“We do not choose between empires -we choose dignity, sovereignty, and freedom.”
(Soekarno was the leader of the Indonesian struggle for independence)
As of March 25-26, 2026, Iran has rejected U.S. proposals to end the conflict, instead outlining five key conditions, as reported by Iranian state media and Iranian Embassy in South Africa. These conditions, aimed at halting the current hostilities, include:
- A complete stop to U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran and its allies.
- The establishment of concrete mechanisms to prevent the re-imposition of war.
- Guaranteed and clear payment for war damages and compensation.
- An end to fighting across all fronts involving Iran and its regional “resistance” allies.
- Recognition of Iranian sovereignty and control over the Strait of Hormuz.
These demands are seen as a counterproposal to what Iran labelled an “excessive” 15-point U.S. plan. Iranian officials stated they would not accept dictates from the U.S. and will continue resisting until their own conditions are met, citing that if they engaged in talks with the USA, it would tantamount to an admission of defeat.
Donald Trump finds himself in a nightmarish space. He is clearly under serious delusions (and lying through his teeth) when he states that had had “very good and productive conversations” with Iran, saying the sides had “major points of agreement”. He claimed to have paused strikes on Iranian power plants to allow these negotiations to proceed. A senior Iranian official mocked the claim, questioning if the U.S. was “negotiating with themselves”.
Iran has denied direct or indirect negotiations, its Foreign Ministry acknowledged receiving “messages” from friendly nations regarding U.S. willingness to talk, but denied these exchanges amounted to formal negotiations. Iran has accused the Trump administration of fabricating news about talks to control high energy prices in the US and to manage the economic impact of the war, which has seen the Strait of Hormuz closed, hurting global markets. These claims follow a period of intense military engagement, with the U.S. and Israel striking Iranian sites. Iran has reiterated that its position on the war and the Strait of Hormuz remains unchanged. The situation shows a clear divergence in narratives, with the U.S. trying to project control and diplomacy, while Iran seeks to project strength and deny a retreat.
Despite US-Israeli air strikes on Feb 28, 2026, targeting senior leaders and nuclear facilities, Iran’s regime has displayed resilience. Iran has launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting US military bases in Gulf states and in Israel. Iran has also warned that any further moves by the US or its backers will result in “relentless, unceasing attacks” on regional infrastructure. Analysts indicate Iran is shifting toward “strategic containment” and pragmatic endurance, retaining its ability to project power over critical energy chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. Iran continues to evade sanctions with economic support from China, which buys the vast majority of its oil.
White House figures have suggested the US should “declare victory and get out” of the conflict, seeking an “off-ramp” or negotiated settlement. Critics allege US official statements claiming Iran’s navy and air force are finished are not supported by ground reality, drawing parallels to false optimistic reporting from previous wars.
White House figures have suggested the US should “declare victory and get out” of the conflict, seeking an “off-ramp” or negotiated settlement. Critics allege U.S. official statements claiming Iran’s navy and air force are finished are not supported by ground reality, drawing parallels to false optimistic reporting from previous wars.
Based on reports as of March 2026, the United States, under President Donald Trump, is exploring an exit strategy or “off-ramp” from the conflict with Iran by framing tactical successes as a “declared victory”. The administration faces pressure to end the war due to concerns over regional stability, global economic impacts, and the desire to avoid a prolonged, costly entanglement.
The White House is shifting goals away from regime change toward limited objectives, such as degrading Iran’s military capabilities and ensuring oil security in the Strait of Hormuz.
President Trump indicated the conflict was decided early on, citing the destruction of Iranian naval vessels and missile capacity, which advisers urge him to use as a “mission accomplished” moment to exit. The administration has sent a 15-point plan to Tehran aimed at ending hostilities, which includes demanding Iran abandon its nuclear ambitions and regional militia support.
Advisers suggest using the degraded state of Iran’s military to compel negotiations, rather than continuing a campaign that could turn into an unsustainable occupation.
Despite US strikes destroying significant portions of Iran’s military capabilities, the Iranian regime has shown resilience, leading to concerns that Iran could also claim victory by simply surviving the conflict.
Reports highlight a divide in Washington, with some officials favouring an immediate exit, while others push for further escalation.
As of March 2026, Israel has experienced significant structural, economic, and security-related damage from prolonged regional conflicts, yet it continues to act as a central, albeit constrained, player in, and sometimes an obstacle to, peace negotiations.
Israel’s economy has suffered heavily, with losses exceeding $57 billion (roughly 177 billion shekels) between 2023 and early 2026, representing about 8.6% of its annual GDP. The ongoing conflict has caused debt to approach 70% of GDP, necessitating a revised 2026 state budget that added $13 billion to finance war efforts.
The Port of Eilat entered bankruptcy and closed due to disruptions in shipping, while the prolonged conflict has led to decreased exports to certain regions. Attacks on Israeli territory increased by 120% in 2025 compared to 2024, with continued attacks into 2026.
The Israel equation
Israel remains an active participant in regional dynamics, with its actions often influencing, or being seen as trying to block, US-Iran peace talks.
Despite fatigue, Israeli officials have stated the “war is not close to ending,” continuing strikes in Gaza and against Iranian targets in 2026. Israel is in a “forever war” scenario, where it is struggling with the costs of managing multiple fronts, including Gaza and Lebanon. Some observers note that the damage has created a new, challenging precedent for Israeli security, potentially weakening its traditional military deterrence, though it still holds significant offensive power.
In summary, the damage is severe and long-term, causing significant financial stress, but Israel continues to hold a defining role in Middle East negotiations, largely through its continued military presence and its capacity to disrupt or support peace initiatives.
The GCC quandary
Post the Iran war, the GCC faces an urgent need for a new regional security architecture, shifting from reliance on US protection to an inclusive “cooperative security model.” This structure would likely incorporate Iran and Iraq to prevent future conflicts, moving beyond the current defensive, fragmented posture toward a collective, stable, and locally-driven equilibrium.
Instead of deepening rifts, the new arrangement would prioritize a, new arrangement between the GCC states and Iran to ensure regional stability, with an, inclusion of Iran and Iraq in a new structure. The war has highlighted the risks of relying on US-Israel protection, prompting, GCC states to reconsider their security dependence. With, oil infrastructure and regional stability threatened by direct attacks, the focus is shifting to, protecting Gulf investments and preventing further conflict.
While, Riyadh stands to gain from a weakened Iran, the potential for an, Iranian state collapse or fragmentation poses, a massive threat to regional stability.
Prospects of regional integration
A Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) without U.S. and Israeli dominance would likely shift toward a security architecture rooted in regional integration, featuring normalized ties with Iran, reduced reliance on foreign military bases, and increased strategic autonomy. This shift would accelerate a pivot toward Eastern powers like China and Russia for trade and diplomatic partnerships. Gulf states would pivot from reliance on U.S. security guarantees toward regional security arrangements, potentially including frameworks with Iran to manage regional disputes. A major reduction or removal of U.S. military infrastructure – long considered targets by Iran – would likely occur, fundamentally altering the GCC’s defense profile.
GCC sovereign wealth funds might pivot from Western investments toward domestic development, infrastructure projects, and partnerships with Asian, Russian, or Chinese initiatives. The pursuit of normalizing ties with Israel, as seen in the Abraham Accords, would likely freeze or reverse, as GCC nations re-prioritize Arab and Islamic world alignment. The GCC might experience fewer retaliatory attacks from regional actors who currently target US-backed infrastructure.
The GCC could emerge as a more independent geopolitical actor, rather than one involved in or impacted by conflicts that are seen as foreign-driven.
Russia and China upset the regional applecart
Russia and China are reshaping the Middle East by leveraging a perceived U.S. pullback to build deep economic and security ties with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations. China drives infrastructure and trade via the Belt and Road Initiative, while Russia focuses on energy coordination and security, offering GCC states a, often seen as, non-interfering alternative partnership.
China is a dominant trade partner, investing heavily in technology and infrastructure. Russia works closely with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stabilize oil prices and expand trade, particularly through buying and reselling sanctioned energy products.
Russia maintains a key security presence, particularly in Syria, and provides arms to regional actors. While not replacing the U.S. security umbrella, Russia and China offer weapons and military technology with fewer conditions than Western powers, including assistance with civil nuclear programs.
The war has highlighted the risks of relying on US-Israel protection, prompting, GCC states to reconsider their security dependence.
China has increased its diplomatic weight, notably mediating the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in 2023, signalling a shift toward regional conflict resolution.
GCC nations use this engagement to hedge against dependency on the U.S., diversifying their strategic partners and negotiating better terms with Western counterparts.
While both often align in countering Western influence, their approaches differ, with Russia focusing on political support and security, and China prioritizing economic investment.
The growing role of Russia and China contributes to a more multipolar Middle East, where GCC countries leverage relationships with multiple global powers to meet economic diversification goals, such as Saudi Vision 2030, and security
In the final reckoning, this war has exposed the limits of power when confronted with resolve. Iran has demonstrated that endurance, geography, and strategic patience can outweigh brute force, forcing its adversaries into uneasy calculations of exit rather than victory. The United States and Israel may still command formidable arsenals, but their political will is fraying under the weight of an unwinnable confrontation. What now emerges is not merely a military stalemate, but a shifting world order where regional actors reclaim agency. If there is a lesson here, it is stark: domination is no longer assured, and dignity, once asserted, can redraw the map of power itself.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
