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Trump’s Killing Spree Isn’t Stopping the Flow of Drugs Into the U.S.

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Trump’s Killing Spree Isn’t Stopping the Flow of Drugs Into the U.S.


The Pentagon claims that attacks on civilian boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific have severely curtailed the import of illegal drugs to the United States. And President Donald Trump says this has saved more than 1 million American lives. Experts call these assertions laughable and reporting by The Intercept shows that claims by the White House and War Department are baseless, phony, or both.

“The administration has failed to explain the long-term objectives of this mission or provide any evidence of reduced drug flows into the United States,” Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee said about the campaign on Thursday. “I would ask for a credible answer to this most fundamental question: What is the operation actually meant to accomplish?”

Under Operation Southern Spear, the U.S. military has conducted attacks on 54 so-called drug boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Ocean, killing more than 185 civilians, since September. The latest strike, on April 26 in the Pacific, killed three people. The Trump administration claims its victims are members of at least one of 24 or more cartels and criminal gangs with whom it claims to be at war but refuses to name.

Experts in the laws of war, as well as members of Congress from both parties, say the strikes are illegal, extrajudicial killings because the military is not permitted to deliberately target civilians — even suspected criminals — who do not pose an imminent threat of violence. These summary killings are a deviation from the standard practice in the long-running U.S. war on drugs, in which law enforcement agencies generally detained suspected drug smugglers and brought them to trial on criminal charges.

“These are extrajudicial executions, or even just murders — something similar to a cop shooting a fleeing suspect in the back when there is no self-defense justification,” said Adam Isacson, the director for defense oversight at Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights group. He called the growing death toll “a gross human rights violation.”

While Trump consistently lies about various aspects of the boat strikes, including the illicit narcotics allegedly on the boats and the number of lives supposedly saved by the attacks, the Pentagon has followed suit, using rhetorical sleight of hand and seemingly disingenuous statistics to bolster the claims of their commander-in-chief.

“I can’t imagine how you could come to some of these conclusions regarding illegal smuggling and drug overdose deaths based on the facts as we know them,” said retired Rear Adm. William Baumgartner, the former commander of the Seventh Coast Guard District, who oversaw drug-interdiction operations in the Southeast U.S. and the Caribbean Basin.

The Pentagon and White House for months failed to respond to detailed questions from The Intercept on the boat strike campaign.

Trump has repeatedly claimed that the vessels attacked by the U.S. are trafficking fentanyl, a synthetic opioid. “The boats get hit and you see that fentanyl all over the ocean, it’s like floating in bags, it’s all over the place,” he said in October of boats leaving from Venezuela.

Rep. Sara Jacobs, D-Calif., a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and five other government officials briefed on boat strikes told The Intercept that top officials admitted in close-door briefings that the vessels are not transporting fentanyl. “They had some convoluted reason why it was still impacting fentanyl that was hard to follow and I did not buy,” said Jacobs, who serves the San Diego area. “Representing a border community, I know that 99 percent of the fentanyl that comes into the United States comes through legal ports of entry by U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents.”

Fentanyl is generally produced in the United States or Mexico, Baumgartner said. “I have not seen any evidence that fentanyl has ever been smuggled from South America to the United States,” he told The Intercept. “Cartels would not smuggle fentanyl down to South America just to smuggle it back by boat.”

“I have not seen any evidence that fentanyl has ever been smuggled from South America to the United States.”

While bales of cocaine float in water, Baumgartner said, fentanyl is shipped in dramatically smaller quantities and would not be seen floating in the aftermath of an airstrike.

Fentanyl or not, Trump has also touted astounding decreases in drug smuggling due to the boat strikes. “Drugs entering our country by sea are down 97 percent,” Trump said at a January 29 White House briefing. Experts said that Trump’s claim is ridiculous, invented, or involves disingenuous numbers meant to deceive the American people. “It wouldn’t be the first time this administration just made up something out of whole cloth,” said Sanho Tree, the director of the Drug Policy Project at the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies.

Baumgartner noted that even the Pentagon figures put the lie to Trump’s claim. “He’s trying to imply that 97 percent of the cocaine that left South America by boat headed to the United States has been stopped,” he said. “That’s not true and is contradicted by the administration’s own statements.” Acting Assistant Secretary of War for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs Joseph Humire, for example, offered completely different numbers to Congress, telling the House Armed Services Committee in March that there “has been a 20 percent reduction of movements of drug vessels in the Caribbean and an additional 25 percent reduction in the Eastern Pacific.”

The word “deterrence” has become a popular Pentagon euphemism for the use of lethal strikes, in contrast to previous U.S. government efforts to marshal economic, diplomatic, and military means to convince adversaries to change their ways. “Deterrence has a signaling effect on narco-terrorists, and raises the risks with their movements,” Humire claimed. But last month, for example, there were eight strikes in the span of 16 days, including five in five days. “That shows that traffickers, even along that high seas route, are not being deterred,” said Isacson.

The amount of cocaine seized by U.S. authorities suggests the strikes have had little impact on the trade. “Really absurdly, there’s been no impact on flows of drugs toward the United States,” said Isacson. While data is limited, figures from Customs and Border Protection show that seizures at U.S. borders and along coasts have increased amid the Trump administration’s airstrikes in the Caribbean and Pacific. “CBP’s cocaine seizures have actually gone slightly up since the boat strikes began. Cocaine seized at all U.S. borders in the seven months before the strikes began was 38,000 pounds. In the seven months since, it’s 44,000 pounds — 6,000 pounds more,” Isacson explained.

The Coast Guard recently announced “record-setting interdictions” of cocaine in the Eastern Pacific under Operation Pacific Viper, indicating that large quantities of the narcotic are still transiting through that maritime corridor. Since last August, that service has seized more than 215,000 pounds of cocaine as part of this operation, Coast Guard spokesperson Brandon Hillard told The Intercept. “Narco-terrorists continue to go to great lengths to traffic illicit narcotics within and out of the Western hemisphere,” he said, highlighting “the seizure of hundreds of tons of cocaine.”

The general stability of the drug’s wholesale price also suggests it remains widely available. “The Coast Guard recently seized 1.2 tons of cocaine and reported a wholesale value of $19.3 million. This works out to be about a $16,500 per kilogram wholesale price. It doesn’t reflect the major jump in price that you would expect if you really had 97 percent reduction in flow,” Baumgartner explained of a seizure announced this month. “This report may be using old pricing information, but I would expect a significant spike in prices with even a 20 percent reduction in the cocaine flow.” 

According to the drug-testing company Millennium Health, use of stimulants, including cocaine, is climbing sharply and was detected in urine samples at nearly twice the rate of fentanyl in 2025.

“A 97 percent reduction in cocaine flow would mean that cocaine was now extraordinarily rare in the United States,” said Baumgartner. “The price of cocaine would have skyrocketed. Addicts would be fighting each other over what little cocaine or crack they could find.”

Trump has also advanced absurd statistics about lives saved by attacks on boats. “When you see the boats being hit, those boats kill on average 25,000 people a boat,” Trump claimed. This echoed his previous assertion that “every boat that we knock out, we save 25,000 American lives.” Experts say that there is no way of knowing how many lives are saved due to drug interception efforts, but that Trump’s claims are nonetheless untethered from reality.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported more than 70,000 drug overdose deaths for the 12-month period ending in November 2025. By Trump’s math, the drugs on the 54 boats would have been responsible for 1,400,000 deaths — 20 times the number of overdose deaths in one year. “The claim that sinking each cocaine smuggling boat saves 25,000 lives makes no sense,” said Baumgartner. “That would probably be more than the number of cocaine deaths in the last five decades combined.”

While not as egregious as Trump’s claims, Humire also offered up overdose numbers that appeared calculated to deceive. “As early as September 2025, the Administration had also achieved a nearly 20% drop in deadly drug overdoses in the United States compared to the previous year,” said Humire, crediting Operation Southern Spear with a share of the success. Left unsaid is that the first boat strike occurred that September, meaning the strikes would have had little or no impact on the numbers. The Pentagon did not provide any details on the source of Humire’s figures.

“ There is no military solution.”

Experts say Humire’s statistics appear to be rhetorical sleight of hand, since Operation Southern Spear is not actually preventing the flow of fentanyl — the leading cause of overdose deaths in the United States. Baumgartner called it “misleading” to link Operation Southern Spear to decreases in overall drug overdoses and drug flow because it “only impacts cocaine smuggling, not fentanyl or other drugs.”

Humire claimed Southern Spear and National Defense Areas on the U.S. Southern border “diminished the flow of fentanyl,” telling Congress it is “down 56% since the same period last year.” In actuality, CBP’s seizures of fentanyl at the U.S.–Mexico border have been declining since 2023. Halfway into fiscal year 2026, fentanyl seizures are almost exactly half of the total for 2025.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth also claims that the boat strikes have significantly impacted the drug trade. “Some top cartel drug-traffickers in the @SOUTHCOM AOR have decided to cease all narcotics operations INDEFINITELY due to recent (highly effective) kinetic strikes in the Caribbean,” he wrote in a February post on X. The Pentagon won’t name these “top” traffickers, failing to respond to repeated requests for information from The Intercept.

Lawmakers and other experts say that the Trump administration completely misconstrues the nature of the drug trade. “They have a fundamental misunderstanding that drug trafficking is a business. And that means there is no military solution,” Jacobs told The Intercept.

Tree, of the Institute for Policy Studies, echoed this. “They’ve applied a war paradigm to an economic problem, as if there is a command structure of the global drug economy where the person at the top finally says, ‘We’ve had enough. Everyone, stop what you’re doing now. We surrender’ — as if a cartel boss could command users, growers, smugglers, money launderers, and dealers, to all give up. It doesn’t work that way,” he explained. “Even if you did find a case or two of someone deciding to get out of the business, there are an infinite number of replacements willing to step up because that’s where the money is. Smuggling is the business. There’s always going to be a Han Solo.”

“They’ve applied a war paradigm to an economic problem.”

The Trump administration’s killing of civilians on alleged drug boats contrasts with the administration’s ongoing embrace of drug traffickers, drug dealers, and certain cartels, as well as its cuts to drug enforcement efforts. Justice Department records show, for example, that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s staff has dropped by about 6 percent since 2024. And more than 5,000 FBI and DEA agents have been reassigned from combating drug cartels to immigration enforcement, according to Rep. Jamie Raskin, D-Md., the ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee. Trump’s then-Attorney General Pam Bondi also scuttled the Justice Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces which allowed the department to coordinate investigations of cartels and transnational criminal networks. And last year, federal prosecutions for drug trafficking dropped to their lowest level in more than two decades.

To justify January’s U.S. invasion of Venezuela and the kidnapping of its president, Nicolás Maduro, Trump administration prosecutors charged him with numerous crimes, including “Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy” and “Cocaine Importation Conspiracy.” The Trump administration is now running the country via a puppet regime that includes Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who was indicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking, having “partnered with some of the most violent and prolific drug traffickers and narco-terrorists in the world, and relied on corrupt officials throughout the region, to distribute tons of cocaine to the United States,” according to the Justice Department. 

Trump has also granted clemency to around 100 people accused of drug-related crimes, including kingpins. He gave, for example, a “full and unconditional” pardon to former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who had been sentenced to 45 years in prison after being convicted in 2024 for using his office to smuggle 400 tons of cocaine into the U.S. Republican Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana asked: “Why would we pardon this guy then go after Maduro for running drugs into the United States?”

On Thursday, Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., questioned Gen. Dan Caine, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the boat attacks. “What legal justification could there possibly be that would allow the U.S. military to strike boats in international waters and kill the occupants of those boats without a showing of evidence that there’s narcotics on those boats?” he asked, before being met by a stream of doubletalk about the legality of the attacks. Unable to elicit a straight answer, Kaine responded: “I think there’s a profound mismatch between what is occurring and the underlying assumptions in the legal opinion.”

Military briefers have admitted to members of Congress that they cannot satisfy the evidentiary burden necessary to hold or prosecute survivors of the boat strikes, leading the U.S. to repatriate, hand off, or leave injured victims to drown. Similarly, those killed — if they are involved in the drug trade — are hardly drug kingpins. An investigation by The Associated Press into the lives of nine of those killed in U.S. strikes found that while they had been smuggling drugs, they were not “narco-terrorists” or gang leaders but laborers, a fisherman, a motorcycle taxi driver, two were low-level criminals, and one was a local crime boss. All were from a desperately poor area, and most were crewing such boats for the first or second time. “These individuals don’t matter in the grand scheme of things,” said one government official of those killed.

“We don’t use missiles to address a public health problem.”

Asked about the disconnect between the Trump administration pardoning drug kingpins and killing low-level persons who may be associated with the trade, Tree said it was par for the course. “The punitive aspect of the drug war has never been about logical consistency,” he said, noting that tobacco will kill close to 500,000 Americans this year, six times the number of overdoses. “Does that mean Trump is going to drone strike the homes of tobacco executives in the U.S.? Can other countries target them since Trump lacks the political will? That would be absurd because we don’t use missiles to address a public health problem.”

“These are visceral knee-jerk responses designed to make politicians appear tough,” Tree said, “but being tough is not the same as being effective.”

Trump administration cites national security in stalling 165 wind farms

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Trump administration cites national security in stalling 165 wind farms

The Trump administration has brought US onshore wind development to a halt citing national security concerns, representing a major escalation in the president’s crusade against renewable energy.

Approvals for about 165 onshore wind projects on private lands are being stalled by the Department of Defense, including wind farms which were awaiting final sign-off, others in the middle of negotiations and some that typically would not require oversight by the department, according to the American Clean Power Association (ACP) and people close to the matter.

Wind farms require routine approval from the defence department to ensure they do not interfere with radar systems. This typically involves the level of risk being assessed and the developer paying an agreed sum for the army to update its radar filter system so it can locate the windmill. Some projects can be deemed not to pose a risk due to their distance from army facilities and flight paths. Normally these assessments can take as little as a few days to complete.

Since August 2025, developers have faced a mix of setbacks, including not receiving expected communications from DoD, having meetings to discuss the status of their projects cancelled without the opportunity to reschedule, and being informed that the department has stopped processing their applications, according to people with knowledge of the situation.

The affected projects include 35 that had completed negotiations and are awaiting sign-off from the DoD—first reported by Axios in March.

More projects are now facing a shutdown—30 of which had undergone negotiations, received verbal signoffs and were waiting for written confirmation, about 50 are in the process of negotiations and 50 that previously would probably have been declared risk-free, according to developers and consultants.

The wind farms could generate 30 gigawatts, enough to power 15mn homes.

Letters sent to developers in early April said the agency was reviewing its processes for evaluating energy projects’ impact on national security.

The moves represent a dramatic escalation of the administration’s effort to shut down wind energy in the US, reaching for developments on private lands as well as public ones.

President Donald Trump has a particular animosity towards wind farms. He has called them the “worst form of energy” and said his “goal is to not let any windmill be built.”

Since its second term in office, the Trump administration has repeatedly tried to shut down work on several offshore wind sites in areas administered by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, also citing national security concerns, as well as other renewable energy projects on federal lands. Some of these actions have been thwarted in federal courts.

“This is so unprecedented,” said Jason Grumet, chief executive of the ACP. “The fact the administration is telling private landowners they’re not allowed to pursue economic activity and generate value from their property is hard to reconcile with conservative values.”

The administration has recently started refunding offshore wind leases in exchange for investments in fossil fuels, such as a $1 billion deal with TotalEnergies in March.

“The Trump administration’s attempts to block wind projects keep getting struck down in court, so it’s reaching for ever more extreme and absurd methods,” said Kit Kennedy, managing director for power at NRDC.

The DoD did not respond to a request for comment.

© 2026 The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved. Not to be redistributed, copied, or modified in any way.

EP Opens Submissions for Sixth Edition of Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism

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EP Opens Submissions for Sixth Edition of Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism


The European Parliament on 4 May opened submissions for the sixth edition of the Daphne Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism, an annual award recognising outstanding reporting that upholds the European Union’s core values.

The prize, awarded each year around 16 October—the anniversary of the हत्या of Daphne Caruana Galizia—honours journalism that promotes human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights.

European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award remains a symbol of support for journalists facing intimidation and violence. She stressed that press freedom is fundamental to safeguarding democracy and that the prize recognises those who continue to expose the truth under difficult conditions.

The competition is open to professional journalists and teams of any nationality, provided their work has been published or broadcast by media organisations based in one of the EU’s 27 member states. Entries must demonstrate in-depth reporting aligned with the Union’s foundational principles.

An independent jury comprising representatives from media and civil society across the EU, alongside major European journalism associations, will select the winning entry. The award includes a €20,000 prize and will be presented in October.

The initiative forms part of the Parliament’s broader efforts to defend media freedom and pluralism. In recent years, MEPs have advanced key legislation, including the European Media Freedom Act, which entered into force in 2024, and the Anti-SLAPP Directive, adopted in 2024 and due for transposition by May 2026.

Gulf state cooperation has long been shaped by the threat of Iran − but shows of unity belie division

gulf-state-cooperation-has-long-been-shaped-by-the-threat-of-iran-−-but-shows-of-unity-belie-division
Gulf state cooperation has long been shaped by the threat of Iran − but shows of unity belie division

Arab Gulf countries, battered economically and physically by the war with Iran, were keen to put on a united front at a key regional meeting on April 28, 2026.

Gathering in the Saudi city Jeddah, representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council warned the Iranian government in Tehran that an attack on any one of its six members would be taken as an attack on all. Rejecting Iran’s claims to control of the Strait of Hormuz, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani later described the summit as embodying “the unified Gulf stance” over the conflict.

The show of togetherness may seem at odds with other recent developments that have seen members of the GCC split over policy and vision for the region – not least the United Arab Emirate’s decision to quit the oil cartel OPEC.

But to followers of Gulf politics, like myself, the scene felt familiar. Time and again, Iran has accomplished what no outside mediator could: It has pushed divided Gulf Arab states together. When tensions rise, the monarchies of the GCC – Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman – tend to stand united, at least publicly.

From revolution to coordination

The modern Gulf security environment was profoundly shaped by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iran shares a narrow and strategically vital waterway with the Gulf states but has long differed in identity and outlook. Specifically, Iran’s Shiite revolutionary model contrasts with the Sunni-led monarchies across the region.

Before 1979, when Iran was ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia, the largest of the Sunni Arab Gulf states, were regarded by Washington as “twin pillars,” protecting American interests in the Middle East. Their relationship was cooperative, but not close.

Then the emergence of the Islamic Republic after the revolution in 1979 introduced a new kind of regional actor – one defined not only by state power but also by Shiite ideological ambition.

Gulf monarchies’ concern over both external security and internal stability was reinforced by the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia, when Islamist militants seized Islam’s holiest site. The event, alongside Iran’s revolution, exposed the vulnerability of Gulf regimes to religiously driven upheaval.

A large plume of smoke is seen amongst buildings

The 1979 siege at Mecca’s Grand Mosque raised concern over security across the Gulf region. AFP via Getty Images

In response to this revolution ideology, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established the GCC in 1981. Although officially framed as a platform for economic and political cooperation, the organization also reflected shared security concerns and Arab identity.

But unity had limits. Member states did not all view threats to their respective regimes in the same way.

Saudi Arabia worried about U.S. pressure for reforms; Kuwait feared neighboring Iraq; Bahrain was concerned about Iran’s influence over its own Shiite population; and the UAE worried about both Iran and its own large foreign workforce. Meanwhile, Oman and Qatar followed a more independent or balanced approach.

These differences would shape the trajectory of the GCC, and Arab Gulf states’ relationship with Tehran.

The eight-year Iran–Iraq War, which began in 1980, brought to the fore fears of Iran’s influence across the region. While Oman declared neutrality, other GCC states supported Iraq by funneling billions of dollars to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

This revealed an early pattern: Gulf states could coordinate politically, but avoided acting as a single strategic bloc. The GCC broadly favored Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, but there was no unified strategy or formal policy.

Security dependence

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 reshaped the region’s security structure again. In early 1991, the move prompted a U.S.-led coalition, including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, to expel Iraqi forces. Saudi Arabia’s role was especially significant: It not only hosted coalition forces but also actively participated militarily – marking one of the first major episodes in which a GCC state was directly involved in the defense of another member.

Soldiers are seen walking in a line in the desert.

American troops at Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield. Eric Bouvet/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

During – and especially after – the Gulf War, GCC states deepened their reliance on the United States, agreeing to host U.S. military bases and expanding long-term defense cooperation.

This external security umbrella provided a measure of stability, but it also introduced new differences. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain aligned more closely with Washington’s strategic framework, others – notably Oman and Qatar – maintained a more flexible approach. As a result, the appearance of unity coexisted with growing variation in national strategies.

This pattern has continued in recent years, significantly through diplomatic moves to normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. While the UAE and Bahrain moved quickly to formalize ties with Israel, others remained more cautious.

The effort to contain Iran

When it comes to combating Iranian influence, GCC states have long played different roles.

Oman has consistently acted as a mediator, maintaining open channels with Tehran and facilitating quiet diplomacy — including back-channel talks between Iran and Western states.

Qatar also kept communication open, partly because of shared economic interests with Iran – particularly the management of the North Field/South Pars gas reserve.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by contrast, have generally taken a more cautious and at times confrontational stance toward Iran. Both view Iran as a regional competitor and a source of security concerns, particularly due to Tehran’s missile program and its support for ideologically opposed non-state actors.

This contrasting approach to Iran across the GCC allows different states to engage Tehran through multiple channels, but it also makes it harder to form a consistent, unified GCC strategy.

A changing regional balance

The 2003 Iraq War marked a turning point in the GCC-Iran dynamic. The removal of Iraq as a regional counterweight allowed Iran to expand its influence.

And this development sharpened divisions within the GCC.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly viewed Iran as a direct strategic threat requiring containment. Qatar and Oman, however, emphasized dialogue and mediation.

These differences became more visible during the Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017. The dispute centered around Qatar’s support for Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered a terrorist organization by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a full air, land and sea blockade in June 2017. The three nations accused Qatar of supporting extremist groups and maintaining close ties with Iran. Isolated, Qatar relied on Iran for airspace, trade routes and supplies, strengthening the relationship between the countries. The blockade eventually ended in January 2021, when the parties signed a declaration restoring diplomatic and trade relations at a GCC summit in Saudi Arabia.

GCC under attack

The series of events that began with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Iranian-backed Hamas in Israel shook up GCC relations with Tehran.

In June 2025, in response to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, Tehran struck a U.S. base in Qatar – the first such attack on a GCC state by Tehran.

At an extraordinary meeting in Doha, Qatar’s capital, GCC members pledged full solidarity with Qatar and strongly condemned the Iranian attack.

But it was not enough to prevent Iran from attacking all six GCC states in response to the ongoing conflict begun in February 2026 by U.S. and Israel.

The subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of global oil supplies, has sparked what many see as the biggest crisis in the Gulf since the inception of the GCC.

The GCC responded by emphasizing collective security and unity. But yet again, the public show of togetherness masks divergent views on how to respond. When the war ends, each state will likely return to its own strategic and foreign policy approach.

Understanding the pattern

Since 1979, Tehran’s actions in the Gulf region have exposed two parallel developments. On the surface, there are shared concerns among GCC members and public shows of unity. But underneath this facade of unity, each state has continued to develop its own national priorities and risk tolerance.

The combination of these two factors helps explain why the GCC often appears unified during crises, while remaining internally divided over how to respond to them.

Rather than viewing the GCC as a fully cohesive bloc, it may be more accurate to see it as a framework where cooperation and disagreement coexist.

Thailand seizes on Hormuz fears to push land bridge dream

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Thailand seizes on Hormuz fears to push land bridge dream

BANGKOK – While Asia suffers from Strait of Hormuz blockades, Bangkok is offering Beijing, Singapore and others a planned multi-billion dollar “land bridge” across Thailand’s thin peninsula, to link shipping between the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand instead of south through the equatorial Strait of Malacca.

China, the US and other countries could use the 90-kilometer-long land bridge for commercial, military and other shipping, potentially reducing fuel costs and time on routes to and from the Persian Gulf and South China Sea.

Beijing’s use of the proposed shorter shipping route could also benefit China if the US were to blockade the Strait of Malacca during a regionwide conflict over Taiwan or other issues.

Thailand’s newly reelected Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has pointed to growing uncertainty around key maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, as justification for moving the project forward, according to a Bangkok Post report.

“The government is also preparing a series of international roadshows to attract foreign investment,” the paper said. The entire project could cost more than US$30 billion, Thai Senator Norasate Prachyakorn told parliament on April 27.

Singapore’s Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing met Anutin on April 27 in Bangkok to discuss the land bridge and other issues.

“They recognize the project’s potential and the opportunities it could create for Thailand and the wider region if it proceeds,” said Bangkok’s government spokeswoman Rachada Dhnadirek.

The project’s supporters say the land bridge could also fit into China’s Belt and Road Initiative by linking to Thailand’s existing railway lines and highways, which are slowly being upgraded.

Some of those Thai lines feed in and out of Laos, where a Chinese-built high-speed train already zips across northern Laos, linking the tiny communist country to southern China.

To avoid depending too heavily on China, Thailand opened the land bridge project to international investors, supposedly attracting interest from India, Dubai, Japan, Europe and elsewhere, including port developers, shipping lines and real estate developers.

Funding would come from private and public sources, according to reports.

Boosters say the land bridge would include a sleek, dedicated superhighway supported by modern warehouses and facilities, plus oil and natural gas pipelines and a fast rail line running parallel alongside the road.

Thailand’s west coast port at Ranong on the Andaman Sea would be connected to the east coast port at Chumphon on the Gulf of Thailand, south of Bangkok.

The road, rail and pipelines could traverse Thailand’s coast-to-coast southern isthmus in only a few hours, supporters said. Several additional hours would be required for loading and unloading.

Ships transiting between the Persian Gulf to and from China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and elsewhere in eastern Asia could dock at either port. There, waiting ships could continue carrying the cargo to international destinations.

Currently, ships coming from the Persian Gulf to eastern Asia must veer south into the Indian Ocean and skirt much of Southeast Asia.

They then head toward the 800-kilometer-long Strait of Malacca, which usually refers to two straits, including the adjacent, additional 105-kilometer-long Strait of Singapore.

Those straits link the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Ships from Hormuz first pass through the Strait of Malacca, which is wedged between Indonesia’s northern Sumatra island and the Malay Peninsula, including Singapore.

Ships continuing on to China and elsewhere in eastern Asia – mostly deepwater vessels – must then squeeze through the narrower Strait of Singapore before reaching the South China Sea.

Hundreds of ships sail through the crowded straits each day. Malaysia and Indonesia control the Strait of Malacca on opposite shores, along the waterway’s western and central side.

Singapore controls the Strait of Singapore which is on the east side and, of the two, is more liable to congestion or a chokehold. All three countries have close military, economic and diplomatic links with the US while also balancing their relations with China.

After exiting the straits, ships from the Persian Gulf bound for eastern Asia must then turn north again to pass Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, before finding harbors along the coast of China and the region’s other ports.

More than 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Malacca each day.

In recent years, slightly more crude oil and petroleum liquids transited the Strait of Malacca compared with the Strait of Hormuz, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).

The Strait of Malacca “is the primary chokepoint in Asia and Oceania,” the EIA said.

All countries can use the Strait of Malacca but China could become vulnerable if the US pressures Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to restrict shipping through the strait which is also used by the US 7th Fleet.

Bangkok, meanwhile, is also trumpeting the land bridge’s potential to turn Thailand into a marine fuel supply base and petroleum refiner, which in turn could attract more international investment.

Opponents insist that traversing the land bridge will take so much time for loading, unloading and overland transport across the peninsula that it won’t save much money for shippers.

Opposition politicians, meanwhile, are sharpening their knives, with Democrat deputy leader Korn Chatikavanij among many who see the project as economically unfeasible.

Supporters, however, point out that the Strait of Malacca also often involves loading, unloading and transshipping to break up large loads into smaller pieces because many goods need to be delivered to several countries, and not to only one final destination.

“Vessels already stop to unload and transfer cargo at hubs such as Singapore,” said Transport Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn, who is also a deputy prime minister.

If a ship needs to link with less frequented ports in, for example, Indonesia, then it is often loaded or unloaded at Singapore, or Malaysia’s Port Klang and Sumatra’s Belawan docks.

Local vessels link up at those ports to transport cargo to and from scattered, smaller, nearby destinations. Big tankers can pass through the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Singapore without much delay.

Environmentalists, meanwhile, warn of a vast disaster to underwater life including coral, fish, and microscopic creatures across the deep Andaman Sea and shallow Gulf of Thailand from oil spills, industrial pollution and other toxins.

The underwater destruction would also severely impact Thailand’s extensive fishing industry and international tourism, which are major foreign revenue sources, environmentalists said.

The sheer size of the two ports would require massive land reclamation and a dozen reservoirs for water. Local residents at both ports and along the corridor would need resettlement and compensation.

The modest facilities in Ranong and Chumphon would need to be reconstructed to become deep-sea ports capable of handling large ships. Bangkok has been touting the land bridge for several years without much traction or committed investment, but that was before the blockades at Hormuz and Iran war.

Richard S. Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based American foreign correspondent reporting from Asia since 1978, and winner of Columbia University’s Foreign Correspondents’ Award. Excerpts from his two new nonfiction books, “Rituals. Killers. Wars. & Sex. — Tibet, India, Nepal, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka & New York” and “Apocalyptic Tribes, Smugglers & Freaks” are available here.

(Shawn W. Crispin contributed reporting and editing from Bangkok.)

Passenger Attacks Flight Attendant, Tries to Storm Cockpit During Landing

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Passenger Attacks Flight Attendant, Tries to Storm Cockpit During Landing


A routine flight turned into a full-blown nightmare when a “crazed” passenger allegedly attacked a flight attendant and tried to force his way into the cockpit just moments before landing in New Jersey.

The shocking incident unfolded aboard United Airlines Flight 1837, which had just returned from the Dominican Republic and was approaching Newark Liberty International Airport Saturday evening.

What should have been a smooth touchdown quickly spiraled into chaos.

According to newly revealed air traffic control audio, the situation escalated so fast that the crew had no choice but to declare an emergency mid-landing.

“We’re declaring an emergency,” a crew member urgently told controllers. “Seems like someone just attacked one of our flight attendants.”

Seconds later, the situation sounded even more alarming.

“A gentleman just attacked one of the flight attendants and tried to open the forward main cabin door… tried to gain access to the flight deck,” the crew member said.

On the other end of the line, an air traffic controller could only react in disbelief: “Oh my god.”

The plane, carrying around 170 passengers and six crew members, safely made it to the gate—but not before the terrifying ordeal left everyone on edge.

Port Authority Police were waiting when the aircraft arrived and quickly detained the 48-year-old suspect without further incident. He was later transported to a hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, according to officials from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Despite the frightening confrontation, authorities say the injured flight attendant declined medical treatment, and no other passengers were hurt.

In a statement, United Airlines praised its crew for keeping the situation under control during what could have turned into a far more dangerous outcome.

Still, the chilling audio and attempted cockpit breach have left many wondering just how close this flight came to disaster.

The suspect’s identity has not yet been released, and the investigation is ongoing.

Toyota built a $10 billion private utopia—what’s going on in there?

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Toyota built a $10 billion private utopia—what’s going on in there?

At the Consumer Electronics Show in 2020, Toyota CEO Akio Toyoda pledged to build a city of the future, a place where researchers, engineers, and scientists could live and work together. It was framed as the start of a transformation for the world’s largest car company, moving it toward becoming a fully fledged mobility company.

Six months ago, after Toyota spent an estimated $10 billion to build an urban paradise atop a disused factory, the first residents moved in. One-hundred handpicked “Weavers,” residents chosen to boost the tech cred of the sensor-laden mini-metropolis, began settling in.

Last week, I got a chance to check it out. Here’s what I learned while wandering the streets of Toyota’s vision of the future.

The future is safe

As part of its transformation into a true mobility company, Toyota is aiming to become the world’s safest carmaker. The company says it wants to create a “society with zero accidents”—a tall order given the sheer number of Toyotas currently on the road.

A courtyard surrounded by modern buildings

Woven City on a sunny day.

Woven City on a sunny day. Credit: Toyota

“Statistically, the set of autonomous vehicles out there is nowhere close to the magnitude of vehicles that Toyota has in the world,” John Absmeier, Woven City’s CTO, told me. While companies like Waymo are fielding tens of thousands of vehicles, Toyota’s eventual autonomous fleet will need to operate at a much higher standard, he said.

To get there, Absmeier said Toyota’s cars will need far more awareness than onboard systems can provide, even with the most advanced lidar, radar, and imaging sensors on the planet. For instance, the only way to spot a kid darting out from behind a truck, he said, is with cameras on every street watching for hazards, paired with warning systems for oncoming traffic.

This is part of the age-old promise of vehicle-to-everything communications, and at Woven City, Toyota is trying to put that idea into practice.

The future is a privacy nightmare

But if the idea of ubiquitous cameras watching everyone gives you pause, you’re not alone—it certainly seemed startling to me. I counted eight separate cameras at a single intersection in Woven City, plus many more mounted on the ceilings of the buildings I toured. Even the small on-site coffee shop had half a dozen hanging overhead.

A wet city intersection

In the rain, Woven City felt even more like a ghost town.

In the rain, Woven City felt even more like a ghost town. Credit: Tim Stevens

There are plenty of cameras in urban areas around the world, but I haven’t seen anything approaching this level of density. All of them feed into what Toyota calls the Woven City AI Vision Engine, an agentic system designed to monitor, catalog, and report activity.

A demo video showed how these cameras can be used in retail environments to spot shoplifters. While I was told the system doesn’t use facial recognition, it can still track people based on their clothing, following them as they move from one camera to another.

Kota Oishi, general manager at Woven City, said that Toyota has surveyed people around the world, including Americans and Europeans, about their views on privacy and data. While people in Southeast Asia tended to be fairly relaxed about privacy, Japanese respondents were far more cautious, he said.

“Japanese people are more on the European side. They are very concerned about that data,” he said. “They need to be convinced that the data is protected, and they want to know specifically what the data will be used for.”

Protecting that data across so many systems under development at Woven City is a complex challenge. To try to manage it, Toyota created a system called “Data Fabric.” Saipang Chan, an engineer on the project, told me that users can opt into or out of individual services.

“We have our own consent management to ensure that all the data being shared or being collected,” he said. “We act under the consent of the data provider.”

Weavers use the Woven app to order services from the city.

Weavers use the Woven app to order services from the city. Credit: Tim Stevens

Chan said that while user data can be exchanged among the various experiments within the Woven City’s walls, it’s not being sold. At least, not yet.

“We allow the Weavers to select what they want to share or not. So whether it’s nothing or whether it’s everything is up to the individual,” Absmeier told me. Oishi, the GM, said the vast majority of the Weavers have opted into the roughly 20 experiments currently underway. For example, 98 percent allow a robot with cameras to operate in their homes.

But these opt-in numbers come from a highly curated group of participants living in a controlled environment. The real world is a different place.

The future is one big creators’ hub

Daisuke Tanaka, a resident of Woven City, is something like an on-site digital matchmaker for Weavers. It’s not love they’re looking for, though; he connects creators and startups to spark collaborations every second Friday.

“Sometimes we’re talking about technologies and products, but sometimes they’re much more casual events,” he said. He cited a next-gen vending machine under development as an example of the sorts of new products coming from this collaboration. “They want to combine the photo-voltaics with the vending machine so it can run anywhere,” he said.

Expansive coworking spaces dot Woven City, designed to foster spontaneous brainstorming, with plenty of 3D printers scattered throughout for rapid prototyping. The stated goal is to spur creation, innovation, and successful startups.

A three-wheeled mobility scooter.

The Swake looks fun, but we weren’t allowed to ride it in the rain.

A maker space

A maker space in Woven City’s Innovation Garage.

Woven City residents act as alpha and beta testers for everything from an AI-powered karaoke machine that selects songs based on mood to a next-generation HVAC system designed to eliminate 95 percent of pollen in the home (roughly half of Japan’s population suffers from hay fever).

Residents also help test delivery robots and a device called the Swake, a three-wheeled scooter with a leaning backrest for cornering. I didn’t get to ride one, but with a top speed of 12 mph (20 km/h) and a range of 3.7 miles (6 km), the Swake could be a more stable and (and fun) alternative to the average Lime or Bird scooter.

The future is tiny

For something called a “city,” Toyota’s Woven City has a small footprint. Its largest structure is the former sheet-metal stamping facility at the factory that once anchored the site. Outside of that, only about 10 percent of Woven City’s eventual 175-acre (70.8-hectare) footprint is complete.

That’s roughly the size of three New York City blocks. You can walk from one end to the other in just a few minutes, which makes it a curious setting for a project meant to benchmark next-generation mobility.

The 20 prototype Swake machines also can’t leave the grounds, which limits the amount of real-world testing they’re getting.

The future must be financially sustainable

From an operational standpoint, Woven City is a business operating under Woven by Toyota, Inc. Its financials aren’t public (Toyota would not comment on total build costs or how much its residents pay to live there), but Absmeier said Woven City is expected to be profitable.

“Ultimately, we have to be a long-term sustainable business,” he said.

That’s why so much Toyota tech is being tested here, including efforts to refine systems like the AI Vision Engine before selling them to municipalities. Toyota has several closed test tracks around the world, but Woven City acts as a safe space to test a far broader suite of services and devices before they’re commercialized.

The future is full of robots that don’t do much yet

“Physical AI” was everywhere at Woven City: robots of all shapes and sizes that, for the most part, didn’t seem to do much.

There were robots for delivering packages to residents and others for carrying home groceries. A self-balancing, two-wheeled robot with one arm carried trays of food around apartments, and another had a single gripper designed to potentially help around the house someday. Most of them looked like design concepts without much practical use.

A robot in front of a Toyota ev

The Guide Mobi robot in front of a Toyota EV.

The Guide Mobi robot in front of a Toyota EV. Credit: Tim Stevens

The Guide Mobi, however, was more compelling. Like a tugboat guiding cargo ships in and out of port, it’s used in Woven City to autonomously move cars from the parking garage to a pickup area for residents. But where a tugboat provides thrust to keep boats moving, the Guide Mobi uses sensors to prevent the cars from going the wrong way.

The cars in question are Toyota bZ4X EVs, which lack the necessary sensor array to handle the task on their own. The Guide Mobi, equipped with a lidar array, imaging sensors, and other systems, effectively takes control of a single car, which autonomously follows its digital “tug.” The car is delivered to the curb outside, where the Woven City resident can hop in and drive off.

Why rely on such a complicated solution when modern Teslas can perform similar tasks using only onboard sensors? Toyota says it’s prioritizing safety, and Tesla’s Summon feature has hardly delivered on that front.

The future has a smart grid

three Toyota EVs parked in a row

When residents want their car, Guide Mobi brings it to them.

A scale model of a parking garage

The parking garage also works as a giant distributed energy store, taking advantage of the EVs bidirectional charging.

Those bZ4X EVs don’t live in just any garage—they’re stored in a space Toyota calls a virtual power plant, or VPP. In addition to a roof full of solar cells to help charge the cars inside, the facility is chock-full of bidirectional chargers.

The cars inside can act as a collective battery pack, offsetting Woven City’s peak power demand by up to 10 percent. The plan is to offer the service to businesses with large EV fleets, reducing their overall power bills.

The catch is that those chargers have standard, human-operated plugs. Though the cars might be able to be delivered autonomously to drivers waiting outside, some poor soul still needs to unplug them before they’re sent out and plug them in when they return.

The future only works in the sun

It was miserable and rainy for much of the time I spent wandering Woven City, and the moisture was an unfortunate limiting factor for its operations.

While the Guide Mobi braved the rain for a test delivery, the Swake tricycles can’t run in such conditions. All the scooter-sharing stations were empty on that day, and many of the robots we’d been told to expect skittering around the streets had stayed home to keep their sensors dry.

The future is beautifully designed

There’s a bit of a prefab vibe to certain aspects of Woven City, particularly the brutalist residential buildings. It’s a space that’s stark, clean, and frequently beautiful.

Many of the shared spaces feature sweeping, flowing ridges of wood that run cleanly from outside to inside, creating a strong sense of visual continuity. The city’s pedestrian areas are lined with lush, attractive gardens that likely received a little extra attention before our visit.

Even the manhole covers, featuring a stylized Mt. Fuji, were cleverly designed. Woven City is certainly cold and corporate in places, but it also shows the level of polish that urban planning and design can reach when a single, well-funded corporate entity makes all the calls and foots the bill.

A pedestrian walkway

But where are all the people?

A manhole cover

The manhole cover has Mt Fuji on it.

The future feels lonely

I spent most of my time in Woven City being shepherded from place to place by tour guides, but when I finally managed to escape and wander around on my own, it felt eerily empty.

It wasn’t quite Omega Man territory, but I didn’t see a single kid playing, dog out for a walk, or citizen running to one of the on-site convenience shops. The electric e-Palettes Toyota uses as buses were empty; they stopped at their stops, waited, and then left without picking up or dropping off anyone.

The curtains were drawn on all the apartments I could see, and there was no sign of laundry, bicycles, or other personal items on any apartment balcony.

I had to remind myself that this place is six months old, with only 100 Weavers so far—fewer residents than you’d find at your average Holiday Inn. It’s early days, and as the facility is built out and more folks move in, it will likely feel less sterile over time. But Toyota’s goal of building the world’s greatest creator hub will only start to take shape if outside companies find real ways to bootstrap their next products here.

A big building

The Inventor Garage at Woven City.

A large open space with some tables and chairs.

Inside the Inventor Garage.

Woven City is Toyota’s attempt to not only identify the next mobility zeitgeist but also to ensure it begins to take shape where the company can capitalize on it. It’s a big bet, but it’s backed by the world’s largest car company by volume and one of the few that has managed to consistently deliver products its customers want in a chaotic global market. As the broader Toyota Group turns 100 this year, it’s natural for it to focus on the next century.

It’s hoping Woven City will help define that future.

I Reached Out to the White House Counterterrorism Czar for Comment. He Lashed Out on X.

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I Reached Out to the White House Counterterrorism Czar for Comment. He Lashed Out on X.

Counterterrorism czar Sebastian Gorka is one of the most controversial figures in the Trump administration, a gate crasher in the buttoned-up world of national security. 

In a field where quiet professionalism is revered, Gorka is loud and mercurial. With a booming, British-accented voice, he describes U.S. operations turning suspected terrorists into “red mist” and stacking bodies “like cordwood.” He wears a lanyard inscribed with “WWFY & WWKY,” referencing a line from President Donald Trump: “We will find you and we will kill you.”

It is a testament to the frenzy of Trump’s first year back in office that even the colorful Gorka had faded into the background as the nation reeled from a mass deportation campaign and sweeping cuts to federal agencies. That changed this February with the launch of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, which heightened the risk of retaliatory attacks on American citizens and interests around the world. Overnight, there was renewed interest in who leads White House counterterrorism efforts.

My editors and I decided it was time to break out the Gorka files. For six months, I had monitored Gorka’s public remarks for clues about the status of his long-promised national counterterrorism strategy and updates on deadly U.S. strikes in Africa and the Middle East. It had started as old-fashioned beat reporting; I cover counterterrorism, and he’s the senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council.

The trove of details I collected from months of Gorka’s public statements, along with interviews with more than two dozen current and former security officials, were woven into a ProPublica investigation published in April. It’s an in-depth look at Gorka and his role in the hollowed-out national security apparatus after a year of leadership turmoil and personnel loss as Trump shifted resources toward his immigration agenda.

ProPublica reached out to Gorka for comment in multiple ways. He never responded, instead lashing out at me via posts on X before the story published. He told his 1.8 million followers that I was anti-American and accused me of writing a “putrid piece of hackery.”

There went my hopes for a good-faith exchange. After discussion with my editors, ProPublica decided to note the insults in the story. It was another revealing layer to the combustible leader Trump had installed in a sensitive national security role. A former senior official noted the eruption was “Gorka being Gorka.”

Increasingly, journalists are pushing back against attacks on our credibility by “showing the work,” guiding readers through the reporting process to dispel myths and foster transparency. In that spirit, I wanted to take this opportunity to show how basic beat reporting — fact-checking the assertions of a powerful figure — led to a broader story about the state of the U.S. counterterrorism mission at a critical moment.

I’ve covered the post-9/11 counterterrorism apparatus for more than two decades, so Gorka was a familiar presence, an academic known mainly for a well-documented hostility toward Islam, which he has portrayed as inherently violent. Gorka has dismissed criticism of this portrayal as “absurd,” saying his focus is “the war inside Islam” between radicals and Western-aligned Muslim leaders. He also served as an adviser under the first Trump administration but was ousted after just seven months amid White House infighting. 

At the time, dozens of lawmakers had demanded his resignation, and investigative outlets detailed links — which Gorka denies — to the Hungarian far right. After the bruising exit, Gorka waited patiently as the Republican Party swung harder right in the Biden era and eventually returned Trump to office.

Gorka was appointed White House counterterrorism czar — he called it his dream job — in a new era without the “adults in the room,” as some officials referred to the more moderate advisers around Trump in the first term. Privately, national security personnel expressed alarm that intelligence about threats was in the hands of an official who reportedly struggled to get security clearance in the first Trump administration.

To me, Gorka was a weather vane for the administration’s national security thinking: Would his “war on terror” mindset clash with the more isolationist “America First” camp that wanted no more forever wars? How would a vast security apparatus built for the Islamist militant threat reorient toward a new focus on far-left “antifa” militants and Latin American drug cartels newly designated as terrorist organizations?

I was especially interested in the status of a national counterterrorism strategy Gorka had been promising since taking office; such documents typically lay out an administration’s approach to fighting the most urgent threats. Though Gorka had described his plan as “imminent” and “on the cusp” of release, months ticked by without any sign of it.

To glean clues about the strategy, I made it my mission to watch every news appearance, read every interview and listen to every podcast featuring Gorka since December 2024, the month before he entered the White House. It took some digging — he rails against the mainstream news media and prefers to appear (largely unchallenged) on niche pro-Trump news outlets and at conservative think tanks.

I developed a nightly ritual. After dinner with my family, I’d hole up to listen to Gorka, hunting for the scraps of news buried in his over-the-top vocabulary and graphic storytelling. Alongside my note categories for “Trump Anecdotes” and “Militant Death Tolls” was one for “Big Words.” For example, the president calls Joe Biden “sleepy”; Gorka prefers “somnambulant.”

Weeks into the reporting, in February 2026, I realized Gorka’s speech had burrowed into my brain when I watched a silly video and thought, in his voice, “Preposterous!” It was time for a break.

I reread my notes from hours of listening sessions. I interviewed counterterrorism analysts and national security watchdog groups about Gorka and his remit. Veteran national security personnel added context and analysis. Just as my editors and I were discussing how to turn the findings into a story, the Iran war began and the spotlight on Gorka grew brighter.

Much of the material on air strikes and the dismantling of guardrails was first incorporated into a story I reported about the Pentagon moving away from more robust civilian protections, a reversal highlighted by a deadly U.S. attack on a girls’ school in Iran. Other reporting ended up in the story about Gorka’s phoenixlike return to the White House and what it says about the Trump counterterrorism doctrine.

Gorka didn’t respond to requests for comment beyond the hostile posts on X. When I asked the White House for comment, spokesperson Anna Kelly praised Gorka’s “incredible job” but sidestepped questions about his approach. “Anyone attempting to smear him and the President’s national security team is only revealing that they haven’t been paying attention for the past year,” Kelly wrote, “as anyone with eyes can see that our homeland is more secure than ever.” 

As of writing, exactly two months into the Iran war, Gorka’s counterterrorism strategy has yet to appear.

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Tanker Hit by Unknown Projectiles Off UAE Coast as UK Agency Urges Caution

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Tanker Hit by Unknown Projectiles Off UAE Coast as UK Agency Urges Caution


Unknown projectiles hit a tanker about 78 nautical miles north of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, a UK maritime trade organization said on Monday, as authorities urged caution in the region.

No injuries were reported among the crew.

“A tanker has reported being hit by unknown projectiles,” the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations said, adding that all crew members were safe. The agency called on vessels to transit the area “with caution” as the incident is investigated.

Circumstances of the strike were not immediately clear.

The incident comes amid heightened tensions following a period in which the United Arab Emirates was repeatedly targeted during the recent war with Iran. During that period, attacks included missile and drone strikes on energy facilities, ports, and urban areas.

Among the incidents cited were a drone strike on the Fujairah port, described as a key oil hub, and a tanker fire at Dubai Port. In Abu Dhabi, debris from intercepted missiles caused fires at the Habshan gas complex.

Attacks during the war were described as focusing primarily on economic and infrastructure targets. Air defense systems intercepted many incoming threats, limiting broader damage.

The latest strike on the tanker occurred as the United States and Iran remain at an impasse in ceasefire negotiations, with speculation increasing that armed conflict may be renewed.

Europe’s consummate systemic rival: Ursula von der Leyen

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Europe’s consummate systemic rival: Ursula von der Leyen

The most consequential threat to Europe in the past decade has not arrived from Moscow, Beijing or Washington. It has been manufactured, word by word, policy reversal by policy reversal, on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont building in Brussels.

Ursula von der Leyen has achieved something genuinely rare: becoming the EU’s most reliable liability. She has built a career on announcing Europe’s future while presenting the consequences of her own failures as if they had arrived from nowhere.

The problem is not that the European Commission President makes mistakes—which any politician does — but that she makes them at scale, from the Union’s highest executive office, across long stretches of time, with the confidence of someone who has never been held accountable for any single consequence.

The pattern is familiar: announce a doctrine, enforce it with bureaucratic zeal, watch it fail, return with a correction that contradicts the first line, and receive applause from the same circles that applauded the first version. Repeat, indefinitely, at a global scale.

Fail, contradict, retreat

The latest cycle has been remarkable even by her standards. On March 9, she told ambassadors that “Europe can no longer be a custodian for the old-world order, that has gone and will not return,” while still claiming to defend it. She even questioned whether the “system that we built [is] more a help or a hindrance to our credibility as a geopolitical actor.”

In her terms, Europe had entered an age beyond American protection. However, Europe’s dependence on Washington was not an inheritance she encountered; it was a condition her own presidency repeatedly accommodated. One cannot lament submission after years spent entrenching it.

Those remarks took place in the context of Trump’s Iran war. Yet she offered no account of why endorsing escalation in a conflict that raises oil and gas prices, strengthens Russian export revenues and helps finance Putin’s wars, increases costs for European households and industry, threatens supply routes, and may trigger new refugee flows serves any European interest. She asked to reverse the EU principles while backing warfare that imposes costs on Europe and yields no gain.

According to this former German defense minister, the post-war architecture of multilateralism, consensus, and international law, the same order her mandates were meant to embody and export, is now a burden in a world that has moved on.

Within 24 hours, her office was backpedaling. The speed of that retreat exposed the weakness of the disruptive line and the thin authority behind it. It also laid bare a deeper problem: von der Leyen operates from a worldview that is genuinely her own and detached from the member states that placed her in office. She governs by announcement and manages dissent ruthlessly.

The pattern overreach-retreat repeated on April 19, when she declared the EU should not be “influenced by Russia, Turkey, or China.” Lecturing Turkey — one of the EU’s largest trading partners, a NATO member spanning two continents, and a longstanding candidate state — was a calculated willingness to antagonize Ankara at the worst possible moment. By the following day, her office was again re-contextualizing.

A few days later, Sabine Weyand — a 32-year veteran of European institutions? — was forced out after she acknowledged the humiliation occurred at a Trump golf course: while von der Leyen posed thumbs raised for a group photo, Weyand stood with hands in her pockets and an unchanged expression.

Essentially, the illustration between those who perform European dignity and those who embody it. In any institution with a functioning accountability culture, naming a problem is not a firing offense. In this Commission, it appears to be.

What makes these episodes worth examining is what they reveal about von der Leyen’s mandates. In 2019, at the start of her first term, she promised a geopolitical Europe: a bloc that would act as a power, not only as a market, a regulator, or a moral actor.

When the second presidency began, the geopolitical map of Europe was neither revised nor reformulated. It simply vanished from Commission scripts.

Six years later, when the international order was described as an obstacle to European interests, she was not unveiling a new vision but the collapse of a claim she had spent years performing. The gap between rhetoric and record had grown too wide to conceal.

What followed was an attempt to recast belated recognition as leadership. That failure deserves to be evaluated as failure, not repackaged as foresight. It also exposed the emptiness of six years of values talk that failed to shift any other government’s policies by a single degree.

Under pressure, values and interests became opposing choices. The call for “a more realistic and interest-driven foreign policy” only made explicit what recent peer-reviewed work argues about her own stances: that she applies a racialized double standard, humanizing Ukrainians while dehumanizing Palestinians through an “extreme form of Othering that negates both their political agency and their status as a political community.”

Unrecognized nuclear reckoning

No issue better illustrates this pattern of long-term denial followed by abrupt reversal than nuclear energy — and no issue carries heavier consequences for the continent’s industrial and strategic future.

In March 2011, von der Leyen was Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, a full member of Merkel’s cabinet when Germany decided, within days of the Fukushima accident and before its own technical assessments were complete, to accelerate the nuclear phase-out.

Germany’s reactor commission later concluded that the conditions behind Fukushima were “practically impossible” in Germany and that plants were safer than the Japanese reactors that failed. That finding did nothing to alter the decision.

As long as the plants remained standing, so did the possibility of reversing the policy, pleasing the anti-nuclear lobby. Demolition removed the evidence and the option.

When von der Leyen arrived to Berlaymont in 2019, she had a second chance, this time at continental scale, to correct that huge miscalculation. Instead, she made the Green Deal a cornerstone of her mandate, treated nuclear with suspicion, allowed Germany’s anti-nuclear inheritance to weigh on the EU taxonomy debate, and left Europe deeper in gas dependence until Russia made that dependency catastrophic.

In 2026, she calls it an “error of judgment,” announces 200 million euros in EU risk guarantees for private investment in new nuclear technologies, and moves on, without any reckoning with her own record or with the scale of the damage.

The Commission’s April 2026 Energy Union communication now states that nuclear power plants supply clean power “suitable for enhancing system integration and providing flexibility facilitating further roll-out of other clean technologies,” that “new small modular reactors or avoiding the premature retirement of existing nuclear capacity can help reducing the need for fossil fuel use,” and that “there is unlocked potential regarding existing nuclear power plants.”

This is the policy environment von der Leyen inhabited, promoted, and defended, and the cost was borne by European consumers facing the world’s highest electricity prices, by industry moving production to jurisdictions with cheaper and more reliable power, and by a climate policy that replaced carbon-free nuclear generation with coal and gas at the worst moment.

That record would have buried a less protected politician. But if she has one undeniable talent, it is turning crisis into a mechanism for centralizing power. In moments of emergency, she moves authority upward, disciplines hesitation, and makes Brussels look decisive. The difficulty begins when that concentration of power must be matched by consistency, transparency, or strategic judgment.

Von der Leyen’s plentiful sycophants operate in Brussels and Berlin think tanks, EU-funded research institutes, together with a commentary platoon that turns Commission priorities into respectable prose.

Much of that material is then fed back to the same public asked to bear the cost, repackaged as sober analysis for audiences expected to subsidize failure. The laundering is so efficient that even the slogans return wearing a decent policy brief costume.

This is the incentive structure of institutional politics. It produces refined arguments for positions that fail on the merits. The academic retreat on nuclear energy showed how narrow the space for dissent had become inside Germany’s policy and expert class. Brussels did not correct that pathology; it elevated it into a method of rule, where failure is recoded as expertise.

Stripped of title and ceremony, von der Leyen represents the European technocratic class at its most self-referential: those who design policy also judge it, failure becomes learning, and the official who helped produce the problem is invited to unveil the cure. The EU institutions have perfected the miracle of political self-absolution.

Expensive costs

History offers sobering precedents: institutions do not collapse only under external assault. They hollow themselves from within. They corrupt themselves through the very structures built to sustain them. What looks, from the outside, like strength is often the late stage of a managed decline.

She promised a geopolitical Europe and delivered bureaucratic performance. She pushed an energy transition without sufficient baseload and the citizens inherited the most expensive energy system globally. She declared defunct the post-war order on Monday and retreated on Tuesday.

She will now present a new doctrine for European security, a new realism for a new era, Socialism with European characteristics, or some other commissioned slogan with a logo and a launch event, and her well-funded defenders will write as though the earlier doctrines had been someone else’s idea.

If someone still dares to criticize this excruciating level of sophisticated institutional capture, they are speedily branded as pro-Trump, soft on China, anti-European, or on Putin’s payroll—or shown the door, as with Weyand. The accusation spares its authors the argument.

But now, consider what her policies delivered: an energy model that enriched Russian gas exporters, deindustrialization that pushed parts of European manufacturing toward China, and an incoherence that made American coercion easier. The outcome strengthened each of Europe’s main external pressures at once.

Officials who spent years warning Europe about external rivals helped produce the very weaknesses on which those rivals feed. If a Kremlin operative, a Beijing trade official, and a Mar-a-Lago lobbyist had collaborated on an EU policy agenda, the results would look remarkably similar.

Europe’s problem is not only a harsher international environment, an unreliable US, a stronger China, or Russian aggression. It is a Union leadership class that has spent years producing the conditions of its own irrelevance under a Commission President whose chief talent is to describe the crisis as if she had found it, not made it.

Europe deserves better than the architect of its vulnerabilities presenting herself, eternally, as the solution to them.

Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a Hong Kong-based geopolitics strategist with a focus on Europe-Asia relations.

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