“India gave us more than just weapons; it gave us hope. If they hadn’t helped us, our fight against Pakistan’s genocide might have been a whisper in the wind. — Lt. Col. Quazi Sajjad Ali Zahir, a Bangladeshi war veteran, 2020
The Bangladesh Liberation War started in 1971. The Bengali people of East Pakistan fought for freedom from the harsh rule of West Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini led the way in this fight. They were a group of Bengali soldiers, paramilitary, and civilians who fought as guerrillas. India’s involvement—giving training, weapons, and a safe place to stay—was key to Pakistan’s surrender on December 16, 1971. But was India’s help an act of selfless humanitarian intervention, or did it start a rebellion that killed innocent people? This study looks into the moral and strategic issues and asks whether India’s help led to freedom or chaos.
A Crisis on India’s Doorstep: Humanitarian and Strategic Reasons
The war started on March 25, 1971. Pakistan initiated Operation Searchlight with a brutal attack on Bengali civilians. They also targeted intellectuals and supporters of the Awami League. The International Commission of Jurists reported that between 300,000 and 3 million people died. Furthermore, 200,000 to 400,000 women were raped. Additionally, up to 10 million people fled to India. This was not a far-off war for India. Refugees flooded into West Bengal and Assam, putting a strain on resources and raising fears of communal unrest.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi led India’s quick response. By April 1971, India let refugees in and started helping the Mukti Bahini, which means “freedom fighters” in Bengali. This group was made up of soldiers who had left the army and civilian volunteers led by Colonel M.A.G. Osmani. India’s Eastern Command trained fighters in camps in Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura. They gave them rifles, carbines, and artillery that had been taken from Pakistan. The Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Special Security Bureau (SSB) secretly aided by teaching guerrilla tactics. They also taught how to gather intelligence. By November, the Mukti Bahini had 70,000 regular soldiers and 50,000 guerrillas, all of which were paid for by India.
India’s reasons were a mix of caring and planning. The refugee crisis needed action, but it was a smart move to weaken Pakistan, which has been a rival since 1947. If Pakistan were split up, it would be less of a threat to India’s western border. It would also counter China’s support for Islamabad. As historian Gary Bass wrote in The Blood Telegram, India was also afraid of a Bengali resistance. This resistance, led by communists, could join forces with Naxalite rebels inside its borders. India made sure that Bangladesh was pro-India by supporting the Awami League’s temporary government. Gandhi said the intervention was for humanitarian reasons, but geopolitics shaped the plan.
Summary: India helped the Mukti Bahini because of a refugee crisis and its own strategic interests. It did this by giving them humanitarian aid while also trying to weaken Pakistan. This dual motive creates confusion. It is hard to determine if India cared more about Bengali lives or its own power in the region.
The Mukti Bahini’s Campaign: Successes and Mistakes
The Mukti Bahini fought a never-ending guerrilla war against Pakistani military bases, bridges, and supply lines. Operation Jackpot was a naval commando mission. It sank more than 100,000 tonnes of Pakistani ships. This made it hard for them to move goods. By December, when India officially joined the war, the Mukti Bahini had freed 80% of Bangladesh’s land, making victory possible.
But the campaign had a bad side. Some Mukti Bahini units attacked Bihari communities. These are Urdu-speaking Muslims who moved to Pakistan from India during the partition in 1947. Biharis, who were often thought to be loyal to Pakistan, were brutally punished. Lawrence Lifschultz’s 1974 book Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution says that between 1,000 and 150,000 Biharis died. Massacres happened in places like Jessore and Khulna. The Razakars were militias made up of pro-Pakistan Bengalis and Biharis. They perpetuated the violence by killing Bengalis in horrible ways. An example is the Dhaka University killings. Survivors’ stories reveal the brutality. For instance, in a 2001 Dawn interview, Noor Jahan shared that Mukti Bahini fighters burned down Bihari homes. Families were inside these homes.
Did India pay for these terrible things? There is no proof that India told its troops to attack civilians. General Manekshaw’s memoirs discuss Indian training logs. These logs were mostly about military goals like ambushes, sabotage, and battles such as Gazipur. But India’s weapons and open borders gave the Mukti Bahini freedom. In an uncontrollable war, rogue units acted on their own. Susan Brownmiller’s book Against Our Will talks about rape by all sides, including Mukti Bahini fighters, against Bihari women. This is similar to what the Pakistani army did.
Some Pakistani historians, like Yasmin Saikia, claim that India intentionally stoked ethnic violence. She discusses this in Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh. They suggest it was done to make Pakistan even less stable. This ignores the fact that the war started because of Pakistan’s genocide. The Mukti Bahini was made up of ordinary people. This made it unlikely that India would be able to control everything from one place. Still, India’s failure to stop excesses makes it indirectly responsible.
Proxy wars and what happened after them in the past
India’s backing of the Mukti Bahini is similar to other proxy wars. The U.S. gave $5 billion to the Afghan mujahideen through Pakistan’s ISI to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. This led to the rise of groups like al-Qaeda. India’s support for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka in the 1980s made the rebels stronger. Later, the rebels attacked Indian peacekeepers. India’s help in Bangladesh led to independence, but it also destroyed Bihari communities. This is similar to what happened in Syria, where U.S.-backed rebels killed Alawite civilians, according to Human Rights Watch in 2013.
In Rwanda after 1994, on the other hand, World Bank aid was linked to changes in how the government worked. This made militia violence go down. In 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, Srinath Raghavan says that India’s support didn’t have these kinds of conditions. The crisis was so urgent. Additionally, Pakistan was being aggressive. The result was a strategic win, but a moral mess.
Summary: Historical proxy wars show that giving weapons to rebels often causes civilians to suffer in ways that weren’t planned. India’s experience in 1971 shows how hard it is to find a balance between taking quick action and being responsible.
The Moral and Strategic Reckoning
Did India help the Mukti Bahini do bad things? Yes, in a way. India triggered a wave it couldn’t fully control by distributing weapons to a wide range of people. This included soldiers, students, and civilians. But Bass says that Pakistan’s genocide was the main cause of the war. Ninety thousand troops killed Bengalis without regard for their lives. Without India’s intervention, the death toll could have been higher, and Bangladesh’s independence delayed or denied.
The Bihari tragedy needs people to be held responsible. A 2023 UNHCR report says that 300,000 Biharis are still stateless in Bangladeshi camps today. Dhaka’s story of liberation ignores their situation. India didn’t push for justice for Mukti Bahini crimes because it wanted to protect Bangladesh’s independence. The Awami League in Bangladesh didn’t either. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission recorded a 1972 testimony from Bihari survivor Mohammad Alam. In his testimony, he said that Mukti Bahini fighters killed his brothers. This story is similar to many other undocumented accounts.
Counterargument: People who support India, like retired General Jacob in Surrender at Dacca, claim it was unrealistic for India to monitor every Mukti Bahini unit. Monitoring every Mukti Bahini unit was deemed unrealistic. This was especially true during a genocide. India’s top priority was to stop Pakistan’s killing, not to micromanage a resistance. This point of view is useful, but it ignores the human cost of giving too much aid.
Summary: India had to help stop genocide for moral reasons, but it didn’t do anything about the Mukti Bahini’s wrongdoings, which left a legacy of unresolved complaints. The Bihari question is still a problem with the war’s victory.
What’s at stake in South Asia right now?
The war in 1971 is still a hot topic. Veterans in Bangladesh, like Commodore Abdul Wahed Chowdhury, who was quoted in a 2021 Daily Star op-ed, say that India is a “great neighbour.” Stories of Indian subversion in Pakistan help shape policies like the country’s nuclear buildup after 1971. Raghavan says that India’s role solidified its dominance in the region, but it also left a complicated legacy: a humanitarian victory marred by the chaos of proxy wars.
The bigger question is whether any country can support a rebellion without getting blood on its hands. The problems in South Asia right now, like Kashmir and Afghanistan, are similar to what happened in 1971. If India or other powerful countries give money to insurgents today, will they have the same successes and failures as the Mukti Bahini? What happens when the line between liberator and enabler gets blurry? The stakes are lives, borders, and a region that is always on edge.
Important Dates in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War
Pakistan starts Operation Searchlight on March 25, 1971, and kills thousands.
In April 1971, India lets refugees in, and the Mukti Bahini group forms.
Operation Jackpot by Mukti Bahini messes up Pakistani logistics from July to November 1971.
December 3–16, 1971: India enters the war, and Pakistan gives up.
After the war, the Bihari massacres killed between 1,000 and 150,000 people, and 300,000 people are still without a country.
Sources: Gary Bass, the International Commission of Jurists, and the UNHCR