The Knesset National Security Committee chairman says the law has been widely misread, while critics call it racist and destabilizing
Israel’s new death penalty law has come under sharp attack since its passage last week, with critics arguing that it is discriminatory in practice, legally vulnerable, and likely to deepen international pressure on the country. Supporters counter that much of the backlash rests on a misreading of what the law actually does and what it was designed to achieve, blurring the line between the political argument around the measure and the legal text itself.
At the center of that defense is Member of Knesset Tzvika Foghel, chairman of the Knesset National Security Committee, who argues that both foreign critics and opponents inside Israel have distorted the law. Speaking with The Media Line, Foghel said the measure is not aimed at Palestinians as a people, but at what he called “a terrorist who carried out a murderous terror attack against the State of Israel.”
The law states that its purpose, as part of the fight against terrorism, is to impose the death penalty on terrorists who committed murderous attacks “for the protection of the State of Israel, its citizens, and its residents; for the enhancement of deterrence; for the prevention of hostage-taking attacks; as retribution for the heinous acts of terrorists; and to prescribe the arrangements for the execution of this penalty.” That language reflects the two main lines of defense offered by the coalition: one punitive and legal, the other strategic.
Most contested is the law’s application in Judea and Samaria, meaning the West Bank. Under the text, the defense minister must, within 30 days, instruct the IDF commander in the area to amend Order No. 1651, the Order regarding Security Provisions, so that a Palestinian resident of the area who intentionally causes the death of a person in an act of terrorism would face death as the default sentence, unless a military court records special reasons for imposing life imprisonment instead.
Separate from that provision, the law also contains a civilian-court track inside Israel, a distinction that matters because critics say the two systems do not operate equally in practice. It also sets out the execution process, including hanging within 90 days after a sentence becomes final, although the prime minister may ask the court to postpone the execution for special reasons for up to 180 days in total.
That provision has drawn the sharpest criticism. Opponents argue that the law creates two parallel legal tracks, one military and one civilian, and that in practice the harsher military framework will fall overwhelmingly on Palestinians because death becomes the default punishment there and because the law removes prior safeguards, including requirements for a prosecution request and a unanimous verdict. Foghel rejects that reading.
MK Tzvika Foghel, chairman of the Knesset National Security Committee. (Noam Moshkovitz/ Office of the Knesset Spokesperson)
Asked who the law applies to in practice, he gave a short answer. “A terrorist who carried out a murderous terror attack against the State of Israel. Simple and clear,” he said.
His answer is concise, but it does not fully resolve the criticism. The law is narrower than some critics suggest. It targets intentional killing in terror cases and applies to specific categories of defendants rather than to Palestinians as a whole. At the same time, it clearly operates within Israel’s existing dual legal structure. Israeli civilians are generally tried in civilian courts, while Palestinians from Judea and Samaria are generally tried in military courts. The law did not create that structure, but it raises the stakes within it.
That is why the argument over discrimination has quickly become central. Foghel said the charge gets the legal question wrong from the start.
“No. Discrimination is different treatment for equals,” he said. “Here there is a difference between residents of an enemy entity, namely the residents of the Palestinian Authority, which supports terror, funds terrorists’ families every month, and where several polls showed that most of its residents supported the October 7 massacre, and the citizens and residents of the State of Israel, Jews and Arabs.”
He then moved from principle to operational reality. “It is important to mention that the overwhelming majority of attacks in the State of Israel are carried out by residents of the [Palestinian] Authority,” he said. “If the security forces were not carrying out arrests and thwarting operations there every day and night, we would see an attack every day.”
Critics are unlikely to accept that distinction. Still, Foghel’s position clarifies how supporters of the law understand the issue: They argue that the different treatment is lawful because the defendants fall into different legal systems and security conditions. That argument is almost certain to face scrutiny if and when the law reaches the High Court of Justice.
The law was not intended only for ‘classic’ deterrence, but as part of a broader concept
Foghel also pushed back against another criticism, that the law is little more than a crude deterrence measure dressed up for public effect. He said that reading misses the wider logic behind it. “The law was not intended only for ‘classic’ deterrence, but as part of a broader concept,” he said. He described that concept as “changing the cost-benefit equation,” meaning “raising an extreme personal price for the perpetrator of an attack and trying to harm the motivation of potential attackers.”
He then turned to the common argument that terrorists are not afraid of death. “It is true that not a few terrorists go out to carry out an attack knowing they may die, but not everyone who is willing to die wants to die,” he said. “It is enough to look at the October 7 terrorists, terrorists who targeted civilians, ‘willing’ to do anything in prison to improve their conditions. That is not how people behave when they want to die.”
A central part of Foghel’s case involved hostage-taking and prisoner exchanges. “The law was not meant only for deterrence. It is also tied to the issue of kidnappings, and this is one of the central aspects,” Foghel said. “Today, terrorists are considered an asset in deals. A death sentence reduces the inventory of ‘cards’ for future deals and creates a change in the incentive for terror organizations to kidnap.” Supporters argue that the law is meant not only to deter future attackers but also to reduce the pool of prisoners who could later become bargaining chips in hostage negotiations.
Foghel put that argument in even starker terms. “The overwhelming majority of terrorists in prison were released before completing their sentence, unfortunately, because of deals for the release of hostages,” he said. “Terrorists stand and laugh at their sentencing, knowing that it will not actually be carried out. The law seeks to stop that.” “A released terrorist endangers our national security. The body of a terrorist does less.”
For Nidal Foqaha, director general of the Palestinian Peace Coalition Geneva Initiative in Ramallah, that argument is both morally unacceptable and strategically wrong. He told The Media Line that “the death penalty law is a racist law which reflects the real face of the current Israeli government,” arguing that the measure violates international law and the principles of human rights.
Going further, he asserted that the death penalty is “already being implemented in the field by the Israeli security and settlers.” He appeared to be referring to what critics describe as lethal force by Israeli security forces and violence by settlers. In his view, the new law does not create security. It formalizes a deeper and more dangerous reality.
“The death penalty violates international law and the principles of human rights and should be strongly rejected by the whole world,” he said.
He also rejected the idea that the law will deter attackers who, in any case, are willing to die for their cause. He then turned to what he sees as the deeper problem. “For many Palestinians, unfortunately, they don’t see an opportunity for a better future given the current policies on the ground.”
The death penalty will not establish stability, but rather leads to more escalation
In his view, the outcome would be the opposite of what Foghel predicts. “The death penalty will not establish stability, but rather leads to more escalation,” he said.
Beyond that, he predicted that the legal and diplomatic fight against the law would broaden quickly. “The Palestinians will appeal and approach all relevant international bodies as well as the international community to pressure Israel,” he said. He pointed to statements from “international stakeholders, mainly EU countries and international organizations,” and said they could, “at a certain stage, take a stance to abort it.”
Internationally, that dimension is not peripheral. It is part of the broader fight over how the law will be understood outside Israel. Critics say it imposes unequal legal consequences within systems that already separate Israeli civilians from Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. Supporters say the law is being mischaracterized and divorced from the security and hostage context that supporters say prompted it.
Foghel cast the law in moral terms as well. “Punishment, in its literal meaning, is intended to set a price tag for the bad acts a criminal commits,” he said. “So yes, there is no punishment that is a proper price for terrorists who murdered the Fogel family or carried out the October 7 massacre, but the death penalty is the closest thing to that. Those terrorists do not deserve to live.”
That language helps explain why the law has become so emotionally and politically charged inside Israel, particularly in the shadow of October 7 and the continuing hostage crisis. For its supporters, the issue is not only legal architecture or future negotiations. It is also about restoring a sense that punishment still has meaning in a system where some of the worst offenders may eventually walk free through a deal.
Legally, the battle is only beginning. Challenges are expected, and the courts will almost certainly be asked to decide whether the law can survive judicial review. Opponents will argue that it is discriminatory in effect, unstable in law, and dangerous in practice. Defenders will answer that it is narrower than critics claim and that its strategic purpose has been badly misunderstood.
Ultimately, the courts will have to decide whether a law framed as narrow and targeted can survive claims that its practical effect is discriminatory and destabilizing. That fight, more than the vote itself, is likely to shape the legal and political battle ahead.
