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For Iran’s diaspora, a tough World Cup call: To support the national team or protest – or both?

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For Iran’s diaspora, a tough World Cup call: To support the national team or protest – or both?

When Iran’s national soccer team walks onto American soil this summer for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, it will do so against the backdrop of an Iranian government crackdown against protesters in January, an ongoing war launched by the U.S. and Israel in February, and a four-month digital blackout affecting some 92 million people. It has left many Iranian fans feeling conflicted about who exactly they’ll be cheering for.

Even before a ball has been kicked, the tension has been clear among not only supporters but team members, too. Iranian players were issued visas to the United States at the 11th hour, and the team only arrived at their training base in Tijuana, Mexico, days before the tournament kicks off.

That came after a request to move their camp from Arizona, citing concerns over unfair treatment on U.S. soil, a move that required the formal endorsement of FIFA before it could proceed. Even with the team finally getting settled, however, multiple Iranian soccer fans have been denied visas to the U.S. Iran’s soccer association has also said its ticket allocation had been denied, leaving fans who had made the trek disappointed.

With a host nation actively at war with a competing one for the first time in World Cup history, the pitch will be a stage not just for soccer but for grief, resistance and competing nationalism. The Iranian diaspora, buffeted by the one-two punch of internal crackdowns and external interventions, now faces a deeply unsettling question: How do you express pride in one’s national team without tacitly supporting the government that it represents?

Diasporic identity crises

Along with many Iranians, mainly expatriates in the U.S., I plan to attend Iran’s opening game against New Zealand on June 15 in Los Angeles. The location is important – Los Angeles is a city that is home to the largest Iranian diaspora, so much so that it is often referred to as “Tehrangeles” within the community.

It is also a community among whom feelings toward the Islamic Republic run deep, with many of them having left Iran during or following the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Many in the community have remained loyal to the deposed Pahlavi regime and the crown prince, Reza, and going so far as celebrating the joint U.S.-Israeli led war on Iran.

It is in this community that the Iranian national team – colloquially known as Team Melli to reflect the Farsi word for national – will face battle not only against New Zealand, but also the conflicted emotions of its ethnic brethren.

With the memory of the January protests still raw, calls have been circulating among some Iranian Americans to formally protest and boycott the occasion. Proposals range from purchasing tickets, only to leave seats conspicuously empty, to booing the national anthem and withholding any celebration of Iranian goals.

Supporters have also been urged within Iranian American communities to resist FIFA’s attempts to prohibit non-Islamic Republic flags inside stadiums, with some Iranian expats suggesting on social media of spray-painting over the symbols on the current flag, carrying plain green, white and red alternatives into the ground, or wearing clothing bearing political slogans. Others have proposed exposing politically motivated tattoos or using stuffed animals to caricature Iranian leaders.

In return, Mehdi Taj, the president of the Iranian Football Association, issued a statement demanding respect, stating: “We need a guarantee there, for our trip, that they have no right to insult the symbols of our system, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.”

A bus passes by a crowd of people.

An Iranian national team bus arrives in Tijuana, Mexico, on June 7, 2026. AP Photo/Gregory Bull

There is a broader question that Iran’s World Cup appearance forces into view, and it sits uncomfortably alongside FIFA’s own record. While the governing body of world soccer awarded President Donald Trump its inaugural Peace Prize ahead of the tournament, it is now looking the other way as the U.S. remains at war and denies visas to would-be participants and spectators. The collision of sport and statecraft is nothing new, from the 1936 Berlin Olympics to the Soviet boycott of Los Angeles in 1984. But it has rarely been managed with such apparent indifference to its own contradictions.

When sport becomes a theater for competing political claims, it is the integrity of the game itself that is diminished. One is entitled to ask whether the notion of sport existing purely on its own terms — especially on the global stage — has ever been anything more than a convenient fiction.

Collision of politics and sport

Yet here lies the puzzle. Soccer occupies a place in Iranian life that borders on the sacred. One need only look to the fierce devotion surrounding Tehran’s great rival teams Persepolis and Esteghlal, a contest that ranks among the most intense club rivalries in world soccer, or to the scenes of street celebration that have swept Iran whenever the national team has won games at previous World Cups.

The memory of defeating the U.S. at the 1998 World Cup in France and the rematch in 2022 speaks to how deeply the game is woven into the fabric of Iranian culture. Supporting Team Melli has long been a source of collective pride, a point of unity that transcends politics and generation, regardless of religion, political views and social class. This creates the dilemma for the fans watching in Los Angeles and Seattle for Iran’s three group games.

A man in a suit puts a medal around his neck.

President Donald Trump puts on the inaugural FIFA Peace Prize presented to him by FIFA President Gianni Infantino. AP Photo/Evan Vucci

In Arizona, where I teach global politics at Arizona State University, several members of the Iranian diaspora articulated this dilemma to me, capturing the tension at the heart of current events. One person invoked the sporting rivalries of the Cold War as a reminder of soccer’s capacity to transcend conflict, yet acknowledged that the wounds of the January protests remained too raw for many in the diaspora to set aside. Another was more straightforwardly hopeful, expressing a wish to see Iran progress in the tournament and a belief that success on the pitch might, however tentatively, cut across political divisions.

Yet for those who have watched the events of recent years with grief and fury, cheering on a team that represents the Islamic Republic feels, to some, like an act of complicity. For its part, the Iranian government – as well as some Iranian critics – would argue that the national team stands apart from politics entirely. From this vantage point, soccer is a matter of national identity and cultural heritage that belongs to all Iranians regardless of their views on those in power. It is, moreover, a moment of proud participation, according to one Iranian official, and that to deny the players their support is to punish athletes for the decisions of politicians.

The protests that shook Iran, and the complex political landscape that followed, have left the diaspora navigating questions that go far beyond soccer.

The Islamic Republic, whatever one’s view of its conduct, remains the sovereign government of a nation with a rich and fiercely proud culture, and the players on the pitch represent that culture as much as they represent the state.

That they do so on the soil of a country with which Iran is actively at war renders this perhaps the most politically charged sporting occasion in living memory – one in which every goal, every flag and every empty seat carries a meaning that extends well beyond the 90 minutes. In that sense, the World Cup has not created a division so much as it has given an existing one a global stage.

Ted Cruz and Ron Wyden try to fight censorship with bipartisan JAWBONE Act

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Ted Cruz and Ron Wyden try to fight censorship with bipartisan JAWBONE Act

US Senators Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) today introduced the JAWBONE Act, a proposed law that could fuel lawsuits against federal officials who try to coerce broadcasters or tech platforms into restricting speech.

The Justice Against Weaponized Bureaucratic Overreach to Networked Expression Act would prohibit federal agencies and employees from coercing or trying to coerce broadcasters and providers of online services or AI services into changing content. The bill could apply to Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr’s repeated attempts to pressure TV networks and broadcasters, or government pressure imposed on social media firms and AI chatbot makers.

The bill would create a private right of action for victims of “jawboning,” letting people recover compensatory damages in court. Individuals whose speech is stifled could bring cases against government officials, and the proposed law could be enforced by state attorneys general through civil actions.

“Jawboning occurs when the government pressures private companies to censor speech protected by the First Amendment,” said a press release issued by Cruz and Wyden today. The JAWBONE Act is “legislation to hold the government accountable for censorship and violations of the First Amendment,” it said.

The bill is bipartisan, and the Republican Cruz previously criticized the Republican Carr for coercing ABC into suspending Jimmy Kimmel. A quote from Cruz in today’s press release focuses only on actions taken by the Biden administration, though.

“The Biden administration weaponized the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to pressure Big Tech into ‘canceling’ Americans who spoke out against vaccine mandates and election fraud. Holding the government accountable and giving Americans the tools to fight back is essential,” Cruz said.

Wyden calls out “blatant” Trump threats

The joint press release has a quote from Wyden criticizing Trump for trying to censor late-night TV. “The most blatant example is Trump threatening cable companies because he doesn’t like their late-night shows, but jawboning isn’t partisan, and it isn’t new,” Wyden said.

Wyden said that “nearly all of Americans’ speech—including TV news, online streams and social media—flows through private corporations that are highly susceptible to government pressure.” A spokesperson for Wyden told Ars that the bill would apply to other scenarios not mentioned in the bipartisan press release, like the Trump administration pressuring app stores to take down apps such as ICEBlock.

A bill summary said that under current legal precedent, plaintiffs must prove that coercion succeeded in causing removal of or changes to content. The bill would let plaintiffs sue and obtain financial damages from “any government agency or employee that jawbones companies involved in social media, AI, or broadcasting, regardless of whether the jawboning succeeds.”

The bill specifically authorizes financial damages, because under current law, plaintiffs can only obtain injunctions that prevent future or ongoing violations, the summary said. With financial damages, government officials who engage in unlawful censorship could be held accountable even after leaving office. The bill effectively imposes a limit on financial payouts by allowing compensatory damages but not punitive damages.

Convenient “chokepoints” for censorship

The bill also “requires agencies to submit certain communications with social media companies, AI companies, and broadcasters to a portal with detailed public summaries and full access for Congress, helping ensure jawboning does not occur in secret,” the summary said.

The proposed portal would help individuals prove their rights were violated, the summary said. Without this measure, “plaintiffs may struggle to prove jawboning because the government has secretly communicated with the private companies it is coercing. Americans may not even know they were censored by their government,” the summary said.

The bill text said broadcasters, online services, and “speech-enabling artificial intelligence systems are critical for access to information and individual expression and have a right to independent editorial judgement. Such entities can also serve as chokepoints convenient for the government to target for censorship of disfavored speech and information.”

The bill defines broadcasters to include stations with FCC licenses and the national TV networks that provide programming to affiliate stations. This means coercion of local stations and national networks would violate the law.

“The term ‘coerce’ means to take a harmful, hostile, or unfavorable action, to imply the possibility of taking such action, or to threaten such action,” the bill said. The proposed ban has exceptions for lawful investigations, enforcement of federal or state laws, and actions taken under a warrant.

ACLU and Grover Norquist joined in support

The bill has a range of supporters, from the American Civil Liberties Union to Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform. ACLU Senior Policy Counsel Jenna Leventoff said the government has repeatedly “abused its authority to coerce private actors into censoring themselves,” and that the bill “would protect the First Amendment by stopping this kind of unconstitutional jawboning against broadcasters, platforms, and AI providers.”

Norquist said that “Twitter and Facebook were pressured by the FBI during the Biden administration to delete posts from the opposition,” and that the bill “will create a real recourse for victims of this indirect censorship and not let bad actors escape just by changing jobs.”

Another supporter, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), said:

If the JAWBONE Act becomes law, Americans will be able to sue federal officials for violating the First Amendment when they coerce social media companies, AI platforms, or broadcasters to change or take down protected speech. If the federal official did the jawboning “willfully and wantonly,” they’ll have to personally pay the damages. (Otherwise, the government will pay on their behalf.) That means federal employees will be personally incentivized to make sure they’re staying on the right side of the First Amendment when they reach out about speech on social media, AI platforms, TV, or radio.

The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University endorsed the bill as “an important mechanism for accountability when government officials unlawfully coerce private intermediaries to suppress protected speech.” Government officials are free to speak directly to the public, but they must not “use threats or regulatory power to coerce private intermediaries into suppressing protected speech,” the group said.

Public Knowledge said the bill could rein in Carr’s campaign against broadcasters and Trump administration attempts to censor social media.

“From FCC Chairman Carr using the threat of the agency’s regulatory authority to coerce broadcasters over programming he (and the president) dislikes, to officials punishing social media platforms over their content moderation policies, government actors time and again weaponize their power to pressure platforms, AI providers, and broadcasters to suppress speech they themselves disfavor,” the group said.

Boy, 7, Killed by Grandfather’s Pet Monkey

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Boy, 7, Killed by Grandfather’s Pet Monkey


A 7-year-old boy was killed in a horrifying attack after his grandfather’s pet monkey turned violent and mauled him outside the family’s home.

Little Ekkarat Srichan was playing near the house in Thailand when the macaque, named Choke, suddenly lunged at him, according to reports.

The animal sank its teeth into the boy’s chest and wrestled him to the ground in a terrifying attack that left neighbors shaken.

Witnesses said they heard the monkey shrieking as the child screamed in pain.

By the time relatives found Ekkarat, he was covered in bite marks and scratches. The monkey was still tied to a bamboo pole nearby with blood dripping from its mouth.

The boy was rushed to a local hospital, but doctors were unable to save him.

His devastated mother, Daranee Srichan, said doctors told her the monkey’s bite had punctured her son’s lung and struck a vital area.

“The doctor told me my son couldn’t survive because the monkey’s bite punctured his lung and hit a vital area,” the 27-year-old mother said. “If it hadn’t struck that spot, he would have been alright.”

The family said Ekkarat’s grandfather had rescued the monkey from the side of the road and kept it at the home.

But neighbors claimed the animal had already shown dangerous behavior before the deadly attack. They said Choke was known to growl, bare its teeth at people walking by and had even killed a stray cat that got too close.

After the boy’s death, the grandfather reportedly released the monkey into the mountains. That sparked fears among police and wildlife officials that the animal could attack someone else.

Authorities later found and captured the macaque.

Ekkarat’s grieving mother said the tragedy has changed her mind forever about keeping monkeys as pets.

“If I do, my other son might not survive,” she said.

Owning macaques is legal in Thailand, but the practice is strictly regulated. Keeping wild-caught or protected macaques without permission can lead to fines, prosecution and the animal being confiscated.

UK defense – a hole in the bucket

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UK defense – a hole in the bucket

In the 1950s and 1960s, a massive wave of underground humor swept across the USSR and the Eastern Bloc featuring a fictional broadcaster called Armenian Radio (known in the West as Radio Yerevan). Many of the jokes involved food lines and food scarcity, a fact of Soviet life.

In one widely circulated shaggy dog story, a man gets in different lines to try and buy some food for dinner. Each time, he reaches the end of the line to be told they are out of (meat, sausages, chicken etc.). He finally explodes in anger. A KGB man tells him to please behave better.

This is something new. The man in line comments that not only is the Soviet Union out of hamburger and chicken, it is out of bullets.

The Armenian Radio story reflects the condition of Great Britain today, not the Soviet Union of past years. The British military is out of everything. It even lacks bullets.

While the UK pretends to be a great power, it has a broken-down army, a fleet with submarines that can’t submarine and frigates that can’t frigate. Yet, despite these massive deficits, the UK promotes the war in Ukraine vociferously, thinking (one supposes) that as long as the Ukrainians are fighting and dying, the UK can worry less about defending itself.

As a member of NATO the UK depends on the United States for its survival, and on the “special relationship” it may have squandered under Keir Starmer. The near collapse of Britain’s fighting capability, including its dreadful lack of reserves and stockpiles, is paralleled by what looks like internal social collapse: a cultural crisis that is altering the UK, not for the better.

John Healey. Source: SCANPIX/AFP PHOTO/Wojtek Radwansk

The overall mess has now led to the resignation of the UK’s defense secretary, John Healey. Healey is a long-time Labor politician and Starmer stalwart. He is not a defense expert and has no particular national security background.

Healey reportedly demanded £18 billion in new funding to patch the critical structural holes in the armed forces (such as the idled submarine fleet, escort ship shortages and munitions stockpiles). The Treasury and Downing Street ultimately offered only £13.5 billion, with officials noting that only £10 billion of that was actually “new” money.

While Starmer previously pledged a long-term goal of hitting 3% of GDP on defense, Healey’s resignation letter revealed that the Treasury’s actual plan would only see defense spending reach 2.68% by 2030. Healey stated bluntly that this “falls well short of what is required for defense and the country at this dangerous time.”

  • At the end of the Cold War (1991), the British Army stood at roughly 155,000 active troops. Today, that number has dropped to approximately 72,500 – the lowest level since the Napoleonic era. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) have seen similar cuts, shrinking by 25% and 40% respectively since 2000.
  • The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has consistently missed recruitment targets. Privatized recruitment contracts have faced severe bureaucratic delays, causing applicants to drop out. Furthermore, social attitudes toward the military have shifted significantly among younger generations, hampering standard recruitment efforts.
  • Physical and mental health conditions mean that more than a fifth of remaining regular forces are classified as “not fully deployable” or completely undeployable.

The US has around 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers in Europe, more than the entire British army. US troops are better equipped and far better supported despite the huge distance between the US and Europe.

The level of UK support for NATO, defined as on or near the alleged front lines, is minimal. Roughly 800 to 1,000 British soldiers (typically an armored or mechanized infantry brigade combat team subunit equipped with Warrior infantry fighting vehicles or Challenger tanks) are stationed in Estonia. In Poland the UK maintains a smaller cavalry troop presence (usually around 150 personnel) integrated into the US-led NATO battlegroup in Orzysz.

While the UK is able to surge troops for NATO exercises, it is notably weak in supporting the Baltic States and Poland. The UK does provide intermittent RAF Typhoon deployments to bases in Lithuania, Estonia, or Romania.

Britain’s navy is in poor shape. There is a severe availability crisis for the hunter-killer submarine fleet. The Royal Navy has an operational availability rate of 0% for its deployed attack submarines. All of them are undergoing repairs. Britain’s ballistic missile submarines, Vanguard-class (Strategic Deterrence / SSBN) also are barely operational. The UK operates four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines based at HMNB Clyde (Faslane) in Scotland. They maintain the UK’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD).

Under a doctrine active since 1969, at least one British nuclear missile submarine is hidden underwater at sea every single second of the year. Each carries American-made Trident D5 strategic ballistic missiles, armed with British-manufactured nuclear warheads. Commissioned in the 1990s with a 25-year design life, these boats are ancient and wearing out. Maintenance overhauls that used to take months now take years, forcing the remaining active crews into grueling, record-breaking deployments (sometimes exceeding six months underwater) just to keep a single boat on patrol.

The UK has not had funds to procure enough F-35B aircraft for its aircraft carriers. The UK simply does not own enough F-35Bs to fully stock even one carrier’s maximum flight deck capacity (~36 to 40 jets) purely with British airframes. To project maximum power during major deployments, British carriers routinely embed US Marine Corps F-35B squadrons alongside the Royal Air Force/Royal Navy joint squadrons to fill the empty spots on the flight deck.

British carriers also don’t have adequate fleet support. They have had to rely on NATO assets, especially the US, for escort duties. This is critical to protect carriers from enemy submarines and from missile and drone attack. Whether British carriers, without integrated escort, are supportable in combat scenarios is an open question.

HMS Argyll in the basin outside the Frigate Support Centre, Feb 2024. Photo: Tom Leach

The situation is also dire in the surface fleet, especially type 23 frigates (Duke Class). The operational readiness of the escort fleet is under intense strain. Only a single Type 23 frigate (HMS St Albans) was actively working up or operating at sea, with the remainder immobilized in various stages of maintenance, refit, or crew reallocation.

A notable portion of the remaining force is locked in extended upkeep blocks to keep them structurally sound and safe for sea. HMS Kent, for example, entered a major, planned deep maintenance and modernization cycle to sustain its baseline utility through the late 2020s.

To plug gaping personnel deficits across the fleet and preserve resources for incoming platforms, the Ministry of Defence prematurely retired HMS Argyll and HMS Westminster. HMS Westminster was decommissioned despite recently undergoing a massive, multi-million-pound refit, because the Navy could not sustainably crew the vessel while simultaneously preparing personnel for future platforms.

The UK has severely depleted its previously inadequate weapons stockpiles. So, too has the United States, but the difference is the US is stepping up defense manufacturing (as best it can with an obsolete defense manufacturing infrastructure) while the UK lacks funds and will power to increase defense production. The failure to meet financial targets (which led to the Defense Secretary’s resignation) means that the road ahead is full of potholes.

A related problem is that the UK has been moving much equipment to Ukraine, but this cannot be sustained. NATO is hoping, along with the Ukrainians, that their drone strategy will keep the Russians contained and force a negotiation that will end Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. But this is a big wish, and drone “dominance” will sooner or later end as new counter-drone solutions get fielded.

The recently published UK Strategic Defence Review outlines a 10-year roadmap aimed at shifting the country toward true “warfighting readiness” rather than just looking good on a parade ground. The Defence Review is a solid assessment of Britain’s dire defense situation. It is unlikely under the current UK government that the Defence Review recommendations will be followed, or that funds will be found to change the current mess.

With plummeting defense capabilities, sooner or later UK politicians (and the supporting cast of defense experts) need to adjust to reality and rethink the country’s national security strategy. With a de minimis security role in NATO and empty stockpiles, the UK should be thinking more about home defense and less about power projection. In short, the UK needs to redefine its defense strategy from top to bottom.

As things now stand, the UK has a big hole in its defense bucket. It cannot continue without radical change in its plans and strategy.

Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy undersecretary of defense. This article, which originally appeared on his newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.

This unfathomably huge fungal network keeps Earth cool and green

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This unfathomably huge fungal network keeps Earth cool and green

Even if you don’t like eating mushrooms, you’re in debt to fungi. One group of them, known as arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi, form vast subterranean networks of tubes called hyphae, hooking up with the roots of plants to exchange nutrients. Earth is so verdant in large part thanks to these partnerships, as this expansive infrastructure is associated with nearly three-quarters of all plant species. But because the network sprawls underground, it’s been difficult for scientists to determine just how much arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi is out there. (Good luck digging everywhere on the planet and taking samples.)

Scientists have developed a workaround, which has produced some astonishing numbers. Using machine learning models, they’ve estimated that worldwide, the arbuscular mycorrhizal network stretches for 110 quadrillion kilometers, almost a billion times the distance from Earth to the sun. (Scoop up just a teaspoon of soil and you might find 10 meters of fungal strands.) Every year, these fungi shuttle around 4 billion metric tons of carbon, equal to 11 percent of humanity’s CO2 emissions. 

Because scientists have already taken thousands upon thousands of samples around the world, the researchers could train the models to build maps (you can play with them here) that predict where these fungi are more or less concentrated, even in the most remote environments. “We have started to have a clear picture of the full extent of these hidden living infrastructures that circulate carbon and nutrients in the soils beneath our feet,” said Toby Kiers, executive director of the Society for the Protection of Underground Networks and coauthor of the new paper, which published today in the journal Science.

enormous amounts of carbon underground in peat, or dead plant material that resists decay and accumulates over centuries.)

Toby Kiers and Merlin Sheldrake take soil samples in the mountains of Bhutan. Courtesy Tomás Munita

At the other end of the spectrum, the study found that in areas with large-scale agriculture, fungal network densities are about 50 percent lower on average. That may be because synthetic fertilizers provide crops all the nutrients they need, easing their reliance on arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi. Tillage also tears fungal networks apart at the end of a growing season. (Other research has found that tilling also disrupts soil’s ability to retain water.) “Maybe we can do better to have more fungal biomass in our agricultural systems, and in our terrestrial ecosystem as a whole, and capture more carbon dioxide,” said ecologist Smriti Pehim Limbu, who studies mycorrhizal fungi at Dartmouth College but wasn’t involved in the new paper.

Humanity has to feed itself, of course. But with this new data in hand, it can also take steps to protect these critical species hidden underground. “This map is for mycorrhizal fungi what the first detailed maps were for, I don’t know, ocean currents or river systems,” Kiers said. “Where you go from knowing a system exists to knowing where it is, how dense it is, and where it’s threatened.”


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A Point-by-Point Breakdown of Trump’s Failed Iran War Objectives

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A Point-by-Point Breakdown of Trump’s Failed Iran War Objectives


At the very start of his war with Iran, President Donald Trump declared victory. “We won,” Trump announced on March 11, 11 days after launching the joint attack with Israel. “In the first hour it ⁠was over.” But more than 2,200 hours later, the conflict is obviously still raging.

This week, U.S. forces bombarded Iran after the downing of an American Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded with strikes on targets across the Middle East and threats to “turn the entire region into hell.” Trump told Fox News’s Trey Yingst on Wednesday night that the U.S. fired 49 Tomahawk missiles at targets inside Iran, in addition to bombing raids by fighter jets. Yingst reported that Trump also said, “We’ll bomb the S out of them tomorrow night’” if Iran did not sign a peace agreement. Trump followed this on Thursday by declaring the U.S. would be “hitting Iran … VERY HARD TONIGHT.”

The burgeoning forever war contradicts months of reassurances by Trump that a peace deal with Iran is imminent.

An Intercept analysis of Trump’s claims about the Iran war, stated objectives, and supposed achievements finds the U.S. has fallen short or flamed out on all counts. The public record shows an administration that has consistently scaled back its goals and downgraded its claimed successes, without nearing anything resembling the victory Trump has touted. 

A Promise of World Peace

On the first day of the conflict, Trump laid out, with complete clarity, his most ambitious objectives. Claiming Iran was already “very much destroyed and, even, obliterated,” Trump said his war would bring peace to the region and, somehow, the globe. “The heavy and pinpoint bombing … will continue, uninterrupted … as long as necessary to achieve our objective of PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on February 28.

The bombing campaign was, indeed, “heavy.” The “pinpoint” attacks included a strike on an elementary school that killed between 150 and 175 civilians, most of them children. And thousands more civilians died in other strikes. Almost 149,000 civilian infrastructures, including homes, hospitals, and schools, have been damaged in the U.S.–Israel war, according to an April report from the Iranian Red Crescent Society. An estimated 400,000 people have been affected by damage to houses and apartments. But Iran was not “very much destroyed,” much less “obliterated.”

Peace in the Middle East, it goes without saying, never came to pass. The U.S.–Israeli strikes actually kicked off a regional war that grew to include more than a dozen countries, including Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Beyond this, the inability of the self-proclaimed “peace president,” head of the world’s newly created Board of Peace, and recipient of the first FIFA Peace Prize to achieve “peace throughout … the world” may stand as Trump’s grandest failure.

Just two days after setting out his topline goals, Trump began publicly vacillating and dramatically scaling back U.S. aims. “Our objectives are clear. First, we’re destroying Iran’s missile capabilities,” he said during a March 2 White House ceremony. “Second, we’re annihilating their navy. … Third, we’re ensuring that the world’s number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon. … And finally, we’re ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.”

Months later, these objectives remain unmet.

Eliminating Missiles

While the United States claims to have struck more than 13,000 targets in Iran, leaked U.S. intelligence assessments found evidence that Iran restored 30 of the 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz to operational status, and retained 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile and 70 percent of its mobile launchers. Reports emerged that in April and May, Iran began efforts to repair its Yazd Missile Base. In just one day last week, Kuwait says it was targeted by an Iranian barrage of “13 hostile ballistic missiles.” On Sunday, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israel. And on Thursday, Iran attacked multiple countries in the region, including Jordan which said it shot down 20 Iranian missiles.

During an aborted interview with NBC News that aired on Sunday, even Trump admitted he had failed. “They have some missiles left,” he said. “I would say, percentage-wise, maybe 21, 22 percent of their missiles. It’s a lot of missiles.” 

Annihilating the Navy

While the U.S. sunk many Iranian ships, the Iranian Navy has not been annihilated. In fact, U.S. Central Command, which is overseeing the war effort, has repeatedly referred to actions by Iran’s Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy in the months since Trump laid out his aims, demonstrating that both still exist, upending Trump’s frequent boasts to the contrary.

Just last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “there is no Iranian Navy,” and in the next breath admitted there was, referencing Iran’s “Boston Whalers with machine guns on them.”

Ending the Nuclear Program

Iran also still maintains its stockpile of enriched uranium. And there is no evidence that nuclear sites that were not attacked during Trump’s 2025 Iran war, such as Pickaxe Mountain, were ever damaged. Last week, in fact, Rubio confirmed that Iran’s “nuclear program” still exists. And during his recent NBC interview, Trump acknowledged that Iran still possessed its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and “they can get it, I guess, with years of work.”

Last week, Rubio even suggested Iran might be allowed to continue enrichment at some later date, noting it would need to accept “severe and long-term limitations, and/or cancellation, of enrichment.”

Halting Funding of Militias

The Trump administration has also failed to ensure “that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.” Days after Trump declared this war aim, House Republicans introduced legislation stating that “Iran remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and provides substantial financial and military support to groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.” In the months since, even the Trump administration says the president’s goals haven’t been achieved.

In mid-April, the State Department said that Iran still “funnels the wealth of the Iranian people to Hizballah and other terrorists in the Middle East.” That same month, the Treasury Department took action against a “constellation of Iran-backed terrorist militias,” specifically “seven Iraqi militia commanders responsible for planning, directing, and executing attacks against U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq,” including leaders of Kata’ib Hizballah, Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Harakat Al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq. In May, the Treasury Department again targeted “Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq,” sanctioning “leaders of Iran-aligned terrorist militias Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq” and referencing still “other Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq.”

Unconditional Surrender

This assemblage of failures has been compounded by other unmet war aims. On March 6, Trump set the terms for an agreement with Iran. “There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!” he wrote on Truth Social. In the months since, that hard-line stance has turned to mush.

“There is the prospect before us — which could happen today,” Rubio said last week of a potential peace deal, in a weak-kneed explanation to lawmakers. “We’re hopeful that something like that could happen in which the straits would reopen, we would enter into a period of negotiations on very specific topics — delineated negotiations in the hope of reaching an outcome that’s acceptable to us, and something they would be able to do as well.”

Reopening the Strait

The “straits” in question have become another sticking point and catastrophe. After failing to achieve all his initial war aims, Trump added another that was nothing more than a return to the status quo antebellum in the Strait of Hormuz: opening the waterway to traffic after Iran imposed a wartime blockade.

Before the war, the average number of vessels crossing the strait — a critical artery for the world’s oil, fertilizer, helium, critical materials for microchips, and numerous other goods — was more than 120 per day. It has never been close to that level again.

“I gave Iran ten days to MAKE A DEAL or OPEN UP THE HORMUZ STRAIT. Time is running out,” Trump declared on April 4. When the U.S. and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 7, Trump wrote on social media that he would “suspend the bombing and attack of Iran” on the condition that Tehran agree to the “COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.”

The next day, the White House declared: “Iran has now agreed to a ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz as the Trump Administration negotiates a broader peace agreement — once more proving Peace Through Strength victorious.” But that same day, Iran closed the strait, following continued Israeli attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. 

In response to Iran’s blockade, the U.S. imposed its own blockade of the strait on April 13, barring commercial vessels from entering or leaving Iranian ports. Then on April 15, Trump posted: “I am permanently opening the Strait of Hormuz.” Two days later, Trump claimed, “Iran has agreed to never close the Strait of Hormuz again.” On April 19, Trump said Iran had launched attacks in the strait and noted Iran had announced a blockade. On April 23, Trump ordered the Navy to attack Iranian ships laying mines in the strait. On May 6, Trump teased that the war might be “at an end, and the highly effective Blockade will allow the Hormuz Strait to be OPEN TO ALL, including Iran.” A day later, Trump said U.S. warships came under Iranian fire in the strait. The situation was still dragging on when Trump wrote, on May 29: “The Hormuz Strait must be immediately open, no tolls, for unrestricted shipping traffic, in both directions.” On Monday, a U.S. Army Apache helicopter gunship patrolling the strait was downed by Iran. 

The Strait of Hormuz remains functionally closed, except for a tiny trickle of traffic. “Last month, I directed our Great U.S. Military to execute a secret mission to support Oil Tankers and other Commercial Ships through the Strait of Hormuz,” Trump posted on Wednesday. “More than 200 Commercial Ships have safely traveled through the Strait.” (About 3,000 ships normally traverse it every month.) On Thursday, Iran announced that it, again, closed the strait to oil tankers and commercial ships.

Oil industry analysts say that global oil reserves are dwindling and that if the war doesn’t wrap up in the near term, petroleum prices could skyrocket to $150 a barrel. “The oil will go down,” Trump said on NBC, but acknowledged the war had driven up prices. “We’re going to have higher gasoline. We’re going to have a little higher fertilizer,” he admitted, before equivocating further when asked if gasoline prices had peaked. “Well, it depends. I mean, it depends where the war goes. It could be,” he waffled. “If we sign an agreement, it’ll go down now. Otherwise, it’ll go down after we’re finished.”

Oil prices rose to about $95 a barrel on Thursday as the U.S. and Iran continued to launch attacks. Trump said on Wednesday that the price of oil would have been at $250 a barrel had the U.S. government not been siphoning off “millions of barrels” of Iran’s oil over the course of the war. On Thursday, Trump posted that the U.S. would also soon seize Iran’s “oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their Oil and Gas Markets.” Despite the rampant oil theft and threats of more to come, U.S. inflation accelerated for a third straight month in May, driven by energy prices which rose 3.9 percent over the month.

A Peace Deal

The “agreement” in question is still another failed aim. On March 23, Trump told reporters about supposed peace talks and cited “major points of agreement, I would ​say — almost all points of agreement.” Iran denied negotiations had taken place. Two days later, Trump claimed Iran wanted to “make a deal so badly.” On March 26, he said Iran was “begging to make a deal.” On April 15, he said the war was “very close to over.” On April 17, Trump claimed that Iran had “agreed to everything” and that “we will get a deal in the next day or two.” 

“An Agreement has been largely negotiated, subject to finalization,” Trump announced on May 23. On June 2, Trump wrote: “as I told Iran, ‘It’s time, one way or another, for you to make a Deal.’” Then Trump told NBC late last week: “We’re very close to having a deal.” But on Monday, Trump said a “Final Deal” has yet to be “reached.”

What such a “deal” will end shines a bright light on another flip-flop failure by the president. Trump went from claiming, in early March, that the U.S. won the war with Iran, to attempting to convince Americans that he never even went to war in the first place. “We don’t call it a war,” he said before the end of that month. “We call it a military operation.” By early May, Trump was calling it a “mini war” or “a little detour.”

Just Give Him Two Weeks

The deadline for when this “mini-war” will finally end may be the most telling of Trump’s failed aims and achievements. It’s well known that Trump’s lying and laziness coalesce around one simple phrase: two weeks. “We’ll have something in two weeks,” Trump said in January of an agreement with Europe to extend U.S. control over Greenland, to take one example.

Trump has long used this two-week delaying tactic when faced with vexing questions about anyone and everything, from Russian President Vladimir Putin and the war on ISIS to international trade and the Covid-19 pandemic. Two weeks really means later. Except when it means never.

The ceasefire with Iran, announced on April 7, was initially supposed to last “two weeks” while the two countries inked a deal to end the war, according to Trump. He claimed at the time that they were already “very far along with a definitive Agreement concerning Longterm PEACE with Iran, and PEACE in the Middle East.”

On Monday evening, Trump held a tele-rally for South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham where he addressed his failed war with Iran. “We’re negotiating now, and they want to make a very good deal. They’re willing to give us everything,” Trump claimed, noting, “It’ll happen very soon.” The president then added in his favorite faux time frame: “I think we are winning that battle, but you’re really going to win it over the next two weeks when we declare total victory.”

UK, Australia, Canada launch fund to support two-state solution efforts

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uk,-australia,-canada-launch-fund-to-support-two-state-solution-efforts
UK, Australia, Canada launch fund to support two-state solution efforts

Group of Palestinian children in Bureyc Camp raise the Palestinian flag over the rubble of buildings destroyed by Israeli strikes following announcements of recognition of the State of Palestine by Canada, Australia, the UK, and Portugal, on September 22, 2025, in Gaza City, Gaza. [Moiz Salhi - Anadolu Agency]

Group of Palestinian children in Bureyc Camp raise the Palestinian flag over the rubble of buildings destroyed by Israeli strikes following announcements of recognition of the State of Palestine by Canada, Australia, the UK, and Portugal, on September 22, 2025, in Gaza City, Gaza. [Moiz Salhi – Anadolu Agency]

The United Kingdom, Australia and Canada announced Thursday the creation of a new International Peace Fund aimed at supporting efforts toward a two-state solution between Palestine and Israel, Anadolu Agency reports.

In a joint statement, the three countries said the multi-donor fund will support projects designed to advance the conditions for a negotiated two-state solution.

The governments said the initiative will complement ongoing diplomatic, humanitarian and development efforts by supporting organizations working to promote peacebuilding and mutual understanding.

The three countries reaffirmed their commitment to a negotiated two-state solution, describing it as the only viable path to lasting peace.

The UK, Australia and Canada will each contribute initial seed funding equivalent to £1 million ($1.3 million) over three years. The fund will also be open to contributions from other international partners.

READ: ‘A stain on our city’: UK urged to ban Israeli property fair selling stolen Palestinian land

After nearly breaking, NASA’s Deep Space Network “worked well” on Artemis II

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After nearly breaking, NASA’s Deep Space Network “worked well” on Artemis II

NASA pushed its Deep Space Network beyond its limits during the Artemis I mission nearly four years ago. The global array of deep space communications antennas couldn’t keep up with the routine demands of 40 robotic science missions and the extraordinary surge required by NASA’s Orion space capsule as it flew around the Moon.

The experience in late 2022 reduced or delayed downlinks from several high-profile science missions, including the James Webb Space Telescope and Mars rovers, as the data-hungry Artemis I mission took priority on NASA’s communications network. And that was before the first Artemis mission with astronauts onboard. When Artemis II launched April 1, NASA called upon the Deep Space Network (DSN) again to connect Mission Control to the Orion capsule as it soared more than a quarter of a million miles from Earth.

With a crew of four flying inside the spacecraft, the agency’s appetite for data from Orion on Artemis II was even higher than it was on Artemis I. But at a little more than nine days, the Artemis II mission was shorter than the 25 days Artemis I spent in space, helping alleviate the communications overload. Artemis I also launched 10 small CubeSats into deep space, many of which required tracking and telecom services from the DSN. Artemis II carried fewer CubeSats.

“We learned a lot on Artemis I, and we actually put some new processes in place ahead of Artemis II, mostly focused around coordination and our scheduling processes with all the missions, not just the Orion vehicle itself,” said Greg Heckler, deputy program manager for capability development in NASA’s Space Communications and Navigation Program. “I think that worked well.”

Lessons learned

Heckler said NASA’s science division, responsible for most of the missions using the DSN, provided the network’s managers with “positive feedback” after Artemis II. But the limitations of the network and the high demand continue to “create some asset contention” among NASA’s missions.

“During Artemis I, we had a subsystem called the Private Cloud Appliance. This PCA actually failed during Artemis I. Because of that failure, that high visibility, we actually received some additional resources from our Moon to Mars program, and we were able to install, effectively, a new subsystem ahead of Artemis II,” Heckler said.

The demand for signal is only going up. NASA and its commercial and international partners plan to launch numerous missions to the Moon in the next few years. NASA is working with commercial providers to construct ground antennas for a dedicated network for Moon missions, called Lunar Exploration Ground Sites (LEGS), to free up more capacity on the DSN to support other spacecraft. Commercial companies are also developing data relay satellites to fly in orbit around the Moon, supporting future landers and construction of a Moon Base. High-bandwidth optical communications may be another solution. NASA successfully tested a laser communications terminal on the Orion spacecraft on Artemis II.

“We’re going to have to work as a community to deal with that higher level of contention during the Artemis missions themselves, but we’re doing everything to establish non-DSN, or new infrastructure, to take on that load and burden,” Heckler said Wednesday in a meeting of the Small Bodies Assessment Group.

Asking for more

The burden currently includes around 40 operating missions that rely on the DSN’s antennas in California, Spain, and Australia to stay in communication with Earth. Most of NASA’s missions outlive their original design lives, so they put demand on the network for longer as the agency launches new spacecraft.

About 40 more missions are projected to need the DSN over the next 10 years, and many of the 40 missions currently using time on the network will likely still be operating over that time. One of NASA’s most data-intensive missions, the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, is scheduled for launch in August. It will return more data through the DSN than all of NASA’s previous astrophysics missions combined.

The 10 CubeSats that launched as secondary payloads on Artemis I placed an unforeseen burden on the DSN. Some of the small satellites were lost soon after deploying from the rocket, and their operators called upon the DSN to use its giant antennas to search for the CubeSats as they headed into deep space, further exacerbating the communications crunch the network was already experiencing with the Orion spacecraft.

“Before onboarding new missions to the DSN, we now strictly require a feasibility study to see if there’s enough capacity to make that type of commitment,” Heckler said. “So we’re trying to balance, through data and analysis, the new demands coming onto the system versus those legacy missions we have to support until they fly out due to natural causes.”

DSN managers are also working with NASA’s older missions, some of which continue to pull on the network decades after their launch, to understand how much capacity they will use. As these older missions got extended, some of them did not update the network on their needs. “Some missions are using more than what their paperwork would say,” Heckler said.

“Once that is in place, as we move forward with new mission commitments, we will just be more focused, I think, and more process-oriented in being able to commit to new missions or not,” Heckler said.

Key antenna offline

One constraint on the DSN is an accident last year that knocked one of the network’s three 70-meter (230-foot) antennas offline at the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex near Barstow, California. This antenna, along with similar ones in Spain and Australia, is used to communicate with some of NASA’s most distant missions.

The 70-meter dish was tracking NASA’s Juno spacecraft at Jupiter last September when it “over-rotated” and damaged cables and water lines in the facility’s fire suppression system. An estimated 200,000 gallons of water flooded the base of the antenna. The water contained glycol, causing it to be classified as an environmental hazard, officials wrote in a report after investigating the accident. The resulting flooding rendered the antenna inoperable.

Investigators cited several technical and process causes. After troubleshooting a problem with the antenna’s emergency stops, technicians at Goldstone “overrode and bypassed multiple safeguards that normally would have prevented over-rotation,” officials wrote in the report.

“The investigation revealed inadequate training, insufficient written procedures, a reliance on undocumented behaviors and tacit knowledge, and deficiencies in the antenna’s control logic,” officials wrote. “In addition to the root causes listed above, the hydraulic limit system—the final fail safe against over-rotation—was discovered to have been severely damaged to the point of inoperability in an unknown and undocumented prior incident.”

Work logs indicated the hydraulic limit system was last tested in 2004.

NASA officials estimate it will cost between $4.1 million and $4.6 million to repair and restore the antenna to service. “Our plan for that system is to combine any of the remediation after the mishap with an already planned upgrade cycle that will keep that system down into 2028,” Heckler said.

Ukraine war now longer than the first world war – the similarities are unsettling

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Ukraine war now longer than the first world war – the similarities are unsettling

The war in Ukraine has now exceeded the first world war in duration. And while the comparison between these two conflicts is imperfect, it is becoming difficult to ignore.

Some of the similarities are obvious. At the tactical level, the conflict in Ukraine has witnessed the return of artillery as the dominant arm of battle.

During much of the first year of the war, artillery was responsible for the vast majority of casualties. Although drones have since transformed the battlefield, artillery remains indispensable to both sides.

Equally striking has been the return of extensive trench systems. Not since the Iran-Iraq war, which was fought between 1980 and 1988, has a major interstate conflict depended so heavily upon field fortifications and prepared positions such as trenches, concrete obstacles and belts of barbed wire.

Large-scale manoeuvre has given way to attritional combat measured in hundreds of metres rather than tens of kilometres.

Yet the deeper similarities lie not in trenches or artillery, but in the underlying logic of the war itself. Like the first world war, the conflict in Ukraine has become a contest of endurance: manpower, industrial capacity, economic resilience and political will.

These factors, rather than any individual weapons system, are likely to determine its eventual outcome. Of these, the most important is manpower.

Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Russian strike on a car dealership in Kyiv.

Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a Russian strike on a car dealership in Kyiv, Ukraine, on June 2. Sergey Dolzhenko / EPA

Broadly comparable losses

During the first world war, British, French and German governments routinely published casualty lists. The public knew that victories often came at immense cost.

Military leaders understood that the key question was not simply how many casualties the enemy had suffered, but whether their own societies could continue to bear comparable losses for longer than the opponent.

Battles such as Verdun and the Somme in 1916 and Passchendaele (also known as the Third Battle of Ypres) in 1917 generally produced losses that were severe for both sides. This was well understood on the home front.

Yet in the Ukraine war, we are regularly invited to believe that Russia sustains several times the number of dead than is suffered by Ukraine. In a particularly unlikely example, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, claimed that 47 Russians were dying for every Ukrainian earlier in 2026.

About a year ago, I was having dinner at a London club with a well-connected former Ukrainian government official whom I have known for some time. Our conversation turned to casualties.

I asked them: “Tell me, no bullshit: what is the real casualty ratio?” My companion paused before replying quietly: “Same as the Russians.” Surprised, I asked for the source. “The General Staff,” they replied.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the senior military command headquarters of Ukraine’s armed forces – the body responsible for planning, directing and coordinating military operations at the highest level.

This is an anecdote, but publicly available evidence tends to support this assertion. Sources such as the New York Times have also confirmed that casualties on both sides are similar, with Russia sustaining more, but not multiple times more. Russia, of course, has a far larger population than Ukraine.

The precise casualty figures remain contested and are likely to remain so until long after the war ends. What matters for present purposes, however, is that the available evidence points towards a war of broadly comparable losses rather than one in which either side enjoys an overwhelming advantage in manpower attrition.

A member of the Ukrainian armed forces fires a rocket towards a Russian position.

A member of the Ukrainian armed forces fires a rocket towards a Russian position in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine on June 4. Mechanized Brigade / EPA

Even if these figures are broadly correct, Ukraine has held the line against a much larger adversary for over four years now and has shown extraordinary resilience in the face of invasion. Its capacity for innovation has repeatedly surprised observers.

New drones, autonomous systems and precision-strike technologies are often presented as solutions to the country’s growing manpower difficulties. Some commentators even suggest that robotic systems may compensate for shortages of personnel.

The difficulty with this argument is that war is an interactive contest. Almost every significant Ukrainian innovation has been met by a Russian adaptation and vice versa. The result has been a continuing cycle of measure and countermeasure rather than a decisive technological breakthrough by either side.

Technology matters enormously, but it rarely abolishes the need for manpower. Artillery, tanks, aircraft and machine guns transformed warfare between 1914 and 1918, yet none removed the requirement to occupy and defend ground with soldiers.

The same remains true today. As military doctrine has long recognised, drones, missiles and aircraft can destroy, disrupt and delay, but ground can only be taken and held by troops.

A Ukrainian drone pilot holds a first-person view drone at an undisclosed location near the frontline.

A Ukrainian drone pilot holds a first-person view drone at an undisclosed location near the frontline in the Druzhkivka area of eastern Ukraine. Maria Senovilla / EPA

There are other echoes of 1918. The small infiltration and assault groups employed by both sides in Ukraine’s drone-saturated battlefields bear a striking resemblance to the German stormtroopers who achieved remarkable successes during the Spring Offensive of 1918.

As so often in warfare, however, innovation did not confer a lasting advantage. The British and French adapted, developed countermeasures and eventually improved upon many of the new tactics themselves.

What transformed the strategic balance in the first world war was not tactical innovation or a decisive technological breakthrough, but the arrival of the US Army and Marine Corps. More than 2 million American soldiers ultimately served in Europe, and their battlefield presence convinced Germany that time was no longer on its side.

Ukraine faces no such prospect today. For all the discussion of technological revolution, the war in Ukraine remains a contest of human endurance – just like the first world war.

How the development of solar and wind farms on the Tibetan Plateau is affecting local communities

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How the development of solar and wind farms on the Tibetan Plateau is affecting local communities

China is building some of the world’s largest solar farms on the Tibetan Plateau, where nomadic people have grazed herds of animals for millennia.

It’s not the first time Tibetan regions have become a major source of renewable energy in China. Since the mid-1990s, many Tibetan communities have lived alongside hydropower stations.

Now, with vast open landscapes and high elevations that provide ideal conditions for harnessing solar and wind energy, many pastoral lands have become key sites for large-scale renewable energy projects.

As part of my ethnographic research, I spoke to number of people in this area, offering a rare look at how large-scale energy development is affecting nomadic communities.

Large metal structures hold up dark panels, and underneath bovine animals walk and graze.

Yaks graze underneath the panels of a solar farm. Sanggay Tashi, CC BY-ND

Herding yaks on solar farms

I spent time in a nomadic community located about 100 miles (161 km) southeast of Xining city, the capital of Qinghai province.

Beginning in 2017 and accelerating more recently, regional subsidiaries of energy companies such as PowerChina have built three solar panel power plants – enough to generate about 1 gigawatt of power – and a dozen wind turbines on the area’s open grasslands.

Sandy, desert-type land is well known to be suitable for solar and wind farms. Yet the grasslands and many other pastoral areas turned into solar farms are not sandy deserts. They are productive grazing land where Tibetans have herded yaks and sheep for generations.

Parts of what was once open fine alpine grassland, which Tibetans call pangtang where herders moved freely and gazed across the boundless horizon, are now covered by dense rows of solar panels. It remains unclear how these sites comply with China’s grassland conservation regulations. Other solar projects elsewhere in China have reportedly been investigated for environmental violations.

Walking through the sites feels like moving through a dense forest of iron pillars rising into the air. “It is easy to get lost in this jungle of solar panels,” Tsering, a local observer, told me as we walked between long rows of panels on a windy winter day in 2023.

That day, I also met Dolma, a local Dokpa, or nomad, herding yaks under solar panels. As we talked, she told me the solar farm had changed the experience of herding. She said, “I am used to herding on open grassland. So, herding under these glass panels feels like something is wrapping around my head. It feels very depressing.”

Mostly bare ground lies between rows of solar panels.

The topsoil and grasses are disturbed by the construction of the posts and digging for underground cables. Sanggay Tashi, CC BY-ND

Individual and collective tensions

These energy projects in nomadic communities are presented as part of of national efforts to modernize rural areas, bring capital to local communities and promote renewable energy development as part of China’s clean energy and carbon reduction agenda.

But their implementation brings tensions and contradictions in the communities where they are located.

Based on my conversations with more than 20 people in the community, some view them as good economic opportunities and are envious of those whose grazing lands were selected for lease. Others oppose them, saying they “open the gate” for outsiders to appropriate local land for short-term financial gain by a few.

As more outsiders move in and the landscape changes with these energy projects, the overall concern that I observed from talking to different people is that the land that generations have lived on and protected may not retain the same sense of home in the future.

Tsering, who guided me through the solar farms, is very critical of those who agreed to lease land to solar farms, saying, “I may sound pretentious, but these days people are like grass growing on a wall – easily swayed by the slightest breeze of money.”

Since the 1950s, all land in China has been either government-owned or collectively owned; private land ownership is not allowed. Individuals may hold fixed-term “land-use rights” that can be transferred, sold or leased. In the 2000s, the government allocated land to individual families in nomadic areas of Qinghai and granted them 50-year “grassland use certificates.”This enables the locals to raise livestock on the land and lease it to others. Most certificates are set to expire in 2050.

Some holders of grassland use certificates have leased their land to energy farms. In the area I studied, those leases typically are for around 25 years, to align with the remaining term of local grassland use rights. What will happen when these land use rights expire remains unknown.

Rows of metal frames stand on flat land.

A solar farm under construction in eastern Tibet. Sanggay Tashi, CC BY-ND

Money matters

In practice, leasing is extremely complex. When I asked a dozen families about their official contracts with the energy companies, several people said they signed it without fully understanding what it said.

“The only thing people made sure to know is how much money they are receiving,” one person said to me. The documents included long and complicated legal or technical language in Chinese, some of which was orally translated into Tibetan during the signing, because many nomads who are heads of households and more than 40 years old can’t read either Chinese or Tibetan.

Negotiations and leasing decisions are often carried out between company representatives and a small number of heads of households, brought together with the help of local officials. That leaves many residents uninformed about the terms and conditions of the agreements.

Households that lease grazing land to energy projects receive a one-time payment that depends on the amount of land involved and which company is seeking the lease. From 2017 to 2026, residents have told me they received offers between 3,000 and 4,000 yuan (US$440 to $587) for each mu, a unit of area equivalent to about 0.16 acres. Those rates have resulted in payments between 40,000 and 100,0000 yuan ($7,300 to $147,000) per household.

Rows of solar panels are in the background as several animals graze on brown grass.

Livestock graze near solar panels in eastern Tibet. Sanggay Tashi, CC BY-ND

Human relations with the land

The energy companies’ contracts treat local households and land as individually owned properties in financial transactions. But local Indigenous communities have a different understanding and relationship to the environment.

Socially and historically, and regardless of the government policies on land ownership, Tibetans have perceived pastoral land as communal and experienced it as inhabited by all kinds of beings besides humans, including deities, animals, insects and other visible and invisible beings that are important in the Tibetan cosmological worldview. The energy planners often disregard these local ways of understanding and relating to the land.

During a dinner conversation, four local residents told me about one of these deeper spiritual concerns. During the construction of transmission lines to carry the solar power to users, they said, several transmission poles were placed very close to a labtse of a neighboring community. A labtse is a sacred site where an important mountain deity is believed to reside and where community members make regular offerings.

When locals asked for the poles to be moved, the energy developers suggested they would cover the cost of relocating the labtse instead – which, culturally, cannot be done, and if it were would require direction from high-ranking religious figures.

For the local people, however, this was not a matter of compensation but of protecting the deity from being stabbed by the giant poles. Some residents were even willing to pay the planners to move the poles. After a series of negotiations, the poles were eventually moved a short distance from the labtse.

People climb a wooden pole that is dwarfed by metal towers and wind turbines.

Workers set up power transmission lines. Sanggay Tashi, CC BY-ND

Living alongside energy farms

Herding on energy farms comes with new challenges.

When the solar panels were installed, excavation for support posts and underground cables disturbed the topsoil and destroyed the native grasses, which consist of a diverse species of grass. According to people involved in the work, the replacement grasses consisted of only one or two dominant species among the several that were common in the local ecosystem. And the seeds used for restoration came from beyond the local area, so residents are unsure whether the replanted grasses are exactly the same as the types that grow locally.

During winter, snow under the shade of solar panels takes a long time to melt, causing baby lambs to freeze in the cold. Dolma also told me, “The solar panels are making a fortune for the wild fox because it is hard to see them when they attack little lambs under the panels.”

Dolma told me that when the wind turbines were being built, their noise frightened her livestock and carried across the valley, disturbing neighbors during windy times.

The locals also told me that wind blowing through the posts and wires of solar farms produces persistent and unsettling noises that disturb both animals and people.

Future uncertainties

While these solar farms are generally considered “renewable” and part of “sustainable development,” their future remains uncertain. Locals told me they do not know whether the land-lease contracts will be renewed or abandoned when they expire in about 25 years. Solar panels also last around 25 years, and local people wonder how the waste will be disposed of.

As more Indigenous communities around the world become locations for climate mitigation projects, energy production and data centers, the stories of local people are essential to understand how their ways of life, culture and environment are affected by these new interventions.

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