As Houthi attacks intensify pressure on Riyadh, Israeli and US elections complicate Washington’s normalization ambitions, while Saudi public opinion and demands for Palestinian statehood remain major obstacles
US President Donald Trump’s renewed call for Saudi Arabia to accept Israeli assistance against Yemen’s Houthis has revived questions about whether shared security threats could bring Riyadh and Jerusalem closer to normalization. But mounting attacks on Saudi infrastructure, Israel’s approaching election, and unresolved disagreements over Palestinian statehood continue to complicate the prospect of formal relations.
Asked on October 16 whether Saudi Arabia should accept Israeli help, President Trump replied: “I do, I think they will. Israel’s been very helpful to Saudi Arabia.” He also suggested that Saudi-Israeli normalization could be back on the table, “maybe more than ever.”
His comments did not establish whether Riyadh had requested Israeli military assistance or agreed to any overt security partnership.
Saudi Arabia is confronting an intensified campaign by the Iran-backed Houthis, whose missiles and drones have targeted airports, oil facilities, and shipping. An attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 13 people, while repeated strikes have disrupted aviation and raised concerns about the kingdom’s ability to protect infrastructure central to its economic development plans.
For Riyadh, however, accepting Israeli military assistance would carry political consequences at home and throughout an Arab region deeply affected by the wars since October 7, 2023.
“Since the Yemen war, there have been contacts with Israel. Israel wanted to assist with the Houthis, but the Saudis, because of public opinion, did not guarantee any open contact,” Dr. Yoel Guzansky, senior researcher and head of the Gulf Program at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), told The Media Line.
A September 30 incident illustrated the limits of cooperation. Following the emergency landing in Saudi Arabia of a Flydubai aircraft bound for Israel after an attack in its cockpit, Riyadh refused an Israeli request to allow military aircraft to retrieve the Israeli passengers, according to Reuters. The passengers instead returned on another Flydubai plane.
“Saudi Arabia did the minimum and didn’t want any normalization,” Guzansky said, referring to the refusal to permit Israeli aircraft to land.
Before the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia and Israel had been moving toward a possible US-brokered normalization agreement. The subsequent wars and destruction in Gaza have made formal recognition considerably more contentious.
Riyadh has maintained that any agreement must include a credible pathway toward an independent Palestinian state, a condition Israel’s current government has resisted.
“Since October 7, the Arab world is very much against Israel. The Palestinian issue is formally at the center because it helps maintain a form of stability for Arab governments,” Guzansky said.
He argued that public opposition to Israel would remain a substantial obstacle even if the two governments identified additional areas of cooperation.
There is no common ground between Israel and Saudi Arabia in terms of societies. Public opinion is against Israel in Saudi Arabia, and it will be hard to shift that.
“There is no common ground between Israel and Saudi Arabia in terms of societies. Public opinion is against Israel in Saudi Arabia, and it will be hard to shift that.”
For Dr. Cyril Widdershoven, senior advisor at Blue Water Strategy, the security crisis also presents an economic and political challenge for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 development program depends heavily on foreign investment, infrastructure expansion, and the kingdom’s reputation as a stable destination for international business. Continued attacks on airports, ports, and energy facilities threaten those ambitions while increasing defense and reconstruction costs.
Widdershoven warned that mounting expenses and persistent insecurity could fuel domestic criticism of the crown prince, making an openly acknowledged relationship with Israel even more politically sensitive.
The economic consequences of the conflict are already apparent. On October 19, organizers announced that Saudi Arabia’s flagship Future Investment Initiative conference, originally scheduled for October 26–29, would be postponed until 2027. The decision followed deadly Houthi attacks and growing security concerns, although organizers did not explicitly cite the attacks as the reason.
Military considerations present another obstacle. Saudi Arabia has fought the Houthis for more than a decade, yet repeated air campaigns have failed to eliminate the group’s ability to strike across the border or threaten shipping through the Red Sea.
“I don’t think that Saudi is militarily able to crush the Houthis. Hurt them, yes. But to go inside Yemen is something else,” Widdershoven said. “I would say it’s like a potential Afghanistan or Vietnam scenario.”
He also warned that direct Israeli military involvement could expand the confrontation by provoking responses from Iran and allied armed groups elsewhere in the region.
I would say to the Israelis, I would offer my help, but I would keep my soldiers out. Let’s have the Arabs deal with the Arabs.
“I would say to the Israelis, I would offer my help, but I would keep my soldiers out. Let’s have the Arabs deal with the Arabs.”
Saudi Arabia is meanwhile seeking assistance from regional partners whose involvement may be more politically acceptable.
On October 18, Egypt’s National Defense Council, chaired by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, agreed to support Saudi Arabia in defending itself against Houthi attacks. The Saudi defense minister also met the president of the United Arab Emirates as the two governments sought closer coordination despite longstanding differences over Yemen.
Turkey submitted the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to its parliament for ratification on October 20.
Signed in August, the three-country pact provides for mutual defense if a signatory comes under armed attack. Turkish officials have indicated that assistance to Riyadh could include military equipment and intelligence sharing, while any Turkish troop deployment abroad would require parliamentary approval.
Britain also announced Tuesday that Royal Air Force Typhoon jets would conduct defensive patrols over Saudi territory, expanding British military support against Houthi missile and drone attacks.
“The Saudis need the Emiratis now in terms of Yemen. It is temporary, not fixing their competition,” Guzansky said, distinguishing immediate security needs from the continuing rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Widdershoven similarly identified Egypt and the Emirates as potential partners while questioning how far arrangements involving Turkey and Pakistan would translate into operational commitments.
He also distinguished official diplomatic relations from informal contacts, suggesting that discussions between Saudi and Israeli representatives might continue without public acknowledgment.
“So to expect that officially there will be a discussion between Riyadh and Jerusalem, I think that will not happen officially,” he said.
Israel’s October 27 election introduces another uncertainty.
The vote, the first national election since the October 7 attacks, will determine whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can assemble another governing coalition or whether opposition parties can form an alternative government.
Guzansky believes a change in leadership could improve prospects for renewed contacts with Riyadh.
“The elections are crucial in this situation, since a new government, the current opposition, would help a lot in terms of rapprochement,” he said.
Netanyahu, Guzansky added, “is not well seen in the Arab world.”
Widdershoven offered a similar assessment, suggesting that Saudi opposition to closer relations with Israel is tied partly to Netanyahu personally.
The current feeling in Saudi is not that they are anti-Israeli. I think that they are anti-Bibi Netanyahu.
“I don’t expect that as long as Bibi Netanyahu is in power, that this will happen,” he said. “The current feeling in Saudi is not that they are anti-Israeli. I think that they are anti-Bibi Netanyahu.”
Yet a change of government would not necessarily remove Riyadh’s principal diplomatic condition.
Gadi Eisenkot, a prominent opposition contender, has avoided endorsing a two-state formula, while other parties seeking to replace Netanyahu hold substantially different positions on Palestinian statehood, settlements, and negotiations.
An opposition coalition united around replacing the prime minister would therefore not automatically agree on a policy capable of satisfying Saudi demands.
Washington faces its own political pressures ahead of the November 3 congressional midterm elections.
A Reuters/Ipsos poll published October 20 placed President Trump’s approval rating at 31%, the lowest of either of his presidential terms, as Americans expressed growing frustration over high gasoline prices and the economic consequences of the war with Iran.
President Trump endorsed Netanyahu’s reelection campaign on October 18, even as both experts interviewed by The Media Line suggested that a different Israeli government might be better positioned to improve relations with Saudi Arabia.
The endorsement highlights a potential conflict between Washington’s immediate political alliances and its longer-term ambition to expand the Abraham Accords.
“Trump may keep pushing rhetorically for normalization with Saudi, but in practice it is very different,” Guzansky said.
The approaching US elections are also influencing calculations in Tehran. Senior Iranian officials told Reuters that Iran had deliberately prolonged negotiations with Washington partly to deny President Trump a political success before the midterms.
Widdershoven argued that Iran could continue pressuring its adversaries through threats to shipping, rising insurance premiums, and regional instability without necessarily launching another major military offensive.
Iran can play this for another two, three, five years. We cannot.
“They are playing the long game,” he said. “Iran can play this for another two, three, five years. We cannot.”
For Saudi Arabia, continued instability increases the incentive to strengthen regional security arrangements. But neither common threats nor a possible change of leadership in Israel would necessarily overcome the diplomatic barriers to normalization.
“A new government in Israel may push new talks with Saudi, but still the opposition won’t guarantee a Palestinian state,” Guzansky said.
