Faced with an emerging multipolar order, the United States appears to be relying less on dominance of every frontier technology than on leveraging its influence over the world’s most finite and strategically vital commodities: oil and gas.
Control, disruption or the credible threat of disruption to global energy supplies has become Washington’s principal instrument for preserving dollar primacy, US Treasury-market demand and a semblance of hegemony.
This is not a claim that every American administration pursues an identical playbook. But across recent administrations, a consistent pattern is visible: energy security, energy market influence and the geopolitical leverage that flows from both have remained central to US strategy.
Energy as strategic leverage
Venezuela illustrates the first approach: direct control. Following Washington’s removal of Nicolas Maduro and its intervention in Venezuelan oil exports, the United States secured access to a substantial share of the country’s hydrocarbon wealth. President Donald Trump has claimed that the arrangement would ultimately give the US control over more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves.
That figure should be treated cautiously. Venezuela’s officially reported 303 billion barrels of proven reserves are widely viewed as inflated; independent experts cited by the Associated Press put realistic recoverable proven reserves closer to 60-120 billion barrels. Even at the lower estimate, Venezuela represents an unusually large resource base in the Western Hemisphere—and one that Washington can now influence directly.
Iran and the wider Gulf represent a second method: disruption. The US-Israel war on Iran, launched in late February 2026, effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global energy supplies once flowed.
Middle Eastern producers cut or rerouted exports, shipping costs surged and Brent crude nearly doubled in the first two months of the conflict, peaking at $118 per barrel in March.
For Washington, outright victory over Iran may not be the objective. Persistent instability in the Gulf raises the global price of energy, strengthens the relative position of US producers and LNG exporters, and reinforces the perception of US-controlled supply routes as indispensable.
The dollar and Treasurys
Energy shocks do not merely affect fuel prices. They reshape capital flows. When oil and gas become scarce or insecure, inflationary pressure rises, risk assets come under strain and investors often seek safety in US dollar assets, particularly long-dated Treasuries.
This dynamic helps explain why energy disruption can serve broader US financial interests. A crisis that weakens alternatives to the dollar, depresses gold and other perceived safe-haven assets and pushes capital toward US government debt simultaneously supports dollar hegemony and lowers the political cost of American fiscal deficits.
The benefits are not evenly distributed. US oil and gas producers and exporters gain from higher global prices, while energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia absorb a heavier burden.
US consumers are not immune: gasoline rose above $4.60 per gallon in May 2026, and diesel reached a record $6.50 per gallon in September as refining capacity tightened. But relative to import-dependent economies, the United States retains a structural advantage.
Why AI won’t replace oil
The contrast with artificial intelligence is central to the argument. AI is transformative, but its supply is potentially replicable. No company or state is likely to monopolize it indefinitely: models diffuse, open-source alternatives emerge and competitors – including Chinese firms – can narrow capability gaps.
Oil and gas are different. They are finite, geographically concentrated and dependent on pipelines, ports, chokepoints, refineries, and political access. Their value lies not only in their scarcity but in the fact that control over their movement can be contested.
This is why the US may regard energy, rather than AI supremacy, as the more durable foundation of geopolitical power. A technology leader can be overtaken; a state that influences access to the Gulf, Venezuela or Russian energy flows retains leverage even if its technological edge narrows.
Russia, Europe and the long game
The war in Ukraine fits the same framework. The severing of Russian pipeline gas and oil flows to Europe was not simply a consequence of conflict; it accelerated Europe’s dependence on US liquefied natural gas (LNG) and other Atlantic-basin supplies.
Whatever one’s view of responsibility for the war, the energy outcome was unambiguous: Europe dismantled its previous reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, while US fossil-fuel exporters gained market share.
The reported US offer to accept Russian diesel under a waiver should therefore be read less as a major market intervention than as a symbolic demonstration of leverage.
Russia has reportedly said the gesture does not materially alter the underlying geopolitical or geoeconomic relationship. Its significance lies in Washington’s ability to grant, withhold or condition access to energy markets, not the volume of diesel involved.
China’s energy dilemma
China faces the sharpest version of this problem. As the world’s largest energy consumer, it remains heavily dependent on imported oil and gas, especially much of it shipped through maritime routes that pass near contested waters and strategic chokepoints.
Beijing’s response has been twofold: expand domestic energy production and accelerate electrification. Coal still generated 49.7% of China’s electricity in the first half of 2026, though its share fell below half for the first time.
Meanwhile, installed solar capacity overtook coal capacity in July 2026, reaching 1,286 GW versus coal’s 1,285 GW — although solar still produces far less electricity because of lower utilization.
China may therefore pursue a combined strategy: more renewables, more coal-fired reliability, greater strategic reserves, diversified import routes and a stronger naval presence to protect sea lanes through which its fuel imports transit.
The South China Sea and the Gulf are the likeliest arenas for a collision between Chinese energy security and US influence.
India is even more exposed. With limited domestic hydrocarbons and rising import dependence, it is highly vulnerable to sustained energy inflation.
Unless New Delhi dramatically expands renewables, nuclear power, domestic refining and diversified suppliers, high energy costs could constrain its long-term economic rise.
Contested energy order
The likely future is a more contested rather than stable multipolar order. Africa, Southeast Asia, the Arctic, the Gulf and Russia will all remain potential arenas of energy competition. As one flashpoint subsides, another may flare.
The central risk is that energy becomes permanently politicized. If major powers treat oil and gas less as tradable commodities than as instruments of coercion, the result could be recurring supply shocks, entrenched inflation, fragmented markets and greater volatility across global capital markets.
In that world, Washington’s strategy is clear: preserve influence over the energy system wherever possible and disrupt it where full control is impossible. Whether this sustains US hegemony or accelerates the rise of rival energy-security blocs will depend largely on whether China and India can build alternatives fast enough to reduce their exposure.
