Damascus’ shift away from its old alliance with Tehran and Hezbollah could reshape border security, smuggling routes, and the group’s freedom of movement
[DAMASCUS] US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks suggesting that Syria could play a role in efforts against Hezbollah in Lebanon have sparked widespread debate—not only because of what he said, but because of what his comments reveal about the dramatic shifts in regional alliances since the fall of former Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government in late 2024.
Speaking on June 8 about developments in Lebanon to NBCs Meet the Press, President Trump suggested that Syria could help facilitate “more surgical” strikes against Hezbollah. He also praised Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, saying he had succeeded in restoring a degree of stability to Syria after years of war and turmoil.
The US president indicated that Washington could either assist directly or “recommend Syria” as part of efforts to address Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon, a statement that immediately fueled speculation about the nature of Damascus’ potential role in any future confrontation with the Iran-backed group.
The remarks opened a broader discussion about Syria’s place in the region’s changing political landscape. For decades, Syria served as Hezbollah’s most important Arab ally, providing the geographic, political, and military depth that helped the group expand its regional influence.
President Trump’s comments were followed by a brief response from al-Sharaa, who dismissed reports suggesting that Syrian forces could enter Lebanon, describing such claims as “completely untrue.” While his statement set clear limits on speculation about direct military involvement, it did not explicitly address issues such as border control, anti-smuggling operations, or other forms of possible security cooperation.
To understand the significance of the American president’s remarks, it helps to revisit the relationship that linked Syria and Hezbollah for decades.
Damascus played a central role in supporting Hezbollah from its initial emergence in the 1980s. During Syria’s military presence in Lebanon, the relationship was built on shared interests in confronting Israel and maintaining a strategic partnership with Iran.
The alliance deepened significantly after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Hezbollah intervened militarily on behalf of the Assad government, deploying thousands of fighters to key battlefronts, including Qusayr, Qalamoun, and the Damascus countryside, and helping the regime survive one of the most perilous periods of the conflict.
At the same time, Syrian territory became a critical corridor for Iranian weapons shipments to Lebanon and an essential part of Hezbollah’s military logistics network.
That reality changed dramatically following Assad’s downfall and the emergence of new leadership under al-Sharaa. Unlike its predecessor, the new Syrian government is not part of the regional axis that linked Damascus, Tehran, and Hezbollah. Instead, it inherited a war-ravaged state seeking economic recovery, regional reintegration, and international legitimacy.
Despite the controversy generated by his remarks, President Trump did not call for direct Syrian military action against Hezbollah, nor did he announce any joint US-Israeli-Syrian initiative. Rather, his comments appeared to reflect a broader political and security vision in which the new Syrian leadership could help limit Hezbollah’s influence and operational freedom.
Retired Syrian Air Force Brig. Gen. Mohammad Mansour told The Media Line that such a role could take several forms.
The first would involve tighter control of the Syrian-Lebanese border
“The first would involve tighter control of the Syrian-Lebanese border,” Mansour said, noting that the lengthy and complex frontier has long served as a key route for transporting weapons, equipment, and personnel.
A second possibility, he explained, would be a more aggressive campaign against smuggling networks that expanded during the Syrian war and became part of Hezbollah’s logistical infrastructure.
Mansour added that Syria could also strengthen security measures against networks or structures linked to Hezbollah within Syrian territory, particularly in border areas where the group has maintained a significant presence in recent years.
Many regional observers argue that Hezbollah’s loss of the freedom of movement it once enjoyed in Syria would itself mark a strategic shift, even without any direct confrontation between Damascus and the group.
For Syrian researcher Abdul Rahman Riyad, the key transformation lies in the changing priorities of the Syrian state.
The relationship that once connected Damascus with Tehran and Hezbollah is no longer what it was before 2024
“The relationship that once connected Damascus with Tehran and Hezbollah is no longer what it was before 2024,” Riyad told The Media Line. He argued that Syria’s new leadership is focused primarily on rebuilding state institutions and consolidating regional and international legitimacy, rather than participating in the axis-based conflicts that defined the previous era.
The issue is not about Syria confronting Hezbollah directly
Political analyst Fawaz Dalloul offered a similar assessment. “The issue is not about Syria confronting Hezbollah directly,” he said. “It is about restoring sovereignty over borders and crossings. Any effort aimed at controlling borders, reducing smuggling, or preventing the movement of weapons outside state authority will inevitably affect Hezbollah’s logistical capabilities, even if it is not specifically directed against the group.”
From Lebanon, political activist and journalist Fatima Othman offered a different perspective. According to Othman, Hezbollah’s future remains tied primarily to Lebanon’s internal balance of power and the Lebanese state’s ability to extend its authority throughout the country. “At the same time,” she noted, “any change in the regional environment surrounding Hezbollah—especially on the Syrian front—will inevitably affect the operational space the group has enjoyed for decades.”
Despite these differences in emphasis, all three perspectives converge on one central point: the most significant shift is not the possibility of Syria entering a military confrontation with Hezbollah, but the fact that Damascus no longer serves as the unrestricted strategic depth upon which the group has long depended.
The Syrian leadership faces enormous economic and domestic challenges while simultaneously seeking international recognition, foreign investment, and support for reconstruction efforts. In that context, Damascus appears increasingly interested in presenting itself as a sovereign state capable of exercising authority over its entire territory and preventing armed groups from operating beyond government control.
The new administration has also benefited from growing Arab and international engagement, as well as a series of US measures in 2025 that first eased and then lifted a range of sanctions imposed during the Assad era.
As a result, many analysts believe that Syria’s current interests differ fundamentally from those of the previous government. Stability, economic recovery, and state-building have become more pressing priorities than participation in regional power struggles.
Does this mean an alliance with Israel? At least for now, the answer appears to be no. There are no official indications of a Syrian-Israeli alliance or publicly acknowledged military cooperation against Hezbollah in available reporting. Syrian leaders are also aware that any overt rapprochement with Israel would generate significant domestic and regional backlash while providing ammunition to political opponents.
This helps explain al-Sharaa’s firm rejection of reports suggesting that Syrian forces could enter Lebanon. Yet Damascus’ insistence on asserting sovereignty over its territory could still produce outcomes unfavorable to Hezbollah, particularly if it includes tighter monitoring of unofficial border crossings and expanded efforts against smuggling networks.
President Trump’s remarks—and Syria’s response—highlight the scale of the transformations that have reshaped the Middle East over the past two years. A country once considered Hezbollah’s closest Arab ally is now being discussed as a potential factor in limiting the group’s influence.
While Damascus continues to reject any suggestion of direct military involvement in Lebanon, changes in Syria’s political structure and strategic priorities appear to have fundamentally altered its relationship with Hezbollah.
Ultimately, the key question may not be whether Syria will participate in a war against Hezbollah, but whether it will prevent the group from benefiting from the strategic advantages that Syrian territory provided for decades. If that happens, the consequences for Hezbollah’s future could prove more significant than any direct military confrontation.
