As US and Japanese missiles roar across Philippine skies, the Southeast Asian nation is becoming a forward-deployed missile hub in the intensifying US-China rivalry in the Pacific.
The US and Japan escalated their military profiles in the Philippines during this year’s Balikatan exercises, multiple media outlets reported. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGDSF) fired Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles for the first time on Philippine territory, while the US Army test-fired a Tomahawk cruise missile from its Typhon mid-range missile system.
About 140 Japanese troops launched two Type 88 missiles from Paoay, Ilocos Norte, sinking a decommissioned Philippine Navy vessel roughly 75 kilometers offshore in drills observed by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr, while Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr monitored remotely.
A day earlier, the US Army Pacific’s 1st Multi-Domain Task Force launched a Tomahawk missile from Tacloban City, Leyte, that struck a target around 600 kilometers away at Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, simulating support for ground operations.
The exercises, involving about 17,000 troops from the Philippines, US, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the UK, highlighted expanding maritime strike and island-defense cooperation. China criticized the drills as destabilizing and warned against Japanese “remilitarization.”
The US and Japanese missile firings highlighted how allied missile deployments could strengthen deterrence against China while deepening the Philippines’ strategic vulnerabilities and exposure to regional escalation.
The drills underscored how the Philippines is evolving from a treaty ally into a forward missile platform embedded in the US-led First Island Chain strategy against China.
The Typhon missile test may have validated US rationales for the system’s deployment in the Philippines. Depending on the variant, the Tomahawk’s 1,250-2,000-kilometer range allows the US to threaten targets in mainland China from Philippine territory.
Furthermore, Japan’s deployment of its Type 88 anti-ship missile, with a range of 180 kilometers, can complement the US Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which has a similar range.
These systems could also complement the Philippines’ BrahMos supersonic missiles. While the export variant of the BrahMos missile has a range of 290 kilometers, the Philippines’ limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities could significantly restrict its operational range.
Still, even with limited ISR capabilities, the Philippines could use its BrahMos missiles to threaten Chinese forces at the disputed Scarborough Shoal, just 220 kilometers off Luzon and a fixed location that would remain relatively easy to target.
If Japan follows the US precedent of deploying missile systems in the Philippines under training arrangements similar to those used for US systems, Japan could eventually keep Type 88 batteries in the country on a long-term basis.
Such deployments could contribute to a broader First Island Chain “missile wall” featuring layered coverage of mainland China, the South China Sea and chokepoints such as the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel.
Despite their mobility and dispersed basing advantages, these systems may remain vulnerable in the Philippines’ small-island geography, where limited roads and sustainment infrastructure could make launchers easier to track and target through satellite ISR, as well as drone or missile strikes.
Furthermore, Japan’s Type 88 missile is a Cold War-era weapon, designed in the 1980s with the Soviet Navy in mind. As such, it may be obsolete against the modern layered ship defenses of China’s carrier strike groups (CSGs) and improved weapons with extended ranges, stealthy designs and hypersonic speeds that may be needed to defeat contemporary ship defenses.
However, the messaging behind these missile firings may be more important. As the US is bogged down against Iran with no clear end in sight, it may need to reassure Pacific allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan. The US missile firing may thus be a warning to China not to move on Taiwan while it is distracted in the Middle East.
In Japan, the Type 88 firings may reinforce the country’s shift away from its long-held pacifist posture toward a more proactive regional security role. The drills may also signal Japan’s growing willingness to loosen longstanding restrictions on arms exports and defense cooperation with partners such as the Philippines.
They may also serve as a sales pitch to the Philippines ahead of a possible transfer of older Abukuma-class destroyer escorts. While such transfers may face bureaucratic hurdles under Japan’s restrictive arms export policies, the Type 88 batteries, though potentially obsolete against newer threats, could still serve as a test case for Japan’s efforts to loosen longstanding restrictions on exporting lethal military systems.
For the Philippines, Japan’s test firings on its territory could be seen as progress toward engaging alternative defense partners beyond the US. The Philippines is likely to maintain its longstanding alliance with the US, owing to its proximity to the South China Sea and Taiwan, its generally weak military and reliance on US security guarantees via a mutual defense treaty.
However, the unpredictability and transactional nature of the US Trump administration, along with its preoccupation with the Iran war, may have driven the Philippines’ urgency to diversify its defense partnerships. In terms of optics, Japan’s missile launch from its territory may have underscored that point by bringing in a capable potential partner aside from the US to help counterbalance China.
Still, it is debatable just how much agency the Philippines has in hosting these missile systems. While the US and possibly Japan may opt to deploy them on Philippine territory on an indefinite or regular basis, the Philippines has no direct control over them.
The Philippines might face a situation similar to South Korea’s, in which the US moved Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems from South Korea to the Middle East despite South Korea’s strong objections.
Contingencies in other theaters, such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe or closer to Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, may require redeploying US and possibly Japanese systems from the Philippines to other locations, leaving the Philippines to its own devices against a potentially irked China.
Another issue is that long-term deployment of these systems under the framework of military exercises could further entangle the Philippines in a great-power rivalry it is too weak to influence.
While such deployments may increase the Philippines’ strategic value to the US and Japan, they may also come at the cost of strategic autonomy, potentially leaving the country exposed on the front line of a confrontation it lacks the power to shape, control or stop.
















