So here’s a story that’ll make your head spin. The US just invited Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir to celebrate America’s 250th Army Day. Sounds normal, right? Except this is the same Pakistan that everyone—and I mean everyone—knows has been playing footsie with terrorists for decades.

General Michael Kurilla, the guy running US Central Command, literally stood before Congress and called Pakistan a “phenomenal counterterrorism partner.” Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies are busy documenting Pakistan’s cozy relationships. These are with the exact same terrorist networks we’re supposedly fighting.

But here’s the thing—this isn’t some massive oversight or bureaucratic confusion. It’s realpolitik at its most naked. And honestly? It reveals more about how the world actually works than any foreign policy textbook ever will.

The nuclear elephant in every room

Let’s start with the obvious: Pakistan has nukes. About 170 of them, and they’re building more. Fast.

Stephen Cohen from Brookings puts it perfectly: “The single biggest threat to U.S. security would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon.” So Pakistan’s stability becomes America’s problem whether we like it or not. Doesn’t matter what they do—we need them stable.

This creates what experts call insurmountable constraints. Bruce Riedel at CFR doesn’t mince words: “Pakistan is a country twice the size of California. It has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. Our options to do anything against Pakistan are severely limited.”

Think about that for a second. We’re basically saying: “Sure, you support terrorists, but please don’t collapse because that would be… inconvenient.”

Geography is destiny (unfortunately)

During the Afghan war—remember that 20-year adventure?—80% of NATO fuel had to go through Pakistan. Eighty percent! There was literally no other way to keep that war machine running.

Even now, post-withdrawal, Pakistan remains the main gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. As one defense official candidly admitted, “It’s either Central Asia or Pakistan—those are the two choices. We’d like to have both.”

So we’re geographically stuck with them. Not ideal when your “partner” is playing both sides.

China’s shadow game

Here’s where it gets really messy. China’s dumping $62 billion into something called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. If we completely abandon Pakistan, guess who swoops in? Beijing.

The US maintains this bizarre relationship partly to prevent Pakistan from becoming a full Chinese client state. Great power competition trumps counterterrorism concerns every single time. It’s that simple, that cynical.

Pakistan’s brilliant double game

Pakistan has mastered what I’d call “selective counterterrorism.” They’ll hunt down ISIS-K operatives for us—like that Mohammad Sharifullah guy who planned the Kabul airport bombing. General Kurilla literally got a phone call: “I’ve caught him, I’m willing to extradite him back to the United States.”

But the same Pakistani military apparatus maintains cozy relationships with the “good Taliban”—Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network—because they’re useful against India. The “bad Taliban”—Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan—threatens Pakistani state security, so they get the hammer.

It’s not accidental. Brookings research shows: “The military’s selective counterinsurgency approach delineates between groups hostile to Pakistani interests. Other groups, like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban, may have future strategic utility.”

Just last year, Pakistan faced over 1,000 terrorist attacks from TTP groups operating from Afghanistan. They even conducted airstrikes against TTP positions in December 2024, leading to direct clashes with Taliban forces. Yet they maintain strategic cooperation with Taliban leadership.

Confused yet? Welcome to South Asian geopolitics.

This isn’t new, folks

America’s been doing this dance for decades. During the Cold War, we partnered with every dictator. We even supported human rights abusers, as long as they were “our” dictators.

Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, made a revealing statement back in 2002. He said, “Pakistan was never important to the United States in its own right. It was important because of third parties.”

That’s brutally honest. Pakistan matters not for what it is, but for what it provides strategically. Always has.

We tried the pressure approach too. Cut military aid by 60% between 2010-2017. Pakistan’s behavior? Didn’t change one bit. Turns out money talks, but geography and nukes talk louder.

The credibility problem

Here’s where things get really awkward. We’re deepening ties with India as our key Indo-Pacific partner while simultaneously maintaining Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally status. You know, the same Pakistan whose military-intelligence apparatus has “long tolerated, if not enabled, cross-border terrorism.”

Regional partners are starting to ask uncomfortable questions about whether US partnerships are actually values-based or just transactional. Spoiler alert: they’re mostly transactional.

China’s exploiting this beautifully, positioning itself as Pakistan’s “iron brother” while highlighting American inconsistencies. As US influence wanes post-Afghanistan, Beijing’s strategic patience becomes increasingly attractive.

The expert consensus (such as it is)

Vali Nasr argues: “Pakistan more than any other country will decide the fate of Afghanistan.” So engagement remains strategically necessary regardless of terrorism concerns.

Stephen Cohen suggests something even more pragmatic. He proposes, “Rather than insisting that Pakistan see its neighborhood through a Western lens, the US could accept Islamabad’s different understanding of its geopolitical realities.” This acceptance would give Washington a better chance at a functional transactional partnership.

Translation: Stop moralizing and start managing.

What this all means

The Munir invitation isn’t going to resolve these contradictions—it’s not supposed to. It signals America’s acceptance that some partnerships must be managed rather than moralized about.

Whether this achieves anything meaningful is debatable. But it reveals an uncomfortable truth about how the world actually works. Geography and nuclear weapons matter more than counterterrorism rhetoric when shaping America’s most consequential relationships.

We can dress it up in diplomatic language all we want. At the end of the day, this is pure strategic necessity. It overrides stated principles. It’s realpolitik in its most naked form.

And you know what? Maybe that’s just how things have to be. The alternative might be worse. It might be more dangerous to isolate a nuclear-armed state with 240 million people. This country sits on crucial supply routes. That situation could be more perilous than this awkward dance we’re doing now.

But let’s at least be honest about what we’re doing. Because this invitation? It’s not about counterterrorism partnership. It’s about nuclear weapons, geography, and keeping China at bay. Everything else is just window dressing.