Chinese investment has long been a cornerstone of development policy for many Southeast Asian nations.
From roads and buildings to green energy that helps countries keep up with global environmental regulations, Beijing’s investment has created significant development opportunities.
But it has also provided a safety net for authoritarian governments seeking to consolidate power while limiting the economic consequences of Western sanctions. Traditional spheres of authoritarian cooperation, including financial dependence, military coordination, and political alignment, now look set to be joined by another: artificial intelligence (AI).
At the World AI Conference in Shanghai earlier this year, President Xi Jinping warned of “new historical injustices” arising from unequal access to artificial intelligence, signalling Beijing’s ambition to shape the future governance of the technology.
Already set to be a key topic during Xi’s visit to the United States this week, the speed at which China is extending its technological influence across Southeast Asia deserves greater scrutiny. Cambodia, where longstanding dependence on Beijing is increasingly intersecting with new surveillance capabilities, offers a glimpse of where these relationships can lead.
Like many countries in the Global South, Cambodia’s relationship with China has long been portrayed as one of economic necessity.
When Prime Minister Hun Manet took the reins of power from his father three years ago, many Cambodians and foreign diplomats hoped the country would change course and reduce its dependence on Beijing. There were also hopes that Manet, educated in the United States and United Kingdom, might reopen some of the democratic space lost under his father.
Instead, Phnom Penh has doubled down on China, to the point that the country is now Cambodia’s largest foreign direct investor and is deeply involved in major infrastructure projects, including the Funan Techo Canal and expansion of the Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand.
China’s growing role in Cambodia’s security apparatus has fueled concerns about Beijing’s long-term strategic influence and raised questions about where, exactly, Cambodia’s geopolitical loyalties lie.
Economic dependence, military cooperation and political alignment reinforce one another. The more deeply these relationships become embedded, the harder it will be for a future Cambodian government to change direction without confronting powerful interests at home and abroad.
Technology could make that dependence still harder to unwind. Artificial intelligence and digital surveillance tools offer governments new capabilities to track, identify and intimidate populations.
China is already rolling out new AI-enabled surveillance technologies, while Cambodia is developing comparable infrastructure through its China-backed “Smart Police” initiative and using it to crack down on dissenting voices.
Activists have feared this development for years, with experts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warning as far back as 2022 that Chinese surveillance technology was being deployed in more than 50 countries.
Through this so-called Digital Silk Road, China has exported such technology while helping shape cyber laws and internet infrastructure abroad, extending Beijing’s influence over how information is managed and controlled.
For Cambodians, the danger posed by this is not abstract. Attacks on opposition voices and critics of the regime are already commonplace, including beyond Cambodia’s borders. Expanding the state’s ability to identify, track, and monitor individuals could give authorities in Phnom Penh powerful new tools to target those already vulnerable to intimidation and repression.
As technological cooperation between China and other authoritarian governments deepens, such repression could become more systematic, less visible, and harder to challenge. In Cambodia, where democratic institutions have been steadily weakened and meaningful oversight is limited, there are few safeguards to prevent technologies presented as tools of public security from being turned against the government’s critics.
For Cambodia’s younger generation, this is a deeply frustrating trajectory. Many hoped Hun Manet represented a chance for a different future. A younger leader could have embraced greater political openness, strengthened independent institutions and built a more balanced relationship with China and democratic partners.
Instead, political space remains restricted, while Cambodia’s international partnerships increasingly reinforce the authoritarian model built under his father.
This should serve as a warning to Southeast Asia. Chinese influence is no longer confined to diplomacy, investment, and military cooperation; it is increasingly reinforced through technology and the exchange of governance models that reach deeper into state institutions and, potentially, the daily lives of ordinary citizens.
With AI surveillance infrastructure still being scaled across much of the world, there is time to establish meaningful safeguards around its export and use. That means protecting journalists, activists, and political opponents, increasing transparency over data collection and surveillance, and setting clear rules for cross-border intelligence sharing before authoritarian practices become embedded in digital infrastructure.
Washington has a particular responsibility to push for such safeguards, not simply because of its position in the global AI race, but because its negotiations with Beijing will help shape the norms governing the technology’s international use.
This week’s talks should look beyond strategic competition and confront a more immediate question: how to prevent AI from becoming another instrument of authoritarian influence, particularly across the Global South.
But the United States cannot do this alone. The European Union, the United Kingdom, ASEAN, South Korea, Australia and other middle powers must also help shape an AI governance framework that protects democratic freedoms rather than enabling state surveillance.
For countries like Cambodia, sovereignty is not only about controlling territory. It is about deciding how technology is used, whose data is collected, and whether a digital future serves citizens or entrenches the interests of those already in power.
Samady Ou is a Cambodian youth activist and Human Rights Foundation Freedom Fellow. He is also the author of ‘The Cambodia Briefing’ Substack, a fortnightly Cambodian news digest.
