If India’s the enemy, why does Pakistan want ICBMs?

Warnings from US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard before the US Senate that Pakistan may be moving toward intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability are raising new concerns about potential threats to the US homeland.

In her testimony before the US Senate, Gabbard stated that Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missiles that “potentially could include ICBMs” capable of striking US territory, though she did not specify timelines, locations or operational status.

Her testimony places Pakistan alongside China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran as states developing missile delivery systems with nuclear or conventional payloads.

These developments are part of a broader trend the intelligence community assesses could increase the number of missiles threatening the US to more than 16,000 by 2035, up from more than 3,000 currently.

The assessment indicates such states are likely to study US missile defense plans to shape their own missile development and evaluate US deterrence intentions, highlighting growing concern in the US over expanding missile threats to the homeland. Gabbard’s warning that Pakistan may be developing ICBM capabilities raises the question of why an India-focused nuclear power would pursue such systems.

In terms of weapons, Hans Kristensen and other writers note in a September 2025 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Pakistan’s Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the longest-range system it has tested, has a range of 2,750 kilometers, sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad.

Kristensen and others note that the Shaheen-III may have been designed to do more than that, as its 2,750-kilometer range was determined by a need to strike the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which India could develop as strategic bases to position its weapons. They also point out that for the Shaheen-III to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would have to be launched from the easternmost parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border.

This suggests Pakistan’s longest-range systems remain oriented toward covering the full spectrum of Indian targets, including outlying bases.

Furthermore, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal stood at around 170 warheads as of January 2025. It notes that Pakistan continues to develop a nascent nuclear triad comprising aircraft, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

SIPRI adds that ongoing development of delivery systems and the accumulation of fissile material suggest that Pakistan’s arsenal could expand over the coming decade, although projections vary due to limited publicly available data.

Given Pakistan’s India-centric posture, it remains unclear why it would pursue ICBM capability, despite modernizing its nuclear arsenal. As Timothy Wright writes in a February 2025 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), available evidence points to emerging developments in Pakistan’s long-range missile capabilities but remains inconclusive.

Wright cites US sanctions on Pakistan’s National Defence Complex and Chinese suppliers linked to composite materials, filament-winding machines, mandrels, and inspection systems associated with large solid-rocket motors.

He also points to satellite imagery showing a new, larger horizontal motor test stand at Attock built between 2021 and late 2023, suggesting the ability to test larger rocket motors, although their ultimate purpose remains unclear.

Still, Pakistan may have enough reasons to be concerned about US action against its nuclear arsenal. As noted by Chilamkuri Mohan in a December 2024 article for the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, during the US War in Afghanistan, the US downplayed Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network, as Pakistan was a key partner in counterterrorism efforts.

Mohan says those constraints appear less relevant after the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. He notes that as concerns from the US and Israel about Iran’s nuclear development rise, there may be an increase in punitive actions against countries and groups that support Iran’s advancement.

The June 2025 US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have heightened nuclear anxieties in Pakistan. Marcus Andreopoulos notes in an October 2025 article for the Royal Society of Asian Affairs (RSAA) that US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities have heightened anxieties in Pakistan, which could accelerate Pakistan’s long-range missile program and the potential development of intercontinental capabilities.

He highlights China’s longstanding support for Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs and notes that Pakistan’s growing dependence on China raises questions about its strategic autonomy amid rising US–China tensions.

At the same time, he argues that a more transactional US approach toward Pakistan may reduce the US’s willingness to confront or constrain these developments, allowing them to proceed with limited opposition.

The ambiguity surrounding Pakistan’s missile development may also serve a secondary purpose: maintaining the US as a stabilizing force. Siddhant Kishore argues in a November 2025 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that Pakistan’s nuclear signaling is less about directly deterring India and more about manipulating crisis dynamics to draw in the US as a restraining force.

He says this signaling is intended to create the perception of imminent nuclear escalation, thereby capturing US attention and prompting intervention. He notes that historically, US involvement has often pressured India to exercise restraint.

In this sense, Pakistan’s nuclear posture functions as a tool of third-party coercion to offset India’s conventional military advantage, with the deliberate cultivation of uncertainty central to the strategy. Pakistan’s potential move toward longer-range capabilities—while unproven—may reflect a gradual shift from purely India-centric deterrence toward hedging against US power.