American military bases, especially those situated in the United States, lack air defenses.
To the degree that this was regarded as a problem, the issue was framed as defense against ballistic missile attack.
The only defense against ballistic missiles is to use integrated air defense systems such as Patriot, THAAD and the small number of ground-based interceptors (GBI) kept in Greely, Alaska.
When it comes to other threats, for example from drones, the US has almost nothing.
The Barksdale example
During the week of March 9th through the 15th, waves of drones hovered over the Barksdale Air Force Base focused on B-52 weapons loading operations and on base strategic assets.
There were some 60 to 75 drone sightings during this time period, and the drones arrived in clusters of 12 to 15. Doing the math, this means that over a seven day period drone clusters operated over the base 5 to 7 times.
Each drone wave lasted around four hours. The drones operated with their lights on, a direct provocation, knowing that the base was paralyzed and had no effective response.
The jammers available to base personnel did not work because the drones operated on much higher frequencies exceeding jammer capabilities.
We do not know where the drones came from, where they returned to, or who operated them.
As previously reported, the drones disrupted operations critical to Operation Epic Fury over Iran. The base was forced to declare FPCON CHARLIE.
FPCON stands for Force Protection Condition and Charlie is the second highest alert status (the highest is called DELTA and involves an actual physical attack). Following protocol, base personnel were directed to shelter in place.
As a practical matter, disrupted operations impacted the operational momentum of Epic Fury, impeded refueling tanker operations needed to support B-52 transit to Iran and likely alerted the Iranians to specific attacks, giving them time to take countermeasures that may have included moving sensitive equipment and weapons away from the impending strike, and time to organize air defenses to try and knock out the B-52 bombers.
So far as we know, the B-52s successfully carried out their mission.
Today the US Air Force (and for that matter the Army) lacks domestically available air defenses that can destroy drones overhead. To make matters worse, there is a lot of confusion whether air defenses can be used in US territory to defend military bases. Thus the Barksdale base commander could not call in fighter jets to destroy the drones.
Obviously this needs fixing.
A cheap air defense capability
The lack of air defenses and air defense missiles is a growing issue and is unlikely to be solved soon. There are no available timelines for new missiles for systems such as Patriot and THAAD, and the ground-based interceptor is such a mess that it isn’t consequential when speaking about base defenses.
Unfortunately, even if Patriot and THAAD were deployable at important US air bases, the systems are very expensive to operate. THAAD’s cost is ghastly. A single interceptor missile is valued at $12.7 million to $15.5 million, making the cost of a takedown of a drone swarm over $168 million (assuming each THAAD actually kills a drone). Patriot is cheaper but stil,l at $5 million per shot, too costly against far cheaper drones.
The other problem with both THAAD and Patriot is they may miss and crash into civilian spaces. That happened, for example, in March 2026 when UAE-operated Patriot air defense systems failed to stop Iranian ballistic missiles, which struck oil facilities in Fujairah. Similar incidents happened elsewhere in the Middle East and in the Ukraine war.
Enter the A-10
The A-10 equipped with “smart” Hydra rockets is very effective against drones. At around $20,000 a shot, the cost of the rocket is close to the cost of the drone. On top of that, the A-10 is far, far cheaper to operate than the F-22, F-35 and its cost is less than the operational costs for the F-16. (Compare the F-22 at $85,000 an hour with the A-10C at $22,500 an hour).
Even more significantly, F-22, F-35 and F-16 need to use air-to-air missiles to kill drones. These missiles cost close to $1 million a shot, and each plane is limited in the number of missiles it can carry.
Smart Hydra rockets on the A-10 are equipped with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS II), currently one of the most important munitions in the US arsenal for the 2026 conflict. Developed by BAE Systems, it is essentially a guidance kit that transforms the unguided 70mm (2.75-inch) Hydra 70 rocket into a precision-guided missile.
The A-10 typically uses two main types of cylindrical launchers for the 2.75-inch (70mm) Hydra 70 rockets –LAU-131 / LAU-68: These are the most common and hold 7 rockets each. Recent intelligence and imagery from CENTCOM (as of March 15, 2026) show A-10Cs operating over Iraq and the Persian Gulf with a single dedicated APKWS pod that contains 7 APKWS II laser-guided rockets.
The Air Force has been trying to get rid of its A-10s. At the present time there are between 150 and 160 A-10s in the “boneyard” at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, where they are managed by the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group. These aircraft include about fifty older A-10A models and around 100 A-10C models. In 2024 the Air Force sent 39 A-10Cs to the 309th.
There are different categories of storage at Davis-Monthan. Type 1000 are regarded as pristine aircraft that are not cannibalized for parts. Between 40 and 60 A-10Cs are in this category. Type 2000 are aircraft that can be used for spare parts, Around 100 A-10s are in this category.
In practical terms, the Pentagon could assign 40 to 60 A-10s to airbases regarded as critical installations, or nearby locations to protect installations lacking suitable airbases and support mechanisms. Doing this would provide solid protection against any drone incursion.
The modest proposal is simple: rejuvenate the stored “pristine” A-10s and use them for base defense in the United States.
Clearly the rules on allowing drone shootdowns must be clarified and, possibly, changed, and rules of engagement need to be worked out to minimize the risk of damage in a shootdown scenario. Assuming that can be done, not every location can be protected, whether because there are not enough A-10s or because the risk is too high, especially in urban areas. It is noteworthy that APKWS II does have a self-destruct mechanism, so the ground risk is minimized.
Because other alternatives, such as lasers, are still off in the future as deployable weapons, and missile based air defenses are very costly, serious consideration should be given to using the A-10s at mission critical bases in the United States and elsewhere.
Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy under secretary of defense. This article was first published on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy.
