What incentives remain for Saudi-Israeli normalization as Washington moves closer to a nuclear deal with Riyadh?
“Israel is not around the table; it is on the table,” former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said, as reports spread that the Trump administration was preparing to submit a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress.
Israel is not around the table; it is on the table
Bennett was warning about more than nuclear technology. The reported deal could give Riyadh one of the main benefits previously tied to Saudi recognition of Israel, while leaving normalization outside the arrangement. That would reduce Israel’s leverage and place the Palestinian issue at the center of any renewed effort to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords.
According to unnamed US officials cited by The New York Times, the Trump administrations was preparing to submit the agreement with Saudi Arabia under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Washington had not publicly released the full terms when Israeli leaders began responding. Reuters reported that a source familiar with the proposed agreement said it would permit future US-Saudi cooperation on sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities, including enrichment, without requiring the United States to provide Saudi Arabia with the relevant technology or capability.
Michael Koplow, chief policy officer of Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow at the Kogod Research Center, said Saudi Arabia had always viewed normalization partly as a route to concessions from Washington. Riyadh wanted a civilian nuclear program, advanced weapons and, ideally, a treaty-based defense pact.
If the Saudis have gotten things from the United States effectively for free, and the risks of normalizing with Israel are much higher now than they were before, then I think it makes the whole thing more tenuous
“If the Saudis have gotten things from the United States effectively for free, and the risks of normalizing with Israel are much higher now than they were before, then I think it makes the whole thing more tenuous,” he told The Media Line. “It doesn’t make it impossible, but it does make it more tenuous.”
What remains is the Palestinian track. Koplow said attitudes toward Israel in Saudi Arabia worsened during the Gaza war, making formal ties more difficult for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to sell at home. “There’s no question that if it’s going to happen now, there will certainly have to be real concessions from the Israelis on the Palestinian issue, because that’s basically what’s left,” he said.
There will certainly have to be real concessions from the Israelis on the Palestinian issue, because that’s basically what’s left
Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute and a visiting professor at the International Centre for Policing and Security in South Wales, reached a similar conclusion. He said Israel should answer the reported deal with a diplomatic initiative rather than rely only on private objections in Washington.
Michael suggested greater flexibility over reconstruction in Gaza and discussion of a limited Palestinian Authority role under Israeli conditions. Such steps, he said, could give Saudi leaders political cover to return to normalization talks and restore a broader bargain in which nuclear cooperation was linked to regional diplomacy. “Israel cannot remain in its position, do nothing and expect that everything will remain in place,” he told The Media Line. “There is no such thing as an ongoing status quo.”
The apparent terms of the proposed nuclear agreement have also alarmed Israeli politicians and analysts. The reported arrangement could eventually allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel inside the kingdom after a joint study with the United States. Both activities can serve a civilian energy program, but they can also produce material used in nuclear weapons.
Michael said Israel could accept Saudi-operated reactors using fuel supplied from abroad. “They can help the Saudis to build the civilian reactors,” he said. “But not to enable enrichment on Saudi soil.”
The reported terms would, if confirmed, be less restrictive than those accepted by the United Arab Emirates in its nuclear agreement with Washington. The UAE renounced domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing and accepted stronger international inspections, conditions that became known as the “gold standard” of US nuclear cooperation.
Koplow said the Saudi agreement would matter even before a reactor was built. If the reporting is correct, he said, Riyadh would not adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors broader authority to examine undeclared sites and investigate suspicious activity. The arrangement also appears to lack permanent Saudi commitments against enrichment and reprocessing.
“That means less monitoring of their sites,” Koplow said. “It just increases the chance that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, which is supposed to be civilian, at some point will turn into a weaponized program.”
It just increases the chance that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program … at some point will turn into a weaponized program
According to the unnamed officials cited by The New York Times, the administration expects the Saudi project to generate billions of dollars for the American nuclear industry, with Westinghouse among the companies positioned to benefit. The newspaper also reported that the proposed agreement includes two undisclosed side letters that could draw scrutiny when Congress reviews the deal.
The backlash in Israel crossed much of the opposition. Bennett called the agreement a serious strategic failure and warned that enrichment on Saudi territory could begin a regional race for the same capability.
Opposition Leader Yair Lapid called it “a total failure” and said the governments he and Bennett led had warned US officials that Israel was prepared to oppose a similar plan in Congress, even at the cost of a direct confrontation with Washington. Lapid pointed to the UAE agreement as proof that civilian nuclear power does not require domestic enrichment. If Riyadh receives that capability, he said, Turkey and Egypt will seek comparable treatment.
Former Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman also called for an Israeli campaign on Capitol Hill, arguing that a civilian program with domestic fuel production would eventually spread military nuclear capability across the region. Yair Golan said Israel had lost both the prospect of Saudi normalization and its ability to prevent Riyadh from developing sensitive nuclear infrastructure.
Former Defense Minister Benny Gantz took a more qualified position. He said some security officials might accept a closely monitored Saudi civilian program, while others would see it as the beginning of a dangerous regional race. But he argued that granting Riyadh such capabilities outside a wider regional arrangement involving Israel could not be justified on security grounds.
Michael said earlier discussions had included several possible limits. Under the most restrictive model, the United States would supply enriched fuel for Saudi reactors. Another option would allow enrichment inside the kingdom, but under American operation and unusually tight supervision. Both, he said, were supposed to be part of a larger deal that included normalization and a US-backed regional security structure.
“There should not be free meals, and the Saudis have to pay for such things,” Michael said. He argued that Riyadh has continued to hedge among Washington, China, Russia and Pakistan while avoiding a firm commitment to normalization with Israel.
The precedent could reach beyond Saudi Arabia. The UAE could seek to revise the restrictions it accepted, while Egypt and Turkey could approach Washington for similar technology or turn to suppliers such as Russia, China or France. “This is an opening shot of a regional nuclear race,” Michael said.
This is an opening shot of a regional nuclear race
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously said Saudi Arabia would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran obtained one. Koplow also pointed to the timing, noting that the agreement has emerged amid heightened regional concern over Iran’s nuclear program. Washington is now reportedly preparing an arrangement that may leave enrichment and reprocessing available as future Saudi options.
Michael said that any such arrangement could weaken the American position in further negotiations with Iran. Tehran could cite the Saudi arrangement to renew its claim that it is entitled to domestic enrichment for civilian purposes.
“It begins with the civilian program,” he said. “What happened in Iran, everything began with the civilian program. They acquired the expertise, then they could make further steps in order to reach military nuclear capabilities.”
Koplow said the decision may also reflect damage to Washington’s relations with Gulf governments during the war with Iran. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states opposed the fighting, objected to the lack of consultation and were exposed to Iranian retaliation.
“In a lot of ways, this is President Trump’s way of trying to make the Gulf countries happy,” he said. “This is the price of having launched this war against Iran that they didn’t want and that they’re now suffering from.”
This is the price of having launched this war against Iran that they didn’t want and that they’re now suffering from
Congress will provide the first formal test. Lawmakers can pass a joint resolution opposing the agreement, but President Trump could veto it. “You then need two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate to override that veto,” Koplow said. “That’s a very high bar. I don’t know that it’s impossible, but it’s a very high bar.”
The debate will depend in part on what Congress is allowed to see, including the two side letters and the provisions covering inspections, enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. Koplow said Turkey will be the other early test. Its response could show whether the Saudi agreement remains an exception or becomes a model for other regional powers.
For Israel, however, the immediate question is political. With nuclear cooperation reportedly advancing separately from recognition, the route described by both experts runs through movement on the Palestinian issue. Whether the Israeli government is prepared to offer it could determine whether Riyadh has a reason to return to normalization talks while the nuclear agreement advances on a separate track.
