For Kyiv, Russia’s talk of peace matters less than the conditions attached to it and the attacks that continue
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent suggestion that the war in Ukraine may be nearing an end has reopened a central question for Kyiv and its partners: Is Moscow preparing for a genuine diplomatic opening, or is it using the language of peace to pressure Ukraine and divide Western support while the war continues?
The contradiction is difficult to ignore. Putin and other Kremlin officials have spoken in recent days about possible movement toward ending the war while continuing to demand that Ukraine withdraw from territories Russia claims to have annexed, including territory that Russian forces do not fully control. Reuters reported this week that the Kremlin repeated Putin’s June 2024 conditions, under which a ceasefire and negotiations could take place only if Ukraine withdrew from the four Ukrainian regions Russia says it has annexed. Kyiv has rejected those terms as unacceptable.
Russia’s actions on the battlefield point in the opposite direction. On May 13 and 14, Russia launched what Reuters described as its largest two-day aerial assault since the start of the full-scale invasion, using 1,567 drones and 56 missiles, according to Zelenskyy. The strikes hit Kyiv and other regions, damaged homes and infrastructure, disrupted electricity in several areas, and killed at least 15 civilians. The attacks came as Moscow continued to present itself as open to talks.
For Kyiv, Russia’s terms look less like a compromise than a demand for capitulation. Moscow announced short ceasefires around Easter and Victory Day, but both sides accused each other of violations. Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov recently told the Russian news agency Interfax that Russia saw no point in further peace talks until Ukraine withdrew its troops from the Donbas, reinforcing Ukraine’s view that Moscow’s offer is an ultimatum presented as diplomacy.
More than four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Russia still occupies about one-fifth of Ukrainian territory and retains major advantages in manpower, missile capacity, artillery production, and strategic depth. Yet Moscow failed to seize Kyiv, failed to collapse the Ukrainian state, and has failed to fully control the four Ukrainian regions it claims as Russian territory. Russia declared the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia in September 2022 after widely rejected referendums, but it did not fully control all four regions then and has never done so since.
David Satter, an American journalist, historian, and former Moscow correspondent, said Putin’s recent language should be treated as potentially meaningful because it is unusual, not because it necessarily indicates a real shift in Moscow’s goals.
“It is serious because it is unusual, and it could be a signal to the Russian public that there may be some concessions Russia will have to make,” Satter told The Media Line. “But at this stage, I would not attach too much importance to it, because Russia also has a desire to appear reasonable.”
Satter said Moscow’s aim may be less about persuading Kyiv than about influencing Europe. In his view, Russia wants to create the impression that it is willing to compromise in order to weaken European resolve and separate Ukraine from its supporters. “They want to separate Ukraine from its European supporters,” he said. “It is in their interest to give the impression that they are willing to compromise.”
Jason Jay Smart, an adviser on national security and geopolitics based between Kyiv and Washington, and an expert on Russia and Ukraine, offered a sharper assessment from the Ukrainian perspective. “Inside Ukraine, Putin’s statements are not taken as a serious offer,” Smart told The Media Line. “They are heard as messaging aimed at Washington and Europe, while Russia keeps attacking on the ground.”
Smart pointed to recent ceasefire announcements as one reason Ukrainians judge Moscow by conduct rather than by Kremlin statements. “Moscow announced Easter and May 9 ‘Victory Day’ ceasefires, then violated them hundreds of times,” he said, “which is why Ukrainians judge the conduct, not the Kremlin wording.”
That is not negotiation. It is surrender language packaged as diplomacy.
He also referred to Ushakov’s statement on Donbas as evidence that Moscow’s diplomatic language still rests on demands Ukraine cannot accept. “That is not negotiation,” Smart said. “It is surrender language packaged as diplomacy.”
Russia has gained territory, but it has not achieved the political victory it sought. Satter described Ukraine’s achievement as “enormous” because, in his view, it prevented the destruction of the country. Ukraine, he said, stopped Russia from achieving its initial invasion goals, held many major cities, and forced Russia to pay “a terrible price” for whatever gains it has achieved.
Russia’s achievements, by contrast, are harder to define politically, Satter said. Moscow wrote four Ukrainian oblasts—Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—into the Russian constitution, but it has not fully conquered the territory it claims. “In terms of their objectives, they have not been successful,” he said. Russia declared the regions part of the Russian Federation, but “they have not conquered those territories.”
He said Luhansk is the only one of the four under near-total Russian control, while Donetsk remains only partly occupied, and Russia still lacks full control of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. For that reason, he argued, Moscow’s battlefield gains have not produced the political victory the Kremlin claimed when it announced the annexations.
Ukrainians are exhausted, but they are not confused about what surrender would bring
Smart framed Ukraine’s current position as both exhausted and determined. Years of missile strikes, funerals, mobilization, and occupation have placed enormous pressure on Ukrainian society, he said, but have not produced acceptance of Russian rule. “Ukrainians are exhausted,” he said, “but they are not confused about what surrender would bring.”
Ukraine’s political position, Smart argued, rests on a simple principle: an aggressor cannot invade another country and then demand to keep the territory it managed to seize. “You cannot break into someone’s house and then demand to keep the rooms you managed to occupy,” he said. “The invader has to leave.”
He described Ukraine’s central achievement as survival that has imposed real costs on Russia. “Ukraine preserved the state, defended Kyiv, kept democratic politics alive, reopened trade routes, struck Russian military infrastructure, and showed the limits of Russian power,” Smart said. “Its central achievement is survival with consequences.”
Ukraine’s resilience has depended on outside support, but Smart cautioned against reducing the war to Western weapons alone. External aid mattered because Ukraine first made the national decision to resist. “Without that national decision,” he said, “no shipment of weapons would have saved the country.”
One of Ukraine’s clearest military successes has been its use of aerial drones, unmanned naval systems, electronic warfare, battlefield software, and locally adapted technologies. These tools have helped Ukraine partly offset Russia’s advantages in armor, artillery, and manpower by allowing Ukrainian forces to damage or destroy costlier Russian equipment with cheaper, more flexible systems.
“Drones and electronic warfare changed the economics of the battlefield,” Smart said. Unable to match Russia “tank for tank or shell for shell,” Ukraine used drones, sensors, and battlefield software to make Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supply lines easier to detect and attack. Innovation has not replaced artillery, air defense, or Western support, he said, but it has made Ukraine “more dangerous, more adaptable, and much harder for Russia to overwhelm.”
The war has also forced Europe to confront its dependence on the US for security. With long-term American support for Ukraine uncertain, European governments and defense analysts are debating whether the continent can keep Ukraine armed while rebuilding its own depleted stockpiles, expanding defense production, and preparing to deter Russia with less reliance on Washington. The debate is no longer theoretical; it concerns shells, air-defense interceptors, production lines, and defense budgets.
Satter said Ukraine is already defending the rest of Europe. If Ukraine were to fall, he argued, much of the country’s mobilized capacity could be absorbed into or redirected by Russia, creating a far greater threat to NATO’s weaker members.
For Satter, Europe has the capacity to resist Russia together with Ukraine, but only if it has the political will. “The key question is whether Europe can now rearm and defend itself without the US,” he said. “Europe, together with Ukraine, can definitely resist Russia.”
Smart also said uncertainty over US support has made Ukrainians more urgent and realistic. Europe can do more, and Ukraine is increasing its own defense production, but American support remains decisive in specific areas, including air defense, intelligence, long-range capabilities, and advanced systems. “For Ukrainians, delays are measured in lives, not press statements,” Smart said.
Economic pressure on Russia is real, but whether it is sufficient to change Moscow’s behavior remains uncertain. Sanctions, war spending, labor shortages, inflationary pressure, and long-term isolation from Europe all carry costs. Satter warned against expecting an imminent Russian collapse. “It is not at a breaking point,” he said, “but it is under pressure.”
Russia’s size and resources mean it can continue for some time, Satter said. That pressure matters, but, in his view, Russia is more likely to be stopped by military defeat than by economic collapse alone.
Conflicts beyond Ukraine also affect Russia’s ability to sustain the war, especially those that move energy prices or strain Moscow’s partnerships. Higher oil prices linked to conflict involving Iran can benefit Russia financially, but Satter said the broader picture does not necessarily strengthen Russian influence. Russia may gain from rising prices, he argued, while still looking less capable as a protector of its partners and clients. “As for their influence, I do not think it helps them,” he said. “They were not able to defend Assad in Syria.”
Asked about speculation that Iran could transfer enriched uranium to Russia, Satter was cautious. Russia already has its own uranium resources and nuclear weapons, he noted, and he said there is no clear indication Iran would send enriched uranium to Moscow. “This is all very hypothetical,” Satter said.
A possible ceasefire remains one of the war’s most politically sensitive questions. A ceasefire along the current line of contact would freeze the fighting, at least temporarily, but it would not require Ukraine to formally recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied territory. That distinction is central to Kyiv’s position: Zelenskyy has said Ukraine will not recognize occupied territory as Russian.
Satter said Ukraine might accept a ceasefire based on the existing line of contact, but not a settlement that gives Russia legal recognition over conquered territory or territory it does not fully occupy.
Smart was even more categorical about Ukraine’s red lines. Formal recognition of Russian territorial conquest, imposed neutrality, or Moscow-dictated limits on Ukraine’s future alliances would be unacceptable, he said. “Anyone arguing for territorial concessions should ask how rewarding mass violence is supposed to deter the next invasion.”
“Ukraine is not asking for a special rule,” he said. “The normal rule is enough: the invader leaves, the victim survives, and aggression is punished rather than rewarded.”
Many Ukrainians are wary of a ceasefire that freezes Russian occupation without making Ukraine more secure. The memory of 2014 and the Minsk process remains central: for many in Ukraine, a frozen conflict can become the preparation period for a larger war.
“A ceasefire that leaves Ukrainians under Russian occupation is not peace for the people still trapped there,” Smart said. “Everyone wants the missiles, drones, artillery, and funerals to stop,” he added, “but stopping the shooting is not enough if Russia gets time to reload.”
He said the real test of any ceasefire would be whether Ukraine becomes safer. If a ceasefire freezes Russian occupation, abandons occupied communities, leaves abducted children in Russian hands, and gives Moscow time to rebuild, many Ukrainians will see it as “a pause before the next attack.”
This also limits Zelenskyy’s room for maneuver. Smart said the Ukrainian president can negotiate sequencing, guarantees, monitoring, sanctions, prisoner exchanges, and the mechanics of stopping the shooting, but cannot sell Ukrainians a deal that makes Russia’s invasion appear successful. “Ukrainians understand painful choices,” Smart said. “They will not accept being told that Russia gets rewarded because it was brutal enough.”
For Europe, such a settlement would shape future defense spending, sanctions policy, energy relations, and the credibility of deterrence. For Russia, it would determine whether the Kremlin emerges from the war isolated and constrained or partially normalized despite the invasion. For other powers, the outcome would send a message about whether territorial conquest can be rewarded if the aggressor can absorb enough costs.
Satter warned that Western governments should not rush to normalize ties with Moscow simply because the fighting stops. “I think the relationship with the West is going to be ruined for a long time,” he said. He argued that easing sanctions without clear signs of changed Russian behavior would be unwise if the same government remains in power.
Smart framed the question in global terms. “A just end strengthens deterrence,” he said, because it shows that “borders cannot be erased by force, civilians cannot be bombed into submission, and nuclear threats do not grant the right to steal land.”
Every dictatorship is watching whether Russia is punished for conquest or paid for it. If Moscow is rewarded, this war becomes a precedent. If Moscow is punished, it becomes a warning.
“A weak pause teaches the opposite lesson,” he warned. “Every dictatorship is watching whether Russia is punished for conquest or paid for it. If Moscow is rewarded, this war becomes a precedent. If Moscow is punished, it becomes a warning.”
For now, Putin’s language has changed more than Russia’s demands. Moscow says it is open to talks while insisting that Ukraine withdraw from territories Russia claims but does not fully control. Ukraine remains under severe pressure, but it is not defeated. The question facing Kyiv and its partners is not only whether the war can be stopped, but whether any ceasefire would make Ukraine safer—or merely give Russia time to prepare for the next phase.
