, is already the third largest on record and still growing. As of July 12, the DRC has reported 1,926 cases and 702 deaths in the outbreak, which is caused by the lesser-known Bundibugyo strain of Ebolavirus.

Under the Trump administration, the US has adopted a seemingly isolationist approach, implementing stringent and controversial travel restrictions and blocking the repatriation of citizens exposed to or infected with the virus. That’s despite the US having multiple facilities around the country designed to safely monitor and provide high-quality care for Ebola patients in these types of situations.

The US is also largely removed from outbreak responses. Upon taking office, Trump moved to withdraw from the World Health Organization, which is helping coordinate the international efforts to halt the spread of the virus—though it is still outpacing health workers.

On Monday, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said that WHO had provided clinical care for the infected American before the patient was transferred to Germany for follow-up care.

Americans infected

While saying such infections among aid workers are not unexpected, Tedros called for more help to curb the virus. “As the outbreak escalates, an accelerated response from local, national, and international partners is urgently needed,” he said on social media Monday. “WHO is working intensively under the government’s leadership and with Africa CDC to bring the outbreak under control as rapidly as possible.”

The American infected was working with the evangelical Christian organization Samaritan’s Purse. The organization told the media that the infected employee is a man in his 60s who was working as a warehouse manager. He was not involved in direct patient care at the organization’s Ebola treatment centers, raising questions about how he became infected.

On Monday, the organization said the man had arrived at Frankfurt University Hospital for treatment. He has “responded well to treatment, is in stable condition, and is receiving excellent medical care in the hospital’s special isolation unit,” it said in a statement to The Washington Post.

The first American infected in the outbreak, Dr. Peter Stafford, was working for a different Christian organization and had been directly treating patients when he was exposed. He was evacuated to Berlin for care after becoming ill. His evacuation was reportedly delayed as officials with the Trump administration prevented him from being repatriated to the US. Stafford recovered from his illness in Berlin and has since returned to the US with his family. One of Stafford’s colleagues at the organization was also exposed and was sent to Prague for monitoring.

Ukraine turning the tide on Russia in Sea of Azov

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Ukraine turning the tide on Russia in Sea of Azov

Certain military campaigns get hugely overblown in their importance (usually famous battles led by famous generals) and others slip by, not getting the coverage they deserve often until long after the war is over.

I wonder if what we are seeing in the Sea of Azov is that. This is an attempt to shut down Russian shipping in this heretofore relatively safe body of water, which has a number of strategic advantages for Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine is talking about it a great deal, which in itself is worthy of note.

If the Sea of Azov campaign deserves more attention, the Russian bombardment of Ukraine by ballistic missiles is already getting that. This week, the US made it clear that for a while the Ukrainians can count on no US support.

Having made this campaign far more deadly over the past year by starving Ukraine of Patriot interceptors, the US put off any significant aid in this area for a while – though people reported this as a success when nothing could be further from the truth.

Lastly in terms of new stories, Ukraine hit Russia’s largest oil refinery this week – which was important not just because of the size, but because of the location. The Ukrainians seem to be steadily increasing the range of their long-range campaign, a further headache for Russian forces.

What is happening in the Sea of Azov?

The Sea of Azov was supposed to be a Russian lake. The Russians have controlled every inch of the coastline along it since the full-scale invasion in 2022, and access to it is through only one narrow channel called the Strait of Kerch (thus the Kerch Bridge), which runs between Crimea and Russia.

Sea of Azov

Now it is anything but a Russian lake. Over the last few weeks, in a sign that their campaign to try and isolate Crimea is continuing to ramp up, the Ukrainians have greatly accelerated a campaign to sink or damage Russian-controlled shipping in that body of water.

The strategic importance of the Sea of Azov is not hard to discern by simply looking at a map. With road and rail communications to Crimea down significantly, and the Russians wary about using the Kerch Bridge too much for items such as fuel, trying to get supplies to Crimea by ship becomes the only reasonable alternative. The Ukrainians themselves are stating that at least one part of this campaign is part of the Crimea “switch off” operation to isolate the peninsula.

However, that is not all. Azov is often the first place that stolen grain from Ukraine and Russian grain itself is shipped out into the world market. It is estimated that up to a quarter of all the grain shipments that are controlled by Russia head through the Sea of Azov.

Finally, there are some oil shipments that head through Azov to the world as well. As global sanctions against Russia in this area seem to be doing little to reduce the shipment of Russian oil, Ukraine is using its “kinetic sanctions” to do the job instead. 

For a small body of water, the Sea of Azov is of very high strategic importance for Russia, and keeping it protected should be a very high priority for the Russian military.

However, clearly they are struggling in this area. Over the last week, at first with very little fanfare, the Ukrainians started to methodically gear up a campaign against Russian shipping. Using both air and sea drones, stories started emerging of a series of Ukrainian strikes against Russian-controlled vessels in Azov. Here is a video with footage of some of the attacks.

Youtube video

The UAV (air) attacks seen in that video show that the Ukrainian tactic seems to be to go for the bridge of the vessels – I’m guessing because they do not always want to destroy the vessel outright, but they do want to cripple it so it cannot be controlled. Though this is a guess for now. Sea drones, obviously, would be a different matter.

The ramping up of the attacks is pretty obvious when you look at it in chart form. I put together this chart of the attacks claimed through July 11, when the Ukrainians said that they attacked 28 vessels

And this was how the types of vessels attacked were described by Ukrainian official sources:

According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, the targets included 21 oil tankers, four tugboats, two cargo vessels, and one specialized dredging vessel. Ukrainian officials said the extent of the damage is still being assessed.

So while oil tankers dominate the list, the Ukrainians are clearly trying to shut down a range of vessels in a clear statement to the Russians that the Sea of Azov is not to be considered a safe place for any shipping.

That message seems to be getting through, as it is now claimed that the Russians on July 10 forbade any new traffic to move through the Kerch Strait between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.

There is no indication when the Russians plan to relax that restriction—and if the attacks stay at the present level (or the capability remains and the Russians do not develop the ability to protect shipping) then it can be assumed that the body of water will remain functionally closed. 

So, using air and sea drones, the Ukrainians have turned the Sea of Azov into a Ukrainian lake. Think about that for a minute.

As of now, the Russians do not seem to have a working counter to this campaign – so the question, as posed in the previous weekend’s update, is whether they can do something to change the dynamic of this operation.

If not, this one campaign will further strangle Russian supplies from getting to Crimea and do real damage to Russian grain and fuel shipments just when the Russian economy is crying out for more funds.

In other words, it is a strategically impactful campaign being waged effectively at the right time. It deserves far more coverage than it is getting.

Trump gifts Putin time

You would be forgiven for believing that Donald Trump had some Damascene conversion last week and switched sides from backing Russia to backing Ukraine. There was enough reporting on this that it almost seemed believable.

The key reason, as I mentioned in a piece yesterday, was Trump’s verbal statement (not followed up yet, it must be said) to provide Ukraine with some kind of license to make some part of a Patriot anti-air system. This announcement was far less clear the more you look into it.

The more you try to find details on this, the murkier it becomes. 

What has happened, of course, is that Trump is trying to verbally associate himself with the Ukrainian cause as it becomes clearer to even him that the Ukrainians are doing much, much better in the war than he had ever imagined possible. Here was how one Wall Street Journal story summarized what Trump is hearing:

Of course, what Trump has actually done is make no promises about anything concrete and if you read his words, he seems to be implying that Ukraine might eventually get this license instead of getting any new supplies made in the US. Here was how he said it:

“We’re going to give a license to you to make Patriots. That’s pretty cool. This way, you can’t complain that we’re not giving ‘em enough.… We’ll give them the right to make Patriots. We’ll show them how to do it.”

In other words, “stop complaining that we are not shipping you more Patriot interceptors as the Russians bombard your cities and economy with ballistic missiles. We will give you the ability to make your own.”

The only problem with this is that it will most likely take years until Ukraine can actually make Patriot interceptors, if they eventually do get the license. The most optimistic forecast I received from a Ukrainian source is that they believe that they could do it in a year, but most believe that is very optimistic. 

The only problem with waiting for years is that bombarding Ukraine with ballistic missiles is a key and growing Russian priority now. The Russians have put far more effort into building these systems just as the US has been slow-walking new Patriots to Ukraine. The scale of the ballistic missile assault facing Ukraine is sobering. 

Here is a quick summary of what we are seeing:

  • Scale of the escalation. Russia’s monthly ballistic missile launches have roughly tripled year-over-year — 28 missiles in a comparable month a year ago versus around 70+ now. January 2026 already set a record of 91 ballistic missiles in a single month, and Russia has sustained a high tempo since. These attacks are certainly set to increase significantly next winter when they can do the most damage.
  • Interception rates are falling behind. The problem of the deprivation of Patriots in a nutshell. Ukraine intercepted about 89% of all aerial threats in June overall (drones, cruise missiles), but only 40% of ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles interceptions seem to require Patriot interceptors—and the Ukrainians had to admit on July 6 that they had none or almost none, left.
  • Notable Recent Russian Ballistic Missile Attacks: June 2: 33 Iskander-M ballistic missiles fired alongside cruise missiles and 650+ drones; only 11 of 41 ballistic missiles (27%) were shot down. June 15: 34 Iskander-M ballistic missiles in a combined strike; roughly half intercepted. Killed 5, injured 35 in Kyiv. July 6: 29 ballistic missiles fired at Kyiv, and Ukraine’s air force said all 29 struck their targets — part of a barrage that killed at least 19-27 people. July 8: The third ballistic missile strike on Kyiv in six days, killing 4. Recent weekend strikes used Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from the Bryansk area alongside cruise missiles and drones.
  • Cumulative toll: at least 60 deaths in Kyiv and its region since the start of July alone.

The fact that Russia seems to be upping its strike rate with three attacks on Kyiv in six days, just as it is clear that Ukraine is running out of Patriots interceptors, shows how the Russians are aware of the help Trump has and will continue to provide for them.

For at least a year, if not longer, they can do a great deal of damage with their ballistic missiles knowing that the Ukrainians have few options to shoot them down. That is a massive strategic gift that the USA has given to Russia.

Trump has provided Putin at least one more whole winter, and possibly two or three (the Japanese after many years of licensing are only making 30 Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, the ones Ukraine needs, annually), to attack what he wants.

And still people talk about Trump actually wanting to help Ukraine. He does not. He just wants to be seen to be supportive of Ukraine because Ukraine is doing better and his beloved Putin is struggling.

But he remains what he has always been, and he has even be able to provide Putin with a massive gift of time while the world applauded thinking he was helping Ukraine.

We really are lost.

Ukraine strikes deep

The largest Russian oil refinery is a long way from Ukraine — and its distance has provided it with some protection (until this week). This refinery is located in Omsk, over 2,500 kilometers from Ukraine. Here is a useful map put together by the Institute for the Study of War, which shows just how far away it is.

Map Thumbnail

On Monday, July 6, distance no longer protected Omsk. The Ukrainians were able to launch a long-range drone attack on the facility and hit some very important parts of the refinery. Here was how Reuters reported it:

July 7 (Reuters) – Omsk oil refinery, Russia’s largest, ⁠has ⁠halted operations following a Ukrainian ⁠drone attack, two industry sources said on Tuesday.

Monday’s strike on ​the refinery, deep in Siberia, was one of Ukraine’s longest-range attacks of the conflict, now ‌well into its fifth year.

The ‌halt in operations at the plant, which is Russia’s top producer of ⁠petrol, is ⁠likely to exacerbate fuel shortages across the country.

The visual evidence of the attack showed some pretty extensive fires.

Russia’s largest oil refinery in flames as Ukraine strikes Omsk, 2,500 km away from border

Why the refinery was put out of action is that it seems that even over this great distance, the Ukrainians were able to hit, according to their military, the crucial distillation units that break crude oil down into its different distillates.

According to the Ukrainians, their drones hit the ELOU-AVT-11 primary crude oil processing unit at Omsk, which has a design capacity to break down up to 8.4 million tonnes of crude oil per year.

Readers of my Substack would have been well aware of the importance of attacking these distillation tanks almost a year ago, as there was this detailed piece on the subject. It is amazing to see how long it takes the media to understand what is important—they are only getting this now.

The dust needs to settle on this attack to see just how damaging it will be. Perhaps the Russians can get Omsk back to production (at least partially) quickly. You would think it would be a massive Russian priority considering their growing fuel crisis.

So this one attack will not end the war. It will, however, terrify Russian air defense forces. If the Ukrainians can reach out and hit Omsk (Ukrainian claims are that the drones used flew up to 3,000 kilometers to reach their target), there will not be a safe Russian asset within 2,000 miles of Ukraine.

That is a lot of Russia and a lot of strategic targets to defend.

Phillips P. O’Brien is professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrew. This article was originally published here, on his Substack, Phillips’s Newsletter. It is republished with kind permission.

The Middle East Power Play in the Horn of Africa

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The Middle East Power Play in the Horn of Africa


Military agreements, port investments, and competing positions on Somalia, Somaliland, and Sudan are drawing the African and Arabian shores of the Red Sea into a single geopolitical arena

he Horn of Africa is becoming an increasingly important extension of Middle Eastern strategy as governments on opposite shores of the Red Sea deepen their involvement through military agreements, port investments, energy projects, diplomatic recognition, and political alliances.

Egypt’s new maritime cooperation memorandum with Somalia is one part of that transformation. Turkey has built an extensive military, economic, and institutional presence in Somalia while retaining strong ties with Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia is expanding its defense and maritime relationship with Mogadishu, while the United Arab Emirates has invested heavily in ports and logistics, most visibly at Berbera in Somaliland.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has added a diplomatic dimension with potential security implications because of Somaliland’s position on the Gulf of Aden. Sudan, meanwhile, offers the clearest warning of how external competition can deepen instability when it becomes entangled with a domestic war.

The emerging regional order cannot be divided neatly into two blocs. The same governments may cooperate to protect maritime navigation, compete for ports and influence, and take opposing positions on Somalia’s territorial integrity or Sudan’s civil war. African governments are also pursuing their own interests, using external partnerships to secure investment, infrastructure, military assistance, and diplomatic support.

The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics

“The Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in contemporary international politics,” Dr. Aly Tarek Metwally, a political affairs and regional security analyst, told The Media Line. “Positioned at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, the region has become a focal point where maritime security, international trade, geopolitical competition and regional diplomacy increasingly converge.”

Dr. Aly Tarek Metwally, Political Affairs and Regional Security Analyst. (Courtesy)

Shiri Fein-Grossman, CEO of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute and former head of regional affairs at Israel’s National Security Council, said the region now attracts powers pursuing a broad mix of security, economic and diplomatic interests.

“The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics,” Fein-Grossman told The Media Line. “Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Iran and Israel all have growing interests in the region, alongside China, the United States, the European Union and others.”

The Horn of Africa has become one of the principal intersections between African, Middle Eastern and global geopolitics

Those interests range from maritime security and trade to energy, infrastructure, food security, and diplomacy.

A Connected Red Sea Arena

Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean must pass through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and continue toward the Suez Canal. The route is vital to global commerce but has become increasingly vulnerable to war, piracy, and attacks originating from Yemen.

Middle Eastern involvement in the Horn is not new. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey have maintained relationships there for years. What has changed is the scale of their activity and the degree to which events in the Middle East now shape alignments on the African side of the Red Sea.

“Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East,” Metwally said. “They form part of an interconnected regional security landscape in which stability, economic prosperity and international navigation are mutually dependent.”

Developments in the Horn of Africa can no longer be viewed in isolation from the wider strategic environment of the Red Sea and the Middle East

That interconnected map includes stronger Egyptian-Somali relations, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access, Turkey’s presence in both Somalia and Ethiopia, Israel’s growing interest in the Red Sea and expanded Gulf involvement.

Metwally said that competition need not be the region’s only organizing principle. The same developments could support a cooperative security framework based on international law, mutual respect and shared responsibility.

Israel and Somaliland

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a significant recent change to the region’s diplomatic landscape.

On Dec. 26, 2025, Israel became the first, and currently only United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Somalia rejected the decision as an attack on its sovereignty, while Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti and the African Union reaffirmed their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Somaliland has governed itself since 1991 and maintains its own institutions, security forces, and political system. Somalia continues to regard the territory as an integral part of the country.

For Israel, geography is central to the emerging relationship. Somaliland’s coastline faces the Gulf of Aden opposite Yemen and lies near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, placing the relationship squarely within Israel’s concerns over Red Sea shipping and the threat posed by the Houthis.

“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations,” Fein-Grossman said. She pointed to Somaliland’s relative stability, functioning institutions, and interest in long-term international partnerships.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland should be understood as the convergence of diplomatic, security and economic considerations

“At the same time, its location on the Gulf of Aden, opposite Yemen and adjacent to the Bab-el-Mandeb, gives it exceptional strategic importance,” she said.

Somaliland’s defense minister said in June that Israel was helping train some police and military personnel, while denying that the sides were negotiating an Israeli base. Somaliland has also promoted potential cooperation in agriculture, water, renewable energy, healthcare, and technology.

Fein-Grossman said the Houthi threat had become more prominent in Israeli strategic calculations after attacks on commercial shipping and direct threats from Yemen, but cautioned against viewing recognition only through a military lens.

She also described an affinity between two societies that have struggled for security, international legitimacy, and national development under difficult conditions.

Egypt views the issue from a different starting point: the defense of Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

“Central to Egypt’s regional policy is its unwavering commitment to the principles of territorial integrity and respect for the sovereignty of states,” Metwally said, describing those principles as pillars of both the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

The dispute reflects the central divide over Somaliland. Israel views its stability and institutions as grounds for recognition and cooperation. Somalia, Egypt, and most African Union members see unilateral recognition as a threat to Somali sovereignty and the wider principle of territorial integrity.

Fein-Grossman said Israel should manage those disagreements through sustained dialogue with Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi rather than expect regional actors to adopt a common view.

Berbera and the UAE’s Port Network

Israel’s relationship with Somaliland is developing alongside a much older Emirati presence centered on Berbera.

Dubai-based DP World, an Emirati multinational logistics company, has committed up to $442 million in a phased plan to develop Berbera Port, an associated economic zone and a transport corridor intended to connect the Somaliland coast with Ethiopia and the wider Horn.

The investment gives the UAE a long-term commercial position near one of the world’s most important shipping routes. It also strengthens Somaliland’s economic relevance despite its limited diplomatic recognition.

For landlocked Ethiopia, Berbera offers a potential alternative to its heavy dependence on Djibouti. For the UAE, the port is part of a logistics network linking the Gulf, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. For Somaliland, it provides revenue, jobs, and a platform for attracting additional investment.

“Berbera has the potential to become one of the Horn of Africa’s most important logistics and commercial gateways, serving not only Somaliland but also landlocked Ethiopia and the wider region,” Fein-Grossman said.

Emirati investment and Israeli recognition do not necessarily represent a coordinated policy. The UAE has not formally recognized Somaliland. Still, its investments have strengthened the territory’s commercial position and increased Berbera’s relevance to Israeli calculations involving Red Sea security and maritime trade.

The arrangement also shows that outside governments do not always work exclusively through internationally recognized central authorities. The UAE has cultivated direct ties with Somaliland and other regional administrations, while Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have placed greater emphasis on Somalia’s federal government.

Egypt and Somalia Deepen Cooperation

Somalia’s cabinet approved a maritime memorandum with Egypt on July 9 covering transport, ports and the development of Somali maritime infrastructure.

The agreement follows a broader expansion of bilateral relations, including defense cooperation and Egypt’s proposed participation in African Union peace-support efforts in Somalia.

Cairo regards the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb as a strategic continuation of the Suez Canal. Its policy is also shaped by its long-running dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its opposition to actions that could weaken Somalia’s territorial integrity.

“For Egypt, engagement in the Horn of Africa is not driven by aspirations for regional influence but by an enduring commitment to safeguarding regional stability,” Metwally said, adding that Cairo has consistently viewed the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea as a natural extension of its strategic environment.

He described secure navigation through the Suez Canal and stability at Bab-el-Mandeb as components of both Egyptian national security and the global economy.

The memorandum, he said, goes beyond technical port cooperation. It forms part of a strategic partnership intended to strengthen Somali institutions, maritime security and economic development.

Egypt’s security role is also tied to the African Union’s operations and to cooperation with Somalia’s federal government. Metwally characterized that involvement as part of Egypt’s long-standing participation in collective African peacekeeping rather than a unilateral military deployment.

The relationship is nevertheless viewed partly through the prism of Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland, which triggered a sharp dispute with Mogadishu. Turkey later mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia through the Ankara Declaration. Both governments reaffirmed respect for sovereignty and agreed to pursue arrangements that could provide Ethiopia with access to the sea under Somali sovereign authority.

Metwally said Egypt’s closer relationship with Somalia should not be interpreted solely as an effort to counter Ethiopia. Cairo, he said, continues to advocate negotiations and international law as the proper framework for resolving regional disputes.

Turkey Works With Both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa

Turkey has built one of the most extensive Middle Eastern presences in the Horn.

Its relationship with Somalia began with humanitarian assistance and expanded into defense, infrastructure, education, healthcare, aviation, trade, and energy. Turkey operates a major military training facility in Mogadishu and signed a defense and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia in 2024 that includes maritime-security assistance.

At the same time, Ankara has preserved substantial political and economic ties with Ethiopia. Its ability to work with both governments enabled it to mediate after the Somaliland agreement caused a rupture between them.

“Turkey is one of the most significant external actors in the Horn of Africa, but its engagement should be understood within the context of a much broader, decades-long Africa strategy,” Fein-Grossman said.

Through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Maarif Foundation, Turkish Airlines, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, business associations, and an expanding diplomatic network, Ankara has built relationships extending beyond military or government-to-government contacts.

Its mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia also reflects an ambition not merely to participate in regional affairs, but to shape them.

Saudi Arabia Expands Its Somali Partnership

Saudi Arabia has accelerated its own engagement with Somalia.

The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement in Riyadh on Feb. 9, 2026, followed later that month by a separate agreement covering maritime transport and port development.

Saudi interests are driven by Somalia’s location opposite the Arabian Peninsula, the need to protect Red Sea shipping and concerns about instability spreading from Yemen and the wider Horn.

Riyadh has also supported Somalia’s territorial integrity, placing it closer to Egypt and Turkey than to Israel on the Somaliland dispute.

Fein-Grossman cautioned against portraying Saudi or Egyptian engagement as a response to Israel. Both countries, she said, have operated in the Red Sea and the Horn for decades because of geography, trade, food security and regional politics.

Metwally said Saudi and Emirati investments in logistics, food security and maritime infrastructure demonstrate the growing interdependence of Gulf and Red Sea security, even when the two states pursue different political relationships.

Sudan Shows the Dangers

Sudan represents the most destructive example of Middle Eastern interests becoming entangled with a domestic conflict.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are widely regarded as closer to the Sudanese Armed Forces. The UAE has repeatedly been accused by United Nations experts and American lawmakers of supporting the rival Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Abu Dhabi denies backing the RSF or either side in the war.

Those differences have become part of a wider Saudi-Emirati rivalry extending across Yemen, Somalia and the Red Sea, although both Gulf governments continue to participate in diplomatic efforts seeking an end to Sudan’s war.

The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region

“The experience of Sudan offers an important lesson for the wider region,” Metwally said. “Local conflicts can become considerably more complex when regional rivalries overlap with domestic political crises.”

Preventing external competition from reinforcing internal divisions, he said, is one of the central challenges facing African and Middle Eastern policymakers.

African Governments Are Not Passive

Describing the Horn solely as a contest among foreign powers risks reducing Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Sudan to passive arenas.

Somalia is diversifying its economic and security partnerships while defending its territorial claims. Ethiopia is seeking alternatives to its dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade. Somaliland is using Berbera, its political institutions, and its strategic location to seek recognition and investment.

“African governments are not passive participants in this process,” Fein-Grossman said. “They actively shape the strategic environment, diversify their partnerships and choose the relationships that best advance their national interests.”

She also warned that discussions of ports, bases, and strategic rivalry often overlook the people whose futures are most affected.

“The people of Somaliland, like people across Africa, seek peace, opportunity, education, healthcare, investment and the ability to build a better future for the next generation,” she said.

Metwally similarly argued that international partnerships can support development, security, and stronger institutions only when they preserve local ownership and sovereign decision-making.

Middle Eastern involvement can bring port infrastructure, investment, military training, energy development, and diplomatic mediation. It can also sharpen sovereignty disputes, deepen internal conflicts, and force African governments to navigate rival alignments.

Egypt’s agreement with Somalia, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Turkey’s position between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, Saudi Arabia’s expanding partnership with Somalia, and the UAE’s investment in Berbera are not isolated developments. They are part of a strategic realignment stretching from the Suez Canal and the Arabian Peninsula to Bab-el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean.

Whether that space develops through cooperative security or competing spheres of influence will depend not only on the ambitions of Middle Eastern governments but also on the ability of African states and societies to retain control over the decisions that shape their future.

Children’s social media curbs planned across EU, von der Leyen says

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Children’s social media curbs planned across EU, von der Leyen says


The European Union will move to limit young children’s access to social media across the 27-member bloc, European ​Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Monday, in what ‌would be the biggest such effort to date to guard against online dangers.

Von der Leyen presented a paper from two experts recommending a tiered approach, with under-13s only ​allowed to use social media for limited periods under the ​supervision of parents, caregivers and teachers. The curbs would be lifted ⁠gradually as teenagers got older.

“It is clear we need age-appropriate restrictions ​to platforms,” von der Leyen told reporters in Brussels.

“The question is no longer ​if children face risks online, but what can we do to give children a safer start online,” she said.

Von der Leyen indicated that she was likely to follow ​the experts’ suggestions and that the Commission would present a concrete proposal ​after the summer. She is expected to announce it at her state of the ‌union ⁠address in September.

Australia, Britain, China, India and the United States have already imposed a social media ban or are considering one, which would mainly target TikTok, Alphabet’s YouTube and Meta’s Instagram and Facebook.

Those companies did not immediately respond ​to emailed requests ​for comment. Social ⁠media platforms have said they have measures to protect younger users and many have already imposed age restrictions.

“We first ​need to consider the type of platforms that are ​harmful to ⁠our children. The evidence shows that this is mainly social media platforms, but also other providers with age-inappropriate and addictive features. So think of it ⁠as ​social media plus,” von der Leyen said.

“And when ​we have this clearly defined category, I believe we need to consider phased and gradual ​access for different age ranges,” she added.

The US government warns that Russia state hackers are coming after your router

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The US government warns that Russia state hackers are coming after your router

The federal government is warning users of home and small office routers to secure their devices as Russia state hackers continue to mass-compromise them for use in obscuring nefarious actions against sensitive organizations in the public and private sectors.

Both the Russian and Chinese governments have been compromising routers for years, sometimes in prolonged tugs-of-war to wrest control of devices the other has already commandeered. The US government has occasionally issued covert commands and taken other steps to disinfect routers. Google and other companies have also worked to disrupt the massive botnets that control compromised routers in lockstep. The actions to date are little more than whack-a-mole exercises as the operators simply replace their botnets with new ones.

Proxy networks: The go-to tool

“Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16 cyber actors continue to exploit poorly configured and vulnerable networking devices worldwide, opportunistically compromising multiple critical infrastructure sector networks,” the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency said Monday. The hacking groups are tracked under various names, including Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly, Ghost Blizzard, and Static Tundra. The advisory was co-issued by governments from around the world, including Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, and the UK.

The primary means of compromise the agency warned about was hackers scanning IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default authentication credentials. These scans are run by the very sorts of router botnets the actors are trying to enroll the targeted device in. By sending malicious traffic from spoofed addresses, the hackers can use the SNMP agent on poorly configured routers to run malware. SNMP allows users to collect and organize information about managed networking devices or to modify that information to change device behavior.

Credit: CISA

With control of a device, the hackers then use it as an exit node when probing or attacking targets in the communications, defense, energy, financial services, and government sectors. By funneling the malicious traffic through a benign-appearing device on a trustworthy IP address, the attackers are able to lower the chances of getting blocked by firewalls and other security defenses.

Monday’s advisory made no mention of identical operations carried out in recent years by China. So-called residential proxies are also a go-to tool used by financially motivated criminal hackers to obscure their true IP address. In many cases, these sorts of proxies are made up of millions of streaming devices that are sold with preloaded malware.

The agency urged router users to lock down their devices. Chief among the suggestions is to ensure SNMP versions 1 and 2 are disabled, because they don’t encrypt passwords or follow other common-sense security practices. Instead, only SNMP version 3 should be used. A better option is to disable SNMP altogether unless it’s needed for a specific use. Other safeguards include disabling Cisco Smart Install on all devices, using strong passwords, updating firmware regularly, and avoiding the use of other networking protocols.

Iconic Actor’s Chilling Words Resurface After Sudden Death

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Iconic Actor’s Chilling Words Resurface After Sudden Death


Sam Neill, the beloved actor known around the world for Jurassic Park, Peaky Blinders, and decades of memorable film and television roles, has died at 78.

His family announced that Neill passed away Monday, July 13, in Sydney, Australia. The news stunned fans, especially because the actor had recently been declared cancer-free after a long private battle with blood cancer.

In a statement shared on Instagram, Neill’s family said his death was “sudden and unexpected,” but added that he was surrounded by family and passed “with the dignity that has characterized his whole life.”

They also thanked the staff at St. Vincent’s Private Hospital for their care and asked for privacy as they grieve the “immeasurable loss.”

For fans who followed Neill’s health journey, the news felt especially heartbreaking. Just a few years before his death, the actor had spoken openly about mortality in a way that was classic Sam Neill: honest, calm, and touched with dry humor.

In an October 2023 interview with ABC, Neill said he was not afraid of dying.

“I’d be annoyed because there are things I still want to do,” he said.

At the time, Neill was already dealing with cancer, but he made it clear that fear was not what weighed on him.

Death, he said, had “never worried” him from the beginning. He was not “in any way frightened of dying.”

Still, Neill was not ready to leave. In a separate interview with The Guardian, he said he hoped for “another decade or two” because there was still more life he wanted to enjoy.

That makes his passing even more painful for longtime admirers. Neill had come through a frightening illness and was looking ahead again.

The actor was first diagnosed about five years ago with T-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive form of non-Hodgkin lymphoma. He kept much of his treatment private, but later opened up about how difficult the road had been.

In April, Neill told 7News that chemotherapy had stopped working.

“I was at a loss and it looked like I was on the way out, which wasn’t ideal obviously,” he said.

Neill then tried a different path. He entered a trial for CAR T-cell therapy, a treatment that trains a patient’s T-cells to attack cancer cells.

After the treatment, doctors performed a scan and found no trace of cancer in his body.

“That’s an extraordinary thing,” Neill said.

His family later confirmed that he was cancer-free at the time of his death.

Neill had also been thinking about returning to the screen. After years of illness and recovery, he sounded excited about acting again.

“I’m very, very excited that this can happen,” he said. “It’s time I did another movie.”

That kind of enthusiasm was no surprise to those who followed his career. Neill was never just one thing. He moved easily between blockbusters, thrillers, prestige dramas, horror, television, and independent film.

He began acting in university theater before landing his first screen role in the 1971 television film The City of No.

His major breakthrough came in 1977 with Sleeping Dogs, a New Zealand film that helped bring him attention outside Australia and New Zealand.

By 1981, Neill’s career had gone international. He appeared in Omen III: The Final Conflict and Possession, proving he could handle both commercial projects and intense, unsettling roles.

Over the years, he built one of the most varied careers in the business.

To millions of moviegoers, he will always be Dr. Alan Grant in Jurassic Park, the paleontologist who helped make movie history when Steven Spielberg’s dinosaur blockbuster took over the world in 1993.

But Neill’s career stretched far beyond that one role. He also appeared in films and shows including The Piano, Dead Calm, The Hunt for Red October, Event Horizon, Peaky Blinders, and The Twelve.

His final major performance came in the TV miniseries The Twelve.

Off screen, Neill was known for his warmth, wit, and self-deprecating charm. He became a fan favorite on social media, often sharing glimpses of his life, his animals, and his vineyard.

That made the news of his death feel personal to many fans. He was not just a familiar face from the movies. He came across as decent, funny, thoughtful, and deeply human.

In the end, Neill’s own words now carry a sad weight.

He was not afraid of dying. He was simply “annoyed” by the thought of leaving before he had done everything he still wanted to do.

For an actor whose career spanned more than five decades, that feels painfully fitting.

Sam Neill leaves behind a body of work that moved across countries, genres, and generations. He also leaves behind the memory of a man who faced illness with honesty, humor, and grace.

Vietnam too slow, too timid to defuse its demographic time bomb

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Vietnam too slow, too timid to defuse its demographic time bomb

Vietnam is one of the most rapidly graying countries in the world, aging at a stage of development that leaves it far less room to adapt than many of its regional peers.

Vietnam’s total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 2.11 children per woman in 2021 to 1.91 in 2024, the third consecutive year below the replacement level of 2.1. Significantly, the decline is sharpest where economic activity is highest. Ho Chi Minh City recorded a rate of between 1.32 and 1.39 in 2024, depending on the source.

Across the country, the number of provinces with below-replacement fertility surged from 22 in 2019 to 32 in 2024, concentrated in the southeastern provinces (1.48) and the Mekong Delta (1.62).

The United Nations Population Fund projects that by 2036, Vietnam will have transitioned from an “aging” to an “aged” society, a shift that took roughly 25 years, comparable to Japan and far faster than the 115 years France required.

Vietnam’s GDP per capita sits at around US$5,000. A joint World Bank and JICA report in 2021 described Vietnam as at risk of “getting old before getting rich,” undergoing its demographic transition “at an earlier stage of economic development and a lower level of per capita income than other countries who have experienced a similar shift.”

Japan and South Korea reached comparable fertility rates, even as high-income economies with mature welfare systems were already in place. Vietnam, in comparison, has none of that cushion, and its adaptation window is correspondingly narrower.

It is in this context that Vietnam’s amended Population Law took effect on July 1, 2026, replacing the two-child framework introduced under Decision 162 of the Council of Ministers in 1988.

Although enforcement had already been progressively dismantled in practice, the law formally closes out the legal framework and replaces it with what Health Minister Dao Hong Lan described as a shift from “population and family planning policy” to “population and development.”

What the law introduces

The Population Law is the first to elevate the 2003 Population Ordinance into a full legislative framework, requiring National Assembly passage and signaling a higher level of political commitment.

Its provisions fall into three categories. The first is leave. Women giving birth to a second child now receive seven months of maternity leave (up from six), and fathers receive 10 working days of paternity leave.

The second is financial support. Eligible mothers can claim a one-off payment of at least 2 million dong (approximately US$77), with higher amounts for women who have two children before 35, women from very small ethnic minority groups, and women in provinces with below-replacement fertility, while families with two or more biological children receive priority access to social housing.

The third is longer-term infrastructure. Prenatal and newborn screening packages are subsidized for disadvantaged households, with universal screening coverage planned from January 2027.

The Ministry of Health has set a target of raising the TFR by an average of 2% annually to restore it to the replacement level by 2030.

From control to development

The scale of the shift becomes clearer against the regime it replaces. Vietnam’s two-child policy, introduced in 1988 during the early years of Doi Moi, was enforced on two tracks.

Administrative penalties for the general population were abolished in late 2013, near-simultaneously with China’s initial relaxation of its one-child policy. But for the Communist Party’s approximately 5.3 million members, a stricter regime continued: under Politburo regulations, a third child meant reprimand, a fourth could result in removal from leadership and a fifth led to expulsion.

These provisions were softened to reprimand only in 2022 and formally abolished in March 2025, more than a decade after the administrative penalties for ordinary citizens had been removed. China followed a broadly similar trajectory, beginning its relaxation in 2013 and abolishing all penalties by 2021.

That Vietnam’s party discipline track was the last mechanism to fall, more than a decade after its own administrative relaxation and several years after China’s formal reversal, suggests the instrument was embedded in the party’s broader disciplinary architecture and served a governance function that outlived its demographic rationale.

The Population Law was in development well before To Lam became General Secretary in August 2024, but its passage and implementation were accelerated under his leadership, moving from Politburo directive to implementing regulations in under 18 months.

That pace is consistent with To Lam’s broader governance agenda, which has emphasized quantitative benchmarks over doctrinal formulations.

In May 2026, he proposed piloting “socialist commune and ward” models in Hanoi, which the Vietnamese Magazine described as an attempt to explain socialism “through the language of KPIs.”

The timeline pressure helps explain the haste. Vietnam aims to achieve high-income status by 2045, the centenary of independence, but it will cross the aged-society threshold by 2036, almost a decade earlier.

The demographic dividend that has underwritten Vietnam’s growth will, on current trends, expire before the development target is reached. The Population Law is, in part, a response to this convergence: an attempt to slow the narrowing of the window through which Vietnam must pass to avoid the scenario the World Bank warned of in 2021.

Regional comparison and outlook

The scale of Vietnam’s initial package is modest by regional standards. The maximum cash bonus amounts to approximately $228, roughly two-thirds of the average monthly salary, as a one-off payment.

South Korea offers birth grants exceeding $1,400 alongside monthly allowances. Japan provides a universal lump-sum childbirth grant of 500,000 yen (approximately $3,200) per child.

Singapore’s baby bonus scheme provides S$11,000 ($8,500) for the first and second child, scaling to S$13,000 for the third and subsequent children. Yet even at those levels, results have been limited.

South Korea’s annualized TFR of 0.72 in 2023 has continued to fall despite successive increases in pronatalist spending. Japan’s extensive interventions have stabilized its rate without reversing the decline.

The structural constraints that sustain low fertility in urbanizing economies, including housing costs, childcare availability and the opportunity cost of female workforce participation, have proven resistant to financial incentives alone across the region.

Vietnam faces the same structural pressures in its most developed regions. Sociologists estimate that raising a child from birth to age 22 costs 10 to 20 million dong per month ($380 to $760), exceeding the average monthly income.

Against those figures, the law’s initial cash incentive covers a fraction of a single month’s child-rearing costs. The UNFPA has noted that “continuous support through child-rearing is often necessary to change parents’ minds.”

The law’s architecture of screening programs, leave provisions, housing preferences and social insurance linkages is designed with a horizon extending to 2035.

Whether that framework is expanded in subsequent policy cycles will be a more telling measure than the initial funding alone, and Ho Chi Minh City’s TFR over the next two to three years will be a useful early indicator.

If it remains flat, it would confirm that the two-child limit was never the binding constraint, and that the structural barriers driving the decline, including housing costs, childcare availability and female workforce participation, require a different order of policy response.

Vietnam’s timeline for demographic adaptation is compressed relative to its regional peers. The Population Law ends a nearly four-decade regime of reproductive discipline and opens a developmental framework that is new to the Vietnamese policy landscape.

The regional evidence is clear, however, that one-off cash incentives at any scale have not reversed fertility decline in urbanizing economies, and Vietnam’s initial package is modest even by those standards.

If the framework the law establishes is not expanded substantially in subsequent budgetary cycles, the 2036 aged-society threshold will arrive with the welfare and childcare architecture still incomplete, constraining Vietnam’s capacity to sustain the growth rates its 2045 high-income target requires.

The law has created the institutional scaffolding. What it has not yet provided is the scale of investment the evidence suggests is necessary to fill it.

Lam Duc Vu isrisk analyst writing on Indo-Pacific security and regional affairs.

Apple sues OpenAI after ex-engineer allegedly used bug to steal trade secrets

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Apple sues OpenAI after ex-engineer allegedly used bug to steal trade secrets

Apple is gunning for OpenAI, demanding steep penalties after stumbling on a “rare” bug that temporarily allowed a poached employee that joined OpenAI to maintain access to confidential information on Apple servers for weeks after his termination.

In a lawsuit filed Friday, Apple sought several injunctions blocking OpenAI from using confidential information allegedly stolen by former employees. According to Apple’s complaint, OpenAI conspired with former Apple employees as part of a grand scheme to “take an unlawful shortcut” and launch a line of AI-powered devices as marketable as Apple’s iPhone.

Apple explained that it found a bug while investigating internal messages between a then-current employee, Yu-Ting “Alyssa” Peng, and an engineer who spent eight years “working on some of Apple’s most sensitive product development programs,” Chang Liu.

Liu left Apple for OpenAI in January 2026. However, on February 9, Liu discovered an “authentication bug” that was unknown to Apple at the time. The bug allowed him to “access Apple’s shared network folders,” while using an Apple-issued work laptop that he should have returned, the lawsuit said.

Rather than report the bug to Apple, Liu allegedly seized the opportunity to download files detailing various aspects of Apple’s business.

Specifically, Apple alleged that “over several weeks, while developing hardware for OpenAI, Mr. Liu surreptitiously accessed and downloaded dozens of Apple’s confidential hardware-related files, including voluminous, detailed information about unreleased products, engineering presentations, technical specifications, and proprietary project data,” the lawsuit claimed.

Particularly concerning to Apple, Liu allegedly downloaded a presentation on Apple’s complex circuit boards that Apple claimed would be “invaluable to anyone developing hardware.” Some files were “expressly labeled as confidential,” Apple claimed.

“LOL,” Liu wrote in a message to Peng, which was among many mocking Apple that Liu apparently left on his Apple-issued work laptop. “I found out I can access the [network storage], so funny.”

In a footnote, Apple confirmed that the bug was “quickly fixed” after they found Liu’s messages and that it did not appear to be widely exploited.

“Although Apple is still investigating, server logs show that, unlike Mr. Liu, the few other users affected by this bug do not appear to have accessed or stolen Apple’s confidential information,” the lawsuit said.

Yet fixing the bug won’t end the alleged theft of Apple trade secrets, the complaint said.

The exchanges between Liu and Peng, as well as other evidence that Apple cited—including support for allegations that Apple’s former vice president of product design for iPhone, Tang Yew Tan, is spearheading the OpenAI scheme—are just the “tip of the iceberg,” Apple claimed.

In a statement provided to Ars, a spokesperson confirmed that OpenAI is still reviewing Apple’s complaint but disputes the core claim that OpenAI is relying on Apple insights to build a hardware business that could rival Apple’s device empire.

“We have no interest in other companies’ trade secrets,” OpenAI’s spokesperson said. “We remain focused on building innovative technology that empowers people everywhere.”

This weekend on X, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman went further when responding to another user claiming that OpenAI was afraid of Apple’s lawsuit. In a post, Altman wrote, “I am not afraid of Apple, but I have tremendous respect for them.”

OpenAI requested Apple “show and tells”

Apple is urging the court to intervene and stop OpenAI from benefiting from the allegedly rampant theft after poaching more than 400 former Apple employees.

Beyond Liu and Peng’s alleged conspiring, the discovery process will reveal an even broader “pattern of theft of Apple’s trade secrets by OpenAI employees who were formerly at Apple,” the smartphone manufacturer alleged.

Supposedly directing the recruiting scheme is Tang Tan, who spent 24 years at Apple before joining former Apple design chief Jony Ive’s io Products and then becoming OpenAI’s chief hardware officer in 2025.

According to Apple, Tan has relied on his insider knowledge, like knowing secret project code names, to get Apple employees to discuss unreleased products during job interviews. He also allegedly used an internal Apple document to create a checklist to help departing Apple employees evade security measures when stealing trade secrets.

Perhaps most egregiously, Tan is accused of asking Apple employees to bring in computer parts for “show and tell” sessions that Apple claimed “would disclose Apple’s proprietary technologies” way beyond what reverse-engineering the parts might allow OpenAI to learn about Apple’s tech.

Those claims seemingly also rest on messages left on Liu’s laptop discussing Tan’s alleged instructions to Apple employees to share information, which Liu allegedly referred to while coaching Peng on how to “avoid trouble” when she left Apple for OpenAI, the lawsuit said.

Liu also allegedly sent Peng messages on how to get hired by OpenAI and avoid repeating mistakes of other former Apple staffers who “fumbled” their interviews by failing to give desired insights into Apple’s “top-secret projects” and unreleased products, the complaint said.

The Wall Street Journal noted that it’s common for engineers to bring computer parts to job interviews, and it’s possible that only non-proprietary information was discussed. So it remains unclear what evidence Apple may use to justify such explosive claims against a former senior executive or any of its former staffers.

Apple calls OpenAI plan “rotten”

Of course, it’s not the first time Apple has accused a rival device maker of poaching staff to steal its technology, and Apple hasn’t always finished those legal battles in court. Apple settled a long, expensive fight with Samsung in 2018 and dropped a chip design fight with Nvidia in 2023, The New York Times reported.

In the OpenAI case, the WSJ suggested that Apple might be motivated to bring the lawsuit just to slow down either OpenAI’s device development or the poaching of its employees.

But Apple seems determined to expose any possible avenue OpenAI might take to use its secrets to race ahead to make rival devices. And Liu’s messages with Peng appear to be the strongest evidence Apple has yet that OpenAI is potentially willfully and/or maliciously striving to copy not only Apple’s technical solutions but also the carefully guarded elements of its business strategy.

Apple’s complaint acknowledged that “Apple lacks visibility into what’s been happening behind closed doors at OpenAI, where such misconduct is normalized and exemplified by leadership.”

“This much is clear, however: at every level, from members of its Technical Staff to its Chief Hardware Officer, and in coordination with business partners, OpenAI has been stealing Apple’s trade secrets and confidential information,” Apple’s complaint said. “As a natural result, OpenAI’s nascent hardware business now rests on the shakiest of foundations, rotten to its core by its illegal reliance on misappropriated trade secrets.”

Climate-impacted communities across Asia are taking their fight to court

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Climate-impacted communities across Asia are taking their fight to court

This story was produced by The Xylom, a nonprofit news outlet covering the world’s most pressing health and environmental disparities, and co-published by Grist. Subscribe to The Xylom’s newsletter here.

When Super Typhoon Rai — equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane — began battering Batasan Island in Bohol, Philippines in December 2021, Trixy Elle and her husband, two children, and father waded into the storm, fearing they would be trapped in their home. Holding on to one another, they were determined not to let go. 

By morning, the house Elle and her husband had spent years building was gone. So was much of the island. They were left with just the clothes on their backs. In the days that followed, the family survived in conditions that stripped life to its barest terms, at one point, eating livestock they had found dead in the storm’s aftermath.

“As a mother, it was up to me to find ways to feed my family,” Elle, a fish vendor, told The Xylom. “It got to the point where we were eating dead chickens, dead pigs. We got to that point because the government’s response took so long.”

The 35-year-old mother felt a deep sense of injustice. The typhoon — locally known as Odette — affected 10.6 million people in the Philippines, killing more than 400 and displacing 1.4 million from their homes. Elle began to question why communities like hers had to endure such devastation despite contributing so little to the climate crisis. “Why are we the ones struggling the most?” 

That question propelled her towards climate justice. In December 2025, 67 survivors of the typhoon sued Shell at the Royal Courts of Justice, arguing that the company’s historic emissions contributed to climate change and so worsened disasters like Rai, seeking compensation for the damages caused. Shell did not respond to The Xylom’s requests for comment.

Residents salvage belongings from their destroyed homes in the coastal town of Dulag in Leyte province on December 17, 2021, a day after Super Typhoon Rai hit. Bobbie Alota/AFP via Getty Images

The plaintiffs also contended that Shell has known since the 1960s about the risks climate change posed to vulnerable communities and the role its operations played in worsening those risks. Scientists agree that climate change is making storms like Rai more frequent and more intense.

The case is said to be the first civil case to directly link a major fossil fuel giant to deaths and injuries from climate impacts in the Global South. 

Asia lags in climate litigation

Climate litigation has surged globally over the past decade, but the Global South — home to many of the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities — still accounts for less than 10% of the cases. 

As of mid-2025, 3,099 climate change cases had been filed, with nearly two-thirds of all cases stemming from the United States, according to the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Excluding the U.S., Europe accounts for the largest share of climate cases at 32%. Asia and Africa are the least represented at 6% and 2%, respectively.

“I remember years ago people would say climate litigation would never take off in Asia because it’s not part of the Asian culture to fight poverty and … to litigate,” Jolene Lin, director of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, said.

Lin disagrees with this line of thinking: she believes that the biggest obstacles to climate litigation stem from weak rule of law. 

Read Next

“In Asia, there are many jurisdictions where judicial corruption is a problem [as well as] the lack of judicial independence,” Lin said. Many judges across the region are still unfamiliar with climate litigation and tend to shy away from such cases, she added. 

Another challenge is the shrinking space for activism. In several countries, restrictions on free speech and association make it harder to organize, campaign, and bring cases to court. 

Still, more people across Asia are turning to the courts. Lin described 2024 as a “particularly meaningful year” for climate litigation in the region. 

That year, South Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that parts of the country’s Carbon Neutrality Act were unconstitutional because they failed to protect the rights of future generations. The case was filed by the environmental organization Youth 4 Climate Action in South Korea, a youth-led movement that leads climate strikes and advocates for clean energy.

Alongside this, the Supreme Court of India recognized protection from the adverse impacts of climate change as a fundamental constitutional right. It stemmed from efforts to protect a critically endangered bird, the Great Indian Bustard, amid concerns that the birds were being killed by collisions with overhead power transmission lines linked to expanding renewable energy infrastructure.

Similar legal challenges are now emerging elsewhere in Asia. In January, a Malaysian climate watchdog sued the federal government in a first-of-its-kind greenwashing case. The complaint alleges a fossil fuel company falsely marketed a fossil fuel-based product as “carbon neutral.”

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Win or lose, the case matters. As Malaysia’s first climate litigation, it will test how judges interpret climate obligations under existing laws and expose where resistance lies, which will create a roadmap for future cases, said Kuberan Hansrajh Kumaresan, head of legal advocacy at Malaysia-based environmental watchdog RimbaWatch. 

In April, Malaysian youths sued the government over deforestation, asking the court to enforce the country’s pledge to maintain at least 50% forest cover. They argue continued forest loss threatens generations to come. 

“My peers are losing hope for a decent future. It feels like we are more and more out of control of our lives. We cannot sit and continue to watch our government risk our future with every tree they cut down,” Amira Aliya, the youngest applicant in the case, said in a statement. 

Cases abroad

Plaintiffs are also increasingly filing cases outside their home countries. The Super Typhoon Rai survivors filed their case in the United Kingdom because Shell is headquartered there. This is a strategic move, as according to Jefferson Chua, a campaigner with Greenpeace Philippines, courts in jurisdictions like the U.K. have more developed climate jurisprudence and stronger mechanisms for assessing corporate responsibility.

Similar cases have increasingly been filed outside plaintiffs’ home countries. For example, in 2023, four residents of Pari Island in Indonesia — where rising sea levels have caused persistent flooding — filed a litigation against the construction company Holcim. They are asking the Swiss cement giant to cut its emissions by 69% by 2040, relative to 2019 levels, as well as to compensate for damages already incurred and fund flood protection measures. The Cantonal Court of Zug in Switzerland admitted the case in December last year. 

“[We] don’t contribute to island damage, but our island is now threatened by tidal floods and will be submerged because of the company’s activity,” said Arif Pujianto, a 55-year-old resident of Pari Island. 

Ibu Asmania, also a plaintiff in the case against Holcim, said they have the right and the responsibility to protect their island because the place where their families are born is at stake. 

The case is still in early stages, but it has already had ripple effects. It has been cited in an Australian challenge to a coal mine permit, and in Switzerland, major commercial law firms have issued alerts to corporate clients warning of the legal risks associated with high emissions, said Johannes Wendland, a legal advisor at HEKS-EPER Swiss Church Aid, which supports the Pari plaintiffs.

Justice in a changing climate

Lin expects a continued rise in climate lawsuits in Asia as awareness grows that the window to act on climate change is narrowing. She also anticipates more cases focused on “loss and damage,” with plaintiffs seeking compensation for climate-related harms. 

The rise in climate litigation reflects a broader strategy of seeking accountability on multiple fronts. “This is a very powerful tool for affected communities in the fight for climate justice, but it’s not the only tool,” Wendland said. “It’s not a silver bullet.”

Beyond setting legal precedents, these cases are also creating space for affected communities to be heard and to act.

“What we really want is to inspire other communities to say that this is actually possible,” Greenpeace Philippines’ campaigner Chua said. “We can hold big companies like Shell accountable. And that’s something that even if it takes time, it will take years to do it [and] it’s still possible.”

For litigants like Elle, the fight is about the future. 

“That’s what I hope I can do, even though I’m just an ordinary person,” she said. “If one day my grandchildren ask me what I did for nature, at least I have an answer: I fought for your future.”


Saudi air defenses intercept Houthi ballistic missiles amid Yemen tensions

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Saudi air defenses intercept Houthi ballistic missiles amid Yemen tensions

Yemen's Houthi group shows the firing of the so-called surface-to-surface 'hypersonic ballistic missile' at an unrevealed site in Yemen on September 16, 2024 [Houthi Media Center via Getty Images]

Yemen’s Houthi group shows the firing of the so-called surface-to-surface ‘hypersonic ballistic missile’ at an unrevealed site in Yemen on September 16, 2024 [Houthi Media Center via Getty Images]

Saudi air defenses on Monday intercepted ballistic missiles launched by the Houthi group from Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition supporting the internationally recognized Yemeni government said, Anadolu reports.

The missiles targeted Saudi Arabia’s southern region, coalition spokesman Turki al-Malki said on the US social media company X.

The attack came hours after Yemen’s Defense Ministry said its forces struck the Sanaa airport runway after the Houthis prevented Yemeni flights from landing and allowed an Iranian plane to land “in violation of the Yemeni territory.”​​​​​​​

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree vowed that the strike “will not pass without retaliation and punishment.”

Saree accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the strike on Sanaa airport and declared that it ended the de-escalation and ceasefire agreement with the Yemeni government.

There was no comment from the Saudi authorities on the Houthi accusation.

READ: Iranian plane lands in Yemen’s Hudaydah after strike on Sanaa airport: Reports

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