According to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, North Korea is preparing to send as many as 50,000 fresh troops to support Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine. While the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unable to verify Zelensky’s claim, it has not fallen on deaf ears in Seoul.
When questioned on August 10, an unnamed foreign-ministry spokesperson stated:
North Korea-Russia military cooperation is a matter directly related to our security and an act that violates UN Security Council resolutions … the government’s position is that such cooperation must be suspended immediately, and we are closely monitoring related developments.
Any new deployment would continue to cement a clear path. Pyongyang and Moscow signed a mutual defence pact in June 2024 and, within months, up to 15,000 North Korean personnel had been deployed to Russia. The deployment ranged from construction workers to logistics personnel, missile operators, engineers and infantry. It included 1,500 special forces troops.
North Korea has gained a lot from its partnership with Russia. So far, its troops have not fought within Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders. But North Korean soldiers have acquired battlefield experience in ground operations in the Kursk region of Russia, where Ukraine launched an incursion in 2024. North Korean missiles have also been fired at Ukraine and Pyongyang has received new military technology from Russia.
Perhaps more importantly, the partnership has provided North Korea with a financial boon. After many years of negative GDP growth, North Korea’s economy grew 3.5% in 2025. Beyond direct payment for the military support it is providing Russia, the partnership between the two countries supplies North Korea with fuel, food and technical assistance, as well as deferring debt repayments.
Their partnership has created a clear cycle in which North Korea supplies ammunition and manpower for Russia to use in the war, Moscow supports North Korea with resources and technology in return, and Pyongyang uses these to improve its standing against the south.
South Korean concern
For South Korea, a key concern is what North Korean troops may be learning in Russia. The North Korean military, the Korean People’s Army, has not fought a major conventional conflict since the Korean war in the early 1950s. But it is now directly involved in a modern war.
North Korean personnel have engaged not only in direct combat, but also drone surveillance, electronic warfare and precision artillery strikes. Pyongyang is also now able to analyse its own weapon technology – and assess its effectiveness – in an actual conflict rather than a test setting.
There have been calls from Kyiv and other allied capitals for Seoul to step up its involvement in the Ukraine conflict, but there is opposition both among South Korean citizens and within the political class to providing direct military support.
This position has been made clear by the South Korean president, Lee Jae-Myung, since 2025. Rather than becoming involved in a distant war in Europe, Lee has focused his foreign policy on the Korean peninsula – most recently calling for talks with the north to pursue peaceful coexistence on August 15.
At the same time, however, South Korea is attempting to bolster its readiness against emerging North Korean threats. The annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, which South Korea carries out with the US military, have shifted in focus. They now incorporate drones, cyberattacks and GPS jamming in addition to more traditional scenario-based field manoeuvres and air operations.
But a key concern here is South Korea’s relationship with its historic security partner, the US. Just as Seoul will not engage in Russia’s war in Ukraine, it has been equally reluctant to join the US’s war in Iran. And, as has been the case for other US allies in Europe, it may face consequences for this.
In a social media post on August 16, Donald Trump said the US would “substantially reduce” its joint military exercises with South Korea. He cited South Korea’s refusal to join the Iran war, as well as his own “very good” personal relationship with North Korea’s leader Kim Jong‑un, as the reasons for doing so.
Meanwhile the US has used substantial quantities of ammunition during the war with Iran, despite being the world’s largest military power. Reports from early August suggested the US had used “virtually all” of its precision strike missiles.
Earlier in 2026, as the US burned through its missile stockpile in Iran, Washington and Seoul discussed the possibility of moving some of the US Patriot defence missile systems based in Korea to the Middle East. As North Korea strengthens, Seoul is learning that its own security policy can no longer be built around the assumption that US weapons will be available in the event of conflict with the north.
Whether or not the 50,000 extra North Korean troops materialise remains to be seen. But the broader warning for Seoul is real: it must prepare for a stronger north in a world where even the largest military arsenals are not always enough to achieve policy goals.
