As the US confronts growing fears that Russian, Chinese and Iranian-backed drone and intelligence activities are turning Cuba into a new strategic pressure point near US territory, the island is reemerging as a focal point of great-power rivalry in the Western Hemisphere.
This month, Axios reported that US officials are increasingly concerned that Cuba’s growing military drone program, backed by Russian and Iranian support, could endanger the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, US military vessels and even Key West, Florida, according to classified intelligence.
The report stated that Cuba has obtained over 300 drones with different capabilities since 2023. These drones have been distributed at key locations across the island, and Cuba has been seeking more systems from Russia in recent weeks.
US CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly traveled to Havana to warn Cuban officials against hostile actions, as the US weighs additional sanctions and legal measures against Cuba’s leadership. US officials said Iranian military advisers in Cuba and Russian and Chinese intelligence facilities on the island have heightened fears that Cuba is becoming a platform for adversaries near US territory.
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth informed Congress that foreign intelligence activities in Cuba have been a longstanding concern. Cuba did not deny possessing attack drones, saying it had the right to defend itself under international law and accusing the US of fabricating pretexts for aggression.
While US officials said Cuba is not considered an imminent threat, they warned that lessons learned from Iranian drone warfare and Cuban involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine have increased the island’s military relevance.
For US planners, the concern is less that Cuba could conventionally challenge US power than that it could serve as a nearby platform for asymmetric disruption, surveillance and political coercion. It reflects broader anxieties over great-power rivalry and strategic influence near US territory as much as fears of any direct Cuban military threat.
Underscoring US vulnerability to drone strikes from Cuba, The War Zone noted that during the lead-up to Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela, many US aircraft were parked openly in the Caribbean, potentially making them vulnerable to such strikes.
The Iran war has highlighted the destructive potential of such attacks, with the Washington Post reporting this month that Iran has hit 228 structures or pieces of equipment in US bases in the Middle East since Operation Epic Fury began in April 2026, notably destroying high-end assets, including a critical E-3 Sentry command-and-control aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
As for the role of Chinese and Russian intelligence facilities in Cuba, Matthew Funaiole and other writers mention in a December 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that four such sites – Bejucal, Wajay, Calabazar and El Salao — contain equipment capable of intercepting communications, monitoring satellites and tracking military activity.
Funaiole and others stress that Cuba’s proximity to Florida allows monitoring of sensitive US military communications, rocket launches and naval operations. They also note that Russian personnel have returned to Lourdes, Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence site.
However, Daniel DePetris argued in a January 2026 Defense Priorities report that despite renewed concerns over Cuba, the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that stabilized the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis still constrains escalation today. He added that Chinese intelligence facilities on the island offer limited strategic value in a China-US conflict centered primarily in the Pacific.
Even so, responding to a relatively limited Cuban threat could impose disproportionate strategic costs on the US. A US buildup in the Caribbean — whether intended as intimidation or preparation for strikes on Cuba — could overstretch US military resources, time and strategic attention from other theaters.
Stars and Stripes noted in November 2025 that during Operation Southern Spear – the lead-up to Operation Absolute Resolve – the US deployed 20% of its operational warships in the Caribbean, leaving the Mediterranean and Middle East without a US carrier.
Despite the looming possibility of a US invasion of Cuba, Rocío de los Reyes Ramírez argues in an April 2026 article for the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies that direct US intervention in Cuba remains unlikely in the near term, but that intervention scenarios are increasingly being normalized in political and public debate.
Reyes Ramírez says Cuba’s internal deterioration, energy crisis, protests and geographic proximity have expanded the range of conceivable US responses, including more intense forms of pressure or even intervention.
However, he stresses that domestic political constraints in the US — including voter fatigue, economic pressures, migration concerns and the political sensitivity of Florida — limit the Trump Administration’s willingness to undertake open escalation. Instead, he says that the US favors calibrated pressure, targeted interventions, selective contacts and strategic ambiguity over direct military action.
As for what may be the US’s endgame in Cuba, Claudia Zilla notes in an April 2026 report for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) that the US seeks political and economic change through blockades, coercion and negotiations with ruling elites rather than with democratic actors, potentially preserving authoritarian structures under US influence.
However, Michael Bustamante writes in a recent article in The Conversation that although surveys indicate many Cubans and Cuban Americans support US intervention, such action doesn’t resolve complex issues like rebuilding institutions, restoring trust, addressing inequality, reconstructing the economy, fostering reconciliation, and negotiating among competing political visions after years of polarization and authoritarian rule.
Bustamante states that the Cuban people now must choose between reverting to a US client state or taking back control of their country’s future.
Saurabh Mishra argued in an April 2026 report for the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) that an energy strategy ultimately drives US pressure on Cuba, Venezuela and Iran.
He said that the US used different threat narratives — narcotics in Venezuela, nuclear risks in Iran and hostile foreign ties in Cuba — to justify pressure campaigns aimed at opening strategically important energy sectors while curbing Chinese and Russian influence.
He says Venezuela and Iran were targeted despite posing no imminent military threat, while Cuba was elevated from a manageable sanctioned state into a “national emergency” because of its ties to China and Russia and its untapped offshore oil potential.
Mishra contends the broader objective is to secure long-term US access to oil resources, expand energy dominance and weaken rival geopolitical influence across the Western Hemisphere and Middle East.
As drone warfare and great-power rivalry spill deeper into the Caribbean, Cuba is reemerging not as a conventional military threat to the US but as a nearby arena for asymmetric pressure, intelligence competition and geopolitical confrontation.
